TEN YEARS IN
JAPAN

A Contemporary Record drawn from the
Diaries and Private and Official Papers of

JOSEPH C. GREW

UNITED STA TES AMBASSADOR
TO JAPAN
1932-1942

Foreword by

The Right Hon. Sir ROBERT CRAIGIE,

G.C.M.G., G.B.

his majesty's late ambassador to

TOKYO, X937-1941

HAMMOND, HAMMOND & COMPANY LIMITED

A LL RiOK*nrfkBSER\nRr>

INCLUDING THE RIGHT OF REPRODUCTION
TINT WHOLE OR IN PART IN ANY FORM
COPYRIGHT, 1944, JOSEPH C* GREW
PUBLISHED THROUGHOUT THE BRFlTSH EMPIRE
(EXCL. CANADA AND AUSTRALASIA)

BY HAMMOND, HAMMOND Sc COMPANY LTD.
36 GREAT RUSSELL STREET, LONDON, W.C. I

ALICE

MY TEAM MATE

WHO, BY HER WISE ADVICE AND ENCOURAGEMENT
THROUGH DIFFICULT YEARS, WAS A SOLID
ROCK OF SUPPORT

First Printed September 1944
Reprinted Jfammrv 1945

THIS BOOK IS PRODUCED IN
COMPLETE CONFORMITY WITH THE
AUTHORIZED ECONOMY STANDARDS

WMXXD Ur OMC1T BftKTAIM BY

FOREWORD

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

1. THE ASSASSIN’S SHADOW LIES ACROSS JAPAN

'May 14, igyi-February 13, 1933)

2. THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

(February so, 1933-February 11, 1336 .

3. FROM ABORTIVE REVOLUTION TO OPEN WAR

{February 26, 1936-April 18, 1937'.

4. CHINA INCIDENT

(July 8, 1937-May 13, 1339\

5. ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

0 October 10, 1933-December 7, 1941)

6 ONE WORLD : ONE WAR

(December 8, 1941-May 31, 134s)

POSTSCRIPT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

LIST OF PROMINENT JAPANESE OFFICIALS AND
FOREIGN DIPLOMATS

INDEX

TJ

23

73

152

186

249

424

459

464

474

ILLUSTRATIONS

Joseph C. Grew Frontispiece

PACING PAGE

Ambassador and Mrs. Grew, with Bishop James De Wolfe Perry,
before the memorial to Commodore Nathaniel G. Perry at
Shimoda, Japan 64

Along the coast of the Izu Peninsula, near where Commodore
Perry landed 65

Dedicating the monument to Townsend Harris at the Zempukuji
(a Shinto temple), site of the first American Legation in
Japan 65

A tank passing through the street outside the Embassy 96

Sandbags in front of the American Embassy 96

A barricade in front of the Embassy 96

Admiral Viscount Saito, assassinated in the February 26 Incident,
and his granddaughter 97

Group of American-Japanese diplomats taken on the occasion
of the visit to Japan of the new Governor-General of the
Philippines. 160

Group of American and Japanese Admiralty chiefs present on

the occasion referred to above 160

Manuel Quezon, then President of the Philippine Islands,
arrives in Tokyo, 1937 161

Helen Keller visits the Embassy garden 161

Imperial Duck Hunt 192

Babe Ruth and “ Lefty 11 O’Doul stare at Ambassador Grew’s
method of putting 192

The Ambassador attends the Tokyo Golf Club’s annual luncheon
for the winners of the women’s tournament 193

The Ambassador attends a geisha dinner 193

Ambassador and Mrs. Grew offer their condolences to Mrs.
Hiroshi Saito and her daughters while awaiting the landing
of the ashes of the late Ambassador Saito 236

A dinner gathering .u thr An.nj-ai: LinAs--- j,, , jv * o1 ’

Captain Turner and the officers oi the L' A-.'rr;

A meeting with prominent Japanese diplomats

Meeting with Townsend Harris’ housebov

*• DI

The Ambassador and staff of the American Embassy- enpv a

Japanese dinner # " '

Office building and apartment houses of the American Embassv.

The Imperial Diet building is in the background 288

A Japanese country villa 289

A view of the rooftops of Tokyo, taken from the American
Embassy. The prominent building in the background is
the Imperial Diet 289

INTRODUCTION

This book has a method and a purpose, both of which require a
word of explanation.

First, for the method. Convinced that the accurate recording of
history depends upon frank contemporary comment, I have followed
the practice during my thirty-nine years in the foreign service of the
United States of jotting down day by day the information, impres¬
sions, and thoughts of the moment. The resulting written record has
the defects of its qualities—and vice versa. Only in the pages of an
honest and candid diary can we find set down the convictions and
assumptions on which our decisions and actions have been based.
No one at any time can aspire to infallibility, but anyone can at all
times set down his honest opinions. These opinions, of course,
change—partly because circumstances change and partly also because
we keep acquiring new information that causes us to modify our
views.

The diary entries during my ten years in Japan suffer from the
shortcomings of any such record, but if occasion has more than once
occurred to revise my judgments, the record has been scrupulously
kept from day to day. Not only that, but I believe that this strictly
contemporary record has a value that has no relationship to the
wisdom or unwisdom of the various judgments in records. Opinions
are therefore here reproduced that were later revised as new facts
came to my attention. Views and prognostications that were later
shown to be wrong have herein been set down quite as frankly as
those which time proved to be right. In keeping the diary there was
never a thought of eventual publication. Furthermore it was im¬
possible, especially in a post like Tokyo, during the difficult years
before Pearl Harbour, for us to have exactly the same global per¬
spective that obtained in Washington. Perspectives develop from
what one knows, and additional knowledge broadens and deepens
and sharpens one’s understanding.

In spite of all discouragements that I experienced, especially when
periods of hopeful labour with peace-minded and constructive-
minded Japanese governments were terminated by their down¬
fall and were succeeded by reactionary cabinets, the results of that
labour having been wiped out as if by a typhoon, I worked for peace
up to the end. An ambassador who on taking a foreign post throws
up his hands and says “ War is inevitable ” might just as well pack
up and come home. Our foreign service is our first line of national
defence. It must hold that line if possible, and work to hold it In
the case of Japan, once the war had broken out in Europe amt the
initial German victories had gone to the heads of the Japanese
militarists like strong wine, the outlook was ominous and t so informed

tNTRopTTfrrmN

11

our Government, warning of possible action b) japan of dangerous
and dramatic suddenness. But I never wholly abandoned hope or
stopped working for peace. To have done so would ha\e hern to
discredit the service of which I am a member.

Here is another point to bear in mind. This bonk contains only
a small fraction of the original diary which, for the past ten years,
fills thirteen large typewritten volumes quite apart from many other
volumes of my letters, speeches, records of conversations, and perti¬
nent press clippings. Many of the items in the original possess no
permanent historic value. Others overlap. Still others cannot
properly be published now. And since this is an intimate off-the-
record journal I have also had to keep confidential the identity of
many living colleagues and other individuals who might be em¬
barrassed or suffer some personal consequences if their names were
made known. The main story has, however, not been injured by
these omissions. I have avoided cluttering up the text with asterisks
and footnotes but have selected and arranged the original diary
entries together with other contemporary material in such a way as
to present a smooth-flowing chronological narrative. While it has
obviously been impractical to include in the diary all of the texts of
the official documents pertaining to the story, many of these texts are
available to the public in two volumes published in 1943 by the
United States Government Printing Office entitled Foreign Relations
of the United States , Japan ,

And now a word about the purpose of this narrative. This book
aims to present to our people and, I hope, to the people of all the
United Nations, a more accurately focused view of Japan than is now
widely held, for only through a correct conception of that country
and its people can we approach with intelligence the difficult problems
which will have to be solved after our military victory is complete.
My last book. Report from Tokyo, was aimed primarily at acquainting
the people of the United States with the formidable character of
the Japanese military machine and to correct some of the fallacious
thinking which has widely persisted throughout our country, under¬
rating the stamina, fighting-power, and staying-power of the Japanese
enemy. Knowing that-enemy through ten long years of close observa¬
tion, I fear that we may have a long, hard road ahead before complete
victory can be attained. Wishful thinking and complacency are
dangerous. To achieve that victory and to bring about the ulti¬
mate unconditional surrender of the enemy, our united war effort
must be constantly intensified and accelerated, never for a moment
relaxed.

We have been presented for some years past with cumulative
evidence of unmitigated subtleties, trickery, brutality, and cynical
faithlessness on the part of the Japanese military caste and machine,
and there is presented in my story fresh, evidence of the mediaeval
character of the Japanese military mind and temperament. A
primary axiom of war is to M know your enemy.” In my former book

INTRODUCTION

12

and in many speeches ami broadcasts throughout our country I
have tried to set forth the great strength and fanatical determination,
the utter cruelty and brutality, of the Japanese military.

The present book will not have served one of its purposes, how¬
ever, if it does not bring home to my readers the fact that there are
many Japanese to-day who did not want war, who realized the
stupidity of attacking the United States, Great Britain, and other
United Nations, and who did everything in their power to restrain the
military extremists from their headlong and suicidal aggressions. In
the heat and prejudice of war some will deny that there can be any
good elements among the Japanese people. Yet those critics, in all
likelihood, will not have known personally and directly those Japanese
who were bitterly opposed to war with the United States—men
who courageously but futilely gave all that was in them and ran the
gravest dangers of imprisonment if not of assassination—indeed
several were assassinated—in their efforts to stem the tide or, let us
say, to halt the tidal wave of insane military megalomania and expan¬
sionist ambition.

Those people must and will loyally support their leaders in war;
those who have to fight must and will fight to the end. But we shall
need to know and to weigh all factors in approaching the difficult
post-war problems. It is my hope that these intimate, day-to-day
records may serve to produce for the future a wider and more helpful
picture of those people as a people.

First, however, Japan’s power to wage war must be wholly de¬
stroyed ; the decision must be complete and irrevocable if our sons
and grandsons are not to fight this war over again in the next genera¬
tion. Japan, no less than Germany, must never again be allowed
to threaten world peace. Aggressive militarism must be permanently
eradicated.

In completing this book I cannot omit an expression to three
persons of my full appreciation of their helpfulness in connection
with its preparation: to Eugene H. Dooman, Counsellor of the
American Embassy in Tokyo during the critical years before Pearl
Harbour, my fidns Achates on whose long experience in Japan, mature
advice, and incisive diagnosis of political developments I counted
greatly in the formulation through those years of the views herein set
, forth ; and to Miss Marion Arnold (now Mrs. Dana W. Johnston)
and Nelson Newton, my secretaries, who gave a great deal of their
time, their interest, and their devoted care to the preparation of the
diary on which this book is based.

JOSEPH C. GREW.

Wanbngton.

Jammy 1944.

1

THE ASSASSIN’S SHADOW LIES ACROSS JAPAN

(May 14, 1932—February 15, 1933:

The ten years that this narrative covers witnessed a series of ex¬
plosive crises in the internal and external affairs of Japan. Some of
these crises remained confined to the political sphere. Others took
the form of assassination and military attack. The year 1932 opened
with a series of political assassinations, culminating in the murder
of Premier Inukai on May 15. The first section of this narrative
therefore covers the period of surface calm that, for once, did not end
in violence but merely in Japan’s recognition of the state of Man-
chukuo and her decision to quit the League of Nations.

THE MISSION BEGINS

May 14-18, 1932. On the Overland Limited , Chicago to San Francisco

We’re off. A new adventure in this kaleidoscopic life of ours—our
fourteenth post and our fourth mission, and it promises to be the
most adventurous of all. For five years we’ve watched the Turkish
Republic digging out from the ruins of the defunct Ottoman Empire
and hewing its way, painfully, to a new salvation. Now we enter a
much bigger arena, on which the attention of the world is going to be
centred for many years, perhaps for many decades, to come. Almost
anything may happen except one thing : the abandonment by Japan
of her investments, her property, her nationals, and her vital interests
in Manchuria. She is there to stay, unless conquered in war, and the
interesting question is the policy and methods she will pursue to meet
international susceptibilities and what camouflage she will employ to
cover uncomfortable facts.

Indeed, many interesting questions present themselves. Will Japan
be content with safeguarding her present rights in Manchuria or, as
some would have it, does her programme include ideas of far-flung
empire throughout Asia, with Korea the first step and Manchuria the
second ? Can she avoid a clash with Soviet Russia, with America ?
The big issue is whether this irresistible Japanese impulse is eventually
going to come up against an immovable object in world opposition and,
if so, what form the resultant conflagration will take, whether internal
revolution or external war. It will depend largely upon how
Japan plays her cards, and this is the problem which we are going
to be privileged to watch from the inside, I hope for a long dm* to
come.

I shall do my utmost to keep a detached and balanced point of view.

An ambassador who starts prejudiced against the country to which

13

14 the assassin’s shadow lies ACROSS JAPAN

he is accredited might just as well pack up and go home, because his
bias is bound to make itself felt sooner or later and render impossible
the creation of a basis of mutual confidence upon which alone he can
accomplish constructive work. On the other hand, there is always the
danger of becoming too much imbued with the local atmosphere.
However, I know the minds of the President, the Secretary, and the
Department pretty well, and that should help to keep a straight course.
To begin with, I have a great deal of sympathy with Japan’s legitimate
aspirations in Manchuria, but no sympathy at all with the illegitimate
way in which Japan has been carrying them out.

One can have little sympathy with the Twenty-one Demands,
formulated when the world was busy with the Great War, or with the
typically Prussian methods pursued in Manchuria and Shanghai sinr.
September 18, 1931, in the face of the Kellogg Pact, the Nine-Power
Treaty-, and the Covenant of the League of Nations. The purely Sino-
Japanese problem has so many complicated features—the interpreta¬
tion of treaties, what treaties were valid, and who broke the valid
treaties first—that one can regard that phase of the situation only as a
technically insoluble puzzle. But fortunately our position is clear as
crystal we hold no brief for either side in the Sino-Japanese dispute ;
we hold a brief for the inviolability of the international peace treaties
and the Open Door, and on that issue we have carefully registered
our opinion and position before the world and will continue to do so
when necessary. So much by way of preface to what may come.

At the very start the pot begins to boil. A correspondent of the
Herdd-Examma met us at the station in Chicago with the Sunday¬
evening paper of May 15 bearing flaring headlines : Japanese premier
slain y serious revolt j palace in peril. This is the fourth import-
ant assassination. The military are simply taking the bit in their teeth
and running away with it, evidently with a Fascist regime in view.
But inspiteof the press reports, I can’t believe the Emperor is threatened’
considering the supposedly universal veneration for the thr on e, There
must be something wrong there. If this latest demonstration of
terrorism—the murder of Premier Inukai and the exploding of bombs
in various public buildings—is the work of a group of fanatics, I wonder
whether such extremes may not possibly have a steadying effect on
the military themselves. We shall see in due course.

At the principal stops along the way—Chicago, Omaha, and San
Francisco—photographers and correspondents met us and solicited
interviews, but naturally I have refused to say a word about Japan
or Japanese problems or the problems of my mission ; a few words
about Turkey have generally sufficed to send them away in a friendly
mood, which is much better than refusing to talk at all. We were
highly amused by one paper in Honolulu which said :

Ambassador Grew is a man of polish, combining an alert American
aggressiveness with the cautious reserve of the European. He is
tall, possesses an engaging smile, and he speaks with a drawl that

ACROSS THE PACIFIC

*5

is not Bostonian, nor is it English, but is a pleasing mixture of the

two.

Sort of a general mixture, it appears.

At Omaha one correspondent asked what I considered the out¬
standing world diplomatic problem which has developed during the
last thirty years, to which I promptly replied : “ Unquestionably, the
building up of an international peace structure. 5 ' I declined to com¬
ment on his observation that the principal danger elements of the
world to-day are Germany and a Russo-Japanese war.

ACROSS THE PACIFIC
May 20, 1932. San Francisco

Gave a luncheon for Consul-General Garrels of Tokyo and Consul-
General Lockhart of Tientsin and their wives and J. Graham Parsons,
Jr. Parsons comes as my private secretary, a Groton and Yale man,
highly recommended by Mr. Peabody, our former headmaster at
Groton, and others. Phi Beta Kappa. He promises well and seems
eager to learn and to be helpful.

Sailed at 4 on the President Coolidge of the Dollar Line, the Japanese
Consul-General, as well as Garrels and Lockhart, coming down to
see us off. Confetti and cheers. Never in my life saw so many or
such beautiful flowers as were sent us.

May 20-June 6, 1932. On Board the s.s. President Coolidge

The voyage was comparatively uneventful, cold at first with a
deep swell, then gradually warmer and calmer as we sagged to the
south. This swell apparently always lasts for the first four hundred
miles from San Francisco. The big ship is almost empty as far as
first-cabin passengers are concerned—only fifty or sixty. On the
23rd there were suddenly six blasts of the siren, the ship stopped, and
a boat was lowered. A Chinese woman in the steerage had jumped
overboard, leaving three small children. She was never seen again,
although we circled around for an hour or so.

I wrote fifteen letters in the first few days of the voyage and am
rapidly catching up to date. Also writing speeches for Japan and
reading much on Japan and Manchuria. It is at least a profitable if
not an exciting voyage. The two chief distractions, besides work, are
the open-air swimming pool, where we swim before brea kf ast and
yi gain in the late afternoon after two or three hard sets of deck
tennis, thus keeping wonderfully fit, and the talkies on alternate
nights.

May 26, 1932. Honolulu

A great big red-letter day, our first in Honolulu. Was up at 5*3^
reminding me of the occasions on which my daughter Anita and I
had often risen early to watch cur entrance iutQ the kwtf °£

16 the assassin’s shadow lies across japan

Naples* Soon afur ft, wt docked to the welcoming strains of “ Aloha”
played by a band on shore, which effectually awakened the rest of
the family. Major Ross, Sheriff of Honolulu and aide to Governor
Judd, came on board with the pilot, welcomed us in the Governor’s
name, and decorated us with the usual floral leis. Indeed, by evening
we must have had a dozen or more leis around our necks, shedding
them from time to time to make room for more—all woven with
deliciously smelling flowers of different sorts.

During the day, the commanding naval officer, Admiral Yates
Stirling, invited us to visit the naval station and take a ride in one
of the navy hydroplanes, but we were far too busy to accept. The
commanding general sent his aide to welcome us with leis. The
Japanese Consul-General likewise called and sent flowers. I radioed
our thanks later.

The ten days from Honolulu to Yokohama were calm, warm, and
pleasant, with the exception of one or two days of rain and fog.
This ship could do the whole voyage from San Francisco to Yoko¬
hama via Honolulu in three or four days less than we actually take, %
but she has to adjust her speed to the speed of the other ships on the
line.

ARRIVAL AT TOKYO

June 6, 1932. Tokyo

By golly, what a day ! It is seldom that days which one has antici¬
pated in imagination for weeks or months ever measure up to one’s
expectations, but this one has gone far beyond. I was up at the
absurd hour of 445 a.m., hating to miss a trick. Thick fog and only
the shadowy form of other ships to be seen. We had skirted along
the coast of Japan last evening and had anchored in the roads of
Yokohama sometime during the night after the foghorn had wailed
drearily for an hour or more. Then, at 5.30, pandemonium : the
stewards banging with full force at every cabin door and shouting
in raucous voices for us to get up and meet the quarantine officer,
and five minutes later repeating the performance. Those stewards
certainly know how to carry out their orders with the utmost thorough¬
ness, but I wonder if others don’t get the same results without making
you want to punch them on the nose for the way they do it.

Anyway, we did meet the quarantine officer at 6 a.m., although
it was quite unnecessary for Alice and our daughter Elsie (who had
slept for only two hours) to have dressed so early, as a special Japanese
officer had been deputed to look after us and he went through our
passports with Parsons without seeing us at all. Another Japanese
officer examined our police dog, Kim, and issued a special
certificate, while still a third man took charge of our baggage. It
wasail done with quiet efficiency and the least possible bother/ "

Then, even before we docked at 7, the reception began. Yesterday
tiiere had been a flight of welcoming radiograms. This morning one
deputation after another came on board and to our cabins. These

ARRIVAL AT TOKYO

visitors included half a dozen Japanese newspaper correspondents
and photographers, and finally the good Edwin Neville, Counsellor
of the Embassy, and his wife. We posed for photographs and were
asked questions by the press ; naturally I refused to say a word about
politics, but my answers to their innocent questions were later adroitly
manipulated into a quoted interview, the Japan Times bearing head¬
lines, mr. grew gives an interview, which began out of a clear sky :

“ I have written a book called Sport and Travel in the Far East but I
know hardly anything about the present Japan. I hope to get down
to serious study when I’m settled in my new post. Mrs. Grew's mother,
who was a daughter of Commodore Perry . . .” etc., etc. Some
mother-in-law !

Well, we took leave of Captain Ahlin of the President Coolidge and
motored to Tokyo in a drizzling rain, but the ugliness of the route
was lost on me as Neville and I, who drove together, had too many
interesting things to talk about. Then the Embassy. Big bushes,
smooth green lawns, flowers, fountains, tessellated pools, and the
buildings themselves, four of them, white with black ironwork
trimmings, already framed in luxuriant trees—a real oasis in the
more or less ugly surroundings of the new-grown city. The residence
is on the crest of a hill looking down on the chancery and the dormi¬
tories, to which one descends on little stepping-stones through a thick
grove of leafy woods. As for the interior of the residence, when we
had explored it with the Nevilles, examined the furniture and curtains
and the thick luxurious carpets in the big salon and the litde salon
and the still littler salon, the smoking-room with its wonderful wains¬
coting, its many bookshelves and abundant deep cupboards (where
at least I shall have space enough to file and store, separate and
catalogue, to my heart’s content), the loggia, the banquet hall,
the private dining-room, the cloakroom, and the seven bedrooms
and the four bathrooms, the ironing-room, sewing-room, and store¬
rooms—while Elsie emitted little shrieks of delight and Kim wagged
his entire acceptance of the new situation—I asked Alice how many
cons she found, and she answered : u Not a single con; they’re
all pros.”

We all went to the chancery, passing the swimming pool onthe
way. I met all the staff and then received the principal American
correspondents : Babb, of the Associated Press ; Byas, of the New
York Times; Vaughn, of the United Press ; Fleisher/-of the Japan
Advertiser . W«e chatted, and I spoke of my hope for the closest co¬
operation which would be of mutual benefit and urged them to drop
in often. Colonel Mcllroy and Captain Johnson* the Mili t a r y and
Naval Attaches, told Neville that their regulations required them
to c a l l on in full uniform, but I sent bade word I hoped they
would forget their regulations, as we could have a mu c h pleasanter,
and more satisfactory chat if they would cut out the gold lace, ,
would undoubtedly leave me tongue-tied. _ , .

Maya Landsley Poole and Parsons ca me to lunch.. I dim t know

1 8 THE ASSASSIN’S SHADOW LIES ACROSS JAPAN

Maya until she introduced herself at table. It was amusing to
remember that when she was pointed out to me at the Copley Hall
dance in January, 1904, as the girl who had just returned from
Japan, and later when I asked to be introduced to “ the girl who had
just returned from Japan,” I was led up to Alice instead.

At 3, Neville came to take me to the Diet to call on Viscount
Saito, who could not leave the session to receive me at the Gaimusho,
or Foreign Office. He is old—over seventy, I believe—and looks old
and tired. Conversation was halting, and he seemed to have too
much on his mind to concentrate, but he is decidedly distinguished ;
he was formerly an admiral in the Navy and Governor-General of
Korea, and has now stepped into the breach as Prime Minister and
Minister for Foreign Affairs to tide over, with his personal prestige,
and probably temporarily, a difficult cabinet situation. I stayed a
very short time, knowing that he was busy in the session and that we
could talk only platitudes ; left with him notes asking for audiences
with the Emperor and Empress, copies of my letters of credence and
the letters of recall of Cameron Forbes, my predecessor, and a copy
of my proposed speech to the Emperor. As Neville liked it, we sent
it in. Afterwards I called on Baron de Bassompierre, the Belgian
Ambassador and Dean of the Diplomatic Corps—very pleasant.

Then, at 5, Alice had the entire staff with wives and daughters
to tea—sixty-five people. What a staff! And what a situation that
enabled us to give a reception, with buffet, for sixty-five people on the
very day of our arrival! Cam Forbes’ Japanese servants are all on the
job and functioning like clockwork; I suppose we shall keep them all.

Bingham and Parsons came to dinner. The latter is to stay
with us until he can get his apartment in one of the dormitories
into shape. I have written up the day while the initial impressions
are still fresh, and now, thank heaven, I shall hit the hay at 10.30
and hit it hard.

PRESS COMMENTS ON THE NEW AMBASSADOR
June 7, 1932

The press gives me much amusement. Yesterday the Japan Times
quoted me as saying that I knew hardly anything about the present
Japan but that I hoped to get down to serious study, which I didn’t
say at all, although I may have remarked that I had much to learn
here. Anyway, this evening’s militaristic and anti-Anierican Times
built its whole column-and-a-half editorial around that alleged
remark, referring in complimentary terms to my “ modesty 99 and
the fact that I had come here with an open mind and was willing
to learn. Some of the other papers, published in Japanese, have
taken still further liberties. The Tokyo Jiji observes :

Mrs. Grew is a most fitting consort of the new Ambassador,
who is a diplomat for the promotion of peace. Interviewed by

PRESS COMMENTS ON THE NEW AMBASSADOR 19

the Jiji on board the liner, the new Ambassador said in a mild
and soft tone if mice that the situation is serious indeed and that as
to conditions in Japan he has no sufficient knowledge. . . . His
Excellency has written a pamphlet, the title of which is Exploitation
and Travel in the Far East. The mother of Mrs. Grew has drawn
many oil paintings representing the scenic views of Japan, and
through these pictures the new Ambassador and Mrs. Grew have
been so influenced as to entertain favourable sentiments towards
Japan. [The italics are mine—J. C. G-]

Ckugai Shogyo says:

The new Ambassador is a great sportsman. He is a tall gentle¬
man and his thick eyebrows show his characteristics. He has a
manly appearance. He diplomatically said that except Mt. Fuji,
which represents Japan’s scenic view, he has no sufficient know¬
ledge about Japan, so he is unable to answer all questions. Ap¬
parently the new Ambassador is a talented diplomat.

Tokyo Asahi observes, among other comments :

The new Ambassador is a tall gentleman, full of vigour, being
as Hi gh as six feet. His long and thick eyebrows indicate that
he is a gentleman of quick decision. He has written a pamphlet
c alled Athletic Sports and Travel in the Far East. As regards Japan,
which has attained a marvellous development unprecedented the
world over, his knowledge about Japan may be as imperfect as
a fairy-tale. Mrs. Grew had once visited Japan a long time ago
and she is in possession of many oil paintings representing the
scenic views of Japan, which she has drawn herself. She is more
delighted in coming to Japan than the Ambassador himself. The
daughter of the Ambassador was seen walking actively on board
the liner in spite of rainfall.

As for Nichi Nichi :

Interviewed by a representative of Nichi Nichi on board the
liner, the new Ambassador said : “ It is quite perplexing for me
to discuss such current topics as the Manchurian question, the
Round-Table Conference, etc., at this moment. Berth Japan and
the United States are at present showing such a tension as to sting
their nerves even by a slight touch of a tiny needle. Instead of
talking over such a question I would say that the Olympic Games
to be held in the United States are attracting a world-wide atten¬
tion. I understand that Japan is sending thither a party of strong
champions who will play splendidly . TroublesoaxK diplomacy is
necessary for the promotion and m a in tenance of fiiendly relations,
among nations but the exchange of sports is more essential and
greater diplomacy at the present time foam ordimuy fopfomacy."

20 THE ASSASSIN’S SHADOW LIES ACROSS JAPAN

. . . Tiho nrw Ambassador is accompanied by his fourth and final
daughter.

Considering that I never mentioned and that my dull imagination
never even thought of the Olympic Games as a useful topic of con¬
versation, the Japanese press is clearly more diplomatic than I am*
Of course I didn’t say a single word about the c< tense situation,”
or about my “ final daughter.”

PREPARATIONS TO MEET THE EMPEROR
June 7* 1932

I thought it was going to be possible to mark time until presenting
my letters of credence. Not so, for to-day has been about as hectic
a day as I have experienced anywhere. I fortunately got an early
start before 7 and was at my desk in the chancery at 9, which I
expect to do regularly because the staff decidedly needs jacking up
in the matter of office hours*

At 11 came Takeo Yamagata, a chief of section under the
Master of Ceremonies in the Imperial Household Department.
Mr. Yamagata said that the Emperor would receive me in audience
on June 14 and that the Empress would also receive Alice and Elsie,
and that after the audience we would return to change clothes and
then would all three lunch with both the Emperor and Empress.
He was very neat and very cordial.

At 7, Neville brought me his telegram to the Department
reporting the talk which the British, French, and Italian Ambassadors
and Neville had had with Viscount Saito this afternoon after they had
held a preliminary conference at our Embassy, it being nearest to
the Foreign Office. The Italian, being the senior, acted as spokes¬
man and told the Minister, in which the others concurred, that owing
to the publicity given to Yoshizawa’s 1 proposal for a Round-Table
Conference in Tokyo, the Chinese were already prejudiced against
the proposal and that it was therefore felt that such a meeting in
Tokyo, omitting the Chinese, would be unprofitable.

The four powers, however, desired to co-operate and suggested
that further proposals should be broached through the Japanese
ambassadors in their respective capitals. Saito replied that he him¬
self thought the conference ought to take place in Shanghai with
the Chinese present but that he didn’t want to make commitments
before the new Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs should be
appointed, which he hoped would take place next week, and that
the matter would therefore be left open for the present. Cabled
that I had authorized Neville to attend the meeting as I had not
yet presented my credentials. Saito’s remarks it look as if

Count Uchida, president of the South Manchuria Railway, were
going to be appointed Foreign Minister.

1 Former Japanese Foreign Minister.

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE EMBASSY STAFF UI

June 9, 1932.

Sir Francis Lindlcy, the British Ambassador, railed for Aliir and
111c at 11 and motored us down to Ilayama while hide went by
train with the Nevilles. There we lunched at their little bungalow,
a Japanese house on the shore, with Lady Lindley, the Nevilles,
and Mrs. Kennedy, wife of the correspondent of the London Times,

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE EMBASSY STAFF
June 13, 1932

Called a meeting of the staff at 10, including the Counsellor,
Secretaries, Military, Naval, and Commercial Attaches and their
assistants, and the two Consuls, and told them that I wanted to bring
our little group into the closest possible co-operation, that my door
would always be open to any of them, and that I wanted them to
drop in whenever they had any information, views, or suggestions
which they thought would be helpful to me. I also wanted them to
send me confidential memorandums whenever they picked up any
significant opinions or information, especially of a political nature,
and that these memorandums would be kept in utmost confidence
and would be very helpful to me in piecing out the general picture,
particularly as they would undoubtedly be in touch with individuals
and classes that I myself might find it difficult to get in touch with.
I wanted all shades of opinions. I also told them that I was not in
the habit of holding regular meetings of the staff at stated times
because such meetings generally were rather forced and seldom
useful, but that I would call meetings whenever there was some
specific subject to discuss, as, for instance, a telegram to the Depart¬
ment commenting on the general situation, or some development
upon which I wished elucidation.

Count Kuroda, one of the Vice-Masters of Ceremony, called to
go over the protocol for to-morrow's presentation of my credentials

to the Emperor. Then came Mr.-, a correspondent of the Jiji }

who had been in Manchuria and with whom I had an interesting
talk. He said that the Japanese officials of the new “ Manchukuo ”
state were not at all inclined to see things from the point of view of
the Japanese Government and not at all inclined to be dictated to
from Tokyo. The International Commission had been very discreet
and had thus far given no indication whatever of their attitude.
Later came Babb, the AJP. correspondent, whom I had asked to
come to see me because 1 wanted a newspaperman's opinion on my
speech for the America-Japan Society, especially whether there was
anything in it which might be magnified out of proportion by the
press. He read it carefully and made two or three minor suggestions
bat said that otherwise he could find nofauUwith it ai^ that he thought
it good. Butts, the Cfcmiraerdal Attach^ also read it and gave Ihe
same opinion. Bingham has made some epodh*t.«j^^ tiS
m awfully difficult thing to put meat into a speech wlutoiw havc to

VI THE ASSASSIN'S SMAPOW t.fW ACROSS JAPAN

avoid every subject which would really interest your audience but
which at the same time would stir up a lot of undesirable comment
and controversy in the press, such as our precise attitude towards
the Sino-Japanese dispute, Manchuria, the Nine-Power Treaty,
the Round-Table Conference, the Hoover Doctrine, and all the
rest of it* I can't see anything to be gained by ramming our policy
down their throats in my first speech, but I am going to emphasize
the universal interest and concern throughout the United States in
Far Eastern problems and hope that this will sink in.

One of Japan’s leading statesmen asked for an appointment before
my audience with the Emperor to-morrow, and told me that before
he went to the United States last winter the Emperor and the Japanese
public believed that the notes written by Mr. Stimson at the time
of the Manchurian crisis represented only Mr. Stimson’s own point
of view and had been drafted on his own initiative. When this
Japanese diplomat returned from the United States he told the
Emperor that quite the contrary was the case and that the notes to
the Japanese Government had been written under pressure from
American public opinion, particularly that of the church, the educa¬
tional institutions, and the women’s clubs and societies. The feeling
of these organizations, and indeed of public opinion generally, was
engendered by the memory of the Great War, which was still fresh
in people’s minds. There was still another reason for the American
attitude. America had created and was sponsor for the League of
Nations and, while not a member, the American institutions mentioned
above felt a moral responsibility for the League, and this feeling of
moral responsibility had been stimulated by European nations,
which had tried to throw the burden on American shoulders. The
Stimson notes were therefore based more on a social than on a political
ground. He had told the Emperor that the church and the universities
in America were really tantamount to the Court in Japan and wielded
great influence. He had had all of the foregoing facts confirmed,
he said, by a considerable number of prominent men, all of whom
said the same thing about American public opinion, men such as
Mr. Hughes, Mr. Coolidge, Mr. Castle, Mr. Charles Francis Adams,
various university presidents, and others.

This Japanese gentleman said he thought it would be helpful for
me to know before my audience that the Emperor knew these facts,
as the subject might possibly be touched upon in conversation, and
that it might likewise be helpful to my wife in case the Empress should
talk with her about women’s organizations in the United States and
their public influence.

I t hanke d my Japanese informant for his thoughtfulness in telling
me this and I said that what he had told the Emperor about American
public opinion was quite correct as far as it went, but that the feeling
of moral responsibility of the United States in this question was not
so much centred on the League of Nations as on the Kellogg-Briand
Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty.

At-DIENOF WITH THE F.MPEROK 23

At 7, I called Neville to the Embassy' because it seemed to me
wise to send the Department a telegram about the possible early
recognition by Japan of the ** Manchukuo ” state and the imminent
appointment of Count Uchida as Foreign Minister of Japan. There
arc a good many conflicting rumours, and public opinion is split
on the subject of recognizing Manchukuo now, but Uchida is in
conference with General AraK, the Minister of War, and it is clear
that if Uchida does accept the job he will be doing it with the full
approval of the military.

Whatever way it falls out, one thing is certain and that is that the
military are distinctly running the Government and that no step can
be taken without their approval.

AUDIENCE WITH THE EMPEROR

June 14, 1932

This has been a terrific day. After all, life is a succession of hurdles
and once over them they look a great deal easier to negotiate than
before one took off. Most of our troubles—the kind that will wear
us out if we let them—are based on totally unnecessary apprehension.

The Imperial coaches came to the chancery, where it was easier
for them and the attendant company of cavalry to manoeuvre than
at the Embassy, at 10.20. The Embassy staff, all in immaculate
dress suits, had been photographed and were still in solid phalanx
when Count Kuroda, Vice-Master of Ceremonies, came to get us. It
was pouring rain, and the plumes of the coachman’s hat and on the
cap of the captaiil of the convoying lancers were sadly wilted, but
not even the rain could dull the birthday-cake effect of the coach.
We set off at 10.35. Cavalry in front, cavalry behind, and then the
other coaches conveying the staff. The Ambassador of the United
States of America sat in state alone on the back seat, with Count
Kuroda facing; all traffic had been held up by the efficient police,
and whenever somebody in the trams or taxis or on the street bowed,
which was seldom, the Ambassador doffed his hat.

We solemnly entered the very beautiful palace grounds, where a
guard of honour stood at attention and the bugler gave a fanfare,
and precisely at 10.50 drew up at the entrance. Baron Hayashi,
Grand Master of Ceremonies, whom I had met at the Lausanne
Conference when he was Ambassador in London, received and led the
way to the big reception room where a lot of officials were gathered,
Viscount Saito, of course, and many others. Soon afterwards came
Alice and Elsie and the ladies of the Embassy. We sat around for
ten or fifteen minutes and admired the really marvellous room,
especially its screens and lacquered doors, and then I was summoned
to the Emperor. A bow at the door, a second bow half-way, and a
third bow on reaching him.

I read my speech; it was translated into Japanese by the inter¬
preter, the well-known Shiratori, “ spokesman of the Foreign Office i#

24 the assassin *s shadow mes across japan

who has spoken quite a mouthful from time to time ; I presented
my letter of credence and my predecessor s letter of recall; the
Emperor read his speech in Japanese in a high sing-song voice, which
was translated into English by Shiratori; then, according to the
protocol, 44 shake hands, 1 ' and the Emperor asked two or three of the
usual formal questions, which I did my best to answer intelligently in
spite of hearing only one word in four of Shiratori’s translation (he
had been told that I heard badly but simply couldn't raise his voice
in the Imperial presence). When the Emperor said that he would
see me again, I asked permission to present the staff, and they came
in one by one, each making the regulation three bows and backing
out with three more bow's: Neville, Dickover, Turner, Washington,
Bingham, Mcllroy, Johnson, Roberts, Butts, and Dowd. I myself
successfully negotiated the backward retreat, and that was over.
The whole thing was done with clockwork precision and solemnity.

The Emperor Hirohito is young—thirty-one, I believe; he has a
small moustache and glasses and smiles pleasantly when talking.
Of course, he received in military uniform. There is a marked
resemblance between the three brothers, the Emperor, Prince Chichibu,
and Prince Takamatsu.

Immediately after the audience with the Emperor, Alice, Elsie,
and I went in to the Empress, where the same thing was repeated
—of course, without the speeches and presentation of letters—and to
Her Majesty I presented the staff and their wives. The Empress
looks more like a charming Japanese doll than any of the other
women ; she is not so pretty as the really lovely Princess Chichibu,
but she lias a nice expression and she does smile delightfully. Madame
Takagi did the interpreting but much too low for me to hear, and it
was fortunate that Alice was there to reinterpret to me everything
that was said, for otherwise I could never have answered the Empress’
questions, I suppose that sooner or later they will find out that they
simply have to speak up if they expect me to reply intelligently.
It's an awful bore to be deaf—especially at the Japanese Court.

Then we returned to the Embassy as we had come; I invited
Count Kuroda, the captain of the escort, and the staff to my office in
the chancery for a glass of champagne, but it had to be snappy
because I had just seven minutes to get up to the Embassy, change
into a morning coat, and start again for the palace in our own car
for lunch. We arrived at the palace again at 12.20 and stood
around talking with Prince and Princess Chichibu, the Saitos, Count
Makino, Baron Hayashi, Count and Countess Matsudaira, and the
other officials of the Court, until the Emperor and Empress entered.
I presented Alice and Elsie to the Emperor, and soon we all went
in to luncheon.

The luncheon was far less formidable than I had imagined ; it
was quiet and stately, of course, but both the Emperor and Empress
talked with us almost steadily and without any formality except that
they spoke only Japanese and everything had to be interpreted by

'IKE AMBASSADOR GETS INTO HARNESS 25

the guest on our other side. As we came into the m«jgwfin"r>t dining¬
room, the servants bower] low, as indeed everybody did when the
Imperial couple appeared -much lower than in Euiopc, and they
stay bowed for an appreciable time. There were about twenty-
four or twenty-six at table. The Chichibus, of course, occupied the
seats on the right. Alice was on the Emperor’s left with Count Makino,
Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and an adviser to the Throne, next
her; I was on the Empress 5 left with Madame Takagi next to me.
Elsie sat between two of the Vice-Masters of Ceremony.

The food and wines were perfectly delicious, and an orchestra
concealed behind a screen played softly. I said that the room was
magnificent and it was, but not so beautiful as the big reception
room ; there were too much rather unattractive woodwork and heavy
draperies ; but one could hardly take one’s eyes off the really magni¬
ficent gold screens with stunted pine trees and flowers, beautifully
arranged, in front of them, or the glorious flowers on the table. Alice
found Count Makino congenial and the Emperor most pleasant
and easy to talk to, of course, through Makino. The latter is really
a great gentleman, but so were they all. Of course with Makino
we talked much of Bill Castle, who had preceded Cameron Forbes as
our Ambassador to Japan.

I talked almost steadily with the Empress through Madame Takagi,
who finally got her voice up to the necessary pitch for me to hear ;
the Empress seemed interested in everything and little by little
extracted pretty nearly the whole story of our lives, including my
travels, our various posts, our interests in sport, the family, and of
course Anita’s nineteen-mile swim, the whole length of the Bosporus,
from the Sea of Marmora to the Black Sea. After luncheon we
separated into groups; the Emperor chatted with me through
Shiratori, asking me much about Turkey, and the Empress with
Alice and Elsie. At 2 o’clock precisely, Baron Hayashi came up,
we bowed and curtsied, and the thing was over.

It was, perhaps, a satisfaction to have it all over and my letters
safely presented ,* being a hardened soldier I don’t sweat the way I
used to before such things, but still it was a hurdle just the same.

Returning to the chancery, I signed the notes to all the diplomatic
colleagues, but insisted on changing the note to the German because
I declined to subscribe to the phrase u the happy relations which
have always existed between our two missions.” To be consistent I
also altered the note to the Spaniard. Neville asked why not the
Englishman, but I said that we didn’t have diplomatic missions here
in 1812.

THE AMBASSADOR GETS INTO HARNESS
June 15, 1932

Herzel and Tait, President and Vice-President respectively of the
American Association, Called to say that the Aaodstioo wanted to
give me a dinner and when would I come. Neville bed mid wt

*6

THE ASSASSIN’S SHADOW LIES ACROSS JAPAN

that hr thought th«it this affair could be put off until autumn* but
they srrmed to want to hold it now* before, the Americans leave town
for the summer, so I agreed to July i. Another speech, of course*
Incidentally, Mr. Tait offered us a big new Lincoln car until our
Cadillac arrives ; it was ordered for the late Prime Minister Inukai,
who was assassinated before he could take delivery’.

Then came Mr. Happer, Secretary of the American Merchants 5
Association, who wants to give a luncheon. Another speech. This
is a terrible life, considering that apart from the American Association,
the American Merchants 5 Association, the American School, and
the America-Japan Society’, I am booked for three separate speeches
in connection with the departure of the Japanese Olympic team-
one for Fox Movietone at a reception at the Embassy, another at the
farewell Japanese dinner, and still a third, over the radio, at the
reception to be given for the team by the Japanese press ; I suppose
there will be many others in due course* Happer is a connoisseur
and collector of Japanese prints, which* we are keen to see, and he
will soon arrange to get his best ones together.

Later I received Mr. Otani, President of the Shojiku Cinema
Company and of the Shojiku Theatrical Corporation, and Mr.
Mishima, Director. The former controls most of the principal theatres
in Japan, and he came to invite us to a representation on Friday,
which we have accepted. It will be fun to see our first Japanese
play. Then came Waugh, Manager of the National City Bank.

At noon I called on the French Ambassador, de Martel, who
struck me as intelligent and sane in his views about the general
situation in the Far East, which we discussed at length. He has spent
much of his career in China. Then to the palace to sign in the books
of the Emperor and Empress and to the Chichibus 5 to sign in their
book too. At 2.30 I made my formal call on Viscount Saito after
presenting my letters—he received me in the building of the Prime
Minister, a magnificent house with a lovely garden; he said that
he had nothing further to tell me since he had talked with Neville
and the other ambassadors but that he expected a new Foreign
Minister to be appointed very shortly. At 3, to the Italian
Ambassador, Majoni, whose Embassy is in a very ugly house in a
perfectly lovely garden completely shut off from the outside world
by big trees and bushes. I liked him immediately, and we had a good
long talk. He thinks, as does nearly everyone, that anything caxi
happen at any time. At 4.30 I called on the Brazilian Ambassador,
Amaral; he said : “ When I came to your palace the other day
you called it a bungalow ; now, in welcoming you to my bungalow,
I must call it a palace.”

That finishes my formal calls on the ambassadors, except on Lindley,
when he returns from his fishing trip, as the German is away, but
now I shall have to receive the ministers and charges and then go to
see them. As there are thirty-two missions besides the Russian
and ourselves, that means sixty-four calls in all, and they all have

AN EVENING IN THE JAPANESE THEATRE

to be made by appointment and in pn*ME a tln.-romJiJy rul'd
infliction.

Thus does an ambassador get into harness—by the sweat of his
brow. The only interlude in the whole day was a cocktail at the
Tokyo Club before lunch with Neville, Raymond, of the firm of
architects who built the Embassy, and Akimoto, treasurer of the dub.
If the job keeps up at this pace I shall need one every day.

Confidential memorandums from the staff* are already beginning
to come in as a result of my request at the meeting the other day.
Here is the gist of some of the more significant items :

At luncheon, the Counsellor of another Embassy' made the interest¬
ing statement that he believed future co-operation between Russia
and Japan to be much more probable than a war between the
two countries. He indicated that his own, and presumably his
Embassy’s, line of thought is that a radical revolution in Japan is very’
much within the realm of possibility’, and from the point of view
of international politics he dreads the power of an alliance between
Russia and Japan.

The same informant also stated that handbills urging the assassina¬
tion of Premier Saito had been circulated recently. As he put it,
plenty of people were hot on the trail of the Premier. He also
expressed the belief that there were elements not averse to taking
action against the Emperor, possibly assassination but more likely a
desire to relegate the Imperial family to Kyoto once more. He feels
that the inability of the last Diet to accomplish very much may be
capitalized by the reactionary and extremist elements, and while
nothing may happen it is perfectly possible that the lid may blow off*
in the very near future.

Colonel-stated that in previous years when the sons of wealthy

men had been drafted into the army it was quite usual for them to
be assigned to duty with the Imperial Guard, especially if trouble
were brewing. In 1932, however, the sons of farmers had been
appointed for duty of this kind and the sons of the wealthy had received
no preferred treatment. He had this on good authority and believes
it highly significant. He also places significance in the evident desire
of the Mitsui to play safe by increasing all salaries and making large
contributions personally for emergency relief. He intimated that it
was something new few: the Mitsui to do anything at variance with
pretty tight-fisted business principles.

AN EVENING IN THE JAPANESE THEATRE
June 17,1932

In the evening at 6 we went to the Kabuki-Zu Theatre, with
Bingham and Parsons, as guests of Mr. Otani, who is president of the
biggest theatre corporation in Japan and control* oyer
and 450 cinemas throughout the country. There we saw two plays,
£iri-Hitoka and Kagami-Jishi, the fioexsier fesatw^x^ the celebrated

*8

THE ASSASSIN** SHADOW LIES ACROSS JAPAN

actor Utaenton, whom Alice had seen in the old days. In to-night's
play Ctaetnon took the part of an old woman. The oilier play
featured the outstanding dancer-actor of Japan, Kikugoro, in his
marvellous Lion Dance.

We were tremendously impressed ; this was the best theatre in
Japan and the best classical drama and dancing. The theatre is very
large, every single seat was filled, and the stage as large as I have
seen anywhere. The scenery and costumes were simply magnificent.
All the women’s parts were taken by men, and they did it extra¬
ordinarily well. There is almost a national veneration for Kikugoro
and for the Lion Dance which is supposedly his masterpiece. He
learned it from his teacher, the famous Danjuro, and is said to have
improved upon his master. Danjuro used to say that it was the
most difficult dance he had known. Most of these great actors inherit
their art from many generations of forebears, Kikugoro being the fifth
of’his line. During the Lion Dance there was not a flicker of expression
on his face, the entire significance of the dance being expressed by
the movement of his head, his hands, and his body ; the head move¬
ments, when he was representing a beautiful young girl, were amazingly
graceful* The classical conventions of these Japanese dances are so
totally different from ours that one cannot immediately appreciate
the great art displayed, but it grows on one gradually. To the
Japanese it is almost sacred.

The story of the Lion Dance is quite simple : the beautiful chamber¬
maid who has been chosen to perform the annual Lion Dance before
the castle of the shoguns is timid before the crowd and it is only after
some time of urging that she begins to dance. She dances gracefully,
the head of a lion in her hand, surrounded by two butterflies who
come to dance with her, but gradually the butterflies, who in the
first scene are merely mechanical butterflies on long poles but later
two beautiful dancers, stir her into a frenzy until she actually becomes
possessed by the spirit of the lion and changes into the lion himself
At this point she comes on to the stage from behind the audience by a
sort of bridge in a marvellous golden robe and long white mane and
then begins the wild and final Lion Dance, while the Nagauta orchestra
eggs her on with still wilder music. This orchestra, composed of
about eighteen men in kimonos, sits at the back of the stage facing
the audience; about a third of them sing or chant while the rest
play instruments and drums. It is, to our Western ears, sheer
cacophony, especially when a shrill fife continually runs totally counter
to the theme or air of the Japanese guitars and voices, and after an
hour of it I had a good old-fashioned headache, but it certainly
added to the impressiveness of the dance. The audience was wild
with enthusiasm, and I could perfectly understand it. The fife, by
the way, is supposed to announce that the principal actor is about to
come on the stage or to leave the stage, or that a climax in the plot is
impending.

Between the acts Mr. Otani took us behind the wings, where we

ADDRESS BEFORE THE AMEIUCA-JAPAN SOCIETY

were solemnly introduced to the great Kikugoro in all his robes and
photographed with him. and later Otani. entirely unexpectedly bv

entertained us at dinner in the theatre restaurant, together with
two of his co-directors, at a table decorated with Japanese and
American flags. I cannot imagine a newly arrived Ambassador in
Washington being entertained thus by a prominent theatre magnate,
but it appears to be quite the custom here, and in America there is
nothing that approaches or can be compared with the nationally
venerated classical acting and dancing or such nationally venerated
exponents as Utaemon and Kikugoro. These programmes include
a whole series of six separate plays and they run from 3 p.m. until
9 or 10, but we saw the best and most popular two of them, lasting
about two hours. I can readily see how they appeal to the public,
and even we, as initiates, went home thoroughly enthusiastic.

In reply to my telegram regarding the possible impending recogni¬
tion of the Manchukuo regime, the Department to-day inquired
whether we could confirm or deny the press reports that the Diet
had passed the resolution favouring recognition. I replied that the
House of Representatives had passed the resolution but that there
was no indication that it was more than political ebullition or that
the Government had engineered it or would be guided by it. I added
the substance of an informal talk which Neville had had with Arita, in
which Arita had said that the Government would not act precipitately
and that Count Uchida, who would not take office until July as he
was returning to Manchuria to wind up some affairs with the railway,
would certainly not act hastily.

I do not think it would be wise for me myself to discuss this question
with the Foreign Office, at least at present. We ought not to acknow¬
ledge officially that there is even a possibility of Japan’s recognizing
Manchukuo, because such action would seem effectively to nullify
all the assurances given to us concerning ultimate withdrawal. But
at the same time I must know what is going on and I asked Neville
to do it casually and informally while discussing other matters, in
connection with the conflicting reports in the press.

ADDRESS BEFORE THE AMERIGA-JAPAN SOCIETY

June 21, 1932. Tokyo *

Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, —If any of you have
been alpinists or mountaineers you will understand a little how I feel
to-day, for you will have known the exhilaration of reaching some
long-hoped-for height at sunrise and of gazing through new eyes and
under new auspices at the scene which lies about you. I think of
sunrise in this connection because your beautiful national emblem
has turned my thoughts to those alpine dawns experienced in bygone
days. The scene and the auspices indeed are new smoe my last
visit to Japan nearly thirty yean ago. The vantage poimu
ably one of the highest in the jpft of my Govtxmmt, and lie usds*

30 THF ASSASSIN^ SHADOW UE5 ACROSS JAPAN

faction of having come to this particular post after twenty-eight years
in the Foreign Service is deeper than I am able to express.

I wish I could find words to tell you of my full appreciation of your
welcome. It gives me great courage in undertaking this important
mission. I particularly appreciate the presence of His Excellency
Prince Tokugawa and the other high officials of the Government
who have courteously and hospitably honoured this occasion with
their presence. May I also express to you thanks on behalf of my
wife and daughter for the -welcome you have extended to us ? Japan
has a wonderful reputation for generous and kind-hearted hospitality
of which we have seen abundant proof during our first few days
here. Sometimes our language—indeed, all spoken languages—
seems thin and superficial. We have to depend, in such cases, on
a sort of X-ray language which vibrates underneath the spoken words
and is often more effective than anything we can say. Your welcome
justifies my hope that as we come to know each other better, this
other inaudible language, which perhaps extends less from mind to
mind than from heart to heart, will prove to be an effective interpreter
supplementing the often inadequate written or spoken word, whether
in your tongue or mine.

Now let us look at the situation. It would be foolish to assert that
no important problems beset us. Wc must recognize that they exist
and do our best to solve them. Many of the complicated inter¬
national problems with which wc are faced to-day are urgently in
need of settlement during the next few months. The oudook might
be discouraging if it were not for the hundreds of men in Japan, in
America, and in all countries who arc devoting their full time and
energy to solving the world’s difficulties. Gradually men are learning
to co-operate with each other, to talk matters over, to discuss things
openly and frankly at conferences, and to share their wisdom and
knowledge with each other for the good of all. I am convinced that
in this direction lies eventual success. I cannot go into any of those
problems in detail to-night; it would be presumptuous to do so
before even taking root in your soil. But let me assure you of the
deep and universal interest in Japan throughout the United States.
Let me assure you that few if any problems to-day concern the people
of the United States as a whole more deeply than the problems of the
Far East.

This interest is not limited to Washington or New York or California.
It is universal. After talking with the President and the Secretary ’
of State, and with my good friends Mr. Forbes and Mr. Castle and
many others, I travelled across the entire continent, and everywhere,
with everyone I felt a keen desire to understand Japan, her thoughts,
her aims, her underlying motives. I believe that the people of Japan
have an equally keen interest in really knowing the United States,
and in really understanding her thoughts and aims and motives.
My principal rdle here, as I conceive it, is going to be that of inter¬
preter, and I shall hope to be able to interpret each country to the

A*?rmK*> T;nv»7M nn, am*.-;* a*. *. ■ ;t :\

other in a way which wiii redound to thr steadily ir.cr^a c rd mutual
confidence of both. It seems to mr that my chief problem will be
in explaining your country’ to mine. You Japanese have been study¬
ing us assiduously for yean;, whereas we as a nation have much to
learn of your manners, customs, history, and marvelously developed
culture. The fact that you use our language is only unc proof of
this.

As for the American people, if I were asked what is the sufojert
in world affairs which interests and concerns them most today*—
the subject to which in the past fifteen years they have given mn?t
thought and most discussion—I would unhesitatingly say the efforts
of the nations to build up a durable structure of international peace.
The interest in this subject is not confined to the so-called intellectual
classes—the church, the universities, the various societies of men
and women which aim to educate and to form public opinion,
although these organizations wield great influence; this interest
extends from the highest official to the lowest labourer in the land ;
it is universal and fundamental, and while the memory’ of the dark
day’s of 1914 to 1918 may gradually, with time, become less acute,
the experiences of those years have instilled into the people of the
United States, as well as into the people of other nations who have
shared the same grim experiences, a will to solidify, both in spirit
and in fact, that structure of international peace which neither time
nor circumstances can ever destroy.

As for the world situation at large, its seriousness cannot be denied.
All countries, including Turkey, from which I have just come, and
the United States, are feeling the stresses and strains of the economic
depression. Countries are made up of individuals, and it is always
possible that countries, as people, may react differently under condi¬
tions of stress than they would react under normal conditions. This
infuses an added element of uncertainty and one for which allowance
must be made. But I am not an alarmist. There are far too many
of them in the world to-day. I am an optimist both by nature and
conviction and I firmly believe in the ability and the intelligence of
man to overcome and master the difficulties which are now besetting
the world, of which Japan, and my country too, are shouldering their
heavy share. *

Calmness, serenity, and philosophy, essentially Oriental virtues,
are particularly needed while our problems arc being solved* This
takes time. No country can expect to regain prosperity overnight.
We are all more or less in the same boat and we know that we are
so interdependent that what happens in one country intimately
affects its neighbours. After all, we are all imprisoned, as it were,
on this tiny planet floating in a space filled with stellar bodies much
larger than our little earth We can’t get away from it so we might
just as well leant to get along together as wefl a? we can*

Tfc» is only one of the many reasons why the United State* has
a very real interest in japan and is anxious to see her succeed, in

3* THE ASSASSIN'S SHADOW UES ACROSS JAPAN

pulling through this period of depression, Consider our trade rela¬
tions alone. The United States itself takes 40 per cent, of Japanese
exports and contributes 30 per cent, of her imports. These figures are
worthy of thought.

So far as my own sympathy and goodwill are concerned, I should
like in due course to be able to translate them into something tangible,
into constructive work of benefit to both our countries. Otherwise
the mere expression of such sentiments is of little value. That con¬
structive work can be accomplished only by straightforward speaking
leading to a perfectly clear conception of each other’s points of view.
After all, what is friendship ? What is it built upon ? Surely not
upon empty phrases. Surely not upon the desire to please and to
acquire popularity at the expense of honest opinion. The only friend
who counts—who can count in any walk of life—is the friend who
says exactly what he thinks. Sometimes what he says is pleasant
to hear, sometimes it is not. But then one knows where one stands.
Nowadays indirectness is a weakness, not a strength. Nowadays
he who indulges in false phrases is discredited, and he who indulges
in expressions of genuine goodwill must prove it in his dealings.
That is the only kind of diplomacy, the only kind of friendship that
I know.

When I arrived in Japan two weeks ago, the correspondents of
various newspapers very kindly met me on the ship and asked me
a number of questions. I answered as many of those questions as I
could, but I fear there were misunderstandings because I was quoted
as saying a good many surprising things, among others that I knew
nothing about present-day Japan. It is true that I have much, very
much, to learn ; it is true that I come with an open and unprejudiced
mind ; it is true that I wish to study Japan and her problems with
all the zeal that I possess. But it is hardly true to say that I know
nothing about present-day Japan. On the contrary," I have read
much and thought much and talked much, not only with the high
officials of my Government but with many men prominent in the life of
our country and of other countries who know Japan, and I have also
talked with many representatives of the Japanese Government abroad,
whose opinion I value and whose information I trust. With such a
background one cannot be totally devoid of knowledge. It is my
earnest hope that so long as I have the good fortune to be with you
I may constantly add to that knowledge; if in some respects it
.is inaccurate, I wish, by sympathetic observation and study, to
correct it.

I have other bonds with Japan too. On my visit here many, many
years ago, I aimed to learn as much as possible, stopping at a Japanese
hotel in Tokyo and trying to enter in every way into the life of your
country. But what changes since then ! Wide streets and avenues,
great modern buildings, luxuriant parks and gardens. The city is
going ahead so fast that it is almost impossible for an ancient visitor
like myself to catch up with it. Also, I think I owe to Japan my

ADDRESS BEFORE THE AMETCU. W \P

wife. She iivt*d herj ib: *kiv : - -■ .j a riri. a;:i • .\.^n ,vhc returned
to America I am perfectly ;care tr^f what rraliy Vivri^i me over ana
caused n;*j to a^k hjr n.arrv me fir:? cf htr stxuiding

on her hearth at home in a gaily coloured Japanese kimono with obi
and ail. May I acid that on 1 of oar x;i>t tr-a-ured po^vwonv which
we cherish with pride and profound respect, is th? aurr^iaphs.
courteously given to me personally at rhe Paris Peace Conference,
of Prince Saionjh Count Makino. and the other Japanese dric.cates to
that historic conference. For whatever picture may now be painted,
that general background offers a useful and workable canvas.

Patience, and lots of it, in solving our problems is essential, and
there must be faith in leadership. I find myself in a position of great
responsibility. If I am to be of practical service* I must have the
faith and confidence, so long as it is justified, not only of the Japanese
Government but also of my fellow-countrymen here. I want them
to feel, as I want my Japanese friends to feel, that ray door is always
open; that I shall welcome their constant co-operation, their
suggestions and their advice, at all times and under all circumstances.
And I wish with all my heart that my mission to your country may
be productive of practical and permanent benefit to both of our great
nations.

In closing I should like once more to refer to Mr. Castle, with
whom I have been in intimate association since we were both young
students at Harvard University. He is a sincere friend and admirer
of your country. I mention him now because I recently came across
the speech which he made at the laying of the corner-stone of the
new American Embassy in Tokyo, and there are certain passages
in that speech which I think should never be forgotten. I should
like to adopt those passages as my watchword while in Japan because
they typify exactly what I want our Embassy to be, and I cannot do
better than to repeat them on this, tome, important occasion :

We hope that the new buildings may be an ornament to re¬
constructed Tokyo. But an embassy fails if it is only a shell, no
matter how attractive. It fails if it merely keeps the lain from
spoiling a multiplicity of papers, merely houses men and women
who carry on routine work. It must be the habitation of a spirit
of service both to America and Japan. It must be a centre of
understanding. Those who work within its walls must consecrate
their lives to the fulfilment of this great purpose. ... I hope
that this stone, impervious to attacks of the elements, may in a
material sense typify that spiritual friendship between our two
countries which will withstand eternally the attacks of slanderers
and mischief-makers. In this continued understanding and fiiendr
ship is enshrined our confidence of future happiness and peace.

To the development of that understanding and confidence, while
depending much on the co-operation of this pul^-apirited sodjety, I
pledge my every effort.

2

34

THE ASSASSIN’S SHADOW LIES ACROSS JAPAN

“ THE SITUATION IN JAPAN IS VERY SERIOUS ”

June 29, 1932

The following statement was made to one of my staff by a Japanese,
a member of the Metropolitan Police Board. As this visitor generally
talks about the weather, his remarks on this occasion are significant:

The situation in Japan is very serious. It appears quiet on the
surface, but underneath there is great discontent among the people.
Wherever a few get together, their brains start to work and they
try to solve their difficulties and to see a way out of them. We
are continually hearing reports of probable actions on the part of
various groups of people. We raid them, take their papers, and
arrest a few of them, and so try to keep down any outbreaks. But
when something serious will occur it is very hard to say. It may
happen at any time. The young Army officers are out of hand ;
they have their own ideas of what should be done. The whole
place is full of malcontents.

As for the cabinet—Viscount Saito is an honest man and there
are a few others in the cabinet who are trying to do their best
for the country. But most of them arc still the same old politicians,
working for themselves and for the good of their parties. Look at
the trouble about the governors of the prefectures. This man
Adachi is not to be depended upon to do anything for the good of
his country. He is just an old politician, working out his own
political schemes.

Many people have been trying to get together and find a man
who could lead and form a new party based on honest principles,
but such a man is difficult to find ; as far as I know, they have
not gone very far with this scheme.

Yes, I think it is very possible that there will be some more assas¬
sinations. It is very difficult to prevent them with the people in
their present mood.

The politicians talk about saving money for the Government
by having reduced all of the officials’ salaries but at the same
time they have appointed various political friends to positions that
are quite unnecessary, such as, for instance, the parliamentary
secretaries to the ministries. These secretaries have nothing to
do. The people know these things and it makes them quite angry.

A GLORIOUS FOURTH
July 4. Independence Day

The day began early as I had to attend the opening of the Oriental
Culture College at 9 o’clock and to make a short speech. Saito
and two other members of the cabinet were scheduled to attend but
did not come.

a glorious 35

Then at 12.15 to the Tofcvo Club. v;b::r, a* ~:rl]:rs, to custom,
the American Ambassador pmcoses the health of the ?resi*Jer:t of the
United States to the assembled members they ira :i;ded Lindlev.
British Ambassador, Marlcr. Canadian Mini-itr, the Persian Minister.
Baron Hayashi, Viscount Ishii. and a or eat many Jap.*nev* and
others; and then the same thing at the American Club at 12.30.
The ceremony at both clubs took place in the bar, but far bn it fram
me to interfere with long-hallowed custom.

From 4.30 to 7 Alice and I were at home to all and sundry.
We had invited all Americans by inserting a notice in the press and
had telephoned to each diplomatic mission and to the Foreign Office
that everybody would be welcome, although a good many had an¬
nounced that they intended to come anyway. I wore formal clothes
and had the Military and Naval Attaches in uniform. Foreigners are
not usually asked to the diplomatic missions on their respective
national holidays here, but Alice and I felt that with our new big
Embassy we might as well set the precedent and make it a sort of
ricevimento . Nearly all the diplomatic and Foreign Office people and
many Americans came, about 350 altogether, commencing with
Viscount Saito himself. Alice had the Embassy beautifully arranged,
and as it was fortunately clear the guests could circulate on the terraces
and the lawn. The buffet, champagne, and punch were in the big
banquet hall and there was dancing in the ballroom, but the music
wasn’t very good, as the leader and pianist of the Japanese orchestra
failed to turn up, and while his four colleagues did their best they
were so ashamed that they absolutely refused to be paid. Still, it
was a very successful afternoon and nearly everybody stayed right
through and seemed to enjoy it.

Afterwards we had a buffet supper on the terrace overlooking the
swimming pool and the chancery. Alice had had special Japanese
lanterns made with the name of the Embassy in Japanese characters
and big sailing junks in yellow (I understand that this touch was a
special tribute to my love of ships) and the terrace was furnished
with cane chairs, straw matting and a great many pillows, and with
the big trees hanging overhead it was really a beautiful spot for
supper, lighted only by the lanterns and the moon. Those who
stayed for supper were General and Mrs. Frank McCoy with Dr.
Blakeslee and Lieutenant Biddle of his staff (McCoy arrived this
morning with the League of Nations Commission and called on me
in the forenoon), the de Vaults, Captain Johnson, Colonel Mcllroy,
the Nevilles, Mildred Teusler and her married sister Mrs. Funstea,
lieutenant Dusenbury, Washington, Parsons, and some other members
of the younger set who later took Ebie down to Yokohama lot die
Foiuth*<ff-Ji 5 y dance, where she had k magnificent time.

X forgot to say that all the members of the League of Nations
Commission Lord Lytton, who is ill, to our reception,

including General Claudel, AJdrovandi, and Dr. Schnee. Yoa^
Altar, Nancy Aster's son, who is acting as aide to Lord

36 THE ASSASSIN^ SHADOW LIES ACROSS JAPAN

expressed his chief’s regret that he couldn’t come and his appreciation
of my having sent Colonel Mcllroy to the station to welcome the
Commission and to offer the Embassy’s co-operation in its work.
Lytton is really very ill with intestinal trouble and a temperature of
105, and Lindley is much worried. I told McCoy that we would
have been delighted to have had Mrs. McCoy and himself stay at
the Embassy were I not uncertain how the Japanese would take it ;
it might look a little like tampering with the jury. McCoy said
that he could not have accepted as he had consistently avoided
staying with any of our diplomatic or consular representatives and
that he had declined to stay with Forbes when they were here
before.

Thus was the glorious Fourth fitly celebrated.

MANCHURIA TO “ MANCHUKUO ”

July 5, 1932

Fleisher, who is the only American correspondent who has followed
my invitation to drop in often and does so every day or two, told
me the source from which he had picked up the material for his
article this morning on certain points of view of the League of Nations
Commission which had aroused a howl of protest. He also told me
that he had cabled the New York Herald Tribune that Lindley had
made representations to the Foreign Office against Japanese recogni¬
tion of Manchukuo and that Arita, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs,
had told Lindley that recognition would not take place at least until
the Commission had submitted its report to Geneva. This also later
aroused a storm of protest in the Japanese press against Arita, who
squirmed out of it by saying that he was only giving his personal
opinion.

Incidentally, Fleisher told me that Ting Chien-hsiu, the Manchukuo
Minister of Communications, at present visiting Tokyo, yesterday
received the correspondents. To the great amusement of the latter,
Ting, when he came into the room, was immediately surrounded
by about seven Japanese officials. A correspondent said : “ Do you
favour the complete independence of Manchukuo ? ” to which the
Chinese replied in the affirmative, whereupon one of the Japanese
officials whispered something in his ear, and he added : “ In accord¬
ance with the self-determination of the Manchurian people.” Another
correspondent asked something about Japanese recognition, to which
Ting replied. Again the Japanese official got up and whispered in his
ear, and Ting added : “ And we likewise hope for recognition by the
United States.” Fleisher said the correspondents could hardly keep
from laughing out loud it was so ludicrous.

July 6, 1932

I went to see Martel to find out if he too had made representations
concerning the recognition of Manchukuo by Japan. He told me

OFF ON THE RIGHT FOOT

37

that he had had no instructions to do so but that yesterday, in a
conversation with Arita, he had urged against precipitancy on the
ground that such action would complicate the whole situation. Martel
believes that the public statements of Araki and others expressing
a determination for early recognition are purely for home consumption
and that the Government will not act hastily.

Uchida was to-day formally installed as Minister of Foreign Affairs,
and he gave an interview to the Japanese press correspondents in
which he said that Japan’s foreign policy would remain unchanged
and that while Japan will claim what is due, Japan dislikes to act
unnecessarily against the interests of other powers ; that the mis¬
understandings of the other powers will eventually be dispelled but
that any blunder on Japan’s part may lead to grave consequences.
The term “ grave consequences ” as published in the Japan Times
naturally caught my eye, and I had Dickover call up Shiratori and
ask him if this was an accurate translation of Uchida’s remarks.
Shiratori replied that the rendering in English sounded somewhat
more forcible than in Japanese but that the statement as we had it
was substantially correct.

OFF ON THE RIGHT FOOT

July 9, 1932

With regard to informative contacts, it is not going to be very easy
to make many of them this summer because so many people go away
and there is practically no social entertaining to give one a chance
to get in touch with informed Japanese. A pleasant initial basis
appears to have been laid, but the question is how best to make use
of it. Some foreign diplomat told me the other day that his Japanese
dentist remarked to him that the new American Ambassador had
started “ on the right foot,” while Count Makino told General Frank
McCoy, American representative on the Lytton Commission, that
we were going to have great influence here and could accomplish a
lot. The question is : how.

The Japanese Government knows the point of view of the United
States perfectly, and I believe that in the present very restive state
of public opinion, more is to be lost than gained by rubbing it in.
Any publicity to the effect that the American Ambassador was trying
to prevent the Government from recognizing Manchukuo would
result in a howl from the public and in the press which might force
the Government into earlier action than it intended, and the press
at present represents the military point of view. A big mass meeting
has just been held, attended by some of the highest officers, including
one or more lieutenant-generals, and passed a resolution demanding
the immediate recognition of Manchukuo.

To-day I wrote to Cpunt Makino to ask if I might come to see him*
to pay my respects. I hope that we can have a very frank discussion
and that he may perhaps give me some useful suggestions. I want

38 THE ASSASSIN’S SHADOW LIES ACROSS JAPAN

to go over the situation with him along the lines of Mr. Stimson’s
recent talk with Nitob6, in the hope that our conversation will be
reported to the Emperor, and I want to find out, indirectly, whether
Makino’s remarks to McCoy merely mean that he thinks we can
accomplish a lot by explaining the Japanese point of view to
Washington or whether he thinks we can bring influence to bear
at present by more clearly explaining the American point of view
to Tokyo. There’s a great difference in meaning there. Just at
present I can see no avenues for useful work opening up and am
very much hoping that my talk with Makino may reveal them. From
the foregoing it may be surmised that diaries are as useful for clearing
one’s thoughts as for recording events.

COUNT MAKINO SAYS THE YOUNGER GENERATION
HAS TAKEN OVER

July 13, 1932

At 11 I went to call on Count Makino by appointment. He
received me in his Japanese house in Japanese dress and I had a
long and intimate talk with him. I went over the ground of our
attitude about Manchuria with reference to the treaties and along
the lines of Mr. Stimson’s recent talk with Dr. Nitobe, and said that
I earnestly hoped Japan would not extend recognition without the
most careful deliberation. He listened to my presentation of. the
matter in the most courteous and kindly way and said that the younger
generation were running things now; he traced Japanese history
since the Restoration and said that the elder statesmen who had
carefully controlled the policy of the country had now mostly gone
and that a sort of interim was taking place before the younger genera¬
tion had developed its own statesmen, but that this would come
about in time. He said that he was an optimist as to the future.
His talk was very similar to that which I had with Ambassador
Matsudaira in London with regard to the swing of the pendulum.

We then discussed the great importance of education and the
prominent part which the universities played in American national
life, and I told him how university graduates were more and more
taking part in our public affairs. He described his own visit to
America when on his way to the Paris Peace Conference after a lapse
of just half a century since his last visit. In the course of our talk
Count Makino referred to certain passages of my speech before the
America-Japan Society in very pleasant terms and said that a transla¬
tion of it had been made for the Emperor. He spoke of Bill Castle
and of the constructive work he had done here. At the end I said
that if Count Makino should ever see specific ways in which he thought
I could be of service I hoped he would feel free to make suggestions
to me.in an informal and personal way, as I would greatly value his
advice.

In every nation great gentlemen stand put, and during our entire

COMPROMISE OR QUIBBLE ? 39

conversation, which was by all odds the pleasantest I’ve had here,
Count Makino impressed me as a really great gentleman. He is
close to the Emperor but he doesn’t, alas, carry much weight in these
days of military domination. He referred, as nearly everyone does
here, to the sentiment of the Japanese for Alice as a Perry ; he had
spoken of this to Frank McCoy in even more expansive terms. As
for the net result of my talk with Makino, I didn’t learn very much
of a concrete nature, it is true, and of course he is not in a position
to reveal to the American Ambassador his precise attitude towards
Japanese policy, but I could read between the lines and believe he
is going to be a sympathetic and possibly a helpful friend.

To turn to an entirely different subject, I was astonished after our
Fourth-of-July reception to find that all the candies on our buffet
table bore the legend “ Moscow, made in U.S.S.R. (Russia).” I
learn that the Soviets are flooding the Far East with these candies,
which sell for less than the price of raw sugar and, incidentally, are
delicious.

“ DANGEROUS THOUGHTS AN ANTI-FASCIST
MONOPOLY

July i5> J 932

Two ‘hundred alleged Communists are undergoing trial in the
Tokyo courts. They are those who have been taken in police raids
since April of last year. Hardly a week passes that the papers do not
tell of the arrest of radicals somewhere in Japan, but, needless to say,
none of the raids has been on the military extremists or other reaction¬
aries. They usually involve comparatively harmless students and
clerks. The movement does not appear to be widespread—in fact,
it has been practically stamped out—but the publicity attendant on
these raids is for the purpose of deterring others of the same persuasion,
as well as to provide a cloak for the military extremists.

COMPROMISE OR QUIBBLE ?

July 16, 1932

Fleisher came to tell me that at this morning’s press conference
Shiratori had told the correspondents that the Japanese Government,
in trying to meet the point of view of the League Commission, was
trying the possibility of recognizing Manchukuo as a cc government ”
and delaying recognition as a “ state ” until it should have proved
its qualifications for the latter status. It is not clear whether this
proposition is intended to preserve the territorial integrity and the
sovereignty of China over Manchuria or not, but whatever it means
it is the very first.indication of a possible compromise. Either it must
mean preserving China’s sovereignty or it is a pure ouibbfe of
words.

4°

THE ASSASSIN’S SHADOW LIES ACROSS JAPAN

WHY JAPAN HEDGED ON MANCHUKUO
July 18, 1932

Fleisher came in this morning to tell me that Shiratori had again
talked to the foreign correspondents about Manchukuo along the
same lines as on Saturday, indicating clearly that full recognition
might be delayed for some time out of deference to the recommenda¬
tion of the League Commission. As Shiratori’s remarks were open
to various interpretations, especially involving the question of the
continued sovereignty of China over Manchuria, I asked Neville to
have an informal talk with Arita and to be sure to say that he had
no instructions whatever but merely wanted to know what Shiratori’s
comments meant. I particularly did not want to prejudice the
situation in any way by seeing Uchida and asking for an official
interpretation.

Neville talked to Arita for nearly an hour and on his own initiative
told him a lot of good, homely truths, which, since he knows Arita
intimately, he could do. Arita said that Shiratori must be “ crazy,”
as there had been no change whatever in the intention of the Govern¬
ment to recognize Manchukuo and that recognition, when it was
accorded, would involve complete sovereignty.

I sent a long telegram to the Secretary reporting both Shiratori’s
and Arita’s remarks and stating that the former’s statements might
well be in the nature of a trial balloon to gauge foreign reaction, for
I could not believe that he had talked without at least the knowledge
of his superiors, especially as he had substantially repeated his remarks
after an interval of two days. Arita also told Neville that he thought
Uchida would send for me shordy in order to go over the whole
situation. I felt a lot better when I had got that telegram to the
Secretary off my chest, for the situation, with its cross currents of
contradictory announcements, press statements, and ordinary gossip,
is bothersome and I want at least to keep Washington informed as to
what is really happening. I dare say the Japanese don’t yet know
themselves what they are going to do and that the tone of Shiratori’s
statements was carefully studied in order to create a favourable
impression abroad until they decide what to do.

July 20, 1932

I picked up the morning paper and saw that Neville’s call on Arita
the day before yesterday was published in headlines with the statement
that now Great Britain and America had both taken up the question
of the recognition of Manchukuo but that it wasn’t known whether
Neville had acted on instructions from Washington or not. This, of
course, is the irrepressible Shiratori, as Fleisher confirmed to me later
in the morning, for Neville very carefully told Arita that he was merely
asking for a clarification of certain press reports and that he was not
acting under instructions or making any representations, which

SOME DIPLOMATIC USES OF THE PRESS

41

could of course be done only by the Ambassador. I don’t see what
the Foreign Office expects to gain by this system of wholesale publicity.
It simply means that I can’t drop in to discuss matters informally,
as every visit to the Foreign Office is bound to be told to the press,
including what was said, and to raise publicity out of all proportion
to its significance. When Japan’s Ambassador Debuchi comes to the
State Department, it is true that the correspondents may see him and
ask questions, but at least the Department itself doesn’t reveal thenature
of the conversation unless there is some good reason for it, or if they
do reveal it, they take care to give it out correctly. Not so in Tokyo.

On going to the chancery at 9 I found a confidential telegram
from the Secretary anent the subject of the recognition of Manchukuo,
which gave me great satisfaction. I think he is following exactly the
right policy. He said that he had read my reports with interest and
“ solicitude ”—defined by Webster as “ with fear and anxiety.”

The new Chinese Minister, General Tsiang Tso-ping, made his
formal call this morning. He has me stumped as to dress (that all-
important element of diplomacy) because he came in a short black
coat and a top hat. If I return his call correctly clad in a tail coat
and top hat I shall be exceeding his procedure, whereas if I wear a
short coat and a bowler I shall clearly be jeopardizing the good
relations between China and the United States. In any case, I refuse to
commit so heinous a breach of sartorial convention as that of which
the Minister was guilty. This is a real problem with which I shall have
to wrestle during the next few days, for of such stuff is diplomacy made.

To luncheon came the Italian Ambassador, the Canadian Minister
and Mrs. Marler, who are leaving this week for a short leave of absence
in Canada, and Mr. and Mrs. Arita, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs.
After luncheon I told Arita of my surprise at seeing Neville’s informal
talk with him published in the press because Neville had carefully
told Arita that he, Neville, was not acting under instructions and was
not making official representations but only seeking a clarification
of certain press reports. I also said that I had noted Arita’s remark
to Neville that Uchida would probably send for me in a few days
to go over the situation. Arita replied that the British and Italian
Ambassadors had asked to see Uchida this week and he thought it
would be better if I, also, would apply for an interview. I said that
I had no particular reason to bother Count Uchida with a request
for such an interview at the present moment, although I might perhaps
wish to do so later. The matter was left on that basis.

SOME DIPLOMATIC USES OF THE PRESS
July 22, 1932

Another scorcher, the glass at 86 in our breakfast-room at eight
o’clock in the morning.

I sent a telegram regarding the military situation in Jehol and
2*

42 THE ASSASSIN’S SHADOW LIES ACROSS JAPAN

another confidential one to the Secretary concerning my not asking
for an interview with Uchida. I told him that it was going to be
very difficult to maintain close relations with the Foreign Office and
to discuss matters informally from time to time because such con¬
versations were almost always given to the press, generally inaccurately,
and were likely to stir up undesirable and sometimes inflammatory
comment in the local press. Shiratori, as the Department is aware,
seems to act independently of his superiors and seems to enjoy giving
sensational impressions. I added, however, that I hoped to be able
to work this problem out in time. Shiratori, indeed, is quite an
enigma ; Shidehara tried to get rid of him and couldn’t, as he is
apparently supported by the military, with whom he seems to be in
entire sympathy. He is also a nephew of Viscount Ishii and is closely
connected with Hiranuma, President of the Privy Council and chief
of the Kokuhonsha reactionary society, which of course renders him
impregnable at the Foreign Office. Furthermore, he is very thick
with Tani, 1 Chief of the Asiatic Bureau of the Foreign Office, who is
a brother of General Tani of the Army, and thus both have close
relations with the military.

Fleisher came in to say good-bye before departing for two weeks’
vacation in Karuizawa. I shall miss him, as he is my regular link
with the press, but he has promised that Don Brown, of his staff,
will keep me au courant of any interesting disclosures by Shiratori in
the daily press conferences. The other correspondents apparently
are going on the old assumption that the American Embassy never
knows anything and never gives anything and they haven’t bothered
to find out whether there is any change in that situation. Fleisher
profits because I frequently tell him current bits of information which
he didn’t know himself. You can’t cultivate useful relations with
the press unless they are reciprocally useful.

GOLF FOR GOODWILL

August 4, 1932

Warner, an importer of American films, had offered to show the new
Bobbie Jones golf films at the Embassy before release to the public
and I thought it a pleasant way to get in touch with the Japanese
golfing world. Through the presidents of the various golf clubs near
Tokyo, invitations were extended and about eighty Japanese golfers
came, as well as a smattering of Americans and others. The thing
was very well done : both movie and talking machines were set up
behind curtains in the big ballroom so that they were hardly visible
Bobbie Jones’ voice, when explaining his shots, was as clear as if he
were speaking in the room. Unfortunately, only four of the series
of twelve films had arrived in Japan, showing the use of the putter,
niblick, mashie-niblick, and mashie, but these were intensely interesting
, and afterwards I noticed many of the Japanese practising their

1 Successor to Togo as Foreign Minister in 1942. Replaced in 1943 by Shigemitus.

japan’s pro-war, anti-league propaganda 43

grip and swing with imaginary clubs during the excellent buffet
supper. The golf films were sandwiched between the usual silly
musical cartoons, but the Japanese seemed to enjoy them. They
were expressively appreciative of the party.

SECRETARY STIMSON’S “VILE, PROVOCATIVE”

SPEECH

August 15, 1932

The next event, which called me from a few days of refreshment
at Karuizawa back to Tokyo, from August 10 till the 13th, was the
outburst in the Japanese press against Mr. Stimson’s speech before
the Council on Foreign Relations. Neville.went down too. At this
writing I have not yet seen the text of the speech, which I believe was
delivered on August 7, so that I don’t yet know just what was said,
but so far as can be gathered from the latest press dispatches, the
Secretary spoke of the application of the Kellogg Pact to the Far
Eastern situation in an academic way and did not directly charge
Japan as the aggressor. However that may be, the dynamic Mr.
Shiratori told the Japanese press that all Japan was indignant at
Mr. Stimson’s charges and the newspapers came out with such
slurring comments as “ malicious propaganda,” “ highly improper,”
“ imprudent utterance,” “ vile and provocative,” and so on. For
two days the vernacular press was full of it, and the tone was not a
bit conducive to good relations between Japan and the United States.
The text, when it finally came to me after the incident was closed,
showed that the speech contained nothing whatever at which Japan
had any good reason to take offence. Japan has consistently main¬
tained that she acted in self-defence in Manchuria, and die public
reaction of the Foreign Office to the speech was a surprising indication
of the guilty conscience.

JAPAN’S PRO-WAR, ANTI-LEAGUE PROPAGANDA
September 1, 1932

When the Commission of Inquiry of the League of Nations visited
Tokyo in July, 1932, the Japanese press published concerted and
inspired articles affi rmin g Japan’s determination to pursue its “ fixed
policy.” This was partly for the benefit of the Commission, but also
partly to inspire the people to defy the League if necessary.. The
Foreign Office spokesman, Mr. T. Shiratori, as already stated in the
diary, released to the Japanese press on August 9 so entirely uncalled-
for, inaccurate, and provocative interpretation of the speech of the
Secretary of State before the Council for Foreign Relations. This was
obviously released for the purpose of arousing nationalistic and anti-
American feeling. .

The people throughout Japan (even school children) are being
urged to subscribe to funds for purchasing and presenting to the

44 the assassin’s shadow lies across japan

Army 66 patriotism ” aeroplanes, tanks, passenger motor-cars, armoured
motor-cars, and anti-aircraft equipment. This is partly for the
purpose of conserving Army funds and partly to encourage war
fever.

ONLY FORCE CAN STOP JAPAN
September 3, 1932

I had a conference of the staff, including the Military and Naval
Attaches, and read to them my telegram to Mr. Stimson, redrafted
after we had slept on it. They all concurred. I don’t want to be
sensational, but I do want to go on record—continually—that the
Japanese Government intends to proceed with its programme in
Manchuria unless prevented by superior physical force. The telegram
said that I could not too strongly impress on the Secretary the certainty
that the Japanese Government firmly intends to carry out its Manchuria
programme unless prevented by superior force ; furthermore, that the
elements who now control the Government believe that their cause is
just and that this gives added strength to their determination. Liberal
statesmen carry little or no weight; the military preparations are
going forward steadily. They expect an unfavourable report from
the League of Nations but regard America as their greatest
stumbling-block ; little is being said of friction with Soviet Russia
just now.

I said that it was difficult to believe that the Japanese, as intelligent
people, could really give credence to the obviously false premise of
self-determination for Manchuria, but they regard their whole course
of action as one of supreme and vital national interest, if not one of
self-defence, and on that basis they are prepared to fight if necessary.
All of these opinions have been confirmed with increasing intensity,
especially during the past few weeks. After a careful study of the
situation I can find no approach by which the present Japanese
intransigeance might be overcome or modified. Japanese policy
may, in time, be compelled to modify owing to foreign moral and
internal financial pressure, but for the present we must inevitably
continue to face openly conflicting policies and principles between
our two countries.

b * was vei T gtad t0 get that telegram off and to have placed the situa¬
tion squarely on record. American policy should be framed with a
precise knowledge of these facts.

It gives one a strange sensation to live in a country where individually
everyone is thoroughly friendly and where one’s personal relations
are of the best, but where collectively one is constantly aware of a
deep distrust of and animosity against one’s own nation. This
animosity doesn’t seem to apply to individual Americans at all,
except Mr. Stimson, upon whom the whole Japanese animus is
concentrated. Indeed, one often gets the impression from the press
that the Japanese doubt if Mr. Stimson really represents American
public opinion regarding Japan. Many seem to think that his various

ONLY FORGE GAN STOP JAPAN 45

notes protesting against Japanese action in Manchuria represent
only his own personal point of view and they talk freely of an altered
situation when Mr. Stimson finally leaves the State Department.
But for any American, the Japanese press is not agreeable reading.
They steadily slam the United States, and the editorials and articles
concerning Manchuria are built, quite simply, on muddy thinking.
All their arguments—to the effect that Japan has not violated the
Nine-Power Treaty and all the rest of it—are erected on two false
premises, the arguments of self-defence and self-determination.
Their legal argument of self-defence is fallacious. But when the
Japanese advance the argument of self-determination for Manchuria
and blandly assert that the 27 5 ooo,ooo Chinese inhabitants of
Manchuria have broken loose from their mother country in a bona
fide revolution and that they, the Chinese inhabitants, have them¬
selves set up this opera-bouffe state of Manchuria, the Japanese become
simply puerile and insult one’s intelligence. Yet this* argument is
constantly advanced as an accepted premise which is not open to
question, and the case for Japan is constantly and carefully argued
out in the press on this false basis.

This is where their muddy thinking comes in and where their
whole case falls like a house of cards. I do not see how the Lytton
Commission can fail to explode these two false premises of the entire
Japanese position, although I suppose it will be done with plenty of
soothing syrup if only to please the French. There are rumours
and Japanese press reports that General Claudel received instructions
to tone down the findings of the report as much as possible.

There was a long article published in the Advertiser on September 3,
by one Shin-Ichiro Fujita, comparing Japan’s action in Manchuria
with the action of the United States in Panama. Indeed, this is a
favourite thesis of Japanese editorial writers. I was therefore very
glad to see that Fleisher published side by side with the Japanese
article his own editorial reciting all the facts concerning the creation
of the state of Panama and terminating :

The foregoing are the Facts. That there is a similarity in the
policies pursued by the United States in Panama and by Japan
in Manchuria none will deny. But there is one essential difference,
which is generally overlooked by Japanese writers, and that is the
factor of time. American intervention in Panama took place thirty
years ago. When American warships supported the revolution
of 1903 in Panama which brought into being the administration
which signed over the Canal rights to the United States, there
were no international commitments to stand in the way of the
American Government.

The Covenant of the League of Nations, the Nine-Power Treaty,
and the Kellogg Pact are products of the era which has followed
upon the close of the World War. Formerly nations worked out
their destiny by the rule of force, using war as an instrument of

46 THE ASSASSIN’S SHADOW LIES ACROSS JAPAN

their national policy. To-day the peoples of the world have set

their faith in a new order of which the treaties are a symbol.

This was just about as far as the Advertiser could go without being
confiscated and it showed a certain amount of courage on the part of
Fleisher, who has to watch his step pretty carefully.

These comments are not, currently, particularly interesting, but I
think a diary should set forth, more or less, what one is thinking at
the time it is written. History is a continuous unfolding panorama,
and in later years it may be valuable to be able to furnish a little
colour and atmosphere to a particular scene of the past.

THE NATIONAL CITY BANK AFFAIR
September 10, 1932

To-day was largely taken up with the National City Bank affair.
The matter would be ludicrous if it were not serious. The bank in
New York had instructed its various branches throughout the Far
East—in China, Manila, Singapore, etc., quite as much as in Japan
—to forward photographs of the business sections in their respective
cities in order to indicate the modern building progress in those
ities. In Osaka the Japanese gendarmes suddenly asked the local
branch of the bank to stop taking these photographs and shortly
thereafter the Japanese press, not only in Osaka but throughout the
entire country, carried sensational headlines and many columns of
print charging the bank with taking these photographs (although in
strict accord with Japanese laws and regulations) for the purpose of
furnishing the United States Government with plans for bombing
these districts in case of war. The matter on the face of it was absurd
because these photographs of these same spots can be bought in the
open shops, and the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Yokohama
had recently circulated in the United States a pamphlet containing
similar photographs for purposes of business propaganda. The
action of the bank was in fact in the interests of the Japanese them¬
selves. But the poison immediately worked its course : at least one
Japanese member of the staff of the bank has resigned, threatening
letters and visits from patriotic societies calling for wholesale resigna¬
tions. are. being received, so that the bank’s prestige and business
will inevitably suffer, even if its personnel and property undergo no
damage.

Shiratori as usual indulged in some high-flown language to the
newspaper correspondents. I sent Colonel Mcllroy yesterday to see
some high officers in the War Office, since that ministry is in charge
of the gendarmerie which apparently started the trouble, and to
ask that an official statement be issued absolving the bank from
blame, but the officers seemed merely amused and refused to take
the matter seriously. Yesterday, also, Curtis of the bank had a long
talk with Arita, who seemed sympathetic, but when he asked that

DOUGLAS FAIRBANKS FOR THE WEEK-END

47

an official statement be issued, Arita remained silent for about three
minutes and finally said : “ Well, how can we prove to our satis¬
faction that the action of* the bank was not open to suspicion? 5 ’
The press campaign had, however, died down and Curtis thought that
no further action was necessary on my part, but to-day he telephoned
me that the Osaka papers had broken out again with inflammatory
headlines, that the matter had been publicly broadcast over the radio,
and that patriotic societies were causing trouble. I therefore decided
to call on Count Uchida and lay the case before him.

Conversation No. 2 September io, 1932

Count Yasuya Uchida,

Minister for Foreign Affairs

Affair of the National City Bank of New York

Called at three o’clock by appointment on Count Uchida, who
smilingly observed that he hadn’t seen me for a long time. Replied
that I had tried to bother him as little as possible since he took office.

I laid before him in detail the case of the Osaka Branch of the
National City Bank of New York, which had ordered the taking of
certain photographs of the business sections of the city under the
instructions from their head office in New York.

I told Count Uchida that the Japanese gendarmerie at Osaka had
asked the bank to stop taking these pictures, even although there
were no laws or regulations against such action, and that immediately
thereafter practically the entire Japanese press had come out with
sensational headlines charging the bank with taking these photo¬
graphs to send to the United States Government in order to assist
bombing operations in case of war. I described in detail the harm
that was being done to the bank’s prestige and business by this
campaign and asked (1) that an official investigation be instituted,
(2) that on receipt of the report an official statement be issued to the
press absolving the bank from blame with a view to partially rectifying
the harm already done, and (3) that steps be taken to stop the press
campaign.

Count Uchida listened carefully to my presentation and then
remarked that it was difficult in Japan to interfere with the press
but that an investigation was already under way as a result of Mr.
Curtis’ call on Mr. Arita, and that when the report was received
he would give it full consideration in the light of my representations.

DOUGLAS FAIRBANKS FOR THE WEEK-END
September n, 1932

There followed a delightful few days in Karuizawa, our last for
the summer. Douglas Fairbanks was a most acceptable guest, full
of fun, a bom entertainer, but surprisingly modest and appreciative.

48 THE ASSASSIN’S SHADOW LIES ACROSS JAPAN

I had written him on his arrival in Tokyo inviting him to Karuizawa
(had met him many years ago in Washington) but explaining the
simplicity of our surroundings. He had another engagement to spend
Sunday with Lieutenant Baron Nishi, the hero of the equestrian
steeplechase at the Olympic games, but was so keen to come to us
that he got his other engagement postponed. We began Sunday
with a swim in the icy pool and then thirty-six holes of golf in pouring
rain, Fairbanks shooting consistent 43’s. He is a crack gofier and
plays scratch in England. Another eighteen holes on Monday before
he returned to Tokyo in the afternoon.

We had a lot of young people in the house—in fact, nearly all our
friends—for lunch, tea, and dinner, and Fairbanks kept them amused
with all sorts of tricks, stories, anecdotes, and reminiscences. He
took quite a shine to Elsie and gave her a wonderful time. On
Monday after lunch we all called on Marquis and Marchioness
Tokugawa, who had asked us to lunch, but we couldn’t make it on
account of golf. They had once met Fairbanks on a cross-channel
boat and wanted to see him again.

Of course the penalty of publicity could not be entirely avoided
even in peaceful Karuizawa : he was continually recognized and
pointed out; had to spend most of his time signing autographs,
which he always did with excellent grace, beginning with the two
small Moss boys at 7.30 in the morning ; and, of course, the Golf
Club was thoroughly stirred, having its best caddies ready and a
big group of onlookers at the first tee. I introduced him to everyone,
and he was invariably cordial and jolly. Every day he sent his daily
cablegram to Mary, who is to join him in Tokyo in a couple of months ;
he is taking a house there for the time being as he wants to get to
know the Japanese and have a lot of golf. In one autograph book
he wrote his name, and when the possessor asked for more he added,
“ Mary Pickford’s husband.” He has recently completed a film in the
South Seas and is going to let us have its first showing in the Embassy.

After he left he telegraphed us : “ Had a most delightful week-end ;
enjoyed every minute ; many, many thanks.” I really believe he did,
and certainly he gave us all a most amusing time. We now know
more about the making of movies, Hollywood, and the cinema world
than we ever did before. He explained clearly every detail of his
films that we wanted to know about—the Indian tricks in Around the
World in 80 Minutes , etc,—and was not in the slightest degree reticent
or pompous. The sensational trick of the Indian boy who climbs up
a rope thrown into the air is managed by the simple expedient of
taking the photograph upside down, the rope hanging down, not up.

On Monday, September 12, the press carried a dispatch from
Washington telling of my representations to Count Uchida in the
National City Bank affair on Saturday and quoting textually my
entire telegram, pretty quick work.- I suppose my telegram must
have arrived in time for the Department’s Saturday press conference
as I hoped it would do, knowing that the Department would be

LEGITIMACY IN JAPAN—MARITAL AND POLITICAL 49

besieged with questions, as the affair may well have been served up
somewhat sensationally in the American press. I had coined the
phrase “ photographic espionage 55 in my telegram, and of course
the press adopted it. After all, that is exactly what the charges
amounted to. The day after the telegram was published in the
Japan Advertiser an editorial appeared in Jiji saying that too much
had been made of the affair and that it regretted that I had made a
diplomatic incident of the matter by taking it up with Count Uchida,
which was considered an unfortunate indiscretion on the part of the
American Ambassador. Shiratori at first told the correspondents
that Count Uchida’s promise to me to conduct an investigation was
merely the usual polite diplomatic reply to representations by an
ambassador and that no investigation would be made, but two days
later, evidently under instructions, he altered his tone and said that
Count Uchida would shortly reply to my representations and would
say that “ the Japanese Government sees no irregularity, nor does it
attribute any impure motives to the action of the American bank.
Count Uchida is expected to inform the American Ambassador
that he sees no objection to having this information released to the
American press, but it is unlikely that he will make any statement
to the press in Japan. 5 ’ I presume that someone may have advised
the Foreign Office to watch its step a little with the American public,
but so far as the Japanese press is concerned, I am convinced that the
Foreign Office cannot control it and doesn’t care to try. This lies
with the military who, in all probability, engineered the whole
campaign against the bank as another opportunity for stirring up
anti-American feeling in the country.

LEGITIMACY IN JAPAN—MARITAL AND POLITICAL
September 20, 1932

The following memorandum comes from a member of the Embassy
staff:

" The Japanese laws and customs governing the legitimating of
children bom out of wedlock are much more lenient than those
of most countries of the world. In European countries and in
most states of the United States, an illegitimate child can only
be legitimated by the subsequent marriage of the parents, and even
in such cases there are usually obstructive conditions, such as that
both parents have been in a legal position to marry at the time of
the birth of the child. In Japan, a child of unmarried parents at
birth is a member of the mother’s family ; upon recognition by
the father, however (whether the father be married or not), the
child enters the father’s family as a skoshi, or legitimated child, and
takes the father’s name. He can succeed to the headship of the house
and inherit the family property—in fact, he becomes a full-fledged
member of society, with practically no stigma attached to him

JO ' THE ASSASSIN’S SHADOW LIES ACROSS JAPAN

because of his origin. Recognition by the father is accomplished
by the simple process of notifying the local registrar that the
child is one’s own—in other words, by acknowledgment before an
authorized official.

So thoroughly accustomed are the Japanese people to this practice
of easily legitimating an illegitimate child that they see no reason
why it should not be applied to international affairs. Manchukuo,
conceived in dishonour and born in disgrace, is to be made a full-
fledged, respectable member of the family of nations by the simple
process of recognition by the father !

Diaries to me are a great blessing, for the spice of life is its details,
and letters seldom paint more than an impressionistic picture ; even
a regular correspondent seldom takes up the tale just where it was left
off, and individual lives, especially of those who are close to us, furnish
the most absorbing of all stories. The inimitable letters of my father-
in-law, Thomas Sergeant Perry, were the nearest approach to a diary
of any correspondent, and I always miss them. My daughters Lilia
and Anita, in their letters, are very faithful, too. Diaries, to be human,
must inevitably be indiscreet. Through nearly thirty years my own
literary indiscretions have never come back to plague us.

I return to political questions. The Japanese press, probably on
the principle that the wish is father to the thought, predicts the early
dissolution of the League of Nations, for the following reasons :

(1) The United States and Russia have not joined the League
and there is no prospect of the former doing so. Therefore Great
Britain and France are in favour of dissolution and the establishment
of another international organ in which the United States will
participate.

(2) Great Britain has shown lack of zeal in supporting the League,
and Ramsay MacDonald believes that international problems should
be settled by direct negotiation.

(3) The activities of the League regarding Far Eastern questions
are worthless, and Japan threatens to withdraw if the League tries to
enforce its Covenant upon her.

(4) If France should bring pressure on Germany through the
League, the latter would withdraw. Italy would follow suit in sym¬
pathy with Germany, followed by Hungary, Austria, and Bulgaria.

(5) The League has shown weakness in the Chaco question between
Bolivia and Paraguay.

(6) The impending resignation of Sir Eric Drummond and the
question of expenditures are contributory causes.

This is an interesting discussion and furnishes food for thought. I
do not know whether the dissolution of the League is being seriously
considered, but much water has flowed over the dam since the
Covenant was adopted ; its weaknesses and disadvantages have been
shown up by practical experience. To-day, with the existence of
the Kellogg Pact, a general revamping, to which the United States

A MEMBER OF THE GERMAN EMBASSY DISCUSSES JAPAN 51

and perhaps Soviet Russia could subscribe, might well be feasible
and to the better interest of all concerned. As a great international
clearing-house the League is a world necessity in which we ourselves
must and do co-operate ; the Kellogg Pact has rendered certain
articles of the Covenant theoretically obsolete. Why not reorganize
the whole show, while retaining the existing machinery ; redraft
the Covenant with reference to the Kellogg Pact in a form to which
the United States could and would subscribe, and begin again on a
new footing, having profited by the practical experience of these
thirteen years ?

A MEMBER OF THE GERMAN EMBASSY DISCUSSES

JAPAN

September 27, 1932

In conversation to-day, a member of the German Embassy staff
expressed doubts concerning current newspaper reports of an under¬
standing between Japan and the Soviets. Koiso (Chief of Staff to
General Muto), however, did seek out Soviet Ambassador Troya-
novsky before leaving for Manchuria and conferred with him un¬
officially. Troyanovsky states that there is no agreement but he is
satisfied that Russia is safe from Japanese attacks for the immediate
future. The present Japanese cabinet does not want trouble with
Russia, and Koiso will hold the Army in check. While the present
cabinet lasts, therefore, all will be quiet, but the cabinet is not expected
to last beyond January of next year, and what will happen then no
one knows.

I asked whether the Russians believe that the military preparations
now going on are directed against them.

The answer was : they do not know. My German informant had
been making a study of this matter for a report to his Government
and did not believe that the preparations were on such a very large
scale. The situation, as he described it, is this. The Wakatsuki
Ministry (which fell in December, 1931)3 especially Wakatsuki and
Finance Minister Inouye, wanted to stay on the gold standard, and
to do so had to save as much from the government expenditures as
possible. They were planning to save money by reducing the Army,
entirely independent of any disarmament proposals. The Army had
to do something or lose all its influence in Japan. The Wakatsuki
government wanted to run the country with the capitalists, not with
the bureaucrats or the military. So the Army started the Manchurian
affair and assassinated Inouye and Dan. When the nation got the
war fever, the Army used this to get as much money as possible, for
the purpose of bringing its equipment up to date. They do not need
all the money which has been appropriated already to keep the five
divisions in Manchuria. They are using the money to buy equipment
Also they are playing up future dangers, such as war with the United
States, in order to get more money.

5 2

THE ASSASSIN’S SHADOW LIES ACROSS JAPAN

LETTER FROM A JAPANESE SCHOOLBOY

September so, 1932

The following letter received from a Japanese schoolboy is worth
recording :

Dear My Sir, —How do you do ?

I am a young boys of eighteen years old but I am so very like
of Aeoroplane that of cause most like of aeoroplane. As only a
photograph to amuse me. Japan have not only slightly aero¬
plane photograph and it is high price and value. I am a want of
good beautiful Aeroplane photograph.

Please no laugh. Please no laugh of my convenience demand.

If you have photograph of aeroplane now please give me one
peace or two peace curtiss all right bouwing all right moth all right.

If you give me it how a joyful and happy and you have not
now please teach me address your country of famouse Aeroplane
company.

Sir please allow my convenience demand. Please Please
Good by Sir

Yong Boy

" LIKE IT OR FIGHT ”

October 7, 1932

We hear a good deal to the effect that the liberal elements in Japan
are steadily working beneath the surface and that they will eventually
be heard from. Of this there is little concrete evidence, although the
decision to send Ambassador Debuchi back to Washington in spite
of military opposition may be a good sign. I rather think that the
Emperor had a hand in that. Anyway, somebody has been sensible
enough to see that it would be fatal to send a blatant type to Washing¬
ton at this juncture, just as it would be fatal for America to have a
blatant type here. Secretary Hurley summed up the situation in a
nutshell when I saw him in Washington last May : C6 Like it or
fight.”

In the afternoon Fleisher called to discuss an article he was sending

to the Herald Tribune , and then came-for an hour’s talk. He

said that he had been, making speeches steadily, one of them to three
hundred military officers, and had clearly explained the position of
the United States. He has had two hours and ten minutes with the
Emperor in the presence of Count Makino and others and was
surprised and immensely pleased by the Emperor’s keen interest
in all he told him. He says that the Emperor understands our position
perfectly and is anxious to stop the anti-American press campaign

and the chauvinistic war talk. - then said that he wished to

impress on me two points, first, that if the Young Marshal, Chang
Hsueh-liang, will only keep quiet, there will be no question of
Japanese troops going to Peiping and that this all depends on Chang’s

NOTE ON DINING OUT IN JAPAN 53

movements ; and, second, he expressed the hope that after the
manoeuvres of our Atlantic fleet in the Pacific it will return to the
Atlantic next winter, because its presence on the west coast furnished
an excuse for much of the chauvinistic war talk and military and

naval preparations here. -continually repeated that the domestic

political situation is now well in hand and that the more chauvinistic
military people are being compelled to moderate their views. Of the
truth of the latter assertion I have yet to be convinced.

- can do what I cannot do, and, as I wrote to Mr. Stimson,

this is a time when, on the part of the American Ambassador, silence
on political matters in public speeches is golden. I can show the
American point of view in private conversations, but the moment I
should try to do it in public speeches—and practically all speeches
are liable to get to the press even in spite of assurances to the contrary
—a public debate would be precipitated and the chauvinists would
take good care that my remarks should leave anything but a favour¬
able impression on the mind of the public. Later, if and when the
United States takes action in connection with the Lytton Report,
a public speech may be timely. The Department recently formulated
in an admirably clear manner, for the information of the ambassadors
in Europe, our attitude and policy regarding disarmament, the
German claim for equality in armament, and the sacredness of the
treaties, and it was repeated to me in view of its indirect application
to the situation here. Part of that statement, together with parts of
some of the Secretary’s speeches, might form the basis for a speech
here, but not until it is called for by developments.

- told me that public sympathy was with me because I had

been patient in the face of attacks, and he intimated that my influence
would be much greater when the time should come to use it than
if I had followed a different policy.

As a little humour is here needed I quote the card of a Japanese
reporter which was handed in to me at the chancery the other day,
applying for an interview :

Please show me on the Litton Commission Report, your american
people’s views coincide with Lord Stimson ?

He deserved the interview but didn’t get it because interviews are
just as dangerous as speeches.

NOTE ON DINING OUT IN JAPAN
October io, 1932

Dinner at Prince Tokugawa’s, including the Debuchis, Aritas,
Takeda, Mcllroys, and so on. The daughter-in-law, also a Tokugawa,
acted as hostess. The food, wines, flowers, table, and service were
as near perfection as I have seen anywhere, but the whole effect was
ruined by the blinding glare of unshaded electric lights. It is strange
that advancing civilization in some countries cannot get away from

54 the assassin’s shadow lies across japan

the idea that the degree of one’s hospitality is measured by the volume
of electric light turned on the scene. It hurts the eyes, irritates the
senses, and robs the women of whatever beauty they possess. As usual
I had terribly uphill work in dinner talk because the Japanese women,
with few exceptions, won’t help to keep the ball of conversation
rolling ; it dies after each remark, and even when they make an
observation it is whispered and I have to get my ear down into their
plates to hear ; besides, the strain of trying to hear is very bad for the
digestion. I always feel like saying to those who won’t speak up :
66 If anything has to be strained, it’s much easier to strain the voice
than the ear ”—but I never do say it. As for dinner conversation,
Alice gets the best of it because she sits between men and I between
women. Anyway, it was a pleasure to dine with nice old Prince
Tokugawa and to remember that his family once ruled Japan.

THE OTHER JAPAN SPEAKS

October 18, 1932

In the afternoon-came to see me by appointment. He said

he wished merely to thank me for our dinner, but that is generally
done by merely leaving cards, and it was obvious that he wanted to
talk. He said a good deal to the effect that the moderate element
in Japan is stronger and more widespread than is generally known,
because their views do not get into the press or public speeches ;
the people who do the most talking and writing in the newspapers
are not always the ones who carry most weight, and that the moderate
thinkers will be heard from in due course.

This is the refrain that they are all trying to convey to me, but
naturally I want some material evidence and want to know just how
this alleged moderate movement is going to register in practical
policy if it does eventually make itself felt. Now that Japan has
formally recognized Manchukuo it is not evident how any Japanese
Government could disavow that step or acknowledge even nominal
Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria, which seems to be the crux of

the whole problem. For my part I talked to - very frankly

and told him of the exact position of the American Government in
the issue, I am told that he is going to be a strong force here and
am very glad because he is anything but a chauvinistic fire-eater.

Dinner at the 'Uchidas’, including Mrs. Woodrow Wilson, the
Debuchis, Count Makino, Count Kabayama, Prince Tokugawa, the
Aritas, the Mcllroys, and so on. Both before and after dinner I
had long talks with Count Makino, who spoke very much along the
lines of-’s talks this afternoon, emphasizing the existing “ under¬

current ” of moderate thought, and then we talked of the results of

the Versailles Peace Treaty. Later I sat down with-, who spoke

along precisely the same !!lines as Makino. They are all trying to
get this idea across to me.

The only possible indications I can yet see which might point tq

DINNER WITH MRS. WOODROW WILSON 55

a slight lessening of military prestige is the fact that Debuchi is to
return to Washington in spite of presumed military opposition, and
the fact that the Jiji this morning published a statement that General
Ugaki, Governor-General of Korea, might succeed Saito as he is
the only man who, it is felt, can control Araki,' being his superior
officer in the Army. The fact that this article was allowed to appear
at all may be significant, although I do not attach much importance
to the prediction as yet.

If anything can undermine the military element, it will be the
heavy budgetary expenditures for prosecuting the Manchurian
campaign and that is certainly an item which will have to be reckoned
with. The “ bandit ” menace in Manchuria seems to be growing
rather than lessening, and although we hear of bandit strongholds
being captured, we do not hear that any appreciable number of
“ bandits ” have been put out of action. Meanwhile there are reports
of disaffection among the Manchukuo troops. There is also a healthy
anxiety as to what Soviet Russia may eventually do, this anxiety
being strengthened by the fact that most of the Manchurian rail¬
ways are more or less out of commission owing to “ bandit ” depreda¬
tions. With their lines of communication disorganized, the Japanese
Army cannot view the hypothetical Russian menace with equa¬
nimity. Herein lies the danger that the Japanese will eventually
feel it essential to occupy Peiping and all of northern China. They
will probably keep out of Jehol until the League of Nations has
acted on the Lytton Report, but Chang Hsueh-liang is always busy
and something is going on in that part of the world which disturbs
Mcllroy but which he cannot at present diagnose. Things are too
nebulous for my liking.

DINNER WITH MRS. WOODROW WILSON
October 24, 1932

Alice took Mrs. Woodrow Wilson for a motor drive and walk in
the Meiji Shrine Park and had an interesting talk with her. Mrs.
Wilson said one significant thing—that a smile goes a long way m
Japan. It is perfectly true, and from the policemen at our gates
to the mothers and babies on the route where Alice exercises Kim
she has made many “ smiling ” friends.

Dinner at the house of Dr. Teusler, the head of the local American
hospital, St. Luke’s, with Mrs. Woodrow Wilson, Count Kabayama,
and others. Mrs. Wilson, next to whom I sat at table, told me the
following very interesting account of the way in which President
Wilson learned of his re-election in 1916. He did not think it proper
to conduct his campaign from the White House and therefore took
a house in New Jersey not far from Asbury Park, but was kept busy
in Washington all s umm er and did not move down until a few days
before the election, which took place, of course, on a Tuesday.
Those were the days before the radio and President Wilson did not

56 THE ASSASSIN’S SHADOW LIES ACROSS JAPAN

want the “ special privilege 55 of having the telegraph company
install a special wire in the house, so they decided to have Tumulty,
the President’s secretary, telephone the result of the election from
the office in Asbury Park.

The only call on Tuesday night was from a friend of Margaret
Wilson in New York who rang up to express sympathy because the
Times Building had just flashed a red instead of a white signal,
indicating that Hughes had won. Margaret Wilson replied that she
refused to concede until further evidence came in, but the President
thought it was all over and, remarking that he was happy to be
relieved of the cares of office (Mrs. Wilson observed that he would
probably be here now if he had been relieved), took a glass of milk
and went to bed, although the others sat up and talked most of the
night. No news came on Wednesday, except that Vance McCormick
telephoned at 4 a.m. that he refused to concede the election until
the returns from the West were in.

On Thursday night, the second day after the election, having
still heard nothing, President and Mrs. Wilson started for Williams-
town to be present at the christening of one of the Sayre children,
and it was on the station platform at the little town of Weehawken,
where they had to change trains, that an unknown woman gave
Mrs. Wilson a bunch of flowers and congratulated her on her husband’s
victory. That was the first they heard of it, still thinking that he had
been defeated. The news was known in Washington at least twenty-
four hours earlier, but nobody had sent word because everybody
thought that of course they knew. I asked what Tumulty was
doing all this time. Mrs. Wilson said she 'guessed he was merely
overcome by the reports. Thus the person most concerned, the
President himself, was one of the last people in the country to hear
that he had been re-elected.

TEMPLES OF JAPAN

October 27, 1932

Another perfect day at Nikko. In the morning we went out with
Lilian Miller to see the temples, of which there are a great many,
both Shinto and Buddhist, in memory of the founder of the Tokugawa
dynasty and his grandsons, Iyeyasu and Iyemitsu. There is no use
attempting to describe them, their amazing richness of architectural
design and detail or the wealth of colour in their lacquer work and
wood-carving. Miss Miller said that when Lindbergh saw them
he uttered not a word until he had gone through the lot, and then
he merely remarked : “ They should all be kept under glass.” That
about sizes it up. Of course I was particularly interested in the world-
famous design of the three monkeys, hearing, seeing, and speaking
no evil, and of course the sacred bridge in red and gold. But what
adds immeasurably to the effect is that the temples (I believe there
are some sixty of them) are buried in an immense grove of huge

ROOSEVELT ELECTED

57

cryptomerias, some of them said to be a thousand years old accord¬
ing to their rings. These trees are of the sequoia family and are called
the cc little brothers 55 of the California redwoods. They stand like
stalwart guardians of the temples, and the vista from some of the
long flights of moss-covered stone steps, with trickles of sunlight
falling through their shade on the vivid red and green and gold of
the temples, is a sight never to be forgotten.

VISIT TO A JAPANESE SILK FACTORY
November 2, 1932

This morning Alice, Elsie, and I, accompanied by Butts, our
Commercial Attach^, and his wife, drove to Omiya, an hour and a
quarter away, to see the Katakura silk factory. The visit had been
long arranged and they made much of it, the Mayor and Chief of
Police of Omiya and the high officials of the company, including
old Mr, Imai, the Vice-President, receiving us in state. We saw the
whole process including the development of the cocoons, the soaking
in hot water, the unwinding of the silk threads from the cocoons,
the weaving into skeins, and finally the packing in “ books 55 for
shipment, 92 per cent, of all the silk in Japan going to the
United States. The unwinding from the cocoons was much the most
interesting procedure—long lines of machines where hundreds of
Japanese girls watch twenty separate machines at the same time,
the thread of five cocoons passing through one eye to form a single
strand, the thread itself being too fine for the naked eye to see—at
least for the untrained naked eye.

The girls have to dip their hands into water at 150 degrees
Fahrenheit to change the cocoons when they are finished or to mend
the thread when broken, and their poor fingers are pretty raw, but
they work so fast that the untutored spectator can’t possibly follow
just what they are doing. There are loud-speakers in the work¬
rooms and the girls are continually given concerts to make then-
hard work pleasanter. While we were there the loud-speakers sud¬
denly thundered out “ The Star-Spangled Banner ” in our honour;
of course we stopped in our tracks and stood at attention, but the
trouble was it must have been an enormous record because that
noble tune was played about three times in succession and I couldn’t
move until it was over.

ROOSEVELT ELECTED

November 9, 1932

My own reaction to the results of the election are those of “watchful
waiting ” because I have very little knowledge of Frank Roosevelt’s
potential capabilities. Some men, when they get to the presidency,
acquire greatness, and Frank at least has the background. I know
very little of his grasp of foreign affairs, but he has a fine panel from

58 THE ASSASSIN’S SHADOW LIES ACROSS JAPAN

which to pick his Secretary of State. As to the effect on our own
fortunes, of course I haven’t the slightest idea and probably shall
not have until March 4 because, while there will be all sorts of cogita¬
tions and predictions in the press (one Japanese correspondent in
New York has already cabled that the Dean of the School of Journalism
of the University of Missouri, Dr. David Williams, will probably be
.appointed Ambassador to Japan), they will all be guesswork and
nothing else. Naturally I should like to see this job through but
shall count no chickens until they are hatched.

The Japanese press is unanimously pleased with the election result,
first because they foresee a tariff policy more favourable for them,
and second because it means the passing of Mr. Stimson, whom they
consider personally responsible for most of their troubles with the
world over Manchuria. It is significant that even the Japanese
servants—Parsons’ maid and Johnson’s chauffeur—-were in high
glee at the news and both said, “ No more Stimson.” Few of them
realize that the American people as a whole are solidly behind the
administration in its attitude towards the peace treaties and not a bit
inclined to sympathize with Japan.

DINNER A LA JAPONAISE
November 25, 1932. Kyoto

To-night we have another great treat—how many treats seem to
come our way in Japan, for life has much to offer here. We dined
entirely d la japonaise in the lovely home of the Osawas. The father
is a business man, representative in Kyoto of General Motors and
President of the Kyoto Chamber of Commerce, but of an old samurai
family ; one of the sons, the one who looked after us when we arrived,
is a graduate of Princeton, and his wife is very lovely. The mother,
another daughter, and another son were present at the dinner, as
well as our entire party and Mr. Takino. I wonder if I can describe
the dinner—^difficult to do because the beauty and gracefulness of it
all must be experienced to be appreciated.

We enter the house, leaving our shoes at the door, and are greeted
by the family, all but the sons in Japanese dress, the young women
in gaily coloured kimonos. After a few minutes of general conversa¬
tion the host leads the way to the ceremonial tea-room where we
kneel or sit, each on a cushion, along the walls. The room is built
of the usual square-latticed screens and spotless straw matting, not
a single piece of furniture marring its perfect simplicity. There is,
however, customarily one object of art, either a kakemono or a flower
arrangement, which the guests are supposed to admire in order to
get into the proper frame of mind for the ceremony. At one corner
a hot-water urn is sunk in the floor, reposing on charcoal which of
course is invisible. The daughter of the house comes to the entrance,
prostrates herself, and then, assisted by her sister-in-law, brings one
by one the articles for the ceremony—a wooden stand, a light wooden

DINNER A LA JAPONAISE gg

ladle, the tea box, a rest for the ladle when not in use, a bowl, a brush,
and a scarlet towel in her belt. When all are in order and ready, the
sister-in-law brings in the first teacup, a beautiful little china bowl,
all of which are placed in particular positions on the clean straw
matting.

Then begins the ceremony. * First a sweet called manju , made out
of a sort of paste of beans and barley sugar, is placed before each
guest with a little stick with which to eat it. Then the daughter,
kneeling, dips the ladle in the sunken urn and fills the bowl with
hot water; the scarlet towel is unfolded and refolded with
three or four precise motions, the teacup is washed, the green
tea is ladled into it, hot water ladled into it likewise and then stirred
with three motions of the brush which is clicked against its side at
the end of each motion. Now the first tea is ready ; the sister-in-law
rises in one sinuous motion, comes to the first guest, prostrates herself,
and places the cup before him. The guest bows low in acknowledg¬
ment, offers the cup to his right-hand neighbour, who courteously
refuses it, offers it to his left-hand neighbour, who likewise refuses it,
then bows low again and drinks, being careful to hold the cup with
his left hand underneath and his right hand covering it, and being
careful also to turn the cup half around in order not to drink from the
spot which has been presented! After drinking, the guest places the
cup on the floor in front of him and, leaning forward, admires the
cup and comments to his host on its beauty. Precisely the same
ceremony is carried out for each guest until all have been served.
It was my first tea ceremony and I found it delightfully graceful and
impressive, an almost solemn national rite.

The tea ceremdny being over, we repaired to the adjoining room,
where again we knelt or sat on cushions in a square and waitresses in
lovely kimonos and old-fashioned head-dress brought in the usual
little lacquered dinner trays on legs, prostrating themselves as each
was placed before a guest. Then hot sake was served and two or
three of the tiny cups were emptied and refilled before we began on
the first round of the dinner—delicious boiled fish in soup, another
fried fish, a shrimp salad, and one or two other dishes, eaten of course
with chopsticks. I fipished most of them, but it was dangerous because
sukiyaki was coming.

After the first trays were removed, two large round low tables were
brought in, with a charcoal hibachi on each, a dish with a raw egg in
it for each guest, and bowls and bowls of raw beef, onions, and all the
other ingredients for cooking this most delicious of all dishes. Needless
to say, we were replete long before the end of it, and then came fruit
and two successive cups of tea. But during, the meal I could hardly
take my eyes from the perfect symmetry and gracefulness of the room
itself—a large square chamber, framed with the usual simple square-
latticed screens, flanked by an open corridor with big windows looking
out on the Japanese garden, spotless straw matting, and only three
articles in it: one, a lovely kakemono of a blossoming cherry tree j

6o

THE ASSASSIN’S SHADOW LIES ACROSS JAPAN

two, a flower arrangement (three roses and a big cherry branch in an
urn), and three, a lacquered stand bearing a china lion and below
a simple lacquered box. That was all, and yet the room, from the
Japanese point of view, was perfectly furnished. Well, we almost
waddled like hibernating bears on taking leave, but it was another
evening that we shall long remember.

THE AMBASSADOR RELAXES
December 29, 1932

We had a bully game of poker at the Embassy in which I took
much pleasure in badly rooking Shiratori ; there’s nothing like the
poker table for getting to know people, and it was not alone the
pleasures of the game that led me to organize the party. We began
at 5, had dinner at 7.30 — a mighty good dinner — and played
until 10. The players were the Norwegian Minister Aubert,
Shiratori, Kaneko, Ohashi, 1 Le Gallais, 2 Alice, and myself. Shiratori
was the biggest loser and I the biggest winner, which perhaps, after
all, was not so very diplomatic on my part—but poker is poker. I
showed him conclusively that I can bluff as well as he, but that I
generally had the cards.

SOVIET RUSSIA : A FOOTNOTE ON
DIPLOMATIC PROTOCOL

I had always taken the position in Turkey that I could not recognize
the Soviet Ambassador as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps and that
the German Ambassador, who was next in line, was the acting Dean
for those countries which didn’t recognize Soviet Russia. But in
Turkey there never arose a situation where I had to place this attitude
on record. Now, however, when Troyanovsky became Dean ad
interim during the absence of Bassompierre, I was suddenly called
upon to sign or to refuse to sign one of the Dean’s circulated announce¬
ments, requesting approval of the speech which he proposes to make
to the Emperor at the Imperial banquet on January 5. I refused
to sign it, as did the Dutch Minister, who is guided by the attitude
of the late Baron Rengers in Turkey, as well as the Rumanian Chargd
d’Affaires and certain other colleagues, but I asked Voretzsch 3 to
say to Troyanovsky that this did not imply any intentional discourtesy
on my part but was purely a technical matter. Troyanovsky replied
to Voretzsch that he felt that recognition of himself as Dean would
not imply recognition of his country and that he would like to discuss
the point with me when next we met. So I took the precaution of
telegraphing to the Department to ask for instructions, believing it
would support my attitude.

1 Subsequently Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs.

2 A Luxembourg business man, now his country’s Minister to Washington.

8 German Ambassador.

DIPLOMATIC SYMPOSIUM gj

To my great surprise, and indeed to the surprise of Neville and all
of us, the Department replied that there was no objection to my
carrying on with Troyanovsky all relations of a social and ceremonial
character which usually exist between the Dean and the Diplomatic
Corps ; that I should receive him if he called on me and could
exchange cards as long as mine was labelled “ To the Dean of the
Diplomatic Corps,” and that in all subsequent exchanges of cards
I should use personal ones. In effect, I could do anything which
did not make it appear that I was entering into relations with him
officially in his capacity as representing the Soviet regime.

Anyway, no harm was done. I prompdy called on the Dutch
Minister, General Pabst, to tell him of my altered decision—he was
very appreciative of my doing so—and asked the R umanian Charge
d 5 Affaires, Stoicesco, to call so that I could tell him too. I then had
Neville ask the Soviet Embassy to send the circular around again and
promptly signed it.

WHY THE JAPANESE PLAY BAD POKER
January 24, 1933

At 5.30 I went to the house of a Japanese friend for poker, stayed
to dinner, and played until 10. I was the only foreigner with
six Japanese. It was a very pleasant evening and my presence
didn’t seem to detract from the informality, for they spoke Japanese
or English among themselves as they pleased. Shiratori said that the
Japanese are not good poker players because they are too honest,
but I observed several occasions when they failed to live up to this
reputation. However, I won.

DIPLOMATIC SYMPOSIUM

February 14, 1933

Yesterday and to-day I had conversations with the German
Ambassador, on whom I called, and with the Dutch Minister and the
Italian and French Charge d’Affaires, who called on me to find out
what I was thinking about the general situation. Voretzsch calls
the situation more dangerous than at any time since the Sino-Japanese
dispute began. Weillschott, the Italian Charge d’Affaires, is even
more inflammatory and confidently predicts a world war within two
years. He and the German, Voretzsch, both foresee the eventual
application of sanctions under Article XVI of the Covenant and the
withdrawal of Japan from the League. Pabst and I see eye to eye in
the whole business.

When they ask me my own views, I carefully preface them by saying
that these views are purely personal; first, because not being a
member of the League of Nations we have nothing to say about the
League’s procedure; and second, because I cannot speak officially
for the incoming administration in the United States, except to quote
Roosevelt’s public statement about supporting the treaties, and that

62

THE ASSASSIN’S SHADOW LIES ACROSS JAPAN

there is nothing to add to the attitude of the present administration
which has repeatedly been made perfectly clear.

With this preface I am always willing to say that in my personal
opinion I cannot see the League or anyone else applying active
sanctions under Article XVI (in connection with the Manchukuo
issue), and while the smaller powers who have nothing to lose are
inclined to regard the prestige of the League as more important than
any other consideration, I do not believe that the powers who have
interests in the Far East will readily let matters get to that stage.
I therefore do not believe that the League will go beyond moral
sanctions.

The Japanese love nothing so much as allegedly heroic fighting
against overwhelming odds ; coercive measures would weld them
together even more completely than they are welded now, and it is
doubtful if any action which the nations would be willing to take
would ever smoke them out. I have also doubted whether Japan
would withdraw from the League. The military and the chauvinists
want to withdraw now, but the liberals are fighting hard against it.
Shidehara went down to see Prince Saionji, the last Genro or Elder
Statesman, to-day. Weillschott assures me that he went to pledge

his support of the Government in any steps it might take, but-

told me definitely that he went, as I supposed, to plead against leaving
the League. Others are working hard too.

Of course I may be proved to be wrong, because one can never be
sure of the strength of the military ; but withdrawal from the League
would first have to be approved by the cabinet, the Privy Council,
and the Emperor, and with such outstanding men as Saito, Takahashi,
and Makino fighting against it, as I know they are, the step will at
least not be taken without counting the cost. Whatever the views
of my colleagues, they all agree that coercive measures would be
attended by the utmost danger to world peace.

JAPANESE TRAFFIC REGULATIONS
February 15, 1933

There being nothing further to report to-day, I take refuge in the
following “ Rules of the Road in English ” as allegedly posted in the'
Central Police Station in Tokyo :

1. At the rise of the hand policeman, stop rapidly.

2. Do not pass him by or otherwise disrespect him.

3. When a passenger of the foot heave in sight, tootle the horn.
Trumpet at him. Melodiously at first, but if he still obstacles your
passage, tootle him with vigour, express by word of mouth the
warning “ Hi Hi.”

4. Beware the wandering horse that he shall not take fright as
you pass him by. Do not explode the exhaust box at him as you
pass him by. Go soothingly by.

LETTERS TO SECRETARY OF STATE STIMSON 63

5. Give big space to the festive dog that shall sport in the road¬
way.

6. Go soothingly in the grease mud, as there lurks the skid
demon.

7. Avoid tanglement of dog with your wheel spokes.

8. Press the braking of the foot as you roll round the corner to
save collapse and tie up.

LETTERS TO SECRETARY OF STATE STIMSON

The Lytton Committee’s
Conclusions on Manchuria

Strictly Confidential

Tokyo, July i6, 1932

Dear Mr. Secretary, —If a brief risumi of the situation as we see
it here would be helpful to you from time to time, I will send you such
a statement by the fortnightly pouch when there is anything to report.

The important event during the past two weeks was, of course, the
visit of the League of Nations Commission which has just ended. . . .

In a nutshell the commissioners are unanimous in finding that
Japan’s action in Manchuria is based on two false premises : (1) the
argument of self-defence and (2) the argument of self-determination
for Manchuria. Neither argument is considered sound. The com¬
missioners have proved to their satisfaction that the blowing up of
the railway and every subsequent incident in Manchuria since
September 18, 1931, were carefully planned and carried out by the
Japanese themselves. They consider that the setting up of this puppet
state, far from tending to pacify the Far East, will result in a festering
sore which will inevitably lead to future wars with China and Russia
and a case of irredentism much worse than that of Alsace-Lorraine.
They realize that the Japanese may supply a more efficient govern¬
ment in Manchuria than did the Chinese but that this fact in no way
weakens the element of irredentism. They consider that the action
of Japan runs directly counter to the provisions of the Nine-Power
Treaty, the Kellogg Pact, and the Covenant of the League of Nations,
and that discussions with the other signatories should have been held
before action was taken. They still recommend such discussions and
delay in extending recognition to the Manchukuo regime. They
feel that the case against Japan was made perfectly clear in their
conferences with the Japanese themselves, even if they had talked with
no Chinese at all. All of the foregoing, with the exception of the last
sentence, was made clear to Count Uchida in their two interviews
with him. Count Uchida, on his side, stated unequivocally that
Japan had made up its mind to recognize Manchukuo and that
he could not consider any counter-arguments nor enter into any
discussioh of the matter.

64 THE ASSASSIN’S SHADOW LIES ACROSS JAPAN

I do not, of course, know whether the report of the Commission to
the League will clearly embody the foregoing points nor what its
tone will be, but there seems to be no doubt that the five commissioners
are unanimous in their findings.

As regards the Japanese now carrying on the Manchukuo regime,
I understand that all of the commissioners feel that these officials
are in fact directly subservient to the Japanese Government and that
any evidence to the contrary is 44 window dressing.” Some members
of the Commission’s staff are, however, inclined to believe the contrary
and feel that these officials are 44 feeling their oats ” and decline to be
dictated to by Tokyo.

Whether the findings and opinions of the Commission, as expressed
to Count Uchida, will have any influence on the Japanese Govern¬
ment and will lead to any modification of its attitude, it is impossible
to predict. Probably not. At present it looks as if recognition would
be extended to Manchukuo in the not very distant future, but if the
step is taken, the Japanese Government will be doing it with their
eyes fully open to Western opinion.

In my telegram of July 7, I said that from the point of view of
purely practical results, as distinguished from the legal aspects of the
matter, I believed that American representations against Japanese
recognition of Manchukuo at the present time would be unwise.
The press, which at present largely represents the point of view of
the military, would under present circumstances be quite capable
of magnifying such representations by the United States in a manner
out of all proportion to their significance and an outburst might
well occur which would afford the military a pretext for earlier
action than the more conservative members of the Government may
desire. That this risk exists is the opinion of every member of my
staff. Naturally it is not for me to determine the wisdom of such
representations from the legal point of view, or from the point of
view of world public opinion and history. Apropos of this, a prominent
peer recently said to a member of my staff, referring to the military :
44 1 hope they will change their minds before they wreck the country.”

Respectfully yours,

HOW JAPAN APED GERMANY

Strictly Confidential

Tokyo, August 13, 1932

Dear Mr. Secretary, —The outburst in Japan against your speech
before the Council on Foreign Relations savours distinctly of a tempest
in a teapot if not of a guilty conscience on the part of the Japanese,
for we now understand that the speech was merely an academic
discussion of a hypothetical case, while the Japanese took it as a
specific charge of guilt. Unfortunately I was unable to take any

EES

>ui«Ttl

liXMl

Along the coast of the Izu Peninsula, near where Commodore Perry landed.

HOW JAPAN APED GERMANY 65

steps to mitigate the effect here, because neither the text of the speech
nor a resume of its substance and intentions has reached me, and by
the time the text arrives from Shanghai the incident will presumably
be closed. However that may be, the Foreign Office has used the
speech deliberately to pour fuel on the temporarily quiescent flames
of public animosity against the United States. I say deliberately,
because the violent Japanese press reaction was based not on the
press dispatches from the United States but on the Foreign Office’s
inflammatory interpretation of Japanese Ambassador Debuchi’s
cabled account, and this interpretation was given to the Japanese
press a day before it was released to the foreign correspondents.

This situation reminds me strongly of the efforts of the German
Government, by calumniating foreign nations, to build up a public
war psychology in 1914, the effort being repeated whenever some
new venture, such as the indiscriminate submarine warfare, was
about to be launched. Here in Japan the deliberate building up of
public animosity against foreign nations in general and the United
States in particular has doubtless a similar purpose—to strengthen
the hand of the military in its Manchurian venture in the face of
foreign, and especially American, opposition.

I believe that on the part of the Japanese it is a sign of weakness,
not of strength. The internal economic and financial situation in
Japan is serious and may become desperate. The plight of the farmers
is very bad, many industries are at low ebb, unemployment is steadily
increasing. The yen is falling and prices have not yet risen pro¬
portionately. Money cannot be obtained from abroad. I was
recently told, although I cannot vouch for the reliability of the in¬
formation, that the Government had tried without success to obtain
loans from England, France, and Holland in turn. It will become
increasingly difficult to obtain domestic loans. This situation is not
critical, but it may become so when the ability of the National Bank
of Japan to absorb domestic bonds comes to an end.

Meanwhile millions of yen are being squandered to support the
Manchurian venture, of which the eventual economic advantage is
highly problematical, and when the full purport of these expenses
becomes known to the people, in their own serious deprivation,
there is no telling what effect it will create. I believe that a steadily
increasing anxiety exists among the Government and the thinking
men of the country outside of the hotheaded military clique which
refuses to face these facts. It seems to be primarily this military
element—vocalized by such men as Shiratori—who believe that the
best way to obscure these facts is to work the public into a patriotic
and nationalistic fervour by representing foreign nations, particu¬
larly the United States, as trying to thwart Japan’s efforts for alleged
self-preservation.

Such a national temper is always dangerous. The German military
machine, supported by a carefully nurtured public war psychology,
took the bit in its teeth and overrode all restraining influences in
3

56 the assassin’s shadow lies across japan

1914. The Japanese military machine is not dissimilar. It has
been built for war, feels prepared for war, and would welcome war.
It has never yet been beaten and possesses unlimited self-confidence.
I am not an alarmist but I believe that we should have our eyes
open to all possible future contingencies. The facts of history would
render it criminal to close them.

Respectfully yours,

MANCHURIA AND THE LYTTON REPORT

Tokyo, October 8, 1932

Strictly Confidential

Dear Mr. Secretary, —Since my last letter to you the two out¬
standing events in Japan have been the recognition of Manchukuo
and the publication of the Lytton Report. The hastiness of the
Government’s action in recognizing Manchukuo had a twofold
purpose : to confront the League of Nations and the United States
with an accomplished fact before the Lytton Report could be acted
upon, and to afford a sop to the Army to prevent their wrecking the
present Saito Government and perhaps setting up a military dictator¬
ship. The net result has been the internal pacification of the
country, which is a great deal less restive than before the step
was taken.

The Japanese were apparently surprised when no action was
taken by the United States at the moment of recognition and that
the step caused so comparatively little repercussion in the world at
large. This feeling may have been one of relief, but I am inclined
to believe that the relief was tinged with a measure of disappoint¬
ment, because in the present temper of the country the last thing
the Japanese really want is to be ignored by the nations. They
prefer dramatics.

The reaction to the Lytton Report here has been just what was
expected—a general condemnation of the findings and an outburst
of self-righteous indignation, but without any serious attempt to
refute the findings save by blunt denials of their accuracy. This
public bluster is, however, not shared by the saner and more moderate
thinkers, of whom one, Baron Hayashi, Master of the Emperor’s
Household and a thoroughly outspoken’ man, recently observed
to a group of friends that he considered the Report an admirable
and well-balanced document, especially Chapter 6 indicating that
the Manchukuo regime had been set up by the Japanese military.
There are plenty of people in Japan who have serious misgivings as
to where the Manchurian venture is going to lead the country, but
the press does not dare to publish their views. The military are
still completely in control.

In explaining the present psychology of the Japanese, two recent
conversations are significant. Recently Prince Chichibu invited to

MANCHURIA AND THE LYTTON REPORT

67

dinner Frederick Moore, who has just come from the United States
and is to act as a Counsellor to the Japanese Delegation at the forth¬
coming meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations, and
questioned him for over an hour as to public opinion in America,
finally asking him point-blank whether it is true that the United
States is actively preparing for war with Japan. Such a question
from the Emperor’s brother is highly significant of the present
nervousness of the country. The other conversation was with a
friendly Japanese whose comments seem to me to size up the situa¬
tion as well as anything I have heard, and I therefore append a brief
resume of them. The kernel of his remarks lies in the statement that
the Army undertook the Manchurian venture because it felt that it
would lose all influence if it did not do something “ for the good of
the country.” Whatever developments may occur in the future,
there will therefore enter into the problem the important element
of “ saving face,” so essential in Oriental countries. Here, I think, is
the most dangerous factor in the whole situation. If the fanatical
military clique finds that its programme is being impeded and is
likely to fail, whether from internal or external influences, it is quite
capable of plunging the country into any kind of disaster rather than
give in to the saner and more moderate elements in the country and
acknowledging the defeat of their plans.

The anti-American press campaign is subsiding, although the
military will probably not permit it to cease altogether. Several
rather friendly articles have recently appeared and the President’s
message of sympathy in the apparent loss of the Japanese fliers who
were trying to win the prize offered by the newspaper, Hochi, will
have an excellent effect. A prominent American journalist told
me the other day that he had spoken to Shiratori of the absurdity
of the fear of the Japanese that the United States was preparing
for war with Japan, to which Shiratori replied : cc Of course it’s
absurd ; do you think we would have dared to attack Mr. Stimson
the way we have done if we thought there was any real danger of
war ? ”

The new Manchukuo envoy, Pao, is truculently asserting to all
and sundry that Manchukuo proposes to escape from Japanese
tutelage at the earliest possible moment, that most of the Chinese
ministers in Changchun are in the pay of the Japanese but that
he himself is 66 fairly independent,” et cetera, but I am inclined to
doubt his sincerity. He has also expressed his opinion that Henry
Pu-yi will soon become Emperor of a North China State, embracing
Manchuria, with his capital in Peiping. Some of my diplomatic
colleagues and foreign press correspondents seem to attach import¬
ance to his remarks, but neither Lindley nor I am impressed. The
diminutive Pao, who looks like a child, will probably continue to
“ talk big.” .

As for PUT 9WU future policy, it seems to me more than ever wise,

68 the assassin’s shadow lies across japan

while firmly maintaining our position with regard to the Kellogg
Pact, the Nine-Power Treaty, and the Open Door, to avoid any
unessential steps which might tend to reinflame public opinion and
give the military further strength. Friendly gestures such as the
comments about Japan in your recent speech in Philadelphia, the
friendly nature of which was finally acknowledged even by Shiratori,
and the President’s message of sympathy concerning the Hochi fliers,
tend to help the hand of the moderate elements in the country.
This, I gather, is your own feeling. It seems to me that the more the
League’s action on the Lytton Report can be tempered with friendly
and constructive suggestions, the more we shall gain rather than
lose in the long run. Our only hope of the eventual enforcement of
the peace treaties in the Far East lies in encouraging the moderate
elements in Japan.

In this connection, a remark made to the Military Attach^ by a
Japanese member of the General Staff is significant. The officer said :
“ We are working overtime nowadays from 8 till 6 because we have
to run two separate departments, the War Ministry and the Foreign
Ofiice.”

Respectfully yours,

A JAPANESE FRIEND EXPLAINS THE ARMY’S
FEAR OF RUSSIA

A Japanese friend states that, when the Army first started on its
Manchurian adventure, the people of Japan looked doubtfully at
the matter. Later, when the League and the United States started
to condemn the Japanese for their actions, the people rallied behind
the Army, like all members of a family will stand behind one member
who is being attacked from outside. Just now they will not admit
that the Army was wrong, but, just like a family, eventually they
will admit that maybe the person who was attacked was in the
wrong. Any violent move against Japan now will strengthen this
family feeling and keep the Army in power, but if everyone stays
quiet for a while, there will be a feeling arising against the Army
and maybe the Shidehara diplomacy will return. Nations are like
people ; they do not like to be disliked.

The Army is trying very hard to keep in power, and they are
trying to keep the people aroused. They are trying to show the
people that the Army is necessary to the country. That was one of
the reasons why they started the Manchurian affair. There was a
feeling in Japan that the country had to have an economic outlet,
but also the Army felt that it would lose all influence if it did not
do something for the good of the country. If disarmament was
successful, the Army would not amount to anything in the future, so
they had to act to save their position.

The Japanese people are very nervous. They are like a boy who

WHEN JAPAN PIPED DOWN 69

has hit smother boy and is looking around fearfully, expecting some¬
one to punish them. They will be nervous until after the League
meets to discuss the Manchurian affair.

The Japanese Army’s operations are really aimed at Russia—not at
present, but at some time in the future. Japan is afraid of Bolshevism
and feels that it must drive Bolshevism out of Asia.

WHEN JAPAN PIPED DOWN

December 3, 1932

Strictly Confidential

Dear Mr. Secretary, —The political situation here is very quiet,
except for one significant factor, which is that the powers that be,
including General Araki himself, seem to think that political assas¬
sinations in Japan have gone far enough and have determined to
put a stop to them by striking at the soul of the whole movement,
namely, old Mitsuru Toyama of the Black Dragon Society himself.
His house was recently raided and searched by the police and his
son arrested. Hitherto Toyama has been immune, but recent
rumours of plans to kill Saito, Makino, Ikki, and Takahashi—after the
political murder of four of the best men in the country (Hamaguchi,
Inukai, Inouye, and Dan)—determined the Government that it was
time to take drastic measures to put an end to assassination. The
fact that the Government dared to take these steps—Toyama having
been looked upon by a large section of the public, including the
military, as a sort of superpatriot—is significant of its growing con¬
fidence and authority. This does not mean that the Saito cabinet
will necessarily last beyond the next session of the Diet, for it very
likely will not. But it does mean that the chauvinistic military hot¬
heads and the so-called patriotic societies, who were directly or
indirectly responsible for the former political terrorism, are less firmly
intrenched and are, it is hoped, giving way to a more constructive
statesmanship.

The anti-American press campaign has, for the present, practi¬
cally ceased. I am inclined to think that-had something to do

with this and I dare say that some order to that effect may have
come from the Emperor himself. It is significant that the personnel
of the press bureau of the Ministry of War has recently been com¬
pletely changed. One of the new officers assigned to the bureau had
been transferred from the Japanese Legation in Mexico, and when
our Military Attache smilingly expressed to him the hope that he
was going to put a stop to the anti-American press campaign, he
replied that this was exactly what he was going to do. General
Araki has recently been unexpectedly cordial in his meetings with
our Military Attache, as he has with me. Shiratori has lost much
of his influence : his intimate contacts in the Army have been trans-

70 THE ASSASSIN’S SHADOW LIES ACROSS JAPAN

ferred, and his political ally, Kaku Mori, the Seiyukai 1 schemer, is
ill and temporarily out of the picture. Shiratori has been singing
on a much lower note in his press conferences. In my telegram of
November 28, I gave further reasons for the present quiescence of
the anti-American feeling in the country. But of course this feeling
is always present and would rapidly be fanned into flame by any
untoward incident.

With regard to the forthcoming meeting of the Assembly in Geneva,
after talking with many diplomatic colleagues, foreign press cor¬
respondents, and American residents who know Japan, I find no
one who believes that Japan will make substantial concessions,
certainly none that would alter or modify Japan’s recognition of
Manchukuo. On the other hand, I think it possible that Japan
may have something in reserve to bring forward at the last
moment.

I base my supposition on three reasons. One is the unlikelihood
that Japan will be so rash as to attempt to face the moral condemnation
of the whole world, in spite of all the brave talk which is now taking
place. It seems possible that they may have some plan by which they
hope to forestall a vote of censure. The second is that Japan is arguing
its case at Geneva. If the nation is as sure of its ground as it claims,
why argue ? In the third place it is becoming increasingly evident
that the recent drastic decline in the yen exchange and consequent
further impairment of the country’s credit abroad are to be traced
largely to a lack of confidence in Japan’s political relations with the
world at large. Until this feeling is liquidated, the danger of financial
and social dislocation through the collapse of the currency is ever
present, while foreign capital markets cannot be counted on to come
to her aid.

It seems to me that the Japanese are trying to ameliorate the feeling
aroused by the Lytton Report against their actions, and that having
put the best face possible on their behaviour they may possibly come
forward at the last moment,, before any action is taken against them,
with some suggestions looking towards an eventual settlement some
years hence. I do not for a moment believe, however, that any
suggestions which they may make will contemplate the relinquish¬
ment of their recognition of Manchukuo as an “ independent state.”
The members of my staff and I have been endeavouring for the past
week to obtain some inkling of what the suggestions, if any, will
, consist of, but we have had no success. It is probable that the discus-
' sions in the Assembly of the League will continue for some time, and
if I succeed in obtaining any idea as to Japan’s intentions, I shall
inform you immediately by cable.

In my cablegram of November 28, I suggested that restraint be
exercised in handling the Sino-Japanese dispute, because coercive
measures would undoubtedly result in more firmly welding the

Pft 1 The more conservative of the two chief political parties in Japan, the Minseito
being the more liberal.

SECRETARY STIMSON REPLIES

71

Japanese nation together in opposition to the League and the United
States. Any hint of force, either military or economic, I believe,
would result in the uniting of the nation behind the military and
would completely overwhelm the more moderate influences which
are working beneath the surface to restore Japan to its former high
place in the councils of nations. Moral pressure, however, I think,
can be exerted without this danger and might tend to widen the
rift now beginning to be noticed between the military and the moderate
elements. Eventually the force of public opinion throughout the
world, coupled with the difficulty and overburdening expense of
pacifying Manchuria, might cause Japan to change its attitude
towards the problem. Anyway, as I see it, it is our only chance,
as the threat of material pressure would almost certainly have the
opposite effect from that desired. Thus the time factor is important,
and a gradual rather than an immediate solution of the problem
indicated.

My speech in Osaka appears to have been helpful. Its main purpose
was to correct the general belief here that the American people are
not behind you in your active support of the peace treaties. The
contrary was clearly brought out by the words :

As for the American people, they are heart and soul behind this
[peace] movement and behind those who have laboured to bring
about a situation where warfare between civilized nations will
be as extinct as human slavery in civilized nations is to-day. This
peace movement represents a fundamental, united, and unanimous
desire of the American people as a whole. The position of the
United States in this issue is clear-cut and unambiguous. It has
repeatedly been made clear.

On the other hand, the speech was eminently friendly in tone and
substance, so that the pill was administered without causing irritation.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs last night expressed to me personally
his appreciation of the address.

May I take this occasion to say that I think your instructions to
Norman Davis and Hugh Wilson relating to the Manchurian issue
meet the situation exactly ?

Respectfully yours,

SECRETARY STIMSON REPLIES
January 21, 1933

The fortnightly pouch came in late last night with a very pleasant
personal letter from Mr. Stimson in which he says, among other
things :

The picture which, you give of the situation is substantially in
accord with ours, and our line of procedure has been substantially
in accord with that which you suggest.

7 2 the assassin’s shadow lies across japan

I note with special interest the effort which you have been making
to explain to the Japanese the feeling of the American people
and my position in support of the peace treaties. The paragraph
which you quote from your recent address states our position
exactly. I am sure that what you are doing will be very helpful.

Thus the Embassy appears to be in the clear up to date.

2

THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

(February 20, 1933—February ii, 1936)

Nobody could miss the political significance of Japan’s decision to
quit the League of Nations. It marked a clear break with the Western
powers and prepared the way for Japan’s later adherence to the
Axis. But the immediate consequence of Japan’s departure from the
League was not a swing towards extremism either in domestic or
foreign affairs. Quite the opposite. Having made their hostile
political gesture towards the Western powers, the leaders of Japan
k took a line that looked almost like appeasement—at any rate as far
as the United States was concerned. But in spite of its apparent
moderation, Japanese foreign policy remained unyielding on essentials:
the Naval Limitation Treaties were not renewed, more Japanese troops
poured into China. But events did not move fast enough to suit the
militarists. The longer the period of calm, the more intense the
storm.

JAPAN DECIDES TO QUIT THE LEAGUE
February 20, 1933

The cabinet to-day voted to secede from the League of Nations
as soon as the Assembly adopts the Report and Recommendations
of the Committee of Nineteen. It is therefore evident that the opposi¬
tion of Saito, Takahashi, and others has been definitely overcome,
and the haste with which the cabinet acted indicates that the step
was taken as a threat in the hope of preventing the Assembly from
adopting the Report and as another gesture of chauvinistic independ¬
ence. The step will have to receive the sanction of the Emperor
and the Privy Council, and it is not made clear how and when the
secession will take place, but there now seems little doubt that it
will go through.

My own guess was wrong ; until recently I did not think they
would do it, and yet it is right in line with everything that they have
done so far, the hasty recognition of Manchukuo and all the rest of it.
Their policy is to face the world with one fait accompli after another.
The military are still supreme and still form a dictatorship of terrorism.
There seems little doubt that Saito was told to fall into line or else
there would be an internal crack-up in the country commencing
with the assassination of himself and others who had opposed with¬
drawal. The Genro himself is practically helpless before the military
clique and will presumably be overridden right along. The saner
heads in the Government are in just the same position as they were at

74 THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

the time of the organization of the Saito cabinet ; from patriotic motives
they give in to the violent elements, always hoping in vain that later
they will get control and that in the meantime it is best for the country
to avoid further affairs like that of May 15. In the meantime, Shiratori
announces that the advance into Jehol may be expected to start any
day. If Japan does go on to Peiping there will be great risk of a general
war. The outlook could hardly be blacker than it is.

Anyway, I am entirely in accord with the League’s action and with
the Report and Recommendations. Now that Japan has finally
determined to defy the world and to isolate herself, putting into
practice the “ Back to Asia 99 movement and with the probable
intention of eventually formulating a Monroe Doctrine for the Far
East, there seems to be no further purpose in trying to humour her
by patience. I am afraid that we are in for a very bad time ahead.

LET THE PEOPLE KNOW

February 21, 1933

Fleisher came in to ask my opinion of a rather sensational dispatch
which he was about to cable to the New Tork Herald Tribune setting
forth the dangers of the present situation and the general talk of the
possibility of war. I said that in my personal opinion it was well
to let the public at home realize the potential dangers ahead, and
since his dispatch would be published in Paris it might likewise have
a salutary effect in Geneva* I told him that I saw no reason for
camouflaging the gravity of the situation.

JAPAN’S BREAK WITH THE WEST
AND WHAT IT MEANS

February 23, 1933

After several days of thought and consultation I have tried to bring
my thoughts into focus with the following result:

In any estimate of the situation in the Far East, full consideration
should be given to the following points :

(1) By the cabinet’s decision to secede from the League of Nations,
Japan has taken steps to burn her most important bridge with the
outside world. This step represents a fundamental defeat for the
moderate elements in the country and the complete supremacy of
the military. Since the beginning of the Sino-Japanese dispute, every
important action of the League of Nations has been forestalled or
succeeded by a fait accompli here, so that Japan’s independence of the
West, and her disregard of Western interference in her affairs and
with what she believes to be her vital interests, might be clearly
demonstrated. There will be no surrender to moral or other pressure
from the West. The military clique and, as a result of military
propaganda, the public are fully prepared to fight rather than give

japan’s break with the west and what it means 75

in. At present the moral obloquy of the world is a negligible force
in Japan. Far from serving to modify the determination of the
Japanese, it merely tends to strengthen it. Were the Government to
show any inclination to temporize or compromise with the League of
Nations, further assassinations if not internal revolution would almost
certainly result.

(2) This national temper is based on many factors, of which the
following are important:

(a) The military are determined to maintain their prestige and

to permit no interference whatsoever.

(b) The essentially important element of “ saving face 55 permits

no backward step.

(c) The belief that Manchuria is the “ life line ” of Japan has

been carefully inculcated among the people.

(d) Future financial difficulties due to the huge expenses of the

Manchurian campaign are totally disregarded by the
military, which simply refuses to be bothered with ideas of
retrenchment in matters touching their province.

(e) The Japanese are fundamentally incapable of comprehending

the sanctity of contractual obligations when such obliga¬
tions conflict with what they conceive to be their own
interests.

(3) As for the incursion into Jehol, I have reason to believe that the
Japanese are taking special precautions to avoid crossing the Great
Wall, even although the campaign may be rendered considerably
more costly and difficult by this decision. It would be unwise, however,
to overlook the risk that developments or incidents, now unforeseen,
may lead to the taking of Peiping and Tientsin, which would of
course immediately bring foreign interests into direct clash with
Japan. Japan is perfectly capable of replying to any action of the
League in applying active sanctions by promptly occupying North
China. This really constitutes the greatest potential danger for the
future.

(4) Finally, we must bear in mind the fact that a considerable
section of the public and the Army, influenced by military propaganda,
believes that eventual war between either the United States or Russia,
or both, and Japan is inevitable. The military machine, already
in a high state of efficiency, is steadily and rapidly being strengthened
and its arrogance and self-confidence are complete. The Navy is
becoming increasingly bellicose. With this temper present in the
Army, the Navy, and the public, the risk is always present that any
incident tending to inflame public opinion might lead Japan to take
radical steps without counting the cost thereof.

The foregoing diagnosis represents the opinion not only of the
principal members of the Embassy staff but of most of my diplomatic
colleagues and other foreigners in Tokyo. These facts and views
are of course reflected in my frequent reports to the Secretary of
State.

7 6

THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

COMIC RELIEF

In these politically dark days in Washington it must have brought
joy to the heart of the Department when it recently received a telegram
from one of my distinguished colleagues in a European capital:
“ The Queen has given birth to a daughter. I have congratulated
the Prime Minister.”

CAN ANY PEACE PACT KEEP THE PEACE ?
February 23, 1933

In the diary I recently said that I was in accord with the Report
and Recommendations of the League of Nations in the Sino-Japanese
dispute. This statement must be modified, as indeed many of the
statements in this diary, in which I am merely thinking aloud, are
modified from time to time on maturer thought and consideration.
The recommendations may be all right in theory, but the trouble is
that they are ineffective in practice because they don’t fit the facts
and at least at present are unworkable. No doubt, from the League’s
point of view, it could hardly have acted otherwise, and once having
become involved, spurred on by our own Government, it has at least
shown patience and restraint. Yet the more one mulls over the whole
problem, the more one is inclined to question whether the peace
machinery which the world has been trying so earnestly and pains¬
takingly to erect these last fourteen years is basically sound, or rather
whether it is basically practical.

To let one’s imagination rove a bit—compare the Manchurian
situation in 1931 with the Cuban situation in 1898. If the latter
crisis had developed subsequent to the conclusion of the Kellogg Pact,
and if the Maine had been blown up in Havana Harbour, resulting
in a war psychology sweeping over our country like a forest fire and
the words 66 Remember the Maine ” on the lips of every man, woman,
and child in the land, could our Government ever have prevented
hostilities with Spain? McKinley wanted to avoid war in 1898 but
couldn’t. Even if the Kellogg Pact had existed at that date, might
we also not have occupied Cuba without declaring war, on the grounds
of self-defence, forced by public opinion to do so ? The public guesses
but does not know to-day who blew up the Maine . The public guesses
but does not know to-day who engineered the incidents which led to
the Japanese attack of September 18, 1931.

Of course the Cuban situation was very different from the
Manchurian situation in many respects, for our action was basically
humanitarian while Japan’s action was expediency pure and simple.
Yet the force of the war psychology was equally potent in both cases.
There are many who are convinced that Japan had long intended
to take Manchuria, just as she took Korea, and was merely awaiting
a favourable opportunity. Very likely they are right.

CAN ANY PEACE PACT KEEP THE PEACE?

77

My point is not to excuse Japan but to question whether the peace
machinery is sufficient to deter any country, even our own, from
hostilities if the urge is sufficiently strong. Could the Kellogg Pact,
for instance, conceivably have prevented the South African War?

-, of the British Embassy, tells me that his father was literally

stoned in his own village for advocating peace at that time. The
Jameson Raid was quite as outrageous a procedure as the Japanese
action of September 18, 1931, and the British themselves would have
condemned it if it hadn’t been for the Kaiser’s telegram to Kruger.
That telegram, trivial incident as it was, furnished the match that
set the war fever ablaze. These things will always create in every
country a war psychology, tending to override all other considerations
and needing no military propaganda to inflame it.

Situations and circumstances similar or analogous to those men¬
tioned will with almost mathematical certainty arise in future.
Hostilities are steadily occurring and will continue to occur in spite
of the Kellogg Pact, the Covenant of the League of Nations, and all
the rest of the machinery so laboriously and studiously created. If
the world allows Japan to break those covenants with impunity, not
only will the peace covenants themselves lose their force and sanctity
but the stability of treaties everywhere will inevitably suffer. They
are suffering already in many parts of the world as a more or less
direct result of the failure or inability of the world to call Japan to
account. What are we going to do about it ?

Moral sanctions ? When a nation is beset with a war psychology,
the moral obloquy of the rest of the world is a negligible force, except
that it tends to strengthen, not to weaken, that nation’s warlike
temper, as witness the situation in Japan to-day. It will always be
questionable, furthermore, how long the unanimous moral obloquy
of the world can continue, for eventual breaks in the solid front are
practically certain, induced by self-interest.

Then if moral ostracism is ineffective, or likely to be ineffective,
what more can we do ? How can we implement the Kellogg Pact ?
Certainly not by force of arms, which would be contrary to the very
principle for which the Kellogg Pact stands. The great war to end
wars has signally failed in that particular purpose. If other world
wars are the only method of protecting our peace structure, then we
had better abandon that structure here and now, because civiliza¬
tion itself will be in jeopardy. Severance of diplomatic relations
would be futile unless followed by other steps. Arms embargoes
are generally ineffective in practice. In the present case they would
simply aid the aggressor. There remains an economic and financial
boycott. Probably futile in practice. In the present case, an
economic boycott would simply cause Japan to occupy those parts
of China whence needed supplies could be obtained, with the re¬
sultant risk of a general world conflagration. Financially Japan
cannot even now obtain a loan abroad ; she has tried and failed,
but she still carries on.

THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

78

Clearly, then, our peace machinery while magnificent in theory is
ineffective in practice. It is ineffective because it is superficial. It is
like a poultice prescribed for cancer by the surgeon long after the
cancer has been allowed to develop. Most of our international ills
closely resemble the ravages of cancer. They generally begin on a
small scale as a result of long irritation on a given spot. Even the
most skilful physician may not be able to sense the irritation in
advance, but the moment the obvious symptoms appear, he seeks
to eradicate the disease by treatment long before operation becomes
necessary.

The future peace machinery of the world must go one step further
than the physician. It must sense the spots of irritation and diagnose
the future potentialities of disease and attempt treatment long
before the disease itself materializes. This, of course, is pure theory.
How it can ever be worked out in practice is the real problem which
ought to be studied by our usually ineffective peace organizations
precisely as 'the Rockefeller Foundation and other similar bodies are
constantly conducting their research for the elimination of cancer
to-day. To put the matter in a nutshell, the peace machinery of the
world must be far more radical, far more prescient, far more con¬
cerned with facts, conditions, and circumstances than with theories
than it is to-day, if it is ever to succeed in abolishing war.

A DIPLOMAT’S WORK AND PLAY
March 14, 1933

Lunched at Hodogaya Country Club and played golf with Goold
and Dennison, two. Standard Oil men, and Parsons, my private
secretary. A most dramatic match. On the eighteenth, a par-4
hole, Dennison, who is a star player, and I needed both best-ball
and aggregate to win the nine. Parsons went down in a birdie 3.
Dennison was fully thirty yards from the green, chipped, hit the
bamboo flagpole, and dropped straight into the hole for an eagle 2.
That gave us best-ball, but we still needed aggregate. Goold and
I had both had trouble; he was on the green in four while I was
several feet off the green in the same number. Amazingly my
twenty-foot approach over a rough winter green went in for a 5 while
Goold was down in 5 also, and thus we saved the day, to the perfect
disgust of our opponents, by what can only be called two miraculous
shots at the critical moment. Such incidents are half the fun of
golf.

Speaking of golf, I remember that in Constantinople some of the
hard-boiled business men used to chaff the Embassy people rather
disagreeably because we didn’t sit at our desks daily from 9
till 6 the way the business men did and therefore were unaccus¬
tomed to a real day’s work. But what they forgot is that we, the
muchrmaligned diplomats, are really on the job throughout the
twenty-four hours. I arise at 6.30 and get to work at 7.15. If we

IMPERIAL DUCK HUNT

79

play golf from 2 till 5, it means, for me, almost invariable work
from five o’clock up to any hour. Three times last week Alice
and I were awakened from “ the first sweet sleep of night ” about
midnight by telephone calls from the chancery to read incoming
telegrams, some of which had to be acted upon immediately. During
our free evenings at home I have to read a vast amount of literature
which I should never think of reading if it wasn’t in connection with
the job, and on many of the other evenings we have to attend official
dinners which are generally a great deal less amusing than sitting
at one’s desk watching the hands of the clock get around to 6.
I doubt if the working hours of the average business man abroad
total anything like ours.

Speaking further of golf, I remember a rule printed in all serious¬
ness on the score cards of the Constantinople Golf Club, to wit:

4 4 A ball found in a sun ’crack, hoof mark, or rut on the putting
green may be removed without penalty.” The Turkish cavalry and
field artillery, which manoeuvre in that region, resented the golf
course and, in spite of barbed wire protecting it, used to gallop across
the links, often when the ground was soft from rain, always con¬
centrating on the putting greens. Encouraging for the golfer !

IMPERIAL DUCK HUNT

March 23, 1933

Alice, Elsie, and I started out in a dismal downpour of rain for
the Imperial Duck Hunt. These hunts occur at intervals throughout
the winter and every embassy and legation is invited to one of them,
including the chief of mission, the counsellor, and the military, naval,
and commercial attaches with wives and daughters. One of the
Imperial princes also attends, and we were delighted when we found
that the Chichibus had chosen to come to-day because they liked the
crowd, which included several of the other Embassy staffs. We met
at the Asakusa Kaminari Mon Station at 9.15 a.m. and went by
special electric train to Bashu Osawa, about fifty minutes’ ride, and
then a walk across the fields of some fifteen minutes (some went by
automobiles) to the Imperial hunting lodge. The wild ducks, of
which there are thousands in the vicinity, settle in canals attracted
by tame decoys. For each “ hunt ” ten guests are selected and are
given great nets, like butterfly nets although much larger and broader
at the mouth. Each guest has a number, and at a given signal he
runs to a marked station, five guests on each side of the canal, behind
parapets, which are built on both sides of the narrow but deep canals.
The wild ducks, as soon as they hear the* “ hunters,” rise from the
canals, and the ec sport ” is to catch them in the nets as they rise. It
isn’t sport at all because it is almost impossible not to catch those
that fly up within reach of one’s net, unless they escape because

wo nets cl&sh. Four c^me my way and I easily caught them all. It

8o

THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

is all a matter of luck how many come one’s way—or ill luck, for
there is no pleasure in catching the helpless creatures. Lindley
caught ten during the day, most of the guests one or two, some none.
Elsie caught one, much against her will. Alice did not participate.
If a duck flies up and escapes, a falcon is sent after it to bring it
down. To-day was bad, for there was no wind and many of the
ducks wouldn’t rise. I was twice asked by attendants to scoop them
out of the water but absolutely refused to do so, although others did.
They want to get all the ducks possible, because, after giving six to
each ambassador and relative quotas to the guests of lesser rank,
the remainder are used by the Imperial household.

The real amusement of the day, which turned out to be a delicious,
clear, sunny spring day after the rain ceased, was in the minor
sports which were carried on in front of the lodge—a baby golf
course, a clock putting green, ping-pong, quoits, battledore and
shuttle-cock—and a delicious luncheon. We were with the Chichibus
most of the time—I beat him in the ping-pong tournament, but the
Princess finally won the tournament. They are perfectly informal
and very congenial personally, and we thanked our stars that it
wasn’t one of the other princes because most of them are stiff and
out of their element with foreigners. Elsie, especially, had a grand
time. The Chichibus say that they enjoyed the dinner and movie at
our Embassy so much that they want us to ask them again soon ; I
think the truth is that it is the only way in which they can see a good
movie, and we shall arrange it after Easter. Prince Chichibu is a
brother of the Emperor, and his lovely wife was the daughter of
Tsuneo Matsudaira, formerly Ambassador in Washington, where she
went to school.

GOOD NEWS FROM SECRETARY HULL
March 23, 1933

Returned at 5 and found a very pleasant telegram from Secre¬
tary Hull, referring to my resignation, which I had placed in
the President’s hands by letter of December 5, and stating that he
was happy to inform me that as the President was satisfied with my
services here, he desired me to continue as Ambassador to Japan.
This is very gratifying. I hadn’t expected such a message, having
supposed that if the President wished me to remain he would simply
not appoint a successor. This is really tantamount to a definite
appointment under the new administration and it makes us very
happy to know definitely that we are to carry on.

JAPAN QUITS THE LEAGUE

March 27, 1933

Japan’s formal withdrawal from the League of Nations was passed
by the Privy Council and the Emperor and cabled to Geneva to-day,

JAPAN QUITS THE LEAGUE ^

while an Imperial Rescript by the Emperor and a statement by Saito
were published here. ^ These and other similar documents talk much
about all Japan’s; actions being aimed at the preservation of peace,
but the trouble is that the Japanese interpretation of that phrase is
diametrically different from our own and the League’s interpreta¬
tion. By the preservation of peace Japan means the cleaning up of
Manchuria by force of arms, until no opponent is left to challenge
her control and a peaceful situation will have been brought about
with Japan in command. 3

If I remember correctly, the document by which Japan announced
her entry into the World War with the Allies stated that she did
so for the purpose of preserving peace in the Orient and then, quite
properly, she proceeded to clean the Germans out of China. But
the term “ preservation of peace ” was just as inappropriate then
as it is now. And yet I doubt if one Japanese in a hundred really
believes that they have actually broken the Kellogg Pact, the Nine-
Power Treaty, and the Covenant of the League. A comparatively
few thinking men are capable of frankly facing the facts, and one
Japanese said to me : “ Yes, we’ve broken every one of these instru¬
ments ; we’ve waged open war ; the arguments of c self-defence ’
and 4 self-determination for Manchuria 5 are rot; but we needed
Manchuria, and that’s that.” But such men are in the minority.
The great majority of Japanese are astonishingly capable of really
fooling themselves ; they really believe that everything they have
done is right, that the Lytton Commission was misled by Chinese
propaganda and that the foreign powers and the League of Nations
have likewise been misled into entirely false conceptions of the facts.

Such a mentality is a great deal harder to deal with than a men¬
tality which, however brazen, knows that it is in the wrong. The
great majority of Japanese—and I include intelligent Japanese—do
not know that they are in the wrong, and therefore their deter¬
mination to resist foreign interference is doubly resolute and strong.
Their mental processes and methods of reaching conclusions are
radically different from ours ; the more one associates with them
the more one realizes it; this is one of the great cleavages between
the East and the West. The Westerner believes that because the
Japanese has adopted Western dress, language, and customs he
must think like a Westerner. No greater error can be made. This
is one of the reasons why treaty commitments between the West
and the East will always be open to misinterpretation and subject
to controversy. It isn’t that the Japanese necessarily has his tongue
in his cheek when he signs the obligation. It merely means that
when that obligation runs counter to his own interests, as he con¬
ceives them, he will interpret the obligation to suit himself and,
according to his own lights and mentality, he will very likely be
perfectly honest in so doing. This, in fact, is the situation in the
Sino-Japanese dispute to-day. No wonder that a solution is difficult
if not impossible.

82

THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

As for Japan’s action in fortifying Yap and the other mandated
islands in contravention to express treaty stipulations, of which we
have abundant first-hand evidence, it is perhaps difficult to see how
even Japanese mentality can square this with their solemn under¬
takings and contractual obligations, but here again there enters the
unquestioned fact that the Oriental conception of such obligations
is not our conception. This whole question of the mandated islands
is full of potential dynamite and may yet cause as much trouble as
Manchuria. This post is not likely to be a quiescent one for some
time to come, but I am not grousing.

Incidentally, the Japanese Government has solved with the wisdom
of Solomon the awkward question of permitting foreign astronomical
expeditions to visit these very islands for the total eclipse of the
sun next year. They have decided to send them all down on a
Japanese warship as the guests of Japan ! They will be honoured
guests but mighty carefully chaperoned guests too. The invitation,
or order—as you will—was conveyed to us officially in reply to our
application on behalf of an American expedition for permission to
visit the islands.

JAPANESE AID CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKE VICTIMS

Nine small Japanese boys in a Sunday school at Meguro have
sent me 96 sen (about 20 cents) of their weekly pocket-money for
the sufferers in the California earthquake in recognition of American
help to Japan after the great Japanese earthquake in 1923. I have
answered their letter with appreciation, have given both their
letter and my reply to the press, and shall send the money to the
American Red Cross through the State Department in an official
dispatch, just as if the little gift had been a large one. The principle
is the same.

Incidentally, the Japanese Red Cross did subscribe 10,000 yen
for our earthquake sufferers, half of which was given by the city of
Tokyo, but this gift, considering the millions of dollars that we sent
to Japan in 1923, impressed me far less than the 96 sen given by
the boys.

P.S. SHE DIDN’T GET THE JOB

The following translation of a letter just received is quite de¬
lightful :

Sir, —With the advent of the spring season, we feel very pleasant
in and outside our houses. Are you and members of your family
enjoying sound health at this season of the year ? I am happy to
say that I am in excellent health. Is the capital of Tokyo under¬
going a change in all spheres of activity ?

I am guite willing to come and reside in Tokyo as soon as

THE BURDENS OP SPEECH-MAKING gg

possible. While serving in your household years ago, I felt as if
I was at my home.

Will you be so kind as to find a job for me in Tokyo ? I beg
you will be so good as to let me know your present address.
Trusting to be favoured with a reply soon.

Your obedient servant,

MATSUOKA REPORTS ON GENEVA AND POINTS

WEST

May i, 1933

The really interesting event was my talk with Matsuoka, just
returned from Geneva and the United States; as a matter of fact,
he did nearly all the talking. His use of English is perfect but he
gives an impression of great self-assurance and conceit. Judging
from some of his published interviews and speeches I should say
that he is capable of expressing a wide range of opinions and senti¬
ments, according to the nature of his audience. To-day he told me
of his endeavours in the United States to improve American-Japanese
relations and of his speeches to American-born Japanese on the
Pacific Coast to the effect that they must be loyal Americans. He
told me that in his opinion the development of good relations between
Japan and the United States should be the corner-stone of Japanese
policy and that he had preached this to the cabinet this morning
and was going to work for it here.

From the way he talked I gather that he addressed them like a
group of schoolboys. I spoke to him of the harm done by the anti-
American propaganda in the press. Recently he said to someone
that if he were the next Foreign Minister he would do thus and so.
Obviously his head is badly swelled by the adulation of the Japanese
public and by his reception as a hero on his return from Geneva.'

THE BURDENS OF SPEECH-MAKING
May 21, 1933

Worked all day writing a speech for the dedication of the new St.
Luke’s Hospital building, and finished it. Last Sunday I completed
two speeches, for Memorial Day at Yokohama and for the com¬
mencement exercises of the American School. The difficulty in all
these speeches is to get started on a theme, but once started the rest
is easy. For Memorial Day and the American School it was simple
to draw on former speeches made in Turkey, but St. Luke’s required
an entirely new approach. I profoundly hope that these three will
suffice until autumn, but one can never tell. These speeches are
really millstones ; they are inseparable from the job, but I am getting
harder boiled about accepting invitations as time goes on. I have
made thirty-five speeches since our arrival in Japan a year ago.

84

THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

MORE TROUBLE IN NORTH CHINA
May 23, 1933

.On the basis of a note sent me hurriedly at 6 p.m. by a Japanese
friend of the Embassy, I cabled the Department that the Japanese
Army had received explicit instructions not to enter Peiping, and
that if there should be any tendency to break in, further more drastic
instructions were in readiness. It looks as if our diagnosis sent last
week, that the Japanese would merely “ invest ” Peiping and then
negotiate with the Chinese to withdraw in return for assurances that
the Chinese would cease attacking them at the Wall, were correct.
But there is evidence that the Japanese want to set up a buffer state
in North China and they may be successful. This military activity
around Peiping on the eve of Viscount Ishii’s conversation in Wash¬
ington 1 doesn’t look any too well. The lack of co-ordination between
Japan’s military and diplomatic actions and policies is very un¬
fortunate ; just when the Manchurian situation was fading out of the
picture with every probability of ultimate tacit acceptance by the
world, the Japanese Army gets itself on the front page again and
creates the impression abroad that it is still running amok (which
it is), and at just the moment when the nations are really trying—
or at least going through the motions of trying—to get together on
some practical disarmament, security, and non-aggression agreement,
I know, that many of our Japanese friends here are really writhing
at the situation but are powerless to influence it. •

KURUSU ON STIMSON

My secretary, J. G. Parsons, writes : “ Last evening Mr. Kurusu
and I were fingering the last number of Foreign Affairs and, referring to
Stimson’s article, I ventured the remark that Stimson was a great and
sincere idealist. Kurusu’s answering remark was, ‘ It’s easy to be an
idealist when you’re not in trouble.’ This to me was a perfect example
of the essentially defensive psychology entertained by many Japanese
of influence which has promoted their aggressive action. I sincerely
believe it is no stretch of the imagination for even educated Japanese
to believe the dogma of ‘ self-defence ’ of which we heard so much
last summer. It seems to me that until this notion that the Japanese
are in trouble is dispelled there will be no halt in the somewhat
misnamed * expansionist ’ movement of the Army. While I do not
dispute that the military entertains visions of Asiatic hegemony, I
feel that its strength is rooted in a defensive attitude, a fear of Russia
of Japan’s security. Therefore it is ‘ Conquer or die.’ ”

1 This took place while Viscount Ishii was en route to the 1933 World Economic
Conference in London.

FOR a “ FACULTY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL HEALTH ”

85

FOR A “ FACULTY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL

HEALTH ”

Address at the Opening of the Mew Unit of St. Luke's Medical
Centre, Tokyo, June 5, 1333

The truth which men of vision of all ages have felt is that the human
famil y is a unit. Yet the practical consummation of this fundamental
truth is inevitably a slow and gradual process. The thought has been
cradled in the past, as it will be fostered in the future, by individuals
in every nation who insist on looking about them and whose interests
are not confined to their own home or to their own creed or to their
own country.

In this philosophy of the unity of the human family, no element
makes a stronger appeal to our common humanity than physical
suffering, for in the relief of disease and pain a broader and deeper
significance than mere utilitarianism is involved : our hospitals
teach compassion, and the veneration which they invoke is funda¬
mentally due to the fact that they stand for love and the responsibility
of mankind as a whole for the welfare of humanity.

It was this enlightened philosophy that led thousands of parishes
of the Episcopal Church in America, the Rockefeller Foundation,
and man y progressive and public-spirited individuals to contribute to
the erection and operation of this noble building which we open
to-day. That the establishment of St. Luke’s Hospital in Tokyo was
a joint and co-operative undertaking is forcefully attested by the
open-hearted and munificent gift from His Imperial Majesty, the
late Emperor of Japan, and by most generous contributions from
the Imperial household, the Department of Home Affairs, the city
of Tokyo, and other organizations, and by a group of prominent
Japanese gentlemen including Count Goto, Marquis Okuma, Vis¬
count Shibusawa, and many others. The assistance given by the
Japanese Council, who, in co-operation with the American Council,
have been most generous and helpful in giving advice and assistance
when most needed, has played a prominent part in the development
of this whole great organization, while the success of St. Lukes
Hospital and its affiliated activities is due in great measure to the
vision and faith and untiring energy of one man, Dr. Rudolph Bolhng
Teusler ably supported by his efficient associates representing both
of our nations. I heartily associate myself with the well-deserved
tributes that have been paid to-day and congratulate the dreamer

of a dream that has come true. • . 4 ,

It is not my purpose to-day to describe in detail the background
and history of the hospital. Others who have been more intimately
associated with its development have dealt with this aspect far more
effectively. My own thoughts may find expression-inadequate, I

86

THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

fear, but not the less earnest—in the broad significance of this building
and all it stands for.

Far above national statecraft and politics stands that noble philo¬
sophy, of which I have spoken, that the human family is a unit. It
is a sublime conception of mankind, a conception towards which the
forces of nature must inevitably exert their impelling influence,
gradual perhaps but not the less certain of eventual realization. Has
not the whole tendency of civilization been in that direction ? The
prehistoric family found that its better interests lay in tribal associa¬
tion. The tribe developed gradually into the nation. To-day the
nations of the world are steadily moving towards a more intimate
and enlightened co-operation because they have come to realize that
only thus can the greatest good of the greatest number be attained.
Thus the co-ordination of the human family is gradually but surely
in the making. When we pass through eras of discouragement, let
us look back on the road that has already been traversed and the
progress already made, even in our own generation. The eventual
triumph of the movement is not a matter of opinion, tinged either
with optimism or pessimism according to the times or the individual;
it is a matter of mathematical certainty, because mankind as a
whole, in spite of all the discouragements and obstacles and delays
which it is bound to meet, will always work towards its greatest good
and its greatest happiness, and with that instinct inherent in the
human race, eventual success is as inevitable as the fulfilment of
the laws of creation. If I am called a visionary, let those who doubt
merely trace the facts, the development, and the fundamental
tendencies of history and* then apply the rules of mathematical
analogy to the future.

I speak of this movement to-day for two reasons. First, because
the establishment of this great medical centre in Japan, representing
in concrete form the principle of international co-operation, is a
material manifestation of that fundamental truth that the human
family is in spirit, and by the nature of things eventually must become
in practice, a unit. I speak of it secondly because the principles of
medicine apply so aptly to the ills from which the world has suffered,
is suffering, and will assuredly continue to suffer before that millen¬
nium of world unity can, by gradual development, experience, and
the wisdom of its leaders, be attained.

Most of our international ills closely resemble insidious disease.
Like cancer, they generally begin on a small scale as a result of long
irritation on a given spot. If that irritation can be sensed in advance
and dealt with promptly, the disease can perhaps be avoided. Even
the most skilful physician may not be able, or may not be given an
opportunity, to sense the irritation in advance, but the moment the
obvious symptoms appear, he seeks to eradicate the disease by curative
treatment long before operation becomes unavoidable.

Some day in the distant future we shall have, perhaps, a sort of
Faculty of International Political Health who will study inter-

FOR A C< FACULTY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL HEALTH ” 87

national relationships from every point of view, much as the family
physician studies, or should study, the mental, physical, and moral
conditions of his individual charges. When sources of potential
danger to international health are perceived, the Faculty will pre¬
scribe, long before the actual illness occurs, in order to eliminate the
causes of potential friction, the sources of infection. The curative
measures must be taken long, long before the disease has been given
an opportunity to grow. In international affairs, once the fever of
animosity has appeared, avoidance of the disease is uncertain ; it
may be too late. The prophylactic steps must be taken in time.
Much can be done around a green table in a definite case by the
sober judgment of a few far-sighted statesmen long before public
opinion has had a chance to become inflamed and their own saner
judgment warped by the course of events and by the heat of inter¬
national animosity.

This Faculty of International Political Health—a vision of the
future (and let me label it as purely a fantasy of my own mind)—must
sit constantly, conducting research as in any laboratory, precisely as
the Rockefeller Foundation and other similar bodies are constantly
conducting their research for the elimination of cancer to-day. Its
members will not be prime ministers or other prominent officials
but non-political technical experts in the many branches of life’s
activities. Their findings, their warnings, their recommendations must
be made in time for the prophylactic measures to be effective.

We have come a long way since the First Hague Peace Confer¬
ence of 1899 ; we stilfhave a long way to go. But need we be dis¬
couraged? This movement towards international co-operation did
not spring, like Athena from the brow of Zeus, full-grown from
birth ; it must develop gradually, profiting like any infant from its
lessons and experience. It will grow to full maturity, just as the
potentialities of this great hospital for public service will grow with
experience, invention, and discovery in the realm of medical science.

And so, my friends, I have ventured to indulge in flights of fancy,
inspired by the significance of to-day’s event. My Faculty of Inter¬
national Political Health is but a figment of the mind, a chimera
perhaps. I have used the term but figuratively and the conception
merely as an illustration induced by the thought of what this faculty
of medicine will accomplish for. the individual and the community
in its enlightened mission. Perhaps even day-dreams sometimes do no
harm. They at least set our minds working in profitable channels.
I see in this great building and the organization whose activities it
will nobly house, a practical manifestation of the fundamental unity
of the human family. Let us then find in the principles for which it
stands a practical analogy in the efforts that are being made to-day
to bring that family into closer co-operation, and apply also to that
broader cause this great hospital’s demonstration of international
friendship, its alleviation of disease and suffering, and its embodiment
of the spirit and precepts of the Cross.

88

THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

WHEN JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS IMPROVED
June 8, 1933

Went to Yokohama and was received on the Houston 1 with the
usual honours ; spent an hour going all over her and then received
with Admiral Taylor a large number of guests from Yokohama and
Tokyo. She is a splendid ship, clean as a whistle, and has twice won
the Navy championship in gunnery and once in communications, so
that she now holds both shields for this year. The anti-aircraft guns
and fire control stations were of course carefully concealed.

I asked Captain Bagley if the Japanese naval officers had asked to
inspect the ship when they came on board, but he said they had not
done so, presumably because they would not be willing to return
the courtesy when the American admiral visits Yokosuka. However,
planes were observed taking photographs from above the ship. ec The
Star-Spangled Banner” was played at 6 to close the reception, at
which the Japanese girls, at least, had had a very good time. Elsie
had asked Sumako Uchida to go as her guest, but neither she nor
her mother had dared ask Count Uchida’s permission because he
had “ let her do so much lately.” However, Countess Uchida
suggested that Elsie approach the Minister directly. She took her
courage in her hands and did so after the Minister’s luncheon for
the Perrys. At first he said no, but later relented and Sumako had a
grand time, chaperoned of course by Alice, and was very grateful to
Elsie. It reminds me a little of the old Turkish pashas who did not
encourage their families to ask for favours.

Sent a long telegram to the Department with regard to the notice¬
able improvement in American-Japanese relations. This is due
to a variety of causes. First and foremost the fact that Japan’s
relations with England have entered upon a very unfavourable state
owing primarily to the abrogation of the trade agreement with
India, which is a heavy blow to the Japanese cotton industry. The
Army has obtained the appropriations which it desired, the Chinese
situation is less acute, while Japan has withdrawn from the League
of Nations, all without a clash with Western nations. It cannot,
of course, be said that the war spirit has died out, but the obviously
inspired anti-American propaganda'is not now in evidence.

This improved feeling towards the United States is markedly
shown by the favourable and prominent press comment concerning
(1) Viscount Ishii’s conversation with President Roosevelt and the
general belief that the President listened sympathetically to Ishii’s
exposition of Japan’s problems. There is a feeling that the new
administration in America is a great deal more friendly to Japan
than the last one ; (2) the visit of Admiral Taylor, which has been

1 Tbe Houston was the flagship of the American Asiatic fleet and visited Japan
as part of its regular round of duties.

GEISHA EVENING

89

an unqualified success; Admiral Taylor’s helpful co-operation with
Admiral Nomura at Shanghai last year is generally appreciated and
the American admiral has been given a most cordial reception here ;

(3) the brief visit of the new Governor-General of the Philippines ;
his calls on the high Japanese officials made a favourable impression ;

(4) the visit of Bishop Perry and particularly his visit to the Perry

monument at Uraga, which was given wide publicity; (5) the

opening of St, Luke’s new medical centre in the presence of the
Emperor’s brother, and a distinguished Japanese representation.

Of course it is quite possible that the military clique may in due
course manoeuvre to undermine this wave of good feeling by con¬
tinuing to fill the press with anti-American propaganda, but I feel
that constructive and probably lasting headway has been made.
Shiratori’s removal from the Foreign Office and his appointment as
Minister to Sweden is a further hopeful factor. Incidentally, I hear
that up to the last minute Shiratori fought against his transfer.

This new friendly feeling for America is shown even in our per¬
sonal relationships here. Captain Johnson, for instance, tells me
that some of his best Japanese friends who were formerly most
cordial have hardly dared be seen with him during the past year,
especially one in particular, who was thought by the military to be
too fond of foreigners. The other day both he and Viscount Inouye
joined Johnson and myself at our table at the golf club on their
own initiative, beaming and very genial, a move which they would
not have dared to make during the past year. I am glad to have
remained here long enough to see this improvement come and shall
be mighty happy if it lasts ; I think it will last unless unforeseen
incidents or developments occur to injure it. Certainly there is a
very great change since a year ago.

GEISHA EVENING

June 29,’1933

Horrid, sweaty Nyubai weather. Spent the day m shirt sleeves
in my study.

Captain Johnson gave a geisha dinner at the Koyokan for the high
admirals of the Japanese Navy and most of our staff, thirty-two in
all. We sat on the floor in two long rows, while the girls plied us
with hot sake and the courses of an excellent Japanese dinner were
gradually served. After an hour or so the dinner began to warm up
and after two hours the “ Yo, yo, ye ” game was in fast and furious
swing and the ceremonial visiting had begun.

The “ Yo, yo, ye ” game is as follows: the geisha who happens
to be serving you for the moment (they continually shift places)
proposes the game, which is the old time-honoured one of scissors
cut paper, paper wraps rock, rock break scissors; if she wins you

THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

90

have to drink to her, if you win she has to drink to you. The girls
at this famous tea-house are much more lively than most of them
and full of fun. Meanwhile your neighbours are continually pro¬
posing toasts, as well as the visitors who slip along the floor to drink
every other guest’s health in turn, and then you return their visits.
So, all in all, a good deal of sake is consumed during the evening,
although the sake cups are very tiny and thus a mere thimbleful is
taken at a time. It made me enjoy the evening thoroughly, and
there are no uncomfortable effects whatever in the morning—if
you don’t put whisky on top of it, as most of the Japanese do ; the
Japanese food is wholesome and easily digestible, which probably
helps, and the vapours of the hot sake wear off very quickly. It
certainly helps to make a gay and highly amusing party that was
convivial but never obstreperous, intimate yet always dignified,
formal, and restrained.

Between the courses there were Japanese music and fan dancing,
and later, when we arose after almost three hours on the floor and
got our cramped leg muscles straightened out, a gramophone was
turned on and the geishas proved themselves as good at Western
dances as they are at their own. Admiral Takahashi, who sat next
me, observed that if international conferences could take place in
such an atmosphere there would never be the slightest difficulty in
reaching agreements. I concurred.

ROMANCE IN THE EMBASSY

.By the time that this mail reaches the family, Elsie’s good news
will be no longer a secret to them, although it must be kept con¬
fidential until announced sometime in August. On June 30 she
became engaged to Cecil Lyon. He had been here hardly a month,
and when he came to me to ask my permission to marry Elsie I
remarked that he was a quick worker ; he replied, “ Can you blame
me ? ”—to which, of course, there was nothing more to be said. We
are all very happy about it; he’s a fine, upstanding young man,
twenty-nine years old, and in height at least he measures up to the
standard set by our other sons-in-law. I will let Elsie deal with his
other qualifications. Apart from our eminent approval of her
choice from the point of view of character and personality, I am
naturally glad that she is marrying into the service ; to have given
three daughters to the service must, I should think, constitute a
record. That thought goes far to compensate for the sad prospect
of losing her from our midst, where she has brought nothing but
gaiety, music, and sunshine. Now she is at least bringing another
son of whom Alice and I are going to be very fond indeed. They
plan to be married on our own twenty-eighth wedding anniversary,
October 7.

THE REVOLUTION IN DIPLOMACY

9 1

RUSSIAN-JAPANESE TENSION GROWS
July 18, 1933

Informal dinner at the Prime Minister’s for Bishop and Mrs.
Welch, whom they had known for years in Korea. Had a long talk
with Viscount Saito after dinner • he said he wished that America
could help China to get on its feet; I replied that the problem was
one that no single power could solve alone. He was very affable
and the next day sent me an American flag woven from Japanese
silk. There must have been more than a dozen police around the
entrance to the official residence where the dinner was held. Some
excitement occurred at the moment of our arrival as the alarm went
off by mistake and the police rushed about with drawn swords and
cocked revolvers, looking for some uninvited guest. There is naturally
a tense atmosphere about that mansion, considering the constant
threats of assassination. Viscountess Saito seemed terribly depressed
throughout the evening.

After a month or so with hardly a telegram out or in, I sent a
very long cablegram to the Department concerning the tense situa¬
tion between Japan and Soviet Russia, itemizing the various incidents
that have occurred and the reasons for regarding the situation as
potentially serious. The incidents may well be regarded as of a
provocative nature, somewhat similar to those which occurred
before the Manchurian affair. The intentions of the Japanese
military clique cannot be measured by Occidental standards; if
they foresee an eventual clash as inevitable, it is quite possible that
they may intend to strike before Soviet Russia gets stronger—-and
the time element is all in favour of the latter. Therefore, while I
do not consider war imminent, I do believe that the situation is
potentially dangerous and bears careful watching. We had written
all this in a dispatch by the last pouch, but it won’t reach Washing¬
ton for another ten days, and while not wishing to be unduly jumpy
or sensational, I don’t want to be caught napping if anything breaks.
In this part of the world it is unwise to take anything for granted,
even the avoidance of a provocative war.

THE REVOLUTION IN DIPLOMACY AND JAPANESE-
AMERICAN RELATIONS

Article for the Japan-America Issue of the Japan Times

During thirty years in the diplomatic service of the United States,
I have watched a gradual but nevertheless well-defined change
take place in the character of the work of the diplomatic agents of
the various countries of the world. Formerly, each nation, through
its diplomatic agents, sought to outwit other countries and to con-

THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

92

elude bilateral treaties or agreements, open or secret, which would
give the country seeking the treaty or agreement some definite
political or commercial advantage over other countries. Stories of
diplomatic life are filled with purely imaginary instances of the con¬
clusion of such treaties. Usually the hero, the young and handsome
Minister of Ruritania, let us say, through his special friendship with
the Queen of Erethria, concludes a secret treaty with Erethria,
thereby outwitting the villain, the Ambassador of Lithia. Treaties
were once concluded more or less in this manner, and continued
to be so concluded up to the end of the last century, but the writers
and readers of such tales of diplomatic life probably little realize
the change which has come over our international relations and
over the business of treaty-making since the beginning of this
century.

If you examine the treaties and international agreements in force
to-day—the treaties governing the external relations of the partici¬
pating states and to some extent their internal administration and
policies—you will note that a considerable proportion of them are
the result, not of secret negotiations between two countries, but of
open international conferences. Even bilateral treaties of commerce
and navigation, or of arbitration, are usually parts of a series of
identical treaties negotiated with all interested nations. Diplomatic
agents nowadays rarely endeavour to negotiate secret agreements
—the world has progressed beyond that stage of international political
relations.

We do not have to look far to find the reason. To-day the world
has become so small, with the development of communications, and
there is such a constant interchange of peoples, and such close com¬
mercial and financial relations between states, that the relations of
any one nation with another are of deep concern to all nations. This
development greatly resembles the development of our community
life in the United States. In the old frontier days, when the settlers
upon the land lived far apart, each man was a law unto himself.
He was his own policeman, judge, and executioner. But as the land
gradually became more closely settled, as communications developed,
and as organized co mm unities grew up, the pioneer settlers no longer
were able to act only in the light of their own interests or desires ;
they were compelled to consider as well the interests of the com¬
munity. The relations between any two members of the community,
whether of enmity or friendship, became a matter of concern to all
members of the community. So it is with international relations
to-day. Our various interests—political, economic, and military—
are so closely interwoven -and interrelated that a disturbance in the
relations between any two countries, instead of being a matter of
interest only to the two countries concerned (as was the case until
fairly recent times), now inevitably reacts upon the interests and
relations of many other countries.

It is in this light that our two countries should regard Japanese-

MORE RUSSIAN-JAPANESE WAR RUMOURS gg

American relations. Here we are, two politically and economically
powerful nations, one on each side of the broad Pacific Ocean, and
holding largely in our hands the destiny of that ocean—holding
largely the power to determine whether the Pacific shall in the future
be the scene of interminable jealousy, suspicion, and dissension, or'
shall be a broad, peaceful highway for the friendly interchange of
culture and commodities and a medium for friendly and sincere
co-operation in the advancement of the welfare of the world.

Our policies and actions will have immense repercussions upon
the future course of international relations throughout the world.
The future of American-Japanese relations, therefore, is not a matter
of concern only to our two countries. For our own welfare, peace,
and prosperity we must certainly strive to ensure the continuance
of the friendly relations between Japan and the.United States, but
in addition we have a larger duty—a duty which we owe to all the
nations of the world. This duty is to develop the coming Pacific
Era as an era of peace and friendly co-operation, rather than one of
bitterness and strife—such bitterness and strife as were evidenced,
for example, in the Mediterranean Era of international relations.

It should not be at all difficult for our two nations to live in peace
and harmony and to co-operate. Economic interests, which in the
past history of the world have been the cause of many great conflicts,
are, in our case, complementary rather then antagonistic. We are both
suppliers of raw materials, but of raw materials which do not compete
with each other. Likewise, we both supply manufactured goods
to the markets of the world, but again these goods are of different,
non-competing categories. Japan supplies manufactured goods
based primarily on the manual skill and dexterity for which this
nation is famous, while the United States supplies goods such as can
be manufactured in immense quantities by automatic machinery.
Our economic interests, therefore, do not necessarily clash, and thus
the principal basis of conflict among other nations is eliminated
from our relations. Other interests, which jingoists in both Japan
and the United States are constantly bringing forward* as possible
causes of conflict, can undoubtedly be reconciled by patient study
and a mutual spirit of helpfulness.

I can see no reason why the coming Pacific Era, whose destiny lies
so largely in our hands, should not be one of peace and friendliness,
consecrated to the promotion of the welfare of the world, and it is
in our combined power to make it so.

MORE RUSSIAN-JAPANESE WAR RUMOURS
September 7, 1933

The Rumanian Charge d’Affaires, Stoicesco, called to discuss
Japanese-Soviet relations. I showed him in confidence my last
telegram on the subject, with which he said he entirely concurred.
One of our assistant military attaches says that he and his colleagues

THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

94

consider war absolutely inevitable and predict it for the spring of
1935, although some believe that it may come much sooner. Much
comment has been aroused by the remarks of the Soviet Ambassador
at a dinner which he gave recently to the foreign newspaper corre¬
spondents. He was apparently stung beyond endurance at the actual
and implied accusations being cast on his country and people by the
Japanese press, and at the dinner he denounced Japanese 6 5 defence
propaganda 55 in no uncertain terms, assuring his hearers that the
U.S.S.R. was nearing the limit of its patience and forbearance. He
stated further that Soviet Russia is not only able to meet any overt
act of aggression by the Japanese Army, but is well prepared on land
and in the air to take the offensive across the border into Manchuria
if such a step becomes necessary—pretty plain speaking.

Of course, this must have leaked out to the Japanese. As the
Russians have observed that in case of war they would completely
destroy both Tokyo and Osaka from the air, I imagine that Tokyo
will be a somewhat active spot in such an eventuality. The recent
Japanese air manoeuvres, when for three consecutive evenings the
entire city of Tokyo was kept in complete darkness, during the raids,
not even reading lamps being allowed, were clearly held with the
Russian threat in mind.

FIRST INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN MINISTER HIROTA
September 18, 1933

Received by Hirota, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, at 2.
Amaral of Brazil was the only other ambassador there, Yurenev,
the Russian, and Auriti, the Italian, being either absent or late.
Hirota received me with warmth, clasping my hands in both of his
and in the course of our short talk he said that the corner-stone
of his policy would be the development of better relations with the
United States and that this, in fact, was the primary reason why he
had accepted the appointment which had come to him as a com¬
plete surprise. I am convinced from his manner that he meant it.
I said that so far as I could see, one of the chief impediments to good
relations between our countries was the press, which constantly
stirred up distrust and suspicion on totally illusory grounds. He
replied, “ We shall talk all that over together.’ 5

My brief impressions of him were favourable ; he certainly has far
more warmth and resiliency than the austere Count Uchida pos¬
sessed ; I believe that it will now be a pleasure to go to the Foreign
Office, which it never has been before, and that he may be a man
with whom one can sit down and really talk things out. Count
Uchida, aside from being very deaf, was never willing to talk, and
on the few occasions on which I have gone to him on special cases
he never appeared to know anything about them and merely said
that he would take the matter under consideration. He has never
been able or willing really to discuss matters in general.

THE LOW-DOWN ON MANCHURIA

95

One of the first things I want to take up with Hirota is the un¬
fortunate and irritating publicity which attends our calls at the
Gaimusho, as the Japanese Foreign Office is called. The other day I
wanted to discuss a purely routine matter, the question of a Standard
Oil tank near Kobe which, after a lot of expense in its construction,
carried out with a definite permit from the Government, could
not be used on account of the alleged and absurd fears of the in¬
habitants of the village of the danger of fire. I had taken the case
up with Arita last spring but without results. However, knowing
the undesirable publicity which would attend a visit on my part
to the Foreign Office, I asked Neville to go and see Shigemitsu.
An hour later Nichi Nichi came out with a definite statement, under
Neville’s picture, that he had started negotiations with Shigemitsu
for putting a stop to the race in naval armaments between the two
countries. Not a word was said by the Foreign Office in denial.
Byas, Babb, Vaughn, Fleisher, and others called up in turn to find
out if the report were true before cabling it to America, but of course
they all dropped it promptly on hearing our reply. That sort of
thing is positively disgusting, but it has gone on consistently
throughout Uchida’s regime without any apparent effort on his
part to stop it.

A really amusing point about the matter is that in Neville’s talk
with Shigemitsu the latter brought up this very matter of publicity
on his own initiative and inveighed against the irresponsibility of
the Japanese press ; an hour later this ridiculous canard was out.
Of course, it may conceivably be a heavy-footed method of floating
a ballon d’essai. Perhaps Hirota will be the man to stop it and make
it possible for me to go to the Foreign Office without apprehension
as to the results, but, on the other hand, he may find himself as
impotent as his predecessor.

THE LOW-DOWN ON MANCHURIA

The following interesting statement was recently written in con¬
fidence by an American newspaper man, whom I know. He mentions
a Japanese business man whom he got to know in Tokyo and quotes
this Japanese as “ opening up ” one night as follows :

I am going to tell you the real truth about Manchuria. It was
a War College plan of long standing ; but with no immediate
prospects of fulfilment. The Chinese in Manchuria exasperated
the Army beyond endurance. They suddenly went off half-
cocked and decided to punish them. The Army expected re¬
sistance, but got none. The Chinese ran away. We chased them
all over Manchuria. In the course of the chase we felt something
heavy on one of our feet. We looked down to see what
was sticking to our shoe. To our amazement, we found it was
Manchuria.

96

THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

They will tell you at the Foreign Office and War Department
that they are now going to work on this and that enlightened
plan. To tell the truth, they haven’t any more idea than the
man in the moon what to do. They are completely bewildered
and dismayed. It is just beginning to dawn on everybody except
the Army that we have made the most tragic blunder of which
any modern nation has ever been guilty. For instance, if they
develop the Manchurian copper mines, all the Japanese copper
mines will have to close down, throwing thousands of men out
of work. The Japanese Government realizes perfectly well that,
as an outlet for overcrowded Japan, Manchuria is just a dream.
The most we can possibly hope for in the way of immigration from
Japan to Manchuria is about 20,000 a year. To a nation in¬
creasing at the rate of 900,000 a year, this is no solution.

The American newspaper man continues :

-, as you know, is one of the intellectual leaders of Japan.

He narrowly escaped assassination at the time of the Manchurian
Incident, having rashly raised his voice against the military
party. His friends took him to a hospital and sneaked him out
of a second-story window at night. He came to the United States ;
publicly yelled banzai all over the place to save his life ; then told
me privately what he really thought.

He too believed that Manchuria is a tragic blunder. I asked him
what he thought of General Araki; he replied : ct Like all soldiers,
General Arald is a fool.”

He said that the policy towards which his party is working is
to recognize the Chiriese ownership of Manchuria ; but to extend
the Liaotung lease over the whole of Manchuria for ninety-nine
years. He said that war with Russia was almost certain at the
end of the next Five-Year Plan. To avert this, he thought Japan
should grant Russia free access to the sea at some port in Manchuria
and try to persuade Europe to open the Dardanelles to Russia.

After-came back to Japan, the Emperor summoned him to

describe to him the condition of American public opinion. Obvi¬
ously the real reason was to save him from assassination. After

the interview - told me what happened. He said that the

Emperor was much distressed at the Manchurian Incident, of
which he disapproved. He (the Emperor) said that Japan’s greatest

peril was chauvinism. Too much nationalism. - said that the

Emperor had ordered the Army on no account to take Peking.

(All this time General Araki was publicly shouting : “ Shall
the Army turn back when our Emperor orders us to cany the
colours of the Rising Sun onward,” etc. etc.)

I had an interview with Viscount Saito which I am sure was
censored and stopped. He was very bitter and sad.

He said that the Manchurian Incident should never have
happened. That the same result could have been achieved with-

A barricade in front of the Embassy.

THE GREAT PACIFIC LABORATORY

97

out offending the world. I asked him what could be done about

it now. He said : “ Mr. -, I have no doubt that the little

chicken often thinks back to the egg—how warm and comfortable
it was ; but once pecked out, there is no egg to which he can go
back. We only go ahead now and hope for the best. 95

I asked him about the rumours of war between the United
States and Japan. I told him both navies seemed to have the
jitters but I couldn’t see any prospects of war. He said : “ Don’t

be too sure of that, Mr.-. Always remember that those whose

careers depend upon war always want war.”

I asked him : “ Do you mean the Navy, Your Excellency ? ”

“ Oh no, no, no,” he said. “ The Navy is all right; but the
Army knows very little about the world.”

THE GREAT PACIFIC LABORATORY

The Ambassador's Address at the Luncheon of the Pan-Pacific Association
and the Pan-Pacific Club in Commemoration of Balboa Day , Tokyo,
September 23, 1933

Mr. Chairman, Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,—
When we picture Balboa standing, over four hundred years ago,
on that mountain chain in Dari6n and gazing for the first time on
the broad expanse of the Pacific, we inevitably wonder whether he
was gifted with imaginative foresight and could visualize that this
great ocean would some day become not only a mighty commercial
clearing-house for the exchange of many of the world’s essential
products, but that it would develop also into the greatest experimental
laboratory in history. For on the shores of that ocean a number
of great and smaller powers are working out their respective destinies
under radically different systems of government, the outcome of racial,
historical, or geographic factors or, in some cases, as the result of a
break with the past and the adoption of a new orientation.

Among other nations of the Pacific, Japan, with her vast back¬
ground of Oriental culture combined with the energy and initiative
of a virile people, absorbed the civilization of the Occident, and yet
came through the process—a process of abnormal rapidity—strong
in her own personality and national character, in which centraliza¬
tion of authority and the pre-eminence of the Throne are the out¬
standing elements.

The British Commonwealth of Nations, which spreading round
the world keeps its far-flung units in vital intercourse by protected
maritime traffic and by periodical conferences that decide how they
can assist and guard one another’s freedom and interests, owes its
strength to the elasticity and resiliency of the system.

The contribution of the United States is a federal organization
that permits of the freest intercourse between its component states,
4

THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

98

each of which possesses and enjoys its own legislative individuality
in matters not essentially of national concern.

And finally Russia, embarked on an untried course, has coined a
new word, sovietism, in the dictionary of government, while the
world looks on with interest at the development of still another
experiment in this laboratory of political science.

Now in looking into the future, we must picture as best we may
the tremendous developments which are bound to take place in
international relationships and contacts. With expansion and ad¬
vancement in aviation, and invention in the realm of electricity and
other fields, it is not difficult to foresee the day when the nations
of the world, in matters of communication and transit, will be
physically linked in far greater intimacy than now. A century ago
the steam-engine and steamship were in their infancy ; the telegraph
and telephone unknown in general application ; the radio and aero¬
plane unconceived. At the present rate of progress in invention and
development, progressively accelerated during the past few genera¬
tions, what may we not expect in the century to come, and the next,
and the next ? What may we not expect in the development of the
international structure of commerce and finance, and indeed in
many other fields, if world progress maintains, as it surely will, its
ever-increasing velocity? The day will surely come when inter¬
national frontiers will lose much or all of their present physical
restraint, and with these physical restraints crumbled or vanished,
who shall say to what degree the world’s eventual community of
interests will bring about a political intimacy among the nations
which we, in our present stage of development, can but dimly
visualize ?

I have spoken of the Pacific, as a mighty experimental laboratory.
In the old days, the chemists strove to discover and to blend the
necessary elements which would produce the elixir of life. Letting
our imagination rove into the impenetrable mists of the future,
may we not wonder whether at some future epoch there will emerge
from these various experiments and experiences a system or a com¬
bination of systems, best adapted to universal acceptance and to
world unity ? That goal, if goal it be, can exist to-day only in our
castle-building imagination. Yet castle-building and day-dreams are
not always futile and not always so fantastic as they seem. Perhaps
Balboa dreamed, yet it is inconceivable that he could have foreseen,
even with the most fertile imagination, the developments to which
his discovery has already led.

Before that epoch comes, human oudook may have undergone
many a change. But always this great laboratory of the Pacific—
where the racial types which have shown high capacity for advance
in civilization have been brought face to. face—will be at work,
developing, experimenting, learning, perhaps perfecting, against
the day when frontiers, which seem natural to-day, can no longer
physically exist; when neither oceans nor mountains can longer

WEDDING DAY

99

maintain their character as barriers to international intimacy ; when
the whole structure of world relationships will have assumed so
intricate, delicate, and universal a nature that the general com¬
munity of interests will far exceed in importance the interests of
any one group or nation. When that day comes, if the machinery
for meeting it is wisely conceived and intelligently built from one
generation to another—and if it is solidly founded upon the en¬
lightened view-point recently expressed by Prince Tokugawa that
“ the.future happiness and welfare of all mankind will in no small
degree depend on the promotion of good understanding and mutual
helpfulness among the nations surrounding the Pacific ’’—who shall
say that the world will not achieve a happier and more enlightened
destiny than our forefathers could have visualized ?

Then may Balboa look down on the great arena to which he
initiated world access, and smile with gratification at his contribution
to the working out of the mightiest problem in history.

WEDDING DAY

October 7, 1933

Elsie’s wedding day is over ; the captains and the kings and the
bride and groom have departed.

It was not the crisp autumnal day of October 7, 1905, but at least
the rain was driven away by a high wind, and the weather was
warm and not unpleasant. At 10 we all filed in to the Con¬
sulate-General and appeared before Consul Spamer, where papers
were signed, Neville and I acting as witnesses ; then to the municipal
office of Kojimachi Ward, which is always used for American weddings
because the officials there are familiar with American legal pro¬
cedure and it avoids having to answer innumerable questions, even
though it necessitates the bride and groom giving the Imperial
Hotel as their residence, a fiction accepted by the authorities as
the hotel is in that district. The premature demise of the bride and
groom was avoided by a hairbreadth when the press photographers,
fiddling with the window curtains, brought down the heavy wooden
contraption over the windows within an inch of their heads in a
cloud of prehistoric dust. Of course we all laughed, but it would
have been no joke had it hit them, and the Mayor, or whatever he
is called, was niuch upset, muttering to Neville in Japanese : “ I
have been exceedingly rude.” That ceremony over (it cost the
munificent sum of fifteen sen—about three cents), we returned to
the Consulate, where Spamer issued the certificate that he had wit¬
nessed the civil marriage and Mr. and Mrs. Lyon, according to
American law, were man and wife.

The religious ceremony at 3 and the official reception at 4
are best described by Esther Crane in the Advertiser and by Chiyo
Hirose in The Times . I cannot do more than say that the bride was
as lovely as they make them, that the groom did credit to his nation,

IOO

THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

and that Fay van Rechteren, the matron of honour, added much
to the picture. We had invited only sixty-five people to the ceremony,
as friends of Elsie, but some four hundred came to the reception.
Alice and I had to look after the Chichibus, who are not a bit stiff,
but I can’t say that I ever feel very comfortable entertaining royalty,
especially in Japan, where they are surrounded by the many drastic
rules and customs of the Imperial Household. However, I had
taken the precaution of carefully writing out our proposed pro¬
cedure, and submitting it in advance to Count Maeda, who approved.
I did invite the diplomatic Ministers to the terrace, where the Chichi¬
bus had tea, and Marler afterwards observed that the Ministers
would never forget their gratitude.

Hitherto Japanese etiquette had permitted only Ambassadors to
talk with members of the Imperial family during entertainments in
foreign houses. However, I cut the Gordian knot by insisting that
the Canadian and other Ministers should be present.

Elsie and Cecil drove to Yokohama and thence took the train
to Gotemba, on the slopes of Fujiyama, where Count Kabayama
had placed his villa at their disposal. Father and mother resume
their daily rounds and try to smile in spite of the empty nursery
upstairs, for the nursery to them has been the most important part
of life.

A DIPLOMAT DISCUSSES PAN-ASIA
November 13, 1933

One of my diplomatic colleagues told me that ever since last
March when a meeting had been held, attended by General Araki,
Yoshizawa, Hirota, et al ., the idea of revising the Pan-Asiatic move¬
ment, or Great Asiatic Association, was being pushed in Japan.
He believes that Hirota, in spite of his policy of improving relations
with foreign countries, is a stanch supporter of the movement
and that he is in sympathy with Japan’s expansionist ambitions.
But my colleague had no precise evidence to support this theory.
The idea, as he understands it, is to form an Asiatic League of Nations
composed of Japan as the leader, and Manchukuo, China, and
Siam ; in other words, a bloc of the yellow races against the white.
He said that he had just been looking at a new textbook for the
primary Japanese schools in which is included a large map of the
Far East, comprising Japan, Manchukuo, China, French Cochin
China, Siam, the Straits Settlements, the Philippines, and the Dutch
East Indies, and that on this map there are three flags—the
Japanese, Chinese, and Manchukuoan. The American, French,
British, and Dutch flags are absent. He thought this significant,
adding that he had observed a significant thing at the funeral of
Princess Asaka yesterday, namely, that in the row of funeral wreaths
the place of honour was given to the wreath from President Pu-yi.
The second place of honour was given to that of General Tinge, the

IOI

WHY THE JAPANESE RESPECTED ROOSEVELT

Minister of Manchukuo to Japan, while the wreath from the Diplo¬
matic Corps was in the third place. His interpreter who was with
him had read the inscriptions.

My colleague thinks the Soviet-Japanese situation very tense
and that any serious incident might precipitate a conflict. He con¬
siders that the Russians have become much less yielding in their
attitude and that the Japanese are genuinely afraid of-air raids from
Vladivostok. He had not heard of the United Press dispatch from
Moscow yesterday reporting the shooting down of Japanese aero¬
planes over Soviet territory and the sinking of Japanese auxiliary
warships off Kamchatka. I have summarized this conversation in a
confidential dispatch to the State Department.

THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR PAYS HIS RESPECTS
November 20, 1933

At 11, Yurenev, the Soviet Ambassador, made his official call
after our recognition of the Soviet Union. I received him in my
study at the Residence and we pledged each other’s healths in some
excellent sherry. I believe he played a prominent part in the revolt
of the Russian Navy at the very beginning of the Revolution. He
has been Ambassador to Italy and Minister both to Persia and
Austria, so must have accumulated considerable diplomatic experi¬
ence. He says that Russia will not cede an inch on the Chinese
Eastern Railway, and gives an impression of pessimism as to the
future relations of the two countries. He is clearly overjoyed at our
recognition and very, very friendly.

I returned his call within the hour and was regaled at the Soviet
Embassy with a wineglass full of cherry brandy and delicious caviare
sandwiches. The Embassy is a new and ultra-modern building, and
with its large bright rooms it might be made very attractive. In¬
cidentally, I profit by the recognition of Soviet Russia to the extent
of a large tin of fresh delicious caviare. Can’t think what to send
him in return, as he doesn’t smoke cigars.

Troyanovsky’s appointment to Washington is an excellent selec¬
tion. The fact that they picked their principal Japanese expert for
Washington is regarded here as intensely significant.

WHY THE JAPANESE RESPECTED ROOSEVELT

November 30, Thanksgiving Day, 1933 *

Read the President’s Proclamation in church. There was a fine
turnout of Americans, including most of the Embassy, and the clergy
was well represented by Bishop Reifsnider, Father Burton, Dr.
Gowan, Dr. Evans, and another clergyman from the Union
Church.

There was a significant allusion in the Proclamation to “ a clearer
knowledge by all nations that we seek no conquests and ask only

1012

THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

honourable engagements by all peoples to respect the lands and
rights of their neighbours.” The Proclamation was published in the
Advertiser and will certainly prick the conscience of a few of those
Japanese who read it. It will make some of the Japanese liberals
writhe, I should say. The President has played his cards well: he
said not a word about Manchuria, but started building up the fleet
and recognized Soviet Russia ; as a result he gets an entirely new
and more friendly orientation of Japanese policy towards the United
States. Hoover and Stimson had to go on record, and the present
administration is profiting by that record having been made. All
Roosevelt had to do was to announce at the start of his adminis¬
tration that there would be no change of policy, and then to keep
quiet, which he has done with entire success, and to act instead of
talking or writing, using an unwritten language which the Japanese
thoroughly understand.

ADVERTISING—JAPANESE STYLE
December 7, 1933

The mail having come in at this moment, I have before me a
typically delicious circular from the Ginza Columbia Retail Store
wherein it is stated :

Modern living conditions—strain, noise, haste—have made
human irritable. Music is a only medium to help overcome and
to console this unpleasant and unhealthy state of heart and mind.

Our store requests the honour of your visit to enjoy the record
music in sucking a cup of tea offering by us without obligation.
You can hear music, modern and classical, European, American
and Japanese, what you like. . . . Apply us anything you want
with regard to the musical discus and talking machine by lines.
Just try and get a good information. English speaking stuffs are
in keen attention to serve on you. You cannot doubt the value
of devoting part of your leisure to hear various music in our office.

TRIBUTE TO F. D. R.

December 9, 1933

In the pouch which came yesterday was a splendid letter from
the President, signed by himself, conveying his greetings and good
wishes for Christmas and the New Year to our personal and official
families and to all the Foreign Service staffs in Japan and saying
some very pleasant things about our helpful co-operation. I have
never seen this done before and it is certainly typical of F. D. R.
that he should have given the thought and taken the trouble to sign,
presumably, some fifty such letters to all American chiefs of mission.
We have never had a President who has taken so direct an interest
in the Foreign Service; in spite of tremendous political pressure

PORTRAIT OF A NAZI DIPLOMAT

IO3

from hungry Democrats after sixteen years on the side lines, he didn’t
throw overboard a single career chief of mission.

THE EMPRESS BEARS A SON
December 23, 1933

Alice awoke me punctually at 7, saying “ I t’s the siren.” Sure enough,
the siren was blowing to announce the birth of the Imperial babe,
one minute if a girl, and two minutes, with a ten-second interval,
if a boy. I waited eagerly through that ten-second interval, and
when the second blast shrieked out, we were happy, for only those
who have lived in Japan can realize all that this means.

PORTRAIT OF A NAZI DIPLOMAT
December 28, 1933

The new German Ambassador came to call. He arrives fresh from
Moscow, where he seems to have heard of us from the Polychroniades.
He is very tall, with a high bald dome of a head and a hatchet-shaped
face, the typical Junker, so that one expects the customary stentorian
voice and is surprised at his effeminate handshake and high, gentle
tone. With typical Prussian methods he started off by sending Knoll,
of the German Embassy, to The Japan Advertiser to say that he didn’t
like the tone of some of their articles about Germany and that this
must change. As a matter of fact, Fleisher has carefully avoided all
editorial comment on Hitlerism, because he didn’t want to cause
ructions in the German element of the rather compact foreign com¬
munity here, and has confined himself to publishing merely the press
telegrams, which are not always very complimentary to Hitler.
When he asked Knoll what the Ambassador would do if the Advertiser
didn’t change its tone, Knoll replied that the Ambassador would
report it to Berlin. Horrible threat!

Wilfrid Fleisher told me that when he described the incident to
his father and asked him what he would have done, the latter replied
that he would have thrown Knoll out of the office. In her initial
press interview in the Advertiser , which all newly arrived chefesses de
mission are accustomed to give to Esther Crane, the Ambassadress
is reported to have said that she expected very quickly to under¬
stand the Japanese “ because we Germans are unusually sensitive
to foreign psychology.” Alas, that is one of their greatest weaknesses,
as witness their misjudgment of Belgian, British, and finally of
American psychology during the last war. Among the messages
given to Nichi Nichi by the various ambassadors and ministers on
the birth of the Crown Prince, the Ambassador is quoted as saying :
u Upon hearing the news of the birth of the Crown Prince, I wish
to express my hearty congratulations. So soon upon my arrival at
my post, I consider it a personal honour to me” It really was very kind
of the Empress to welcome him so cordially.

104

THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

JAPANESE WRESTLING—SUMO STYLE
January 15, 1934

This afternoon we went to the Japanese Sumo wrestling tourna¬
ment in the big arena. No form of sport that I can imagine could
be more boring. The wrestling is not at all like ours. The wrestlers
are a caste by themselves, chosen in youth for their height and then
stuffed like turkeys to make them enormously fat and heavy ; they
appear on the scene stark naked save for a loin-cloth and with tremend¬
ous bulging bellies. In each match the opponents face one another,
after various lengthy ceremonial gestures, precisely like cocks in a
ring, stooping and with their fists on the floor ; they spring simultane¬
ously and the stronger one almost always throws his adversary out
of the ring with one shove and the match is over. The longest match
we saw didn’t last more than ten or fifteen seconds. When any part
of the body touches the floor outside the small ring the bout is finished.
There is no rolling on the floor, merely shoving. There are said to
be forty-eight different holds.

But the ludicrous element is that when the bout is called and
the wrestlers crouch for the spring, they survey each other for a
few seconds and then, generally six or eight times or more, they
rise and saunter out of the ring, swabbing themselves and drink¬
ing water as if they had undergone tremendous exertion ; they
then throw a handful of salt into the ring and repeat the same per¬
formance. Thus the spectators have to wait for ten or fifteen minutes
for a few seconds of actual combat.

I am told that the purpose of the repeated failures to spring is
that each combatant desires to hypnotize the other by simply glaring
at him and by keeping him waiting as long as possible before the
actual fight. Once in a while one of them actually barks at the
other. Sometimes, also, one. will spring while the other remains
crouching, constituting a false start and a repetition of the process.
It is entirely ludicrous. But these wrestlers are the idols of the public ;
there were, I should say, well over a thousand spectators in the arena,
camped there for the day with their hibachis for warmth and food.
The papers report every match, and the champions rival Babe Ruth
in public estimation, especially the fattest ones. The sport is carried
on as a Shinto rite, a priest being in the ring for every bout and
striking a dramatic attitude when the contestants crouch ; the
throwing of salt is also part of the rite, and the announcer of each
match carries a fan and declaims in a high sort of chant. We were
glad to have seen it, once.

WHEN JAPAN SUSPECTED LINDBERGH
January 16, 1934

The press during the past few days has been full of Admiral
Suetsugu’s article in the magazine Gendai , a pretty jingoistic utter-

THREE JAPANESE RESCUE ONE EMBASSY DOG

ance in which the warlike intentions of the United St*** ™

^ hhted at He that Japaa foagh. Twj
the Russo-Japanese wars and took over Manchuria in o^der to
maintain peace m the Far East-which to every Japanese of X?
means simply Japanese dominance, yet they say it with kppSSly
genuine sincenty. Among other comments he observes : PP Cntly

They [the Americans] are now bringing airplanes to Canton

* “ la , r § e n T bCrS A ; tbGy are Enforcing the air hues at ShanX
Hankow, etc. At the present moment they are bringing more
to Canton and then to Amoy and Foochow, ™

bases along the coast up to Shanghai. Now in the north we
remember that Americans several times attempted to cross
the Pacific via Alaska and repeatedly failed. Viewed from our
military pomt of view, their frustrated attempts were simply recon-
noitang They were purposeful, but the Japanese, being a race of
§°°^' nat ! ired me f ’ sh °wed unstinted kindness to them, especially
the country people were kindly disposed to them, acting as if they
were their own sons who were trying to fly across the big sea 7
A certain lieutenant made a strange flight and returned.' Then
what happened, do you think ? The Lindberghs came, and they
delayed in the Kurile Islands for a week, saying it was bad weather
yesterday, and again to-day. They flew and again returned. It
may be imagination of course, but it is equally possible that they
reconnoitered inthat part of the country. What are the Americans
I 0111 !, n °™ ' They are continuing smce then surveying along
the Aleutians, on a large scale making use of survey corps, tele-
g^aph corps, and aviation corps, etc. What does all this point to >

1 hen they have resumed diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia
Ut course we can see economic motives in this, but it is possible
to say that they may have had in view the possibility of surrounding
Japan m all directions with their warlike preparations. Soviet
Russia is concentrating efficient bombing planes and making war
preparations m the Far East. In case of an outbreak, from Formosa,
from the North, and from the Soviet territory, they would surround
Japan by air raids m three directions. We must expect a large
air force will be brought by the large fleet across the Pacific We
■ are preparing for such an eventuality.

The allegations of Lindbergh’s spying seem to me to be going
pretty strong. 8 8

THREE JAPANESE RESCUE ONE EMBASSY DOG
January 19, 1934

Elsie and I were taking a last walk with our dogs, Kim and Sambo
along the palace moat this morning when suddenly looking back
we found that Sambo had disappeared. Elsie said, “ Do you thinlr
he could have fallen into the moat ? ” We looked over the edge

106 THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

and there, at least thirty feet below, was poor Sambo struggling
in the ice and water with only his head showing, like a drowned
rat. The wall was perfectly vertical and I could see not the slightest
possibility of climbing down it. I ran back to see if a row-boat was
available anywhere, but the policeman on duty at the palace entrance
shook his head and didn’t seem in the slightest degree interested.
There didn’t seem to be a place anywhere where I could climb into
the moat and swim to the dog, and at that moment I saw no chance
whatever of saving him. But when I got back to the spot, there was
Sambo, shivering in the midst of a large crowd of people and motors
who had stopped to look on or to help.

It appears that Motosawa, our chauffeur, a passing taxi driver,
and a delivery boy had managed to climb down that perfectly sheer
wall of tire moat with the aid of a rope, and by digging their fingers
and toes into the cracks had rescued the poor little animal, who had
somehow climbed into a small crevice. It was a courageous thing
for them to do because a single slip would have meant a serious
drop on to the ice below, and it was a big drop ; Sambo was very
lucky not to have been killed outright by the fall. I tried to get the
names of the man and the boy who had helped, but the taxi had
gone and the delivery boy absolutely declined to tell his name or to
accept a present, and I could only shake him by the hand. Anyway,
we got Sambo home and after half an hour in front of an electric
heater and some warm milk he was as fit and frisky as ever.

Count Kabayama, to whom I told the tale after lunch, said it
would make a good story for the press and asked if he might send
me a correspondent from the Asahi. I received him and told him of
the appreciation of the help given and my desire to get in touch
with the two anonymous rescuers. The next day the story, with
Sambo’s picture, was nicely spread in the Asahi and also in the
Advertiser , so that Sambo is now a well-known public character,
and when Alice takes him out driving she sees people pointing to
him as he stands on his hind paws looking out of the window. The
episode was a nasty shock to Elsie and me. I suppose that Sambo
had either frisked over the edge of the moat or that Kim had
unwittingly brushed him off. We certainly love those dogs,
both of them.

JAPANESE FAMILY EVENING—WITH MUSIC
January 20, 1934

Dined at the Azabukis’, who do things extremely well, a lovely
table, beautiful old plates, and a perfectly delicious dinner, the
best we have had in any Japanese house. It began with the head
of a wild boar served as hors d* mores with the cocktails and included
a delicious salmon and a Manchurian wild turkey, the meat of
which is the colour of venison and even more gamy. After dinner
one of the sons played the xylophone, accompanied on the piano

ARAKI RESIGNS—HAYASHI TAKES OVER

107

by Miss Fumicko Ikeda. There are seven children, each of whom
plays a different instrument, forming a family orchestra. I have
often heard them practising when passing their big house near the
Nevilles 5 in Karuizawa. For a mother of seven children Mrs. Azabuki’s
youth and beauty are amazing.

ARAKI RESIGNS—HAYASHI TAKES OVER
January 21, 1934

General Araki resigned as War Minister to-day, and I had to draft
a long telegram to the Department which went out on the 23rd,
trying to interpret it after talking with a great many people. One
can get interpretations all the way from A to Z and from white to
black. Of course, his present illness is the main reason ; the War
Ministry needs a representative in the coming debates in the Diet
and there is no telling how long Araki 5 s convalescence will take.
But I think the opportunity was gladly seized by those who wanted

to get him out. As-said to me, u Araki talked too much. 55 He

certainly both talked and wrote too much and he was a symbol
before the world of military aggressiveness. I hear on fairly good
authority that Wakatsuki of the Minseito and Suzuki of the Seiyukai
had threatened to make a scandal and seriously to embarrass the
Army by interpellations in the Diet, and agreed to refrain only if
Araki resigned.

In the Army itself, Araki is not over-popular with the younger
officers. Strangely enough, they consider him too moderate and not
sufficiently forceful to suit their views; he is a kind-hearted man and
has hesitated to retire the old generals to make way for younger
men, and they believe he has compromised too much in the cabinet.
As a matter of fact, Araki stands about halfway between the liberal
Ugaki and the young hot-headed chauvinists. General Hayashi, his
successor, is a leader of troops rather than a staff officer. He has
the reputation of being a silent man, but cold and hard, self-willed
and impetuous, and capable of taking rapid decisions, as when he
moved the troops from Korea to Manchuria on his own responsibility
in 1931, in spite of Shidehara 5 s opposition. It is said that he considers
that the Army should keep out of politics, mind its own business
and not make speeches, particularly inflammatory ones. The
majority of observers therefore feel that his appointment presages an
improvement in Japan’s foreign relations. There are others, how¬
ever, who see in his appointment a definite step in preparation for
possible war, because he is a leader of troops, is not conciliatory
and is less likely to compromise than Araki. I discussed these various
factors with opinions in my telegram to the Department and said
that I at present believed Hayashi’s appointment would have a
favourable effect on the political situation and on Japan’s foreign
relations rather than the reverse, but that the coming debates in the
Diet might give enlightenment.

108 THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

CALM BEFORE THE STORM

January 23, 1934

Surveying the general political situation :

(1) Hirota is genuinely doing his best to improve Japan’s rela¬
tions with foreign countries all along the line. He has succeeded
in creating a better atmosphere with the United States, mainly
through keeping the military comparatively quiet and by exerting
a calming influence on the press. Relations with Great Britain
have been improved by the agreement with India, but sure subject
to fluctuation through many economic and commercial difficulties.
There is no evidence of improved relations with China ; very likely
an effort is being made to buy off some of the northern leaders, and
there is a general feeling that North China will sooner or later be
incorporated into Manchukuo or else will become an autonomous
buffer state. With Soviet Russia the relations are about as bad as
they can be, for in spite of the attempt to reopen the negotiations
for the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway to Japan, the Soviet
press and the Japanese reactions to its fulminations are openly bitter
and provocative. The risk of an eventual conflict is always present.
Germany, having left the League of Nations, is beginning already
to flirt with Manchukuo.

(2) The political parties are heckling the Government in the Diet
as they have not for long dared to do. This indicates increasing
strength and confidence on their part, and a belief that the country
as a whole is getting tired of the vast military and naval expendi¬
tures. But they run the risk of overplaying their hand and bringing
about renewed terroristic activities by the younger military and
naval officers from whom angry reverberations are already being
heard.

(3) It is generally felt that Araki’s retirement as War Minister
represents a victory for the Liberals and the political parties, and
it seems probable that there will be less public rattling of the sabre
than heretofore. But Hayashi is still an unknown quantity—still
waters run deep—and he is firm and forceful. The Army, as well
as the Navy, must cultivate the war psychology if they are to continue
to get the enormous appropriations at which they aim.

(4) If there is any real improvement in the general political situa¬
tion, it probably represents the calm before the storm. Whatever
may happen with regard to the Naval Conference in 1935, whether
it takes place or not and whether an agreement is reached or not, it
will inevitably subject Japan’s relations with the United States, and
perhaps'also with Great Britain in less degree, to a more or less
serious strain, with loud and angry vituperations against us for
keeping Japan an “ inferior nation.” The outburst will subside, but
it will leave another scar, if not an open wound. Every effort that
can be made to create a friendly atmosphere in anticipation of that
storm will be constructive work.

RUSSO-JAPANESE TENSION BEGINS TO EASE IO9

(5) The Japanese do not expect us to recognize Manchukuo in
the near future. They know our policy and there is no need to
reiterate it, unnecessarily arousing new antagonism. We sacrifice
no principle by silently maintaining our position.

January 24, 1934

Dinner at the Embassy for the Foreign Minister.

Hirota was very friendly as usual but also evidently very tired
from the strain of the opening of the Diet and of answering inter¬
pellations. Said it was an entirely new and difficult experience for
him. Our dinner was unusually delicious, beginning with thick
pheasant cream soup, which drew forth many comments, and end¬
ing with hot maple syrup on ice cream; there were also trout and
quails. It’s easy to dish out good chow in Japan.

SEQUEL ON SAMBO

January 25, 1934

To-day I was informed that the taxi-driver who had rescued Sambo,
and who had been discovered by the Asahi , had come to receive my
thanks and a present in answer to our wish published in the press.
There was some delay while Alice wrapped up and sent down to
the chancery the wrist-watch which she had bought for that pur¬
pose. When, finally, I asked to have the man brought in, there was
a further delay, and after twenty minutes or so Neville and Jeff
came in with somewhat sheepish expressions which finally ended
in guffaws. It appears that while waiting for the present, the taxi-
driver had been assaulted outside of the Embassy by another taxi-
driver whose taxi he had stolen to come to the Embassy, and that
in the ensuing fight both taxi-drivers had been carried off to the
police station, where it was discovered that the alleged rescuer of
Sambo was merely an impostor who had seen the publicity and
thought he could wangle the present. Old Neville rocked with
merriment. I put the present back in a drawer and locked it up.

January 30, 1934

The Asahi man came in to-day with the bona fide taxi-driver
who did rescue Sambo ; we had him come up to the residence,
where Alice gave him the wrist-watch, and a photograph was duly
taken, which appeared the next day in the Asahi, of Alice handing
the package to the chauffeur while Sambo looked on. The chauffeur
was a nice-looking boy and very, very shy and modest. I was glad
to have him get the deserved and probably helpful publicity.

RUSSO-JAPANESE TENSION BEGINS TO EASE
February 8,1934

The chances of war between Russia and Japan continue to agitate
most well-informed persons here. Barring incidents of a provocative

no

THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

nature, such a conflict might occur in 1935, but the outlook for
peace has improved slightly during the past six months. These are
the chief factors now working against a Russo-Japanese war :

(1) There has been in recent months a noticeable reaction against
the military and especially against the vast military expenditures
and demands in the budget. This reaction has manifested itself in
the cabinet, in the press, and especially in the Diet. The recent
attacks on the Army and Navy through interpellations in the Diet
have been the most direct and forcible anti-military manifestations
that have occurred in Japan since the Manchurian adventure began
in 1931.

(2) The forcible nature of these interpellations in the Diet in¬
dicate a growing strength and confidence of the political leaders.
The military have overplayed their hand. It now remains to be seen
whether these political elements, with their increasing confidence,
will in turn overplay their hand. If they do so, there will be the risk
of further terroristic activities. Angry reverberations have already
been heard from the Navy. Once the Diet is adjourned, however,
there will be less opportunity for the politicians to express their
views in public, although they will have had full opportunity to
register their concern at the dangerous situation into which'|military
aggressiveness has been leading the country.

(3) Public feeling against the Army has been accentuated by the
light sentences given to the officers concerned in the assassination of
Premier Inukai on May 15, 1932, compared to the heavy sentences
meted out to the civilians, although the latter were involved to a
lesser degree. General Araki, it has been reliably reported to me,
remarked not long ago that the military court-martial in deter¬
mining the military sentences made a serious mistake, having totally
misjudged the force of public opinion. He added that if the officers
who assassinated Premier Inukai had committed hara-kiri on his
doorstep instead, there would have been an immediate revolution,
but they adopted the wrong method of gaining their ends.

(4) It is generally felt that General Araki’s resignation, actually
due to his illness—which many feel to have been providential dis¬
pensation—has relieved the situation of an inflammatory element.
While his successor’s attitude towards a Soviet-Japanese war is not
known, it can at least be said that there will now be less public rattling
of the sabre and fewer provocative utterances from the military. This
should exert a calming influence.

(5) The middle classes, including the liberal professions,
merchants, industrialists, landlords, have changed their mentality
during the past year, and in the face of the economic prosperity
caused by increasing exports, they desire a continuation of the status
quo and dread the upsets which a war would bring. The rural popula¬
tion has not shared fully in the prosperity which has fallen to the
industrial and merchant classes. In the face of constantly rising
living costs, the farmer’s income has remained stationary, or nearly

RUSSO-JAPANESE TENSION BEGINS TO EASE ln

so. In addition, the modern urge for improved living conditions has
affected rural areas, and the people there are no longer content
with the simple hard life of their ancestors. These factors, added
to the heavy taxation which rural communities have to bear, have
caused a great deal of unrest in the country districts. They naturally
desire relief, and are showing more interest in, and opposition to,
heavy military expenditures than they have ever done before.

(6) The highest influences in the country are pacific. The Em¬
peror is a man of mild and peaceful character. The era of his reign
is characterized by the word “ showa,” which he himself chose and
which means “ enlightened peace." There is no reason to believe
that he approved of the Manchurian adventure, for the matter did
not lie in his decision. Prince Saionji, the Genro, and Count Makino
are profoundly imbued with the horrors of war. Since 1931 they
have not been able to make their view publicly felt, but they are
constantly working behind the scenes and it is believed that their
influence is gradually increasing.

The Prime Minister is personally an influence more peaceful than
bellicose. Hirota, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, has displayed
unexpected strength and is personally largely responsible for the
comparatively milder tone of the press since he took office and for
a new orientation in endeavouring to develop better relations with
foreign countries. A strong group of liberals in the country have
been steadily working behind the scenes and are, it is believed, de¬
veloping more strength than they formerly possessed. At a recent
dinner at the Tokyo Club in honour of Sir Francis Lindley, the
British Ambassador, and Ambassador Debuchi, Baron Hayashi, the
chairman, in introducing the speakers, said slowly and with firmness,
in a tone nearly menacing and emphasizing his remark with a bang
of his fist on the table : “ We want peace ! 95 This is a small detail,
but Baron Hayashi is Grand Master of Ceremonies of the Imperial
Court and one of the Emperor’s favourites.

(7) From the point of view of the Army itself—for in the last
analysis the Army is likely to have the last word as to whether it
shall be peace or war—new factors may exert a restraining influence.
Even in the Army itself there are not lacking sane elements who
are aware of the seriousness of a Japanese-Soviet conflict and who
question whether the end to be attained f would justify the risks run—
whether the game would be worth the candle.

.Undoubtedly the Army has complete confidence as to its ability
to take Vladivostok and the Maritime Provinces and probably all of
the territory up to Lake Baikal, for the Russians, separated by several
thousand kilometres from their home base of supplies, will always
be in a strategically hazardous position. But their defences in the
East have been materially strengthened, and their air forces in
Vladivostok and elsewhere along the frontier constitute a serious
threat to Tokyo and other important Japanese cities. Furthermore,
American recognition of Soviet Russia has injected an important

112

THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

psychological element into the situation and gives pause to those
in authority in Japan, for regardless of the pacific policy of the
United States, American action in the event of a Japanese-Soviet
conflict would be to the Japanese an unknown and disturbing factor,
necessarily to be taken into consideration. Military plans may be
regarded as infallible ; but the attitude and possible action of the
United States constitute the element of uncertainty and therefore
an unknown hazard. American recognition has increased self-
confidence in Moscow, but no one believes that the Soviet Union will
commence hostilities. I therefore believe that our recognition of the
Soviet Union has injected into the situation a restraining influence, \
probably of greater effect than any other single integral.

(8) The opinion among the military attaches in Tokyo is that the
Japanese Army will reach the zenith of combat efficiency in 1935,
and that after that period, time will tell in favour of Soviet Russia
in point of lines of communication, organized man-power, fortifica¬
tion, and equipment. The hypothesis was advanced, and is firmly
held by the majority of foreign observers, that in the general scheme
of Japanese expansionist ambitions the Maritime Provinces and
eastern Siberia occupy an important position, and that in those
ambitions the Soviet Union constitutes an obstacle which must be
removed at a favourable moment. Granting that this is true, I never¬
theless believe that an increasingly influential body of opinion in
Japan recognizes the importance of consolidating gains already
made before embarking on further military adventures. The creation
of the “ Manchukuo Empire ” is a step towards that consolidation.
This school of thought feels that Manchukuo must first justify itself
before the world as a stable and progressive political unit before
further expansionist plans should be put into operation. There
seems at present to be greater hope that the influence of this saner
element in the country may predominate over those who are less
amenable to reason.

In spite of the foregoing tendencies and considerations, the course
of future events is subject to incidents and uncertainties which no
one can predict. The foreign military attaches are, I believe, unani¬
mously pessimistic. It is certain that an important faction of the
armed forces of the Empire, especially the younger elements, eamesdy
desire a conflict with the Soviet Union, for the primary purpose of
which all the energies of the Army and Navy are united in an intense
and unanimous effort of preparation. I have once before drawn
the parallel of the intensively trained football team which, being
convinced of its superiority and dissatisfied with mere practice,
desires a game. This is precisely the attitude of a considerable element
of the Army, just as it was the attitude of the German Army in 1914.
If this element has its way, there will be war, and there will always
exist the hazard that this element will work to create a situation
where war will be unavoidable.

As an illustration of this hazard I have been told the following

THE JAPANESE COURT CELEBRATES 113

incident by Mr. J. B. Powell, editor of the China Weekly Review . He
was dining with a young Japanese officer in Mukden who pointed
out a small table in his apartment which he said was historical* “ On
that table, 59 he remarked, “ were worked out the plans for bombing
Ghingchow. There was a difference of opinion, and I myself voted
against it, but the majority of my friends voted in the affirmative
and the bombing was therefore carried out as planned. 95 The im¬
plication was that the step was taken without higher instructions. I
cannot of course guarantee the accuracy of the story, but Mr. Powell
was convinced of its truth. It is in line with other incidents of the
1931 campaign in Manchuria. We must not close our eyes to the fact
that similar incidents may occur in future, regardless of the views
and policies of those in authority either in Tokyo or at the front,
and that any one serious incident might create a situation where
war with Soviet Russia would become unavoidable.

To sum up, the pacifist tendencies latent in Japan have in the
past few months been able to make themselves felt and heard to a
greater degree than at any time since September 18, 1931. If the
proponents of these tendencies do not overplay their hand, they may
be expected to gather strength and influence, and they may, in the
long run, effectively guide the country into saner and less aggres¬
sively militaristic channels. The possibility of avoiding a conflict
with the Soviet Union depends to some degree upon the continued
strengthening of these newly manifested tendencies, for which, at
the present moment, there appear to be reasonable grounds for
optimism.

THE JAPANESE COURT CELEBRATES
February 23, 1934

Court mourning was raised for three days to celebrate the birth
of the Crown Prince, and for three days all Japanese officials of
certain rank are to be entertained in turn at the palace—on the
third day 7000 of them. To-day the Imperial princes and princesses,
the Diplomatic Chiefs of Mission, and the Members of the Cabinet
and their wives were invited to luncheon with the Emperor and
Empress, all seated at one big table. First Amaral, as Acting Dean
in the absence of Bassompierre, presented the Emperor with a tre¬
mendous silver bowl and a silver-bound book containing the signa¬
tures of the members of the Diplomatic Corps, on behalf of the Corps,
with an appropriate speech, and the Emperor replied, subsequently
shaking hands with each of us.

The luncheon was magnificendy done. Alice, being acting
Doyenne, sat between two of the princes. The Emperor and Empress
were in the middle. Special crimson sake cups with the Imperial
crest in gold, and small silver samurai helmets, were presented to
each guest* Prince Ri, whom I do not know, suddenly leaned across
Mrs. Hultman, and said to me in German: “ Where is the most

114 THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

beautiful spot in the world ? ” Without thinking I quickly replied :
“ The Scheidegg, under the Jungfrau.” He seemed satisfied and said,
“ I shall go there.”

That terminated the conversation. Afterwards each chief of
mission and his wife were asked into the room where the Emperor
and Empress were sitting, sat down with each in turn, and had a
talk of five minutes or so, of course through interpreters. The
Emperor said he was glad to see a distinct improvement in Japanese-
American relations. I expressed American congratulations on the
birth of the Crown Prince and then, to our surprise, he said, “ How’s
Sambo ? ” or words to that effect. He had evidently read all about
the dog’s falling into the palace moat and subsequent rescue. The
Emperor seemed to me exceedingly cordial, and the Empress was
beaming ; she wanted to know all about Elsie. Alice told her how
Elsie had not dared to take the Empress 5 wedding present to Peking
lest it should be lost because it was her most valued treasure. I also
had a long talk with Shidehara. The wives of the members of the
cabinet and of a few other high officials were dressed in costumes
of some 1000 years ago—magnificent brocades, red shoes, hair down
their backs plaited with sticks. It was a great party, never to be
forgotten ; we were there from 12 till after 3.

THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR SEES THE
SPRING OF 1934 AS DECISIVE

March 9, 1934

During a long conversation to-day with the Soviet Ambassador,
Mr. Yurenev, he first told me the present status of the negotiations
for the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway ; these negotiations are
still confined to pourparlers between the Minister for Foreign Affairs
and himself, the general conference not having yet reconvened.
These pourparlers have taken the form of bargaining pure and simple,
each side naturally wishing to win a success—especially Mr. Hirota,
who will have difficulty in satisfying Japanese public opinion. In
brief the situation is as follows :

The Soviet Government places the negotiations in two categories,
the first comprising (1) replacement of the Russian personnel of the
railway and (2) Manchukuo assumption of the railway’s debt, and
the second category comprising the actual sale of the railway itself.
For the compensation of the personnel the Soviet Government will
expect an amount of between nine and ten million yen. The ap¬
proximate amount of the debt he did not tell me. With regard to
the price for the railway, the Manchukuo authorities have not moved
from their original offer of fifty million yen. The Soviet demand
which was originally placed at two hundred and fifty million roubles
was later reduced to two hundred million roubles. In order to con¬
venience the Japanese, the Soviet Government had subsequently

SOVIET AMBASSADOR SEES SPRING OP 1934 AS DECISIVE H5

agreed to receive 50 per cent, of the total amount in merchandise,
and of the other 50 per cent., 15 per cent, would be paid in yen
immediately on signature and the remaining 35 per cent, would
be paid within three years by the Manchukuo Government. The
final figure to be agreed upon would be a global amount. Bargain¬
ing with regard to the type of merchandise to be received is now
going on, the Japanese desiring to make as favourable a deal in this
respect as possible.

I asked the Ambassador whether he was optimistic as to an eventual
favourable outcome of the negotiations. In reply he made the
significant remark : cc An agreement will be reached if the Japanese
wish to avoid war with Soviet Russia.” I said to him : “ That
remark could be interpreted as meaning that if the Japanese do not
come to terms the Soviet Union will declare war.” He replied that
this was not his meaning and that what he wished to convey was
that if an agreement for the sale of the railway should not be reached,
this fact would be a significant indication that the Japanese in¬
tended to bring about a war and would use the failure of the negotia¬
tions as an excuse to satisfy public opinion in Japan as to the reasons
for such a war. They had already given their hand away in the
documents published, to the effect that they would take the railway
anyway, whether the negotiations succeeded or not.

I then asked Mr. Yurenev whether he was optimistic that war
would be avoided. He said that it was important to be optimistic
and implied that he had to be very careful to take such a position
because at a given moment the Japanese Government might make
public his pourparlers with Hirota over the railroad and that his
attitude as then revealed might be an important element in the
situation. In spite of this statement he gave me the distinct im¬
pression that he was far from optimistic with regard to the future.
He said that a meeting of the principal generals of division will take
place in Tokyo sometime this month 1 and that the pros and cons
of an attack on Soviet Russia will be thoroughly discussed at that
time. He alluded to the significant fact that a similar meeting of
generals had taken place shortly before the outbreak of the Man¬
churian adventure in September, 1931. He said that Hayashi has
constantly worked against Soviet Russia, particularly in Sinkiang,
and that while it is very difficult to get a precise line on his present
attitude, there seems to be no good reason to credit him with peaceful
intentions.

Mr. Yurenev repeated what he has frequently said to^ me before
that the Soviet Union is fully prepared for all eventualities and is
strongly fortified both in Vladivostok and along the Siberian border.
The double-tracking of the Trans-Siberian Railway has been carried
on steadily throughout the winter in spite of the intense cold. If

1 This meeting of division commanders is scheduled to meet in Tokyo on March 26
and to last for five days. It is not an annual meeting but is said to be customarily
held after the appointment of a new Minister of War.

THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

Il6

the Japanese should attack, they could of course pour immense
forces into Manchuria and might be able to take Vladivostok and
the adjacent portion of eastern Siberia, but further operations would
entail extending and weakening their lines of communication, and
little by little the Soviets could pour more and more troops into that
region. If war should commence, it would not stop until one side
or the other was completely exhausted, and it would take a long
time to exhaust the almost unlimited power of the Soviets. Japan’s
Navy, he said, is of course incomparably stronger than the Russian
Navy, but the Russian fleet of submarines at Vladivostok is very
strong and the sinking of a Japanese battleship or two would have
immense significance and would alter the whole situation in the
Far East. He said furthermore that while the Soviet measures were
now purely defensive in character, if war should break out these
measures would immediately become offensive, and unless Japan
should quickly win an outstanding victory the Soviets would be
able to occupy part or all of Manchuria, especially, he said, as at
least 100,000 of the present troops of Manchukuo would support
the Soviet arms and might turn the whole tide of the operations.

I said to the Ambassador that most of the foreign military experts
in Tokyo believe that the Japanese Army will reach the zenith of
its combat efficiency in 1935 and that if war is intended, the spring
of 1935 will be the most likely moment for attack. The Ambassador
replied that while nobody could foresee a precise date, he thought
it more likely that such an attack would occur this spring, at any
time after the coming meeting of Japanese generals, because they
realize that time is constantly telling in favour of the Russian forces.
He seems firmly convinced that the final decision will be taken at
this coming meeting of high Japanese military officers. He agreed
with me that important pacific influences are at work in Japan, in¬
cluding the Emperor, Prince Saionji, Count Makino, a considerable
body of liberal opinion, and especially Hirota, but he added that
in the last analysis the decision would lie with the military.

In further conversation Mr. Yurenev spoke of the situation in
Sinkiang, where the Chinese troops which had been repatriated by
Soviet Russia had been victorious over other troops. He believes that
the Japanese are steadily working in China to foment further dis¬
ruption. He thinks that the Japanese are convinced that the United
States is backing China, especially in its aircraft development. He
asked me many questions with regard to our intentions concerning
the further fortification of the Philippines, Guam, etc. He also said
that according to his information England is showing a distinct pro-
Japanese tendency. England, he said, is in a very difficult position
because she has good reason to be afraid of Japan becoming too
strong. On the whole he agreed that the political situation is rather
nebulous, although he finds that international intrigue is constantly
working throughout the Far East.

CELEBRATING JAPANESE-AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP

117

CELEBRATING JAPANESE-AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP
April 22, 1934

A grand red-letter day. Alice and I were up at 6 and boarded the
Japanese destroyer Shimakazjs at Yokohama at 7.45. I had asked
the Department if they saw any objection to our going down to
Shimoda on an American destroyer, but they disapproved the sug¬
gestion as Shimoda is technically a closed port—unless the Japanese
should themselves propose it, which they didn’t. However, they did
take us down on one of their own destroyers, together with Debuchi,
Admiral Nomura, Count Kabayama, the Rogers, Cranes, Dickovers]
and Goolds, several other prominent Japanese, and a raft of press
and cameramen. This was to be the main celebration of the eightieth
anniversary of the signing of Japan’s first treaty by Commodore
Perry, at the spot where the “ black ships ” made their principal
stay.

The trip to Shimoda lasted three hours and a half, going at a
speed of twenty-five knots. The day was lovely and the sea quite
smooth, thank heaven (yesterday the trip would have been appal¬
ling), but even so, there was a marked swell when we got out of Tokyo
Bay and some of the ladies looked rather green, while Debuchi and
Kabayama passed out completely. (Which reminds me that the
Japanese press solemnly spoke of the ceremonies that were to be
held at the graves of five sailors of Perry’s expedition who had
“ passed out ’’—not “ passed on ” !) Fuji, which was constantly in
sight, was crystal clear and remarkably impressive.

The little harbour of Shimoda is lovely—high, thickly wooded
shores and pretty little islands, one of which was not so pretty when
a Russian warship was later wrecked on it in a fog. In those days
the Japanese intended it- to be the main post for foreign commerce,
and in Perry’s treaty only Shimoda and Hakodate were opened, but
later of course it proved to be impractical and Yokohama was opened
instead.

We landed first at the little village of Kakizaka on the other side
of the harbour from Shimoda, where Townsend Harris lived in his
Gyokusen-ji (“ ji ” means temple) for four years before going to
Yedo—with Okichi, the geisha, who deserted family and friends
to nurse and cook for Harris and was consequently regarded at the
time as a social outcast and was denied decent burial, but was later
almost sainted in Japanese estimation for her unselfish service to the
then hated foreigner. Her memory lives in verse and song to-day.
The original temple was destroyed, but an exact replica now stands
on the same spot and we were met and escorted to it by the chief
priest, with whom I have already had much correspondence.

Alice and I first burned incense before each of the graves of the
five American sailors, and then to the memory of Townsend Harris
himself within the temple. We were profoundly moved by the signifi-

Il8 THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

cance and solemnity of it all. After pausing before the shrine we
examined the various relics of Harris which are reverently kept in
the temple, including some of his personal articles and the suit of
his Dutch interpreter, Heusken, who was later assassinated. On a
monument to Harris near the temple is engraved the following excerpt
from his diary on the day that he raised the first consular flag in
Japan :

Thursday, September 4, 1856. Slept very little from excite¬
ment and mosquitoes,—the latter enormous in size. Men on
shore to put up my flagstaff. Heavy job. Slow work. Spar falls;
break crosstrees; fortunately no one hurt. At last get a reinforce¬
ment from the ship. Flagstaff erected ; men form a ring around
it, and, at two and half p.m. of this day, I hoist the “ First Con¬
sular Flag 55 ever seen in this Empire. Grim reflections—ominous
of change—undoubted beginning of the end. Query,—if for the
real good of Japan ?

Admiral Nomura asked me what he meant by “ Undoubted begin¬
ning of the end.” I said he must have meant that this was to be the
end of Japanese isolation (I wonder) and that his final observation
“ Query,—if for the real good of Japan ? ” showed that he was think¬
ing of the interests of Japan quite as much as of the interests of his
own country.

Then we motored a mile or more to Shimoda, through almost
unbroken rows of Japanese school children, both girls and boys,
hundreds and hundreds of them gathered from towns and cities as
far away as Nagoya, all waving Japanese and American flags and
shouting “ Banzai! ” with a heartiness which could hardly have been
simulated. This was really very moving too. At length we came to
the town school where the exercises were to take place in the open
air. A shrine had been erected for the occasion and a Shinto service
was held in memory of Perry and Harris, with music, several priests,
and the usual banquet heaped up on tables; the evil spirits were
driven away by waving sakaki branches, the audience was purified
with sacred water, and then the chief priest was in a position to ask
the gods to descend and to listen to our petition for the repose of the
souls of the two heroes which he read from a parchment. There¬
after we all came up and offered sakaki branches and finally the little
door in the shrine was closed, indicating that the gods might now
retire.

There followed speeches, many of them—from the Governor, the
Mayor, the chairman of the celebration committee, Dcbuchi on
behalf of Hirota, Kabayama, Admiral Nomura, Yamada, a descend¬
ant of the famous Egawa Hidetatsu, and myself. Yamada, who is
reputed as an orator, spoke very frankly and said that the next twenty
years of Japanese-American friendship were going to be much more
important (and impliedly critical) than the past eighty years, and

the situation flares up again 119

that the centennial of Perry’s treaty would be a far more significant
observance than the present one.

The speeches had lasted so long that a visit to another temple and
a town luncheon had to be abandoned and we departed at 3, having
been there for three hours and a half, through the same rows of
cheering children, accompanied out of the harbour, just as we had
been received, by many decorated boats and among them an old
steam trawler painted to represent one of the “ black ships, 55 with
side paddles and all, and prominently labelled on the stern Powhatan .
The trip back was smoother and very pleasant, with much frater¬
nizing over refreshments in the wardroom. It was a really grand
day.

RUSSIAN FABLE

Troyanovsky is reported to have related in his speech before the
American Society of International Law the Russian fable of a cook
who, upon discovering a cat eating meat, lectured to it. Though the
animal listened, it continued eating. “ I guess this fable was written
with international relations in view, for it raises the question of what
is to be done when a cat listens but continues to eat. 55

THE SITUATION FLARES UP AGAIN
April 28, 1934

These are days of political intensity. Indeed, in our job the in¬
teresting situations and work come in cycles ; we pass through periods
of comparative calm, with more or less routine duties to perform,
and then quite suddenly something breaks and we are busier than
bees. Ever since the statement of Foreign Office spokesman Eiji
Amau on April 17, the political pot has been boiling ; long telegrams
out and in; ambassadors, ministers, charges d’affaires, press corre¬
spondents constantly coming in for information or diagnosis of events ;
there is little rest. Amau at least has given the press correspondents
plenty of occupation while the diplomats have been spending thousands
of dollars on telegrams. I told Amau at a dinner the other night that
we were all going to send our telegraph bills to him, to which he
replied that that would be all right because he would naturally get
a rake-off from the Ministry of Communications for stimulating
the telegraph service. It is difficult these days to judge whether
Amau is regarded in Japan as an enfant terrible or a hero 5 it rather
depends on whether you seek opinions from the camp of the moderates
or that of the chauvinists.

The first reaction of the Japanese press to Amau’s original state¬
ment was one of unqualified approval, but when the unfavourable
repercussion began to come back from abroad, some of the papers,
while approving without qualification the doctrine that Japan has
the sole responsibility for the u preservation of peace in the Far

120

THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

East,” agreed that the wording of the statement was a little awkward.
It will be noted that the statement given me by Hirota on the 26th
differed from Amau’s statement. According to the unofficial trans¬
lation of the statement of the 17th, Amau said :

. . . This country considers it only natural that, to keep peace
and order in East Asia, it must act singlehanded and upon its
own responsibility. In order to be able to fulfil this obligation,
Japan must expect its neighbour countries to share the responsi¬
bility of maintaining peace in East Asia, but Japan does not con¬
sider any other country, except China, to be in a position to share
that responsibility with Japan.

In the official translation of the 26th the wording is modified :

However, Japan cannot remain indifferent to anyone’s taking
action under any pretext which is prejudicial to the maintenance
of law and order in East Asia for which she, if only in view of her
geographical position, has a most vital concern. Consequendy,
she cannot afford to have questions of China exploited by any
third party for the execution of a selfish policy which does not take
into consideration the above-mentioned circumstances.

Amau, in his statement of the 17th, is further reported to have
said :

Japan will oppose any attempt of China to avail herself of
the influence of some other country with the idea of repelling
Japan, as this would jeopardize the peace in East Asia ; and it
will also oppose resort by China to any measure intended to
4 4 resist foreigners by bringing other foreigners to bear against
them.” Japan expects foreign nations to give consideration to
the special situation created by the recent Manchurian and
Shanghai incidents, and to realize that the undertaking of joint
operations in regard to China, even if they be in regard to technical
or financial assistance, must eventually attain political significance
for China. Undertakings entailing such significance, if carried
through to the end, must give rise to complications that might
even necessitate discussion of problems like fixing zones of interest
or even international control or division of China, which would be
the greatest possible misfortune for China and at the same time
would have the most serious effects upon East Asia and, ultimately,
Japan.

Japan therefore must object to such undertakings as a matter
of principle, although it will not find it necessary to interfere with
any foreign country negotiating individually with China in regard
to propositions of finance or trade, as long as those propositions
are beneficial to China and arc not likely to threaten the main-

the situation FLARES UP AGAIN 121

tenance of order in East Asia. If such negotiations are of a nature
that might disturb peace and order in East Asia, Japan will be
obliged to oppose them.

For example, supplying China with warplanes, building aero¬
dromes in China, and detailing military instructors or mili tary
advisers to China, or contracting a loan to provide funds for political
uses, would obviously tend to separate Japan and other countries
from China and ultimately .would prove prejudicial to the peace
of East Asia. Japan will oppose such projects.

The foregoing attitude should be made clear by the policies
followed by Japan in the past. But, due to the fact that gestures
for joint assistance to China and for other aggressive assistance,
by foreign countries, are becoming too conspicuous, it is deemed
advisable to make known the foregoing policies.

There has been much conjecture regarding the reasons for the
issuance of Amau’s statement of April 17. I endeavoured to define
those reasons in our telegrams and in our last dispatch to the De¬
partment, based chiefly on the theory that Japan was becoming
restive at the cumulative evidence of foreign activities in China.
Furthermore, approval of the doctrine that Japan alone is respon¬
sible for the maintenance of peace in the Far East would give Japan
added claims to naval parity in the forthcoming naval conference,
and would also enable her to dominate China. Amau had been
pressed by the Japanese newspaper correspondents for comment on
these various matters and Shigemitsu finally agreed to his giving out
the substance of an instruction already sent to Ariyoshi, Minister
to China.

Whether or not Hirota approved the issuance of the statement is
unessential, for the statement accurately expresses the policy which
Japan would like to pursue. While there has been criticism of the
phraseology, the substance of the statement seems to have the un¬
qualified approval of practically all Japanese, and Hirota, in the
present state of public opinion, could not repudiate the statement
and remain in office. The net result of the statement will probably
be : (1) an intensification of the feeling of isolation that has pre¬
vailed since the Manchurian campaign ; (2) a furtherance of the
Army and Navy campaign to prepare for the “ crisis ” of 1935-3^
and (3) the development of patriotic feeling to such an extent that no
Japanese Government will be able to compromise with the powers
in case of decided differences in viewpoint regarding policies towards
China or with respect to naval ratios.

Saw Sir Francis Lindley off at the station, Hirota and most of the
colleagues being there.

With deep regret I saw Lindley go. We were colleagues in Cairo
thirty years ago, and Alice and I have always had sincere affection
for him and his wife. He has been a good colleague and perfectly
frank and free in imparting even confidential information.

122

THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

Another colleague of mine recently read to me a dispatch he had
sent his Government and later, at my request, sent me a copy in
confidence. Among other things he says :

It is true, as-said (after a conversation with Ambassador

Dodd in Berlin), that the attitude of America towards Manchu-
kuo has not changed up to the present. I have given you my
opinion, namely, that the day when the United States sees an
advantage in it, she will not hesitate to abandon the Stimson
Doctrine which she is bound to no one to uphold. She did not
hesitate in 1920 to abandon the League of Nations notwithstand¬
ing the fact that the Covenant was the work of her President.

This comparison shows a complete lack of familiarity with our system
of government. The so-called Stimson Doctrine is an executive
policy, and the recognition or non-recognition of foreign states is an
executive prerogative. Congress can pass resolutions but it cannot
send ambassadors without the approval and action of the executive.
Congress, however, was competent to refuse its approval of the Treaty
of Versailles comprising the Covenant of the League of Nations.

This same foreign diplomat went on to say that he continues to
believe that the Kellogg Pact should not have been considered as
applicable to the events in Manchuria, and he raises the point:

By virtue of the protocol of Peking of September 1, 1901, the
United States (as well as France, England, Italy, and Belgium)
had the right to maintain garrisons in China—at Peking, Tientsin,
Sharihaikwan, and other points. Supposing that the American
garrison at Tientsin, which exists at present, which is numerous
and well equipped with modern armaments, should be led by
circumstances to use force to fulfil its normal mission and one
envisaged by the treaties; for example, to prevent a massacre
of American missionaries at 20 or even xoo kilometres from the
city. In such a case would Mr. Stimson maintain that the Chinese
frontier or the Kellogg Pact were violated ? No, because it would
be absurd. Nevertheless, he did maintain this in the case of the
Japanese military action in Manchuria, which was an absolutely
analogous case. Strict legality pushed to a certain point risks
becoming a challenge to elementary common sense.

The argument is weak and the analogy false. For a local foreign
garrison to make a sortie to protect life can hardly be held as analo¬
gous to the action of a country in pouring tens of thousands of troops
into a foreign area, and conducting large-scale military operations
with the purpose and result of separating that area permanently
from its owner. I said so to my colleague, but he refused to
agree. He continues in his dispatch to argue that as long as
America and the League of Nations persist in their present attitude,

SECRETARY HULL STANDS FIRM

123

a situation pregnant with the danger of war will continue to exist in
Eastern Asia.

My colleague’s attitude towards the Nine-Power Treaty is this •
being unwilling to acknowledge that Japan violated the provision
of Article I he won’t acknowledge that she violated the provisions
of Article II. Yet the contracting powers, having agreed in Article I
“ to respect the sovereignty, independence, and the territorial and
administrative integrity of China,” proceed in Article II to agree
“ not to enter into any treaty, agreement, arrangement, or understanding,
either with one another, or, individually or collectively, with any
Power or Powers, which would infringe or impair the principles stated in
Article I. Even those who are able to accept the patendy illusory
theory of “ self-determination ” in Manchuria, and who can there-
tore persuade themselves that Japan did not violate Article I, can
hardly, with any intelligence or intellectual honesty, hold that Japan
did not violate Article II. She most certainly did violate that Article
when she concluded her treaty with Manchukuo. We hear much
talk about changed conditions superseding legalistic obligations,
yet if that perfectly clear violation is condoned and accepted, we,
might as well regard all treaties as “ scraps of paper ” to be torn
up when they become inconvenient to an individual nation,
precisely as when Germany violated Belgium in 1914. Mr.
Hull, in his recent aide-memoire, made clear the fact that there are
accepted means for modifying or terminating treaty obligations,
but only by processes prescribed or recognized or agreed upon by
the signatories. I hope that I shall not see a day when the United
States recognizes Manchukuo.

SECRETARY HULL STANDS FIRM
April 29, 1934

Fortunately I was at home when Mr. Hull’s aide-memoire- on the
question of foreign assistance to China came in. It was decoded
at 5 and typed at about 5.30. In spite of its being Sunday and the
Emperor’s birthday I immediately wrote a personal letter to Hirota
asking if he could see me urgently. He replied by telephone, setting
the hour at 6.30, and I was therefore able to deliver the document
without delay. He read it slowly and carefully and then asked me
what portion or portions I considered the most important. I replied
that I did not feel that I ought to try to interpret it and that the
text seemed to me to be quite clear. He merely remarked that
Amau’s statement had caused “ great misunderstanding ” and said
that he would reply after studying our aide-memoire in due course.
He was perfectly friendly and showed no surprise or disapproval.
In my opinion the aide-memoire is wholly admirable, absolutely called
for by the circumstances, drafted in masterly fashion, perfectly clear
in substance, moderate and friendly in tone.

It seems to me that after all that has passed. Sir John Simon

THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

124

appears to have accepted a little too readily Hirota’s assurances that
Japan intended to respect the Nine-Power Treaty, and his statement
to the House of Commons to the effect that he was satisfied with
those assurances may cause certain elements of the British public to
feel that something more was called for and desired. At any rate,
we have registered our own position with complete clarity. I think
that the Department’s 4 4 rush ” instruction to me to present the aide-
memoire at the earliest possible moment was probably to forestall
another pious statement which it was reported that the Foreign
Office would issue to the press to-morrow. Evidently it did forestall
it because on the following day Amau announced to the press that
there would be no further statement for the present. Whatever the
other nations may think or do, we shall have their (perhaps grudging)
respect. I am very happy about it.

JAPANESE PATRIOTS THREATEN THE
NETHERLANDS INDIES

May 14, 1934

Pabst came in for one of our periodical talks. He said that a dele¬
gation from the Japanese patriotic society cc Meirinkai,” including a
retired admiral and a retired general, recently called on him and
presented a memorandum drawn up by the society with reference
to the forthcoming Japanese-Netherlands East Indies trade confer¬
ence, shortly to meet at Batavia, Java, in which the society somewhat
aggressively urged the Netherlands Government to ensure a success¬
ful outcome of the negotiations. Among other comments, the memo¬
randum referred to the oppression of the natives of the Dutch East
Indies by the Netherlands Government and observed that failure
of that Government to come to terms with the Japanese would cause
“ dark clouds ” to arise in the relations between the two countries.

General Pabst said that he raised two points : (1) that dealings
between his Government and the natives of the Dutch East Indies
were matters of purely domestic concern in which his Government
could not tolerate interference by others, and (2) that the observa¬
tion concerning <fi dark clouds ” was in the nature of a threat which
likewise was not acceptable, and that these two points must be with¬
drawn if he, the Minister, were to receive the memorandum. The
Japanese delegation bowed in apparent acquiescence; the Minister
said : e< May I take your bow as an apology ? ” whereupon they
bowed again.

The Minister further informed me that he had learned that the
above-mentioned society has recommended to the Japanese Govern¬
ment the severance of diplomatic relations with Holland if the forth¬
coming negotiations do not prove successful.

The Netherlands Minister requested information as to the cus¬
tomary procedure of this Embassy in regard to the reception of such

THE POLICY OF APPEASEMENT : JAPANESE STYLE j 35

delegations and the acceptance of their communications. He was
informed that the delegations are usually received with courtesy,
but that the Embassy has consistently refused to accept, on behalf
of the United States, any memorandums, protests, or other communi¬
cations addressed to the Government or to officials of the United
States, maintaining that such communications, coming as they do
from Japanese sources, must pass through the usual and proper
channels, namely, the Japanese Foreign Office and the Japanese
Embassy at Washington.

Persistent adherence of our Embassy to this procedure apparently
has succeeded in discouraging attempts by patriotic and other societies
to put their ideas before us, as no attempts to present communications
to the American Government through the Embassy have been made
by these societies since my arrival, although at several periods such
attempts might have been expected.

THE POLICY OF APPEASEMENT: JAPANESE STYLE

{Mr. Grew to Mr. Prentiss B. Gilbert , American Consul ,
Geneva , Switzerland)

Confidential

Tokyo, May 17, 1934

Dear Mr. Gilbert, —I acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your
letter of April 5. In answer to your letter and in compliance with
the suggestion contained therein I shall endeavour to outline briefly
the present political situation here with particular reference to the
Japanese attitude towards international co-operation both at present
and in relation to the basic Japanese policy of dominating East Asia.

In your letter you remark that “ one gains the distinct impression
that, having achieved to such a large degree their objective in Man¬
churia, the Japanese are now endeavouring to effect an appeasement
of the feeling against them in every direction possible. 55 That is, in
fact, the specific task which Hirota has set himself as Foreign Minister.
Accordingly—to use the phrases current in the Japanese press—
for the “ desperate diplomacy 55 of Count Uchida there has been
substituted the “ national defence by diplomacy 55 of Mr. Hirota.

In promoting his policy of conciliation Hirota has shown force
and ability. He came into office last September at a moment when
the pendulum of public feeling was tending to resume the norm.
Already Shiratori, the aggressive spokesman of the Foreign Office,
had been forced out. The resignation of Count Uchida was in itself
a blow to military influence. Within a few weeks commenced the
momentous “ Five Ministers 5 Conference 55 at which Hirota by con¬
fronting Araki with pure common sense is believed to have won his
pledge not to interfere in matters of foreign policy. And then in
January, Araki himself, the high priest of the military cult, found

126 THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

he could not redeem the* pledges he had made to the Army and
resigned.

Furthermore, through public utterances and in the Diet, the voice
of public opinion revealed dismay at the size of the military budgets
and an inclination to blame the Army for the unnecessary and
dangerous state of agitation into which the nation as a whole had been
led. Business men and capitalists wished to be free to reap the profits
of the export boom.

During all these months Hirota worked steadily, and I believe
sincerely, to create a friendly basis upon which to deal with China,
Soviet Russia, Great Britain, and the United States. His hand was
manifest in an immediate toning down of anti-foreignism in the
press ; it was revealed in the renewed efforts to solve the current
problems between Japan and Soviet Russia one by one ; and it was
emphasized to me in conversation in which Hirota showed an eager¬
ness to explore any possible avenue which would lead to an improve¬
ment in American-Japanese relations. Certain people considered
him a genuine liberal and the strongest Foreign Minister since
Komura and Kato.

Nevertheless, many believe Hirota’s moderation to be one of
manner and strategy rather than substance. Certainly no one could
have come into office last year unless he was pledged to support
Japan’s continental adventure and unless he profoundly believed
in Japan’s “ mission to preserve the peace of East Asia.” It is pre¬
cisely here that we find a deep-rooted antithesis. The Japanese
Government is at present struggling to escape from the dangers of
international isolation and yet substantially every Japanese—in the
Government and out—is determined that their nation must realize
its long-cherished ambition, hegemony over East Asia.

It is for this reason that the Japanese Government finds it difficult
to beg for the world’s friendship with anything more tangible than
words. One cannot avoid the suspicion that at heart a great many
here—we might even say a majority—view the treaties and inter¬
national commitments to which Japan is a party as just so many
obstacles in the path to empire. Of course there are reasonable-
minded elements, and the older statesmen, Saionji, Makino, and
others who influence the Throne, do not share these somewhat un¬
scrupulous views without many reservations, but they are old men
and we cannot count on their restraining influence much longer. It
is simply that the nation, with the goal in sight, is reluctant to admit
that the period of consolidation, customary after each wave of Japanese
expansion, is now in the best interests of the country.

It immediately comes to mind that this incompatibility between
the desire of Hirota to win friends for Japan and the fundamental
ambitions of the nation has already been illustrated by the justly
famous “ Amau Statement ” of Japan’s policy towards foreign assist¬
ance to China. It has already proved a source of great embarrass¬
ment to Hirota’s policy of friendship on the one hand, and yet, on

THE POLICY OF APPEASEMENT : JAPANESE STYLE 127

the other hand, no one, no government official even, has publicly
denied that this statement represents the genuine policy of the Govern¬
ment. It happens, as a matter of fact, that the original Amau
statement was an instruction to Japan’s diplomatic representatives
abroad and that its public announcement did not have the approval
of the Foreign Minister, but this circumstance is beside the point.
Japan has revealed herself as firmly opposed—say what she may—to
the objects and purposes of the Nine-Power Treaty and the efforts
of the League of Nations to extend international (and Occidental)
assistance to China. . . .

With Soviet Russia Japan is trying to keep the peace at present.
Viewing the situation from Tokyo, neither side has now any stomach
for war, nor are there indications in Japan or Manchuria of prepara¬
tions pointing to imminent warfare. For the time being at least we
need only fear a frontier incident of unusual gravity. Although
Hirota has taken up the Chinese Eastern Railway question, the
yen-rouble exchange question, the fisheries dispute, and the boundary
problems one by one with an evidently genuine desire to remove
them from the slate, progress has been very halting and bids fair to
continue so.

The rumours that the U.S.S.R. is contemplating joining the League
have not aroused great attention here although such comments as
have come to light interpret the step as prompted by considerations
of national safety. Undoubtedly the Japanese realize that the League’s
influence in the Far East would be strengthened by the entry of the
Soviets, but the possibility seems too remote to have aroused any
great degree of apprehension as yet. Incidentally, the Soviet Am¬
bassador recently told me that he had no reason to believe that Soviet
Russia was about to join the League but that he did not know what
might come about in future.

So far as the question of a non-aggression pact between the U.S.S.R.
and Japan is concerned, Hirota has stated that it is his policy first
to remove the specific points of conflict between the two nations
before taking up the question of a general pact. It is believed that a
strong minority, notably the Army, opposes such a pact and that to
ignore this minority would court the risk of reversing the present
trend towards a. more normal national psychology. After these
specific points of conflict have been removed, the minority would
retain no valid reason for continuing their opposition.

In concluding this letter I refer to the portion of your dispatch
outlining the position which Japan is taking at the present time in
Geneva, namely, the wish to be represented on League bodies in
return for Japanese co-operation, the alternative being withdrawal
from all League treaties. Writing from Tokyo I should be inclined
to question the value of Japanese co-operation in the first place
(except in social matters such as narcotics control) owing to the ex¬
clusive character of Japanese ambitions in the Far East, and in the
second place I should question whether withdrawal from all League

128 THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

treaties would create a situation entirely distasteful to the majority
of the Japanese people. That the technical and political difficulties
involved in securing acceptance of the Japanese reservation should
be envisaged in Tokyo as providing plausible reasons for not with¬
drawing from the League next year, I am inclined to doubt. Japan
has burned her bridges behind her so far as the League is con¬
cerned. The Government has repeatedly indicated that Japan’s
withdrawal from the League was necessitated by a fundamental
divergence of views and, only two weeks ago, the Foreign Minister
—the spearhead of the conciliatory forces now articulate—said.
publicly :

Our proposition having been rejected by the powers, we were
compelled to serve notice of withdrawal from the League of Nations,
with which we had maintained close co-operation for so many
years. However, that step was one which Japan perforce had
to make in order that we might fulfil our mission and responsi¬
bilities in East Asia.

Any Japanese Government which attempted to retain Japan^s
membership in the League would court the danger of denying Japan’s
Cfi mission and responsibilities in East Asia ”—one of the terms in
which the conviction of Japan’s “ Manifest Destiny ” is expressed.
If, then, Japan’s secession from the League and League activities
should be definite, it would of course carry with it the inevitable
corollary that Japan would be stopped from making use of the
League as a medium* for the manipulation of the balance of power.

The arguments of the foregoing pages indicate the nature of the
problem which confronts the present “ Cabinet of Old Men.” The
Saito Government is trying, so to speak, to keep the brakes on.
Furthermore, having survived recent political crises with increasing
difficulty, the cabinet is racing against time. Will the common sense
of the nation reassert itself with sufficient celerity or will the Govern¬
ment succumb to death by attrition before the forces of moderation
have gained the upper hand ? At the present time it is only the
liberal, super-party advisers to the Throne who are keeping the
Government in power in the face of dissatisfaction in many quarters.
Should they fall in the near future the succeeding Government
would almost inevitably be more reactionary. For the real good of
the country they must hold on as long as possible. In any event, the
mantle of government will not again fall on the generation which
was at the helm when Japan rose to the position of a world power.
We shall sooner or later be seriously concerned as to whether the
new generation will acquit itself successfully of the gigantic task to
which the nation seems committed, because American and Japanese
policy in the Far East will directly conflict—unless someone puts the
helm over hard.

With kind personal regards,

Yours very sincerely,

A HELPFUL TALK WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR 129

On July 3, the cabinet of Premier Saito resigned and a new cabinet, headed
by Admiral Okada, took office.

ESTIMATING THE OKADA CABINET

July 6, 1934

Cabled the Department an extensive estimate of the new cabinet
given me by an eminent Japanese liberal. He regards it as an out¬
standing victory for the moderates, as indeed it is, because the
chauvinists were pressing hard for an ultra-nationalist line-up.
Saionji, Makino, and their group are clearly in the saddle. Foreign
Minister Hirota and War Minister Hayashi are to stay, and Finance
Minister Takahashi for a while, although he will probably later be
succeeded by the Vice-Minister of Finance, Fujii. My informant
told me that the decision had come like a “ thunder clap ” and that
if the United States had had the privilege of choosing the cabinet
in its own interests, it could not have done better. The new cabinet,
he said, would follow precisely the policy of the Saito cabinet but
with more driving force and initiative, which Saito lacked. I told
the Department that while I was not yet in a position to subscribe
to the foregoing estimate in its entirety, I did believe that the
moderates had come out on top. My source of information had
already shown that his opinion was worthy of consideration because
he had predicted A dmir al Okada’s appointment some time before
the latter’s name had even been mentioned publicly.

A HELPFUL TALK WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR
September 7, 1934

Palled on the Soviet Ambassador and asked him if there were any
particular developments or facts concerning the negotiations for the
sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway other than those which had
appeared in the press which he might be willing to tell me. Mr.
Yurenev replied that in spite of the Japanese statement that the
negotiations had only been adjourned, they were in fact broken off
de facto. He said that the termination of the negotiations had at
,least eliminated from the scene Mr. Ohashi, who was an ignorant
and obstructive element and had been brought into the negotiations
only at the insistence of the Japanese military in Manchuria. He
•thought that Mr. Hirota was equally glad to be rid of him.

I ast-pd Mr. Yurenev whether the failure to come to terms on the
sale of the railway was not more a question of prestige and a desire
to achieve a moral victory than a mere question of price because the
Soviet demand and the Manchukuo offer were now separated only
by the comparatively trivial difference of ¥40,000,000. The Am¬
bassador replied that the Japanese were great bargainers where
money was concerned and that Mr. Hirota when Ambassador in
Moscow had haggled for a long time with the Soviet Government

5

130 THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

over a matter of a mere ¥500. I asked the Ambassador if there was
any indication as to which party would take the next step in re¬
opening the negotiations, to which he only replied that this could
not at present be foreseen.

In this connection Mr. Yurenev expressed a high opinion of Mr.
Hirota, for whom he said he had genuine admiration. He said he
considered him a very able and shrewd negotiator but a great deal
pleasanter to deal with than Count Uchida, who was merely a
mouthpiece of the Japanese military.

General Relations

The Ambassador said that he thought there was little danger of
a Soviet-Japanese conflict at the present time. The Soviets were very
strong in Siberia and Vladivostok and were prepared for any eventu¬
ality. Even if some inflammatory incident should occur, he thought
it could be localized, especially because the Japanese Army in
Manchuria was by no means in condition to take the offensive at
present. He said he also considered Japan’s military were much
more in hand than during the regime of General Araki and that
the Emperor and his entourage were very much stronger and much
more able to dictate a sane policy for the nation. He thought that
the recent withdrawal of Admiral Suetsugu from the command
of the fleet and his replacement by Admiral Nagano was a very
important indication of this strength and presaged a desire for a
conciliatory policy in the coming naval negotiations. Mr. Yurenev
did not seem to know whether Admiral Suetsugu was to be given
another assignment or not.

While the Ambassador avoided saying that he was either pessi¬
mistic or optimistic about the general situation, his remarks
gave me the impression that he was not particularly anxious as
to the outlook at the present time but rather that he thought matters
were improving.

Arrest of the C.E.R, Employees

Asked about the significance of the arrest of a large number of
the Soviet employees on the C.E.R., Mr. Yurenev did not seem to
attach any great importance to the incident. He of course said that
they were absolutely innocent of the charges against them and that
on the contrary there was definite evidence that the sabotage com¬
plained of had been carried out from other quarters. He said it
was particularly significant that the railroad cars carrying Japanese
guns and other military equipment had suffered no damage.

Eastern Locarno Pact

The Ambassador then turned to the situation in Europe and said
that the Eastern Locarno Pact would undoubtedly go through but
that it was not at all sure that Germany and Poland would participate
therein.

HIROTA ON THE 1934 NAVAL CONFERENCE jgj

Anglo-Japanese Alliance

The Ambassador asked me what I thought about the rumours of
an Anglo-Japanese alliance. I told him what I knew about the
rumours and said that while it was easy to build up an academic case
to justify the rumours I had nevertheless no evidence whatever that
they had any foundations in fact and that on the contrary I doubted
if any definite negotiations for a rapprochement had taken place.
The Ambassador said he agreed with me and that he also had no
information but he thought that England’s situation in the Far East
at the present time might well give her cause for concern. He asked
me if I knew anything definite about the British Industrial Mission
to Manchukuo, to which I replied that I had no reason to believe
that it had any political significance whatever. The Ambassador
concurred.

HIROTA ON THE 1934 NAVAL CONFERENCE
Leave of Absence

I called on the Minister of Foreign Affairs to take leave of him
before departing on a month’s leave of absence to Peiping and told
him that if any questions should arise during my absence which he
wished to discuss with the Embassy Mr. Neville would be in charge
and would be glad to be helpful at any time.

Naval Conference

The Minister, on his own initiative, approached the question of
the Naval Conference and said that Japan had definitely decided to
abrogate the Washington Treaties towards the end of 1934. Many
elements in the Navy wished to abrogate immediately, but Mr.
Hirota had insisted on waiting until after the London conversations
in October because as soon as one signatory had abrogated, the
Washington Treaty would become null and void as regards aU the
other signatories and Mr. Hirota intended to discuss the matter with
the other parties before abrogation in order not to give offence to
the other signatories and also in order to avoid, prior to the next
naval conference, unfavourable atmosphere which might be created
if the abrogation should take place without some pre limin ary mutual
understanding. The Minister said that the discussions concerning
abrogation would be conducted with the various powers separately
and that owing to Ambassador Saito’s absence from Washington
the matter is to be taken up with the American delegation to the
preliminary conversations in London by Ambassador Matsudaira.

Mr. Hirota said that while the difficulties of solving the naval
problem with foreign powers were no doubt considerable, they were
not so difficult as the domestic problem which he had to face in
dealing with the chauvinists. He said he had great hopes of some
solution of the naval problem which would avoid saddling the various
countries with future heavy building programmes, especially because

132 THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

the younger officers of the Japanese Navy were definitely opposed
to the building of big ships and were in favour of small ones.

“ THE IMPERIAL NAVY MUST BE AVENGED 99
November 2, 1934

We have a first-hand report of a meeting at the Young Men 9 s
and Ex-Soldiers 9 Association in Kobe, where a Lieutenant-Colonel
Matsumoto, a member of the staff of the Commander of the Fourth
Division of the Army, made an inflammatory address of which the
gist was as follows :

1. The outcome of the Naval Conference is immaterial in that
Japan now has a preponderance of warships of the class desired,
and will continue to maintain this advantage. Japan is in a position
to defeat America at any time, and, in fact, any other country or
combination of countries.

2. American duplicity during former naval conferences degraded
Japan, and this insult to the Imperial Navy must be avenged .

3. After all, America is the one nation that stands in the way
of justice, and the long list of insults from that country must be
wiped out, and to establish Japan as the just ruler of the world
America must be crushed.

4. America, formerly the richest and most opulent nation in
the world, has become weak and flabby through dissipation and
now is the time for Japan to prove the worth of her inheritance
of the Tamato Damashii .

5. War is surely coming and all must be prepared so that a
successful outcome may be assured. The Japanese Army is now
waiting for the time to act, and the ex-service men and reserves
must be prepared at any time to be called to the colours, which
.will probably be by the end of this year, or early next year. No
ex-service man should leave his district unless on very urgent
business, and then only for a very short time.

6. Japan has never lost a war and never will.

When one considers the impressionable age and somewhat limited
outlook of the young persons who usually attend these meetings,
speeches of the type reported seem dangerous and may easily lead
to incidents, particularly at this time when there is more or less
excitement over the London naval conversations. I shall bring the
matter informally to Hirota’s attention.

ENTERTAINING BABE RUTH
November 6, 1934

Motored Babe Ruth, Lefty 0 9 Doul, and Shiro Akaboshi, champion
of the Tokyo Golf Club, to Asaka for golf, where we managed to
finish about fourteen holes in spite of the camera men who pursued

WHY AMERICA MUST STAND FIRM IN THE FAR EAST 133

the Babe over the course. The Babe hits a tremendous ball, as does
O’Doul, and both of them play sound golf but both were out of
practice and their shots were not always straight. It amused me to
hear the Bambino observe, when he said I was trying to hit the ball
too hard (my usual weakness), that it was precisely the same principle
in baseball and that if one tried to hit too hard (listen to the King
of Swat) one was bound to take one’s eyes off the ball. I haven’t
noticed the Babe letting up any at the home plate.

But the real kick of the day for me was to listen to the Babe and
Lefty discussing a hundred subjects in the baseball world while we
motored out and in. Wish I had had a stenographer present. After
the game we had to sit on the steps of the Club, with our caddies
behind us, and talk for the news-reels. Suddenly and unexpectedly
told to say something, I observed, so far as I can remember : “ Well,
Babe, it’s fine to see you in Tokyo. I don’t know if you realize
what distinguished company you are in to-day : Mr. Akaboshi,
champion of the Tokyo Golf Club, and—the worst golfer in the
world—myself.”

The Babe responded nobly that he must dispute that title with
me as he had been in every blankety-blank trap on the course. He
had. But he always got out with his first explosion shot, while I
didn’t. Of course the personnel and caddies at the Club were thrilled
to the core, and I presented the Babe to such players as we met on
the course ; “ Pleased to know you,” said the Bambino. Of course all
Japan has gone wild over him. He is a great deal more effective
Ambassador than I could ever be.

WHY AMERICA MUST STAND FIRM IN THE
FAR EAST

December 27, 1934

In the London naval conversations the firm stand of our Govern¬
ment and delegation to maintain the present naval ratios intact in
the face of Japanese intransigeance, as well as their decision that the
action of the Japanese Government in denouncing the Washington
Naval Treaty automatically created a new situation in which the
conversations must be suspended sine die , leaving the Japanese to
return home empty-handed, were especially gratifying to those of
us who have watched the development in London from this angle.

The thought which is uppermost in my mind is that the United
States is faced, and will be faced* in future, with two main alterna¬
tives. One is to be prepared to withdraw from the Far East, grace¬
fully and gradually perhaps, but not the less effectively in the long
run, permitting our treaty rights to be nullified, the Open Door to
be closed, our vested economic interests to be dissolved, and our
commerce to operate unprotected. There are those who advocate
this course, and who have advocated it to me personally, on the

134 THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

ground that any other policy will entail the risk of eventual war
with Japan. Frank Simonds has emphasized that risk as almost a
certainty. In their opinion, “ the game is not worth the candle ”
because the United States can continue to subsist comfortably
even after relinquishing its varied interests in the Far East, thereby
eliminating the risk of future war.

The other main alternative is to insist, and to continue to insist,
not aggressively yet not the less firmly, on the maintenance of our
legitimate rights and interests in this part of the world and, so far
as practicable, to support the normal development of those interests
constructively and progressively.

There has already been abundant indication that the present
administration in Washington proposes to follow the second of these
alternatives. We may therefore, I assume, discard the hypothesis of
withdrawal and examine the future outlook with the assurance that
our Government has not the slightest intention of relinquishing the
legitimate rights, vested interests, non-discriminatory privileges for
equal opportunity and healthful commercial development of the
United States in die Far East.

In following this second and logical course, there should be and
need be nothing inconsistent, so far as our own attitude is concerned,
with the policy of the good neighbour. The determination to support
and protect our legitimate interests in the Far East can and should
be carried out in a way which, while sacrificing no point of principle,
will aim to restrict to a minimum the friction between the United
States and Japan inevitably arising from time to time as a result of
that determination.

The administration of that policy from day to day becomes* a
matter of diplomacy, sometimes delicate, always important, for
much depends on the method and manner of approach to the various
problems with which we have been, are, and will continue to be
faced. With the ultra-sensitiveness of the Japanese, arising out of a
marked inferiority complex which manifests itself in the garb of
an equally marked superiority complex, with all its attendant bluster,
chauvinism, xenophobia, and organized national propaganda, the
method and manner of dealing with current controversies assume
a significance and importance often out of all proportion to the
nature of the controversy. That our Government fully appreciates
this fact has been amply demonstrated by the instructions issued to
this Embassy since the present administration took office, and we
have tried to carry out those instructions or to act on our own
initiative when such action was called for, with the foregoing con¬
siderations constantly in view.

But behind our day-to-day diplomacy lies a factor of prime im¬
portance, namely, national support, demonstrated and reinforced by
national preparedness. I believe that a fundamental element of that
preparedness should be the maintenance of the present naval ratios
in principle and the eventual achievement and maintenance of those

WHY AMERICA MUST STAND FIRM IN THE FAR EAST

135

ratios, so far as they apply to Japan, in fact. With such a back¬
ground, and only with such a background, can we pursue our diplo¬
macy with any confidence that our representations will be listened
to or that they will lead to favourable results. General Douglas
MacArthur, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, was recently
reported in the press as saying : “ Armies and navies, in being efficient,
give weight to the peaceful words of statesmen, but a feverish effort
to create them when once a crisis is imminent simply provokes
attack. 5 ’ We need thorough preparedness not in the interests of war
but of peace.

It is difficult for those who do not live in Japan to appraise the
present temper of the country. An American Senator is reported to
have recommended recently that we should accord parity to Japan
in order to avoid future war. Whatever the Senator’s views may be
concerning the general policy that we should follow in the Far East,
he probably does not realize what harm that sort of public statement
does in strengthening the Japanese stand and in reinforcing the
aggressive ambitions of the expansionists. The Japanese press of
course picks out such statements by prominent Americans and
publishes them far and wide, thus confirming the general belief in
Japan that the pacifist element in the United States is preponder¬
antly strong and in the last analysis will control the policy and action
of our Government. Under such circumstances there is a general
tendency to characterize our diplomatic representations as bluff
and to believe that they can safely be disregarded without fear of
implementation.

It would be helpful if those who share the Senator’s views could
hear and read some of the things that are constantly being said and
written in Japan, to the effect that Japan’s destiny is to subjugate
and rule the world (sic), and could realize the expansionist ambi¬
tions which lie not far from the surface in the minds of certain elements
in the Army and Navy, the patriotic societies, and the intense
nationalists throughout the country. Their aim is to obtain trade
control and eventually predominant political influence in China, the
Philippines, the Straits Settlements, Siam and the Dutch East Indies,
the Maritime Provinces and Vladivostok, one step at a time, as in
Korea and Manchuria, pausing intermittently to consolidate and
then continuing as soon as the intervening obstacles can be over¬
come by diplomacy or force. With such dreams of empire cherished
by many, and with an army and navy capable of taking the bit in
their own teeth and running away with it regardless of the restrain¬
ing influence of the saner heads of the Government in Tokyo (a risk
which unquestionably exists and of which we have already had
ample evidence in the Manchurian affair), we would be reprehensi^ly
somnolent if we were to trust to the security of treaty restraints or
international comity to safeguard our own interests or, indeed, our
own property.

In a confidential conversation with the Netherlands Minister,

136 THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

General Pabst, a shrewd and rational colleague with long experience
in Japan, he said that in his opinion the Japanese Navy, imbued
as it is with patriotic and chauvinistic fervour and with a desire to
emulate the deeds of the Army in order not to lose caste with the
public, would be perfectly capable of descending upon and occupying
Guam at a moment of crisis or, indeed, at any other moment, re¬
gardless of the ulterior consequences.

I do not think that such an insane step is likely now, yet the
action of the Army in Manchuria, judged from the point of view of
treaty rights and international comity, might also have been judged
as insensate. The important fact is that under present circumstances,
and indeed under circumstances which may continue in future
(although the pendulum of chauvinism throughout Japanese history
has swung to and fro in periodic cycles of intensity and temporary
relaxation), the armed forces of the country are perfectly capable
of overriding the restraining control of the Government and of com¬
mitting what might well amount to national hara-kiri in a mistaken
conception of patriotism.

When Japanese speak of Japan’s being the “ stabilizing factor ”
and the “ guardian of peace ” of East Asia, what they have in mind
is a Pax Japonica with eventual complete commercial control and, in
the minds of some, eventual complete political control of East Asia.
While Ambassador Saito may have been misquoted in a recent issue
of the Philadelphia Bulletin as saying that Japan will be prepared
to fight to maintain that conception of peace, nevertheless that is
precisely what is in the minds of many Japanese to-day. There is a
swashbuckling temper in the country, largely developed by military
propaganda, which can lead Japan during the next few years, or in
the next few generations, to any extremes unless the saner minds in
the Government prove able to cope with it and to restrain the country
from national suicide.

The efficacy of such restraint is always problematical. Plots
against the Government are constantly being hatched. We hear,
for instance, that a number of young officers of the 3rd Infantry
Regiment and students from the Military Academy in Tokyo were
found on November 22 to have planned to assassinate various high
members of the Government, including Count Makino, and that
students of the Military Academy were confined to the school area
for a few days after the discovery of that plot. A similar alleged plot
to attack the politicians at the opening of the extraordinary session
of the Diet—another May 15 incident—is also said to have been
discovered and nipped in the bud. Such plots aim to form a military
dictatorship. It is of course impossible to substantiate these rumours,
but they are much talked about and it is unlikely that so much smoke
would materialize without some fire.

I wish that more Americans would come out here and live here
and gradually come to sense the real potential risks and dangers of
the situation instead of speaking and writing academically on a

WHY AMERICA MUST STAND FIRM IN THE FAR EAST

137

subject which they know nothing whatever about, thereby con¬
tributing ammunition to the Japanese military and extremists who are
stronger than they have been for many a day. The idea that a great
body of liberal thought lying just beneath the surface since 1931
would be sufficiently strong to emerge and assume control with a
little foreign encouragement is thoroughly mistaken. The liberal
thought is there, but it is inarticulate and largely impotent, and in
all probability will remain so for some time to come.

Perhaps this gives the impression that we at the Embassy are
developing something of an “ anti-Japanese 55 complex. This is not
the case. One can dislike and disagree with certain members of a
family without necessarily feeling hostility to the family itself. For
me there are no finer people in the world than the best type of
Japanese. I am rather inclined to place Hirota among them ; if he
could have his way unhampered by the military I believe that he
would steer the country into safer and saner channels.

One of these friends once sadly remarked to us : u We Japanese
are always putting our worst foot foremost, and we are too
proud to explain ourselves.” Theirs has been and is a cc bungling
diplomacy.” They habitually play their cards badly. While it is true
that the military and the extremists are primarily responsible for the
“ bungling diplomacy ” of Japan, the Japanese as a race tend to be
inarticulate, more at home in action than with words. But the
military and the extremists know little and care little about Japan’s
relations with other countries, and it is the desire of people like
Shiratori, Amau, and other Government officials to enhance their
own prestige at home and to safeguard their future careers by stand¬
ing in well with the military that brings about much of the trouble.
Perhaps we should be grateful that they so often give their hand away
in advance.

But all this does not make us less sympathetic to the better elements
in Japanese life or in any sense <e anti-Japanese.” Japan is a country
of paradoxes and extremes, of great wisdom and of great stupidity,
an apt illustration of which may be found in connection with
the naval conversations ; while the naval authorities and the press
have been stoutly maintaining that Japan cannot adequately defend
her shores with less than parity, the press and the public, in articles,
speeches, and interviews, have at the same time been valiantly
boasting that the Japanese Navy is to-day stronger than the American
Navy and could easily defeat us in case of war. In such an atmo¬
sphere it is difficult, very difficult, for a foreigner to keep a detached
and balanced point of view. We in the Embassy are making that
effort, I hope with success, and in the meantime about all we can
do is to keep the boat from rocking dangerously. Constructive
work is at present impossible. Our efforts are concentrated on the
thwarting of destructive influences.

In view of all these considerations, I have little hesitation in
reiterating and emphasizing the potential dangers of the situation
5 *

138 THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

and the prime importance of American national preparedness to
meet it. As a nation we have taken the lead in international efforts
towards the restriction and reduction of armaments. We have had
hopes that the movement would be progressive, but the conditions
of world affairs as they have developed during the past twelve years
since the Washington Conference have not afforded fruitful ground
for such progress. Unless we are prepared to subscribe to a
Pax Japonica in the Far East, with all that this movement, as con¬
ceived and interpreted by Japan, is bound to entail, we should rapidly
build up our Navy to treaty strength, and if and when the
Washington Naval Treaty expires we should continue to maintain
the present ratio with Japan regardless of cost, a peace-time insurance
both to cover and to reduce the risk of war. In the meantime every
proper step should be taken to avoid or to offset the belligerent
utterances of jingoes no less than the defeatist statements of pacifists
in the United States, many of which find their way into the
Japanese press, because the utterances of the former tend to inflame
public sentiment against our country, while the statements of the
latter convey an impression of American weakness, irresolution,
and bluff.

My own opinion, although it can be but guesswork, is that Japan
will under no circumstances invite a race in naval armaments, and
that having found our position on the ratios to be adamant, further
propositions will be forthcoming within the next two years before
the Washington Treaty expires, or before our present building
programme is fully completed. When the United States has actually
completed its naval-building programme to treaty limits, then, it is
believed, and probably not before then, Japan will realize that we
are in earnest and will seek a compromise. We believe that Japan’s
naval policy has been formulated on the premises that the United
States would never build up to treaty strength, a premise which
has been strengthened in the past by the naval policy of the past
two administrations, by the apparent strength of the pacifist element
in the United States, and more recently by the effects of the
depression.

While it is true that Japan, by sedulously forming and stimulating
public opinion to demand parity with the United States in principle
if not in fact, has burned her bridges behind her, nevertheless
the Japanese leaders are past masters at remoulding public
opinion in the country by skilful propaganda to suit new conditions.
Once Japan is convinced that parity is impossible, it is difficult
to believe that she will allow matters to come to a point where com¬
petitive building becomes unavoidable. With a national budget
for 1935-36'totaling 2,193,414,289 yen, of which about 47 per cent,
is for the Army and Navy, and with an estimated national debt in
1936 of 9,880,000,000 yen, nearly equal to the Cabinet Bureau of
Statistics estimate of the national income for 1930, namely,
*°>635> 000 > 000 yon ; with her vast outlay in Manchuria,

EXPLAINING THE DIARIES AND DISPATCHES igg

her already heavily taxed population, and the crying need
of large sections of her people for relief funds, it is difficult
to see how Japan could afford to embark upon a programme
of maintaining naval parity with the United States and Great
Britain.

Once we have registered our position firmly and unequivocally,
we can then afford to await the next move on the part of Japan. I
believe that it will come.

So far as we can evaluate here the proceedings of the recent pre¬
liminary naval conversations in London, I am of the opinion that
the most important and the most valuable result issuing therefrom
has been the apparent tendency towards closer Anglo-American
co-operation in the Far East. If we can count in future—again as a
direct result of Japan’s “bungling diplomacyon a solid and
united front between the United States -and Great Britain in meet¬
ing Japan’s flaunting of treaty rights and her unrestrained ambitions
to control East Asia, the future may well assume a brighter aspect
for all of us.

Theodore Roosevelt enunciated the policy “ Speak softly and
carry a big stick.” If our diplomacy in the Far East is to achieve
favourable results, and if we are to reduce the risk of an eventual
war with Japan to a minimum, that is the only way to proceed. Such
a war may be unthinkable, and so it is, but the spectre of it is always
present and will be present for some time to come. It would be
criminally short-sighted to discard it from our calculations, and the
best possible way to avoid it is to be adequately prepared, for pre¬
paredness is a cold fact which even the chauvinists, the military,
the patriots, and the ultra-nationalists in Japan, for all their bluster
concerning “ provocative measures ” in the United States, can grasp
and understand. The Soviet Ambassador recently told me that a
prominent Japanese had said to him that the most important factor
in avoiding a Japanese attack on the Maritime Provinces was the
intensive Soviet mili tary preparations in' Siberia and Vladivostok.
I believe this to be true, and again, and yet again, I urge that our
own country be adequately prepared to meet all eventualities in the
Far East.

Of course I have conveyed these views to our Government.

EXPLAINING THE DIARIES AND DISPATCHES

January 22, 1935 , . T „ . . T . A

On reading back over this diary I really wonder how I have the
courage to send it to anyone, it is such a patchwork and crazy quilt,
and so many of the comments so rapidly set down require further
elucidation or discussion. The field of Japanese-American relations,
for instance, is so broad and so impossible to cover in a r unnin g
document of this kind that my day-to-day comment, hastily ex¬
pressed, might well give erroneous impressions. Our official dis-

140 THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

patches, taken as a whole, probably cover the field fairly well, and
from the point of view of history they must furnish the criterion. The
only thing the diary can do is to supply a few illustrations to the
text, but these illustrations, historically, should never be considered
without the text. They are too likely to give one-sided and inadequate
impressions.

Our dispatches, also, must be read as a whole and over a period
of time to get the correct picture. Some of our dispatches, for instance
might be regarded as inconsistent. For instance, one of our dis¬
patches on the naval conversations (No. 1087), which I am told was
sent to the President, was based on the idea that the Japanese as a
whole are absolutely intransigent regarding the question of naval
parity and that there is complete solidarity in the country on that
issue. That is absolutely true at present, but a fortnight later
I wrote another dispatch (No. 1102) conveying the idea—though
only as guesswork and so stated—that when the Japanese eventu¬
ally find that we mean business in maintaining the present ratios,
and that we intend to build and do build up to treaty strength, and
propose to continue that policy even if it means a naval race,
they, the Japanese, will seek a compromise rather than face such a
naval race, and that although they have burned their bridges behind
them, they are capable of remoulding public opinion and policy
over a period of time—even during the two years elapsing before
the treaty expires. This, as I said, can be but guesswork, but every¬
body in the Embassy, including the Counsellor and the Naval and
Military Attaches, agrees that it is a sound guess. So the two
dispatches were not actually inconsistent : the first dealt with the
present, while the second had to do with the future if certain things
happen, namely, the clear and factual demonstration of our deter¬
mination to construct and maintain our navy on a 5-3 proportion.
I only hope that the President, if he saw both dispatches, will get
this point.

WHY AMERICA SHOULD NOT REPEAL
THE EXCLUSION ACT

January 27, 1935

The Bishop Reifsniders, just returned from America, and the
Walter Edges, on their way around the world, came to tea. Reifsnider
told me of his talks with Hull, Castle, and others, chiefly with regard
to a repeal of the discriminatory provisions of the Exclusion Act of
1924. He tried to see Hearst in California to ascertain his attitude,
but Hearst was ill and couldn’t see him. I do not think that this is
the time to approach the question ; of course the Act always rankles
and always will, but to repeal the discriminatory provisions now
would be interpreted by many as an indication of weakness and as a
desire to placate the martial spirit of Japan, and while lovely edi¬
torials would be written about our graceful action in recognizing
Japan as an equal, it would not in the slightest degree alter Japanese

WHY OUR FLEET MANOEUVRES IN PACIFIC OCEAN AiDED PEACE I 4 1

policy or tone down the military propaganda. On the contrary, I
can see some Japanese writers arguing that having recognized
Japan as an equal on the immigration issue, it would now be all
the more appropriate and logical for us to recognize her as an equal
on the naval issue. Besides, who can ever predict with certainty
that any bill will pass the Senate ? We thought our Lausanne Treaty
with Turkey secure, and, so far as I am aware, the administration
thought the World Court Protocol would pass, yet both were defeated.
To bring up the repeal of the discriminatory provisions of the Ex¬
clusion Act and to have the effort fail would be disastrous. Better
e t things lie for the present.

WHY OUR FLEET MANOEUVRES IN THE
PACIFIC OCEAN AIDED PEACE

April i, 1935

Dr. Ivan Lee Holt, recently elected President of the Federal Council
of the Churches of Christ in America, came to see me on his way
home from Shanghai. I had arranged an interview for him with
Hirota, to whom he merely wishes to deliver a message of goodwill.
He asked me what position I thought he ought to take as regards
the efforts of the churches at home to have the scheduled naval
manoeuvres in the Pacific cancelled on the ground that they would
constitute a provocation and threat to Japan.

I went to the bat hard on this issue and told him that I thought
the movement against the manoeuvres was both nefarious and
actually dangerous. The manoeuvres, which were purely routine
and had been arranged some two years ago, would not come within
1500 miles of the shores of Japan ; we have two oceans to protect
and it would be not only the height of absurdity but a confession
of weakness and fear of Japan if we were to caned them. If we are
to shape our policies and actions soldy with a view to pleasing the
Japanese, it will make them more cocky than ever and simply invite
aggressive tactics on their part and will give them the impression that
the so-called pacifist element in our country is so strong that they,
the Japanese, can do whatever they please and ride roughshod over
our rightful and reasonable interests without any concern whatever
as to protective action on our part—a distinctly unhealthy impression
to convey.

We want peace, not war, but the surest way to court war is to
follow the weak and defeatist policy advocated by some of the churches,
and the best way to ensure peace is to follow the wise policy of our
Government, preparedness without aggressiveness, and protection of
our rightful interests interpreted in the spirit of the good neighbour.
If Japan sees fit to interpret our routine naval manoeuvres as sabre-
rattling she has only herself to thank, for it was certainly Japan
which began the rattling, and the more we adopt a spineless attitude,
the more will Japan be tempted to unsheathe the sword. There

142 THREE TEARS of calm before the storm

is nothing that the Oriental respects so much as strength, and nothing
that conduces to his aggressiveness so much as weakness.

I didn’t say all this in precisely these words, but I did talk with
the utmost frankness because the attitude of some of the churches at
home disturbs me greatly and Dr. Holt probably has a good deal of
influence as President of the Federal Council. He looked mildly
surprised at my attitude, because he had told me that I am regarded
as a staunch supporter of church interests, but I think he got the point,
and when he left he at least implied that he would be guided by
what I had said. If I do possess the reputation of being a good friend
and supporter of the church workers out here—which I am—my
advice on this point may be listened to with more respect than
otherwise.

HOW GERMANY’S REARMAMENT HELPED JAPAN
April 2, 1935

Stoicesco, the Rumanian Charge d’Affaires, and later Pabst, came
in for political talks. The German declaration of rearmament has
certainly brought about a sort of bouleversement in the general situa¬
tion, all in favour of Japanese interests. The increased tension in
Europe absorbs most of the available attention of the foreign powers,
with the exception of the United States, which are interested in the
Far East. Japan can feel safer from foreign interference than at any
time since the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and there¬
fore has a distinct advantage in political negotiations with other
countries. Amau denied yesterday that any steps had been taken
for a Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact. Indeed, under present
circumstances, Japan has no need for one. Developments are playing
directly into Japanese hands. Amau said that Japan has no alliance
or ententes except the more or less defunct sort of informal under¬
standing that exists with Poland, and we have indications that there
is an intimate exchange of views and information going on between
Japan and Germany. But all this is nebulous, and the main fact is
that Japan can now “ sit pretty ” and carry on more or less as she
wishes, with the assurance that the European powers are much too
busy at home to bother very much about the Far East. This situation
is not going to make our diplomacy any easier.

A GREAT JAPANESE GENTLEMAN ON JAPAN
May 22, 1935

Big Japanese dinner given by the Grand Master of Ceremonies
and Viscountess Matsudaira at the Maple Club, including Count
Makino, Baron Hayashi, members of the Imperial Household Ministry,
and all the chiefs of mission and their wives, with the exception of
the charges d’affaires ad interim . The charge d’affaires en titre were
there. It was a brilliant function.

After dinner I sat with Count Makino and had an interesting tali,

MR. AND MRS. AMERICA VISIT JAPAN 143

in the course of which he toid me of a conversation he had just had
with Dubose, editor of the Paris Temps , who has been travelling in
Japan. Dubose apparently told Count Makino that he considered
the political situation in Japan as “ dangerous," owing to the strife
and corruption among the political parties and the risk of military
Fascism on the one hand and of Communism on the other.

Makino said to Dubose (as the former repeated the conversation
to me), “ When you return to Paris and make your report or write
your editorials on the domestic situation in Japan, cut out the word
‘ danger 5 from your vocabulary. We have a safeguard in Japan
which other countries do not possess in the same degree, namely, the
Imperial Household. There will never be 4 danger 9 from military-
Fascism or Communism or from any other kind of c ism 9 simply
because the Emperor is supreme and will always have the last word."

I have never heard the old man speak so emphatically or exhibit
so much patriotic emotion ; his eyes filled with tears and he had to
wipe his glasses. The manner in which he talked to-night—his
emphasis and emotion—gave a momentary revelation of the intensity
of their devotion to the Throne, and I think that the force of that
devotion throughout the nation—in spite of all the bickerings and
political agitations and even the assassinations, or perhaps because
of them—is stronger, much stronger, than foreigners generally
appreciate. At any rate, I was greatly impressed to-night by this
momentary glimpse into the mind of the usually suave, courteous,
and eminently gentle Count Makino, whom I shall always regard
as one of the world’s greatest gentlemen.

MR. AND MRS. AMERICA VISIT JAPAN
June 20, 1935

Mr. and Mrs. America called at the Embassy this morning in the
course of their round of official visits. They are two life-size American
dolls, sent over to Japan on a tc goodwill mission 99 by the Mayor
of New York. They are not only life-size but amazingly life-like.
After looking into the young lady’s lovely eyes, Alice said it was
astonishing not to find a soul behind them. The visit has stirred up
quite a lot of controversy, which has taken the form of open letters
to the Advertiser , one correspondent asserting that the whole thing
is silly and undignified and that the reception of the dolls by the
Prime Minister and the American Ambassador—who allegedly
served the dolls with iced tea—was absurd and placed both Japanese
and Americans in a ridiculous light. Other correspondents dis¬
agreed with that view.

What happened is that the Board of Tourist Industry of the
Japanese Railways suggested to the Mayor of New York that a
“ goodwill mission " of two American dolls would be warmly wel¬
comed in Japan, and Mayor LaGuardia took it up and the dolls
were dispatched after appropriate ceremonies in New York. They

THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

144

were given, according to the press, the suite de luxe on the Japanese
liner which brought them over, and they are being taken all over
Japan by train, bus, aeroplane, ferry, and every other means of
transportation. Of course, the thing is merely propaganda for the
Japanese Tourist Bureau—a publicity stunt pure and simple—but
when informed that the dolls would call on us at the Embassy I could
not possibly have refused to receive them without giving unnecessary
offence and creating an unpleasant impression. However, I did take
the precaution of consulting a Japanese officer of the America-Japan
Society, and he, after investigation, advised me to go ahead.

There were several reasons for doing so : first, the dolls were to
be received by the Prime Minister and several members of the
cabinet and by the Mayor of Tokyo ; second, the sentiment for dolls
in Japan is deep and universal, arising no doubt from the Japanese
devotion to children ; there are annual doll festivals and doll societies;
third, I believe in supporting American tourism in Japan; the
more Americans who come and travel in Japan, the better,
barring certain exceptional incidents and cases, for Japanese*
American relations. So Alice and I received the dolls on the back
terrace, with most of our staff there to see the fun ; although Mrs.
America’s arm dropped off as she entered, the accident was quickly
repaired and they were seated in two chairs while we shook hands
with them in front of a battery of press cameras. Iced tea was served,
as customarily, to the Japanese who accompanied the dolls. The
whole thing didn’t last ten minutes.

Later there was a big public meeting in Hibiya Hall, attended
largely by children, at which the Mayor of Tokyo personally appeared
and made a welcoming speech, and the least I could do was
to send Andrews, a Third Secretary, to read a speech for me in
which I said that I was glad to support the visit. My speech was
given a light touch by the remark : ee Mr. and Mrs. America have one
advantage over other visitors to Japan : they speak and understand
Japanese precisely as well as they speak and understand English.”
The Japanese press unfortunately failed to catch the point of this
intended delicate humour and quoted me as saying that the dolls
spoke and understood Japanese perfectly.

Letters to the Advertiser are still continuing daily, some very nice
and others very horrid. The incident really hasn’t deserved so
much attention. The Japanese, I am sure, were glad that I entered
into the fun of the thing and respected the sentiment for the doll
in this country.

RUSSIA’S AMBASSADOR SEES TROUBLE
AHEAD FOR AMERICA AND JAPAN
July 17, 1935

I called to-day on Soviet Ambassador Yurenev, who is departing
soon on leave of absence, and our conversation opened with a dis-

FAREWELL TALK WITH HIROTA

145

cussion of Russian-Japanese relations. The Ambassador said that
while certain difficult questions were at issue between the two
countries he was not at all anxious concerning the outcome because
the Japanese did not want war and were not prepared for war. He
thought the questions which I had to handle between Japan and
the United States were much more difficult than his own questions
and that the outlook for Japanese-American relations was much less
favourable than that of Japanese-Soviet relations. He implied that
he thought the future relations between Japan and the United
States were ominous. I took issue with the Ambassador on this point
and after enumerating and dealing briefly with each of the important
issues between Japan and the United States, I said that I was con¬
vinced that they could be amicably solved or, if not solved, they
could at least remain in abeyance.

Mr. Yurenev said that the situation regarding the Soviet-
Manchukuo frontier dispute had somewhat altered since our last
conversation. The present intention is to set up a commission which
will deal not with the delimitation of the frontier but only with the
specific controversies arising therefrom. He had first taken the
position, as he told me in our last talk, that the Soviets would be
willing to deal either with the Japanese or the Manchukuoans on
the commission but not with both. His Government has now, how¬
ever, agreed to meet representatives both of Japan and Manchukuo
on the. basis of parity. In other words, there would be as many
Soviet delegates as there were delegates from Japan and Manchukuo
together. Mr. Hirota has not yet accepted this proposal and he
expected that the negotiations would continue over a considerable
period, particularly as the Japanese military were very hard to
.please in the matter. He thought there would be a lot of discussion
and negotiation concerning the agenda, place of meeting, et cetera,
before the commission could be set up and he himself would haye
to conduct these negotiations, so that he saw not much hope of
getting away to Karuizawa this summer.

FAREWELL TALK WITH HIROTA

July 18, 1935

I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning and told
him that having been more than three years in Japan my Govern¬
ment had accorded me a leave of absence and that I was sailing for
the United States to-morrow. Said that I expected to return to
Tokyo sometime in the late autumn. The Minister was good enough
to say that he hoped I would return without fail because changing
ambassadors always caused a certain amount of disturbance and an
undesirable interim during which the new ambassador and the govern¬
ment to which he was accredited had to get used to each other.
He thought it most important that no change should be made
especially at the present time. I replied that so far as I was awar<t

THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

146

there was no intention to make a change at present and I fully
expected to return to Tokyo.

I said that on arriving in Washington I would of course report
directly to the President and to the Secretary of State and tell them
of my observations and impressions concerning the situation in
Japan and the situation between our two countries. If the Minister
should desire to express any views, I would be only too happy to
communicate them to the President and to Mr. Hull. Mr. Hirota
replied by reminding me of the statement he had made to me when
he first took office, to the effect that he considered good relations
between the United States and Japan to be of paramount importance
and that he intended to make the improvement of those relations
the corner-stone of his policy. He said that while our relations had
been difficult two years ago he felt that they were now distinctly
good and he saw no reason whatever why they should not remain
good. It was his purpose to do everything in his power to contribute
to that most desirable result. He added that in his opinion the
relations between Japan and certain other countries were very much
more difficult and less satisfactory than the present relations between
Japan and the United States.

In this connection he mentioned the naval situation and said
that unless there was some prospect of coming to an agreement and
concluding a treaty this year, he thought it much better to leave
matters in abeyance and to maintain the present “ peaceful 55 situa¬
tion. He said he thought the most important thing to avoid was
the bringing of pressure by one country on another, which could
only cause irritation. The Japanese Navy had no plan at present
and was content to let things remain as they are for the time being.
He thought that a conference would have to be held before the end
of the year, but it could be a purely formal meeting and could
adjourn for a year or two without necessarily stirring up contro¬
versies. Mr. Hirota gave me the impression that the Japanese Navy
was in a less exacting frame of mind than it has been, but he did not
say this in so many words. The idea expressed was that if given
sufficient time a good many difficult problems could be smoothed
out.

A five months * leave after three years in Japan interrupts the diary
at this point , but the following item seems worth including for the
record:

REPORT TO THE WHITE HOUSE
August 4-5, 1935. Washington

We were met by mpst of the Far Eastern Division, all of whom,
especially Hornbeck, their chief, were exceptionally cordial and
helpful during my three visits to Washington. Met Billy Phillips at
the Carlton and had a long talk with Secretary Hull, whom I had
not known before. Saw the President, who was quite affectionate.
JJe indicated complete optimism, cheerfulness, and energy. During

A YEAR OF WRATH BEGINS

my three talks with him I was astonished by his power of concentra¬
tion in the midst of intensely busy days and his detailed grasp of the
problems of my post. He said that the fact that he had not written me
very often was a compliment as it meant that no mistakes had been
made. Saw nearly everybody in the Department and did a great
many jobs. Went to two of the open-air concerts on the Potomac.

BACK IN TOKYO

December 17, 1935

Here beginneth the second lesson—the first having extended from
June 6, 1932, to July 19, 1935.

I have neither the time nor the intention to mention or to discuss
at the start the various new or old problems facing us on our return
from five months 9 leave of absence, save to say that there are plenty
of them and that comment thereon will crop up from time to time.

Went to see Baron de Bassompierre, the Belgian Ambassador. He
broke the unwelcome news that I would be acting Dean of the
Diplomatic Corps from now until next September because he was
at present in official mourning for the late Queen and in January
would go on a long leave of absence. That means that I must make
the periodical speeches before the Emperor four times a year and
attend to lots of other official ceremonies at this exacting Court. In
fact, the text of the speeches for January 5 has already been circulated
to the colleagues with the notation that I, as Vice-Doyen, would
deliver it, a rather terrifying task.

In the afternoon I called on Hirota at the Gaimusho merely to
report my return, and in our brief conversation nothing of interest
came up except that Hirota observed with a twinkle in his eye that
the Japanese press had recently shifted its customary broadsides of
vituperation from the United States to England. He didn’t use just
those words but that is precisely what he meant. Sir Frederick Leith
Ross, chairman of the British Financial Mission to China, is the
nigger in the woodpile and is generally regarded here as responsible
for the financial and political machinations in China which have
led to the recent troubles in the north—in other words, tampering
with Japan’s “ stabilizing influence 99 in that allegedly misguided
country.

A YEAR OF WRATH BEGINS
New Year’s Day, 1936

Life has taught me a good many things but nothing more definite
than the fallacy of making New Year’s resolutions. If you know
you’re going to break a treaty, it’s much better not to sign one, and
as I know by long experience that I am most certainly going to
break all the nice resolutions made on January 1, philosophy now
dictates the unwisdom of making them at all. So I no longer prepare

148 THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

the old charts (a la Benjamin Franklin) of just how many hours
shall be spent in educational reading, piano practice, exercise, limi¬
tation of drinks and smokes, etc., but shamble across the threshold
into the new year with a care-free thumb-nose at my New England
conscience, which it has taken me all of half a century to conquer.
I shall in all probability waste valuable time even more in 1936
than in 1935—and why worry? Life is good, but only if you don't
take it too seriously, and those good old New England forebears of
ours (bless their memory) certainly did their best to make it hell.
Yet in such a job as mine, how can life be other than serious ?

For the first time since 1933 the Emperor held Court, although
the Empress, having recently given birth to her second son, did not
appear. However, this did not exclude the ladies, who came in their
court trains and swept past the Imperial presence with the required
three curtsies, in all their glory. As acting Dean of the Diplomatic
Corps I had to lead the long line, and I must say that the extent
of our own Embassy was rather staggering. Our commissioned
personnel and wives totals thirty-five persons and most of them were
there.

One’s march across the big throne room is too brief really to size
up the spectacle, but it is a gorgeous one just the same—the Emperor
standing before the throne, the solid phalanx of Imperial princes
to the Emperor’s right and the princesses on his left, and behind
them the line of high court officials in all the glittering splendour
of their gold-encrusted uniforms. Some of the colleagues groused
because they and their ladies have to get all dressed up merely to file
past the Emperor with no opportunity either before or afterwards
to mingle with the Court, a procedure which they say exists in no
other Court in the world. I still maintain that the unhurried dignity
of the Japanese Court is unsurpassed anywhere, but it seems to me
that at the last Court in 1933 we were at least offered a champagne
buffet afterwards; this year there was not even that. I myself had
to be received by the Grand Master of Ceremonies of the Empress
in order to request him to express to Her Majesty the New Year’s
good wishes of the Diplomatic Corps, but that was all and we were
out of the palace in record time.

HOW ROOSEVELT’S NEW YEAR WARNING
STRUCK JAPAN

January 5, 1936

The President’s message to Congress was published here in ex¬
tensive summary with long quotations but without any editorial
comment whatever in the vernacular press ; I rather think that the
Foreign Office has passed out word to stay off it in order to avoid
the vituperative reaction in which some of the papers would surely
have indulged. Amau and other officials took refuge in the state¬
ment that they hadn’t read the address. The President’s remark that

HIROTA ANSWERS ROOSEVELT

*49

any nation which chose to do so might fit the shoe to its own foot
was a masterly stroke.

There was some pretty plain speaking, directed obviously at Italy,
Germany, and Japan, with such comments as : “ A point has been
reached where the peoples of America must take cognizance of the
growing ill-will and marked trends towards aggression, increasing
armaments, and shortening tempers—a situation which has in it
many elements leading to the tragedy of war. 5 ’ “ Nations seeking
expansion, seeking rectification of injustices springing from former
wars, and seeking outlets for trade, population, and even their own
peaceful contributions to the progress of civilization fail to demon¬
strate ^ the patience necessary to attain reasonable and legitimate
objectives by peaceful negotiations and by appeal to the finer instincts
of world justice. They have hitherto impatiently reverted to the old
belief in the law of the sword or to the fantastic conception that they
alone are chosen to fulfil a mission and that all others must and
shall learn from and be subject to them. I recognize that these
words, which I have chosen with deliberation, will not be popular
among any nation that chooses to fit this shoe to its foot. ... I
emphasize on you the gravity of the situation confronting the people
of the world. Peace is jeopardized by the few, not the many, and
is threatened by those who are seeking selfish power.”

This I call courageous statesmanship, and whether or not it will
have any real effect, except to help pass the neutrality legislation
and armament budgets which the President desires, it will inevitably
sink deep into the consciousness and conscience of those at whom it
is directed. It won’t stop the Japanese push into China—for no thing
can stop that except defeat in war—but it may conceivably exert
a moderating influence on their methods and tactics; it may possibly
tend to slow up the movement temporarily. The Japanese didn’t
like Stimson, but knowing Roosevelt’s predilections as a big-Navy
man, and with this public warning—“ A point has been reached
where the peoples of America must take cognizance ”—on top of
it, I rather think that they will pray for a Republican victory at
the next election.

HIROTA ANSWERS ROOSEVELT
January 21, 1936

Cabled about Hirota’s speech before the Diet. He made a sort of
reply to the President’s speech before Congress, mentioning no names,
but criticizing “ foreign statesmen ” who lay down the law about
foreign countries without knowing the facts. Of course the Japanese
will give him a high mark for allegedly outsmarting the Americans.
The pertinent remarks of Hirota were :

It is to be regretted that there are abroad statesmen of
repute who seem determined to impose upon others their private

THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

150

convictions as to how the world should be ordered, and
who are apt to denounce those who oppose their dictates as if
they were disturbers of peace. No one is qualified to talk world
peace unless he not only knows the national aspirations and
obligations of his country but also understands and appreciates
the standpoints of other countries. The understanding and
appreciation of another country’s standpoint is often attainable
through the understanding and appreciation of that country’s
culture and civilization. We have succeeded in building up our
national strength and prestige by adding and adapting to our
civilization Occidental art and science, which we have imported
during the past years. Now it is time for us, I believe, to try to
introduce our arts and culture to other lands, and thus contribute
towards international good understanding and to the enrichment
of the world civilization and the promotion of the peace and
happiness of mankind.

SENATOR PITTMAN TELLS OFF JAPAN
February 11, 1936

Received from the Department a cablegram quoting the com¬
ments of the Secretary on Senator Pittman’s inflammatory speech
in the Senate about the danger to the United States of Japanese
aggression. Mr. Hull said that he had not been consulted about the
speech and had had no hand in its preparation—of course. These
telegrams from the Department are very helpful to us in checking up
on press reports. Of course the Pittman speech was utterly jingoistic
and it is quite right that the American press editorials should ex¬
coriate it as they appear to have done. But just the same I per¬
sonally and unofficially am not sorry that it was delivered and believe
that its net result will be helpful rather than harmful—or rather that
its advantages will outweigh its disadvantages.

From the American point of view it should serve to modify the
outcry which will be raised by the pacifists against our big military
and naval budgets. In Japan it should tend to indicate to the Govern¬
ment and public that we are not, as many believe here, a country
ruled by our peace organizations and women pacifists, and that
when slapped in the face often and hard enough a time might come
when we wouldn’t turn the other cheek. The Japanese, I think, tend
to forget history, which shows that the American people are among
the most inflammable in the world ; they forget the sudden wave of
anger which swept over our country like a forest fire almost over¬
night in 1898 and brought on the war with Spain against the wishes
and intentions of the Government, Congress, and the great majority
of the public, and there has been so much peace talk and activity
since the Great War that they seem to regard our action in 1917 as
in a forgotten era. I am therefore not at all sure but that an occasional
speech like Pittman’s is useful in making the Japanese at least stop

SENATOR PITTMAN TELLS OFF JAPAN jijj

to think; it may. penetrate to the extent of making them realize
that there is a point beyond which they cannot interfere with our
rights and interests in the Far East in general and in flhina in
particular without risk of retaliation.

Let the executive branch of our Government continue the eminently
wise policy which it has followed in recent years of avoiding un¬
necessary friction and irritation while recording its position at every
step, but meanwhile let American public opinion, whether in Con¬
gress or in the press, convey the idea that we have not the slightest
intention of pulling out of the Far East and that we have every
intention of protecting our commercial and industrial and other
interests even in the face of Japan’s so-called “ stabilizing influence ”
in East Asia, which means, in effect, a Pax Japonica—East Asia for
the Japanese exclusively. We have allowed the door to be closed
on our nose in Manchuria; perhaps we couldn’t have avoided it
without war; we shall no doubt allow further encroachments in
other parts of China, but the time is likely to come when the American
people will begin to get just a little impatient, and if at that time
some incident should occur (as is always possible), even an incident
less dramatic than the blowing up of the Maine, the fat might well
be in the fire overnight.

I can’t help feeling that just once in a while it is healthy to let
the Japanese know that fire still exists in what they may believe to
be an extinct volcano. It may tend to slow down their acquisitive
programme and somewhat to implement our diplomacy. Therefore
I am not at all so angry with Pittman as I probably ought to be.

3

FROM ABORTIVE REVOLUTION TO OPEN WAR

(February 26, 1936—April 18, 1937)

Japan’s drive for world power began at home. Ever since the onset
of the world depression, successive Japanese governments had failed
to provide an outlet for the energies of the same elements in the
younger generation who had followed Hitler in Germany. Only
the Army offered these young men their chance—but the civil
authorities kept trying to hold the Army in check. In 1932, rebellious
young officers assassinated some of Japan’s leading statesmen but
never came close to gaining power themselves. In 1936, they struck
again. This time they attempted a revolution of sorts and though
their bid for power failed and some of their leaders were sentenced
to death and executed, their failure served only to inspire them with
dreams of foreign conquest more dazzling than their plans for domestic
revolt.

THE LIGHTNING STRIKES :

TWO TELEGRAMS THAT MADE HISTORY

Telegram Sent

To: Secstate Washington

36 February 26, 10 a.m. 1936

The military took partial possession of the Government and city
early this morning and it is reported have assassinated several
prominent men. It is impossible as yet to confirm anything. The
news correspondents are not permitted to send telegrams or to
telephone abroad.

This telegram is being sent primarily as a test message, to ascer¬
tain if our code telegrams will be transmitted. Code-room please
acknowledge immediately upon receipt.

Grew

Telegram Sent

To: Secstate Washington
RUSH

37 February 26, noon. 1936. Section 1.

Embassy’s 36 February 26, 10 a.m.

1. It now appears fairly certain that former Premier Admiral
Saito, former Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Count Makino, Grand
Chamberlain Admiral Suzuki, and General Watanabe, Inspector

I S*

THE LIGHTNING STRIKES : TWO TELEGRAMS THAT MADE HISTORY 153

General of Military Education, have been assassinated. It is also
reported that Finance Minister Takahashi and the Chief of the
Metropolitan Police Board have been wounded.

2. The military have established a cordon around the district
containing the Government administration offices and the Imperial
palace and do not permit ingress without Army passes. Telephonic
communication with the administrative offices has also been stopped.
The stock exchange has been closed.

Section 2.

3. It is now reported that Premier Okada, Home Minister Goto,
and former War Minister Hayashi were also assassinated and that
Finance Minister Takahashi has died of his wounds. The Embassy
cannot confirm any of these rumours.

4. So far there has been no disorder and no street fighting, as far
as the Embassy is aware. The troops taking part in the uprising
appear to be under perfect discipline and are not interfering with
the normal affairs of the people. Until the nature and probable
results of the uprising are better understood by the Embassy, however,
the Embassy is advising those who ask to remain at home. There
appears to be absolutely no anti-foreign feeling involved in the
affair.

Section 3.

5. A mimeographed statement was left by groups of soldiers at
each of the principal newspaper offices this morning. The statement
alleged that the present Government has been drifting away from
the true spirit of Japan and that it had usurped the prerogatives of
the Emperor. As evidence of this the statement cited the signing of
the London Naval Treaty and the dismissal of General Mazaki. It
continued rather vaguely with an expression translated by the U.P.
about as follows : “ If this condition is permitted to continue, the
relations of Japan to China, Russia, Britain, and the United States
will become ‘ explosive in nature.’ ” The statement was signed by
Captain Nonaka and Captain Ando, both of the Third Infantry
Regiment stationed in Tokyo. According to the soldiers who delivered
this statement, another announcement will be made at five o’clock
this evening and at that time “ a new law of state ” will be pro¬
mulgated. The Embassy’s informant believes that certain con¬
stitutional prerogatives will be suspended. He likened the existing
situation to the Batista coup d'etat in Cuba.

Section 4. [Paraphrase]

6. The uprising, as far as can be ascertained by the Embassy, is
in the nature of a coup d'etat engineered by the young Fascist element
in the Army and intended to destroy the entire group of elder
statesmen who have been advisers to the Throne and thereby effect
the so-called “ Showa Restoration.” Presumably to prevent anyone
from obtaining access and securing an Imperial Mandate which
would interfere with the plans of the Army group, the Emperor him¬
self is apparently being held in the palace incommunicado. The

FROM ABORTIVE REVOLUTION TO OPEN WAR

154

trial of Aizawa, murderer of General Nagata, which has excited the
feelings of the Fascist element in the Army, and the recent election
which returned an unexpectedly large number of more candidates
who are liberal, appear to be the immediate causes of the uprising.
Latest reports indicate that Admiral Osumi, Minister of the Navy,
has assumed the position of Acting Prime Minister and that General
Mazaki is the leading spirit in the affair. The movement, down to
the last detail, appears to have been thoroughly organized in advance.
[End of paraphrase]

7. The Embassy has just learned from a fairly reliable source that
Count Makino is safe.

Grew

THE MURDER OF VISCOUNT SAITO
February 27, 1936

This is a dreadful time and I have just returned from a harrow¬
ing experience—calling at the Saito house, the very one where he
was murdered yesterday, being ushered up to the little room where
liis body lay on the floor under a sheet, probably the same room
where he was killed, kneeling to burn incense and then turning to the
mourning family and finding myself face to face with dear Viscountess
Saito herself. Yesterday she was in the hospital, recovering from the
wounds inflicted on herself; she must have dragged herself out, her
arm in a sling, to be with the body of her beloved husband.

She asked if I wished to see his face and then removed the sheet;
there was a bullet wound visible (only one of his thirty-six wounds),
but he looked peaceful enough. How we loved him and admired and
respected him. He had a winning smile, always, and his white hair
gave him a distinction quite apart from the distinction he had won
in his many high posts and useful life. Only a few hours before the
assassinations he sat at our table beside Alice, jolly and gay, and
his wife next to me, and opposite me was Admiral Suzuki, who lies
at the point of death from his own wounds.

To-day, when I had paid my respects, Viscountess Saito said to
me, while wc were both still kneeling in front of each other beside
the body, that her husband had never before seen the sound films
and that he had loved the picture at our Embassy and that she knew
he would wish her to thank us for having given him such a happy
last evening. I was really too much moved to do more in reply
than to convey Alice’s sympathy too. Who could have foreseen that
he was leaving our Embassy that night, and probably Admiral Suzuki
too, to go straight to his death by bullet and bayonet in his own
peaceful little Japanese home ?

These assassinations have stirred us terribly—Saito, Takahashi,
Watanabe dead and Suzuki probably fatally wounded. Thank
heaven that Count Makino escaped ; he was warned in time’ and
managed to leave the hot-spring hotel where he was staying and

piecing together the course OF THE TRAGEDY 155

find some refuge just before a gang of the insurgents broke in with
the intention of killing him in cold blood. Kabayama has talked
with him since and telephoned from Miyanoshita to tell me so.
Prince Saionji, in the country at Okitsu, also escaped in time, but
those in Tokyo seem to have had no warning whatever.

It is significant that somebody telephoned to our servants during
dinner asking that they be informed the moment Saito left our
Embassy and when we looked up the number later it was found to
be the local police station ; they may have had some special warning
or it may have been merely the usual precautionary protection,
probably the latter. At any rate, Saito’s presence under our roof
that night made no difference one way or the other; he left well
before midnight and was not killed until five or six o’clock the next
morning. It would have been doubly horrible if the murderers had
invaded our Embassy, as they could easily have done so far as their
force was concerned, and bayoneted him at our table; the inter¬
national aspects of such a move would probably have weighed litde
with those young hotheads if they had felt that it would facilitate
their object; some and perhaps all of their groups were armed with
machine-guns ; in the case of the Prime Minister several police were
mowed down before the building was entered, and at the Watanabe
house his entire family and servants were wiped out.

PIECING TOGETHER THE COURSE OF THE TRAGEDY
March 1, 1936

Everything that happened before the revolt now seems so trivial
in comparison'with the events of the past four days that there is no
incentive to record the earlier daily notes. Little by little I shall
have to try to piece out all that took place between February 26
and 29. The final denouement, namely, the sudden reappearance of
Prime Minister Okada, alive and uninjured, after we and nearly
everybody else believed him to have been assassinated, savours of
the most intense melodrama and it has certainly made the insurgents
the laughing-stock of Japan if not of the world, which is a very
healthy thing. Yet sorrow and anger overcome the humour of it. ^

To begin the story we have to go back to our dinner for the Saitos
on the evening of February 25. We sat down to two tables, thirty-
six in number, and wishing to give the old gentleman and our other
guests something out of the ordinary in the matter of entertainment
I had seen several films at the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer studio
during the past few days. On the last afternoon, Shathin showed
me Naughty Marietta , with Jeanette MacDonald and Nelson Eddy
and I decided at once that the ideal picture had been found, for
it was full of lovely old Victor Herbert music, beautiful scenes,
a pretty, romantic story and no vulgarity whatever, almost as good
a film as One Night of Ijqm.

156 EROM ABORTIVE REVOLUTION TO OPEN WAR

Almost immediately after dinner the film began. We put Viscount
Saito in a comfortable arm-chair, knowing that if he was bored with
a film he could comfortably sleep because he had told Neville that
he had learned in the Navy to catch a nap at any time and under
any circumstances. But I think he enjoyed it too much to sleep. We
had a pause with refreshments half-way through and then continued,
nearly two hours of film. Betsy Neville said that the Japanese ladies 9
eyes were distinctly red at the end of it, so I think they were moved
by the romantic story. There was supper afterwards, but the Saitos
left at about 11.30, pretty late for them because they generally leave
dinners punctually at 10. I saw the old gentleman out and that was
the end of a friendship which began when I made my first call on
him as Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in
June, 1932.

It is interesting to think that he began his great career with
Americans—with Admiral Schley and at the Naval Academy at
Annapolis—and finished it at the American Embassy. He was a
lovable character, gentle, charming, courtly, but with great wisdom
and broad liberal views in an age of chauvinistic strife. I had hopes
that he would be able to use his influence in settling the school crisis
in Korea, arising out of the demand of the petty authorities that
both Christian pupils and teachers worship at the Shinto shrines—
a demand which may result in the closing of all our mission schools
if persisted in. He always supported our missionaries. But now his
wise influence has gone and who knows what the future will bring ?

The telephone rang early on the 26th—it was Neville, I think—
who broke the news of the assassinations during the early morning
—wild rumours that the insurgents had taken over the Government
and parts of the city—no one knowing who had been killed and
who survived or how intensive the insurrection might be. Our first
telegram was sent in the morning and was acknowledged by the
Department, six hours in transmission. During the four days of
revolution we had scouts constantly moving about the city, especially
our Military Attach^, Colonel Carey Crane, and his language officers,
observing developments to the best of their ability. On the very
first morning Neville quietly walked through the lines of troops,
politely telling the soldiers in Japanese that he wanted to go to fixe
Foreign Office and being passed through with equal courtesy; I
think he was probably the only foreigner who got to the Gaimusho
that first day—and he did it twice.

That night Alice was nervous lest the American Ambassador
might be included in a sort of supplementary programme of the
revolutionists and insisted on our sleeping in an unusual room and
nearer to the baby ; I fear she didn’t sleep very much at all, but I
laughed at her fears, well knowing that the last thing the insurgents
wanted was trouble with the United States at this particular juncture.
The next day our Embassy was heavily guarded with troops, out¬
posts, and sandbag barricades below the chancery, as well as three

PIECING TOGETHER THE COURSE OF THE TRAGEDY

detectives (including our friend Iida from the police station) and
two soldiers inside the house, and whenever I descended to the
chancery they insisted on coining too.

The Mexican Minister came into town from the country the first
day and couldn’t even get into his Legation and telephoned to me
for help ; I did my best through Horinouchi, but the Foreign Office
was completely powerless and the Minister seemed to be satisfied
with my efforts, unavailing as they were. The rebels were situated in
the official residence of the Prime Minister and the Sanno Hotel,
very near us, and their banners floated from both buildings ; we
watched developments through glasses from our roof.

The Japanese Government quietly made all military preparations
to capture or kill the rebels, meantime maintaining the most perfect
discipline and order in the city, and then waited for two days until
they surrendered little by little, in small groups, as a result of broad¬
casts, leaflets dropped from aeroplanes into the grounds of the Prime
Minister’s residence and the Sanno Hotel, and a big streamer attached
to a balloon, all stating that the Emperor called on the men to return
to their barracks, where they would be pardoned because they had
been misled, that their parents and brothers and sisters were weeping
at the thought of their disobeying the Emperor, and that unless they
disbanded they would be shot. This had precisely the desired effect
and the whole thing was setded with very litde, if any, shooting
except for the orignial assassinations. I should call this anything
but barbarism.

We now know that when the last soldiers had left the Prime
Minister’s residence and the Sanno Hotel, the officers who had
engineered the revolt finally surrendered after four days and that the
Government gave them two hours to commit hara-kiri. But they
didn’t commit hara-kiri because they expected civil trials as in the
case of former assassins and they fiilly intended to use the court¬
room as a forum to stir up the people against the Government. It
must have been a great shock to them when they were tried by court-
martial and several of them sentenced to death and shot.

The story of one incident, that of the attempt to kill Count
Makino, is deeply moving. The old gentleman was staying at a
hot-spring hotel in the country when an officer and several soldiers
arrived in the middle of the night to assassinate him. According to
the story which reached me, and I believe it to be true. Count Makino’s
guard shot and killed the officer and was himself killed by the soldiers,
who then set fire to the hotel with the intention of forcing Count
Makino into the open. Behind the hotel was a precipitous cliff and
the old gentleman was led by his granddaughter Kazuko and trained
nurse up on to a ledge on the cliff from which they could
climb no higher. They were shortly lit up by the fire as if
a flood light had been turned on them and the soldiers raised
their guns. At just that moment, however, the little granddaughter,
who was a lovely girl and a great friend of our daughter Elsie, spread

FROM ABORTIVE REVOLUTION TO OPEN WAR

158

her own kimono in front of her grandfather, and the soldiers, being
deeply moved by this heroic gesture, dropped their guns and did
not shoot. I have always felt that little Kazuko was one of the real
heroines of the February 26 incident and she certainly saved her
grandfather from death.

JAPAN’S NEW ERA BEGINS

March 1, 1936

The period of the insurrection lasted only four days and yet we
in the Embassy feel as if an era had passed since that happy evening
when we had the Saitos and Suzukis under our roof last Tuesday.
If time is measured by events, certainly an age has gone by since
then. Such things are occurring in many parts of the world from
time to time, disasters of one kind or another whether caused by
the forces of nature or by the hand of man, and the rest of us look
on objectively. We read the morning paper and say, te What an
awful catastrophe,” and pass on to our daily tasks and thoughts, not
greatly moved. It is only when such things occur in one’s midst and
when violent death and heroic action take place among one’s friends
and almost at one’s door that the shock really comes home and
remains.

Gradually, from the accounts of friends, we can now reconstruct
the way the assassinations took place, and not only do the stories
redound to the credit of the men, but they show the true stuff of
Japanese womanhood—how Viscountess Saito placed herself in front
of her husband, said, “ Kill me instead ; my husband cannot be
spared by the country,” and actually put her hand on the mouth
of the machine-gun until her wounds forced her aside, and how
Mrs. Watanabe lay down with her husband in her arms so that the
assassins had to force the gun underneath her body.

The story of Admiral Suzuki should live in history; Captain
Ando, pointing his revolver, discussed the situation with him for
ten minutes and when the discussion faltered, Suzuki asked : “ Have
you anything more to say ? ” Ando replied : “ No, sir.” “ Then
shoot,” said Suzuki, and Ando fired the three shots. One grazed
his skull but failed to penetrate the brain, one went through the
chest and lungs, and the third lodged in the leg. The chest wound
was the serious one and the Admiral lost so much blood that only
blood transfusions could save his life. It looks now as if he might
pull through. Takahashi’s murder was the really brutal one : not
content with shooting, the rebel officer hacked him with his sword—
and then apologized jto the household for the “ annoyance ” caused.

Well, we must carry on and try to see what it is all going to mean.
One thing emerges as absolute certainty : there must be a “ New
Deal ” in Japan or the same, thing will happen—as predicted by the
defence counsel in the Aizawa trial—again and again. I have con¬
fidence in Hirota, but he is saddled with one of the most difficult

HOW PREMIER OKADA ESCAPED ASSASSINATION

159

problems which any man ever faced. He has a tremendous oppor¬
tunity, in some ways the same opportunity* which confronted Franklin
Roosevelt when he took office, and if he can deal effectively and
successfully with the problem, he should go down in history as a very
great statesman.

It is easier to understand how such things as the incident of
February 26 can occur in Japan if one stops to think that the history
books upon which the Japanese youth is brought up are full of the
records of just such deeds from the earliest times—assassinations or
suicides for motives of revenge or loyalty to one’s chief or the
assumption of responsibility for a given situation. Paradoxically—
and Japan is a country of paradoxes—these young officers held that
they were acting in the interests of the Emperor, ridding him of
the alleged nefarious influences around the Throne, men whom the
Emperor himself had chosen. And there was no personal animosity
involved. When they had killed Saito and Watanabe and Matsuo
(mistaken for his brother-in-law, the Prime Minister), they called for
incense to burn beside the bodies ; in the Takahashi house no incense
could be found, so they insisted on placing lighted candles beside the
murdered statesman. If these things are to be prevented in future,
not only will a social and economic New Deal have to be brought
about within the country, but Japanese education in the schools and
in the Army will have to undergo a radical alteration.

One of the pleasant things which emerged from the incident was
the absolute unity of the Embassy staff as a single team both in
action and spirit. This included the Naval, Military, and Com¬
mercial Attaches, and their several assistants who worked with the
rest of us, hour by hour, in the closest co-operation, pooling their
observations and information for the good of the whole, without
any special thought of their own departments. Although all our
nerves had been pretty well tried by the end of the four days, there
was never a sign of irritation or friction on the part of anyone. Of
course it is easier to weld such a group into a unit in a place like
Tokyo than in London or Paris, and we certainly have unity here.
Our staff is made up of all sorts of heterogeneous types and characters,
yet no club membership could be more congenial. One of the secrets,
I think, lies in the fact that any group of men who play together a
lot will almost certainly work well together too.

HOW PREMIER OKADA ESCAPED ASSASSINATION
March 2, 1936

The facts concerning the escape of the Prime Minister now seem
to be fairly well established. Early in the morning of February 26
the alarm bells in the official residence rang (as they once^ rang by
mistake when Alice and I were dining with Viscount Saito when
Prime Minister some four years ago and the report got around that

l 60 FROM ABORTIVE REVOLUTION TO OPEN WAR

we were being assassinated). Admiral Okada looked at his watch
and remarked to his brother-in-law, Matsuo, who was sleeping in
the same room : “ Well, my last hour has come but I won’t die in
pyjamas.” Matsuo replied : “ Your life is too valuable to be spared, 95
and while Okada dressed, Matsuo ran downstairs and into the garden,
shouting “ Banzai,” where he was pursued and promptly killed, being
mistaken for Okada in the early-morning light.

Five of the police guards were shot and killed at the entrance and
one wounded. Okada was pushed into the servants’ quarters and
shut in a closet. There he remained until the next night, when
Matsuo’s body was removed and Okada, disguised, simply walked
out with the mourners. I should say that Matsuo was the real hero*
of the whole rebellion because, while there were plenty of brave
and loyal police who met death in trying to protect their charges,
they were acting in line of duty and Matsuo’s action was
spontaneous altruism.

HIROTA REORGANIZES

March 5, 1936

Cabled to the Department that Hirota has been commanded by
the Emperor to form a cabinet. I am very much pleased because I
believe that Hirota is a strong, safe man and that while he will have
to play ball with the Army to a certain extent, I think that he will
handle foreign affairs as wisely as they can be handled, given the
domestic elements which he will have to conciliate. I think too
that he wants good relations with the United States and will do
what he is able to do in that direction—in other words, as much as
any Japanese Minister could do. If I had had the pick myself, I
know of nobody whom I would have more gladly chosen to head
the Government, with American interests in view. To have chosen
an out-and-out liberal would have been fatal because any Prime
Minister at this juncture must absolutely possess the confidence of'
the Army and Navy if he is not to be hamstrung at the start.

To our astonishment, Hirota immediately announced the make-up-
of his new cabinet, including Yoshida as Minister for Foreign-
Affairs, and the press said that Yoshida was acting as his chief of
staff in choosing the various Ministers. This seemed to us precisely
like waving a red flag at a bull because not only is Yoshida a pro¬
nounced liberal but he is the son-in-law of Count Makino. But
naturally the Army wouldn’t accept him for a moment, and it was*
soon announced that Hirota had run into hot water and was having
difficulty in forming his cabinet and that General Terauchi, his
choice for Minister of War, would not serve unless a radical alteration
were made in Hirota’s slate.

I can’t imagine why Hirota made the announcement because he
surely must have known that Yoshida would be impossible and it

Justice Frank Murphy, then High Commissioner to the Philippines, stands at the
centre of this picture. Foreign Minister Hirota stands between him and Ambassa¬
dor Grew. At the extreme right stands Shigemitsu, former Ambassador to Britain
and Russia, subsequently Foreign Minister in Tojo’s war cabinet. Eiji Amau, For¬
eign Office spokesman who later became war-time Minister to Switzerland, stands
behind and just to the left of Mr. Grew. Second from the left is Saburu Kurusu of
the infamous mission who later became Ambassador to Germany, and just in front
of him and to his right is Debuchi, former Ambassador to the United States. Hori-
nouchi, another former Japanese Ambassador to the United States, stands just

behind Hirota,

Admiral Murfin, former Commander-in-Chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet;
Admiral Nagano, Navy Minister, and Ambassador Grew. Admiral Shimada,
present Commander of the Japanese Fleet in China, is second from right.

39

HIROTA DEFINES “ POSITIVE DIPLOMACY

161

would seem to put him, Hirota, in a weak position to have to throw
Yoshida overboard and revamp his cabinet at the Army’s dictation.
There must have been some deep-seated purpose in the manoeuvre,
possibly to place squarely on the Army the responsibility for tamper¬
ing with Hirota’s foreign policy. To anticipate a little, it took
Hirota four days to smooth out his differences of opinion with the
Army and to submit to the Emperor his final slate in which he him¬
self is to keep the portfolio of Foreign Affairs for the time being.
Throughout all this time very little if anything has been heard from
the Navy, publicly, that is. It is said that no love is lost between the
two forces and that during the uprising the Navy, which brought
several ships up to Tokyo, said to the Army : “ Settle the affair
quickly or we will either settle it for you or pull out,” and they
did pull out almost immediately. I am told that they are, in fact,
thoroughly ashamed of the Army’s responsibility for the whole busi¬
ness. The story of Admiral Osumi’s going to the palace the first day
of the uprising surrounded by a large body of bluejackets and with
two machine-guns is perhaps significant.

HIROTA DEFINES “ POSITIVE DIPLOMACY ”

March 13, 1936

At three o’clock Mr. Hirota received me in the Prime Minister’s
official residence, and while I was waiting to go in, Kishi, who has now
been appointed Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, showed me
the room where Okada slept and from which Matsuo ran out into
the garden to his death. Hirota saw me alone without an inter¬
preter. He said at the start that the policy which he has been follow¬
ing as.Minister for Foreign Affairs would continue unchanged and
that now that he was at the head of the Government this
policy would always prevail. He said that he had the support of all
members of the cabinet and that eventually he would select a Minister
for Foreign Affairs upon whom he could count equally to support
his policy.

I asked Hirota if he would define the term “ positive diplomacy ”
which was now being aired in the press as the programme of the
new Government. Hirota said that this term applied only to China
and Soviet Russia and it simply meant a general speeding-up of the
policy already followed. So far as Soviet Russia was concerned, the
Army is dissatisfied with the great difference between the Soviet forces
in Siberia and the Japanese forces in Manchuria and they wish the
latter—referred to as “ defensive forces ”—to be built up to a point
more nearly approximating the Soviet forces across the border. He
said, however, that a Soviet-Japanese war would be stupid because
neither party could be expected to accomplish concrete results
and he assured me that there would be no war so long as he is in
office. *

6

162 FROM ABORTIVE REVOLUTION TO OPEN WAR

With regard to China, Hirota said that the three points already
enunciated would form the basis for future Sino-Japanese negotiations
and that these points had already been accepted by the Chinese
Government in principle. At my request he defined these points
as follows :

a. A stop must be put to anti-Japanese activities and propaganda
in China.

b. It is understood that de jure recognition of Manchukuo by
China at present would be difficult and it is not demanded, but
what is desired is recognition of the existence of Manchukuo and
regularization of such factual relations as customs, communications,
transit, et cetera.

c. Sino-Japanese co-operation is desired to combat .the spread
of Communism.

I told Hirota that it would be helpful if he could authorize me
to reassure my Government that the pursuance of Japan’s policy in
China would not interfere with foreign rights and interests, includ¬
ing the principle of the Open Door. The Prime Minister said that
there would be no tampering with the principle of the Open Door
by Japan and that, so far as he could see, the' only possible way in
which foreign rights and interests might be indirectly affected by
Japan’s policy would be through the possible relinquishment by
Japan of her extra-territorial rights some time in the future.

Before leaving I took occasion to speak to the Prime Minister, on
my own initiative and not under instructions, about the difficulties
which the Government in Washington is encountering through the
increasing flow of cheap Japanese goods into the United States; I
spoke of the co-operative efforts which were being made between the
Department of State and the Japanese Embassy in Washington to
solve these difficulties on a practical and equitable basis, but said
that in spite of all efforts in this direction, our domestic industrial
interests were bringing greater and greater pressure to bear on our
Government and it might become necessary eventually to ask for
more restrictive efforts by the Japanese Government.

Incidentally Hirota said during our conversation that, as he had
told me at our first interview, good relations between Japan and the
United States were the corner-stone of his policy and would continue
to be so.

ROYAL FUNERAL SHINTO STYLE
March 26, 1936

Attended with Alice the Shinto funeral of the Dowager Princess
Kitashirakawa, precisely similar to that of Princess Asaka, which we
attended in 1933. Had to go in a dress suit, out-of-doors, on a cold,
windy day, with overcoat prohibited, so took the precaution of wear-

TWO LETTERS TO THE EMBASSY jgg

ing two sets^ of underwear and socks plus a sweater under my boiled
shirt; felt like a stuffed boa constrictor but did keep warm.

The Shinto service is in three parts, first the placing before the
shrine of a complete repast including the mochi or rice cakes, a big
fish, vegetables, fruit, tea, etc., and then a trunk containing wearing
apparel for the deceased, all most reverently carried out by five or
six priests, ; then the reading by the chief priest of a message to the
spirit of the departed, and finally the laying of sakaki branches first
by the representatives of the Emperor, the Empress, and the Empress
Dowager in turn, then by each of the Imperial princes and princesses
and finally by each member of the Diplomatic Corps, the Prime
Minister, and the rest of the Government. These things are tre¬
mendously moving and carried out with an unhurried precision
and reverence which are really impressive. There is never any
scurrying at the Japanese Court ; things simply don’t go wrong
because every step is so precisely planned in advance, and everyone
knows just what to do and when to do it.

TWO LETTERS TO THE EMBASSY

I. “i WANT AT 60 YEN ON SALARYED 55

U.S. Ambasyder.

Dear Sirs, —Excuse me to tell like this. I know so much that way
never good, but I can’t any way. I worship to America very very
like, and I wanted liveing in the freedom U. S. A. but Another
tene years I live at the Tokyo City of Japan. Becouse. I study
Japan thing, please your ears I say in the now I tell about my tragic
lot. I was born 30th Sept 1914 in Tokio. My mother and father
divorced owing to the discord, when I was fifteen years old. He had
to miss of the work and to fall flat, lost the estate. Mother took her
childs to leave without me. and go out my father very degraded and
not love me. whatnever. I still on the his family relation for the
Japanese low father’s Another Wife before got married with my
mother, and also her childs a several, they all unlucky. My father
not fit father. Father now got step wife, he love her more than I
and they go away. I never life so that heard father, but I alone,
my father 61 years old. my mother 45 years old. I have six sister and
brother than I watched mothers poor family. I understand tutelary
their at heart. I was just at one of the taxie driver, but I dislike
that groups.

I wish employment with some American by moter car driver. Well
I can drive very safely, and I am very health, please have a heart,
will you kindly introduce me. some American.

I want at 60 yen on salaryed.

Please your word write to me.—Sincerely yours,

Junichiro-

164

FROM ABORTIVE REVOLUTION TO OPEN WAR

2. A SECRET AGENT PRESENTS HIS CREDENTIALS TO
MR. NEVILLE, COUNSELLOR OF THE EMBASSY

[Address on the envelope]

To Sir Nuviel, Esq.

Chief Superintendent of Rep. U.S.A. Government
in Tokyo,

Tokyo, Japan.

To

Sir, Nevil Esq.

Rep. Chief Magistrade of U.S.A.
in Tokyo.

Dear Sir, —Pardon me writing to you such a letter as circumstances
compels me to do so.

I am an American Citizen, thirty eight years of age.

I am here for finding out some secret affairs in Japan.

I speak English, German, Japanese and several Chinese dialects
fluently.

I have been here in Japan now about an year and been working
all kinds of works since.

And found nearly all about Japans opinions and the truth about
Japanese war mind & secrete places.

I am ready now to send the map of the principle places Japan’s
navy & army.

But I am stand in knot now, over here, as I am broked up, as I
lost my money.

I am staying in a small Japanese Hotel privately by Japanese
name as I can’t give my real name.

Now Sir ! please keep this secretely by yourself or General Luit!
Standley of U.S. otherwise. IT 1 be kaptured by Japanese Army
Corps.

I beg to ask if you could be so kind as to help me by lending me
some money to fix up everything to send to U.S.A.

I need here now at present, two hundred dollars gold at once, and
to get back to Shanghai and send the news & etc. through Consul
General at Shanghai to U.S., as it will be save, I must do all the work
secretely & very carefully.

So I am sorry as I can’t send to you for U.S. as it mite be found
by some Japanese on the way by mail.

Please lend me the amount two hundred dollars gold at least,
ril certainly return to you as soon as I get to Shanghai.

I can come to interview with you privately if you need.

Please reply me as soon as possible, as I can’t stay here too long.

I’ll close for this time, as I can’t write anything secrite on this
letter so long, but will give you a good news when interview.

Holland’s minister foresees japan’s southward thrust 165

Please do me this favor as I’ll be awaiting for it and I can’t move
at presend as I’m no mor money.

Please write my Japanese name when you reply.

A good health & a kind regards to you.

Awaiting for your favorable reply.

Thanking you in anticipation.—I remain, Dear Sir, Yours Sincerely
State Nick name ! H. Tanaka in Japan when reply.

HOLLAND’S MINISTER FORESEES JAPAN’S
SOUTHWARD THRUST

April 25, 1936

The Dutch Minister came in to see if I knew of any developments
concerning recent statements that the scope and field of activity of
the Japanese Navy would be extended to include the area of the
South Sea islands. Dickover had recently asked Admiral Hasegawa,
Vice-Minister of the Navy, about it and Hasegawa said frankly that
it simply meant an effort to extend Japanese trade to the south and
the natural protection by the Navy of the new trade routes.

Without mentioning names or countries, I told General Pabst of
a remark made by a highly placed Japanese during the Washington
Conference of 1921-22 : “ There is absolute unanimity in Japan on
the proposition that we must expand ; but there are two schools of
thought as to where we should expand : the first is the Continental
school, the second is called Blue-water school. For the moment, the
Continental school has the upper hand and probably will for years
to come, but if ever it should be blocked or thwarted, then-”

This first school of thought is obviously military and the second
school, naval. General Pabst was perfectly fa m iliar with this situa¬
tion, but he said that in view of recent talk in Japanese naval circles
with regard to expansion towards the south, he believed that, if
conditions in Europe remained in the present state, compelling the
British fleet to stay in or near home waters, there was a fifty-fifty
chance that the Japanese Navy would attempt a coup de main within
six months, with the objective of taking possession of New Guinea
or Borneo or some part of the Netherlands Indies producing
petroleum.

As I have often said, General Pabst is essentially a pessimist, and
as a Dutchman interested in the protection of the Dutch East Indies
he can hardly afford to be otherwise. It was he who told me two
years ago that he thought a Japanese naval descent on Guam was
by no means beyond the bounds of possibility. He seems to like the
phrase “ a fifty-fifty chance ” and recently used it with regard to the
possibility of a Japanese-Soviet war this summer. From all I see of
the general reaction in Japan to the incident of February 26 and the
real anger which has developed in many circles against the direct
actionists, I do not look for a coup de main by either Japanese Navy
or Army in the South Seas or in any other part of the world in the

i66

FROM ABORTIVE REVOLUTION TO OPEN WAR

near future, always qualifying such opinions with the observation
that it is dangerous ever to predict anything precisely in this part
of the world.

THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR CELEBRATES
THE NEW ROMAN EMPIRE

May 9, 1936

Dined with Auriti, the Italian Ambassador, at the Tokyo Kaikan;
he had invited most of the members of the American and German
Embassies because, as he told us, he wanted to begin his official
dinners with the representatives of the countries which had not
declared sanctions ! It was, incidentally, a rather horrible evening
with heavy food, poor Italian wines, an ugly room and a blinding
glare of electric light, but Italy evidently can’t afford just at present
to spend money on such details as putting her dilapidated Embassy
in condition. Auriti after dinner spoke volubly to me on the crimes
of the League of Nations and their net results ; they had driven
Japan to declare the independence of Manchukuo and Italy to make
Abyssinia an Italian colony whereas if the League had kept its finger
out of things Italy in all probability would merely have taken an
Abyssinian mandate. Furthermore, the League had embittered
Anglo-Italian and French-Italian relations, had brought Europe
nearer to war, and had practically ruined its own prestige.

Seldom have I seen in any man such a transformation as in Auriti
since Italy’s victory in Abyssinia. A few months ago he seemed
crushed and despondent; now he is on the crest of the wave, gay,
talkative, and almost flaunting the Italian flag in our faces. At a
party at our Embassy I found him after dinner playfully embracing
Mrs. Stoicesco and I naturally commented to $toi, who was looking
on, on the outrageous behaviour of Italy, which, not content with
Abyssinia, was now going after Rumania. Stoi loved it. But I
wonder whether my silly quip was really so far-fetched and whether
dreams of a revived Holy Roman Empire may not be lurking in the
background of Mussolini’s political megalomania. Who can tell
whether friction with Yugoslavia might not eventually lead to war,
and with Yugoslavia conquered, where would the Roman chariots
stop ?

JAPAN FORBIDS OUR NAVY TO VISIT HER
MANDATED ISLANDS

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan
(Paraphrase)

Washington, June 13, 1936

For several years now the Government of Japan has requested,
each year, that the American Government extend facilities in its
territorial waters off the Alaskan coasts to two Japanese Government

JAPAN FORBIDS OUR NAVY TO VISIT HER MANDATED ISLANDS 1 67

ships and permit their entry into harbours in Alaska and in the
Aleutian Islands that are not open, ordinarily, to foreign commerce.
In the case of one of the vessels in question it was stated that its
purpose in visiting these waters and harbours was the making 0 f
studies in connection with protection of fur-bearing seals ; in the case
of the second vessel, however, it was not suggested that the visits
would be made on basis of any treaty or formal arrangement between
the American Government and the Government of Japan. The
Government of the United States has acceded, nevertheless, to the
requests of the Government of Japan in this regard.

A strong undercurrent of suspicion and conjecture has existed for
some time past over harbour developments or fortifications in
possessions which both Japan and the United States have in the
Pacific. No objection to the visits of Japanese Government vessels
to the territorial waters and closed harbours of Alaska has been maHe
by this Government, as it was believed that the opportunities which
were open in this way for observation by Japanese vessels would serve
to remove any suspicion which the Government of Japan might hold
that any improvements have been made of such a nature as would
violate either the letter or the spirit of the naval treaty signed on
February 6, 1922.

In our view it is unfortunate that the Government of Japan so
far has not adopted an attitude similarly liberal in the face of allega¬
tions that in the Japanese mandated islands of the Pacific improve¬
ments are being carried out which are irreconcilable with Japan’s
treaty obligations not to fortify these islands. We can understand
that the Government of Japan should be reluctant to give any
countenance to irresponsible allegations but nevertheless the Govern¬
ment undoubtedly shares with the Government of the United States
the view that persistent suspicion with regard to this matter is pro¬
vocative of mutual distrust, and that such suspicion, therefore,
should be dispelled.

The American destroyer Alien will be sent shortly to the Asiatic
Station according to the Navy Department plans. The Japanese
Government will thus have presented to it an opportunity to extend
to a vessel of this Government courtesies at the larger unopened ports
.of the Pacific mandated islands, as well as at the open ports. An
invitation by the Government of Japan for the Alien to visit these
ports would have, in our opinion, highly beneficial results from the
point of view of relations between the two nations.

Please consider carefully and attentively our views as we have
sketched them. If no objection is perceived, please present these
views informally and orally to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, putting
forward the suggestion outlined in the foregoing paragraph as on
your own initiative.

Inform the Department currently by telegraph.

Hull

i68

FROM ABORTIVE REVOLUTION TO OPEN WA*

The Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State
(Paraphrase)

Tokyo, July 8, 1936

To-day I made suggestion, as on my own initiative, to the Minister
for Foreign Affairs with regard to an invitation to the Alien to visit
open and unopened ports in the Pacific islands under Japanese
mandate.

Marked interest was shown by the Minister in the situation as I
described it, but he professed not to know anything at all about the
subject. He told me that he would see what there was that could
be done and that he would try to give me, before July 20, the results
of his inquiries.

Grew

The Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State
(Paraphrase)

Tokyo, July 28, 1936

At the request of the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Coun¬
sellor of the Embassy called on the Vice-Minister to discuss certain
questions that had been broached by the Ambassador to the Minister
for Foreign Affairs. One of these questions related to the possibility
of the visit by the Alien to ports in the Japanese mandated islands.
This call was the only opportunity that presented itself for discussion
of the matter since the visit of the Ambassador on July 8.

The Vice-Minister stated that the suggestion of the Ambassador
had been referred to the Ministry of Overseas Affairs but that no
reply had been received. He further stated that there would probably
be a consultation with other government departments. In response
to a query by the Counsellor, he expressed the fear that the Foreign
Office had no way of expediting the reply.

The manner of the Vice-Minister was friendly, but it indicated
that the Foreign Office could do nothing further.

Grew

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan
(Paraphrase)

Washington, August 7, 1936

Embassy’s telegram No. 163, July 28, 1 p.m. With regard to the
suggestion made relative to the Alden> the Department assumes that
there is no prospect that the Japanese authorities will take favour¬
able action. In reply to a communication from the Japanese Embassy
here, the Department is to-day returning an adverse answer to that
Embassy’s request that the Japanese Government training ship
Shintoku Mam be permitted to enter a Hawaiian harbour which is not
listed as a port of entry.

Phillips

DEATH SENTENCE TO THE FEBRUARY REBELS

169

GERMANY MAKES FRICTION BETWEEN
RUSSIA AND JAPAN

June 18, 1936

In conversation to-day - told me confidentially that he was

aware of the fact that all German newspaper correspondents in Japan
had been instructed from Berlin to use every effort not only in their
written dispatches but also by direct and indirect intrigue to embroil
Japan with Soviet Russia since it accords with German interests
that Soviet Russia should have its hands full in the Far East and

therefore be less free to cause trouble for Germany in Europe. -

said he was also aware that the French Ambassador in Moscow
was taking precisely the contrary action by endeavouring to calm
Soviet-Japanese relations so that in case of a German attack on
France, Soviet Russia would be in a strong position to come to
France’s rescue.

DEATH SENTENCE TO THE FEBRUARY REBELS
July 6, 1936

Telegraphed the Department that the War Office had announced
at two o’clock this morning that of nineteen officers, seventy-five non¬
commissioned officers, nineteen privates, and ten civilians indicted
and tried for complicity in the incident of February 26, the following
sentences have been given :

13 officers and 4 civilians to death ;

5 officers to life imprisonment;

1 officer, 17 non-commissioned officers, and 6 civilians to imprison¬
ment of from 2 to 15 years.

27 non-commissioned officers and 3 privates to imprisonment of
from 18 months to 2 years but with stay of execution for 3
years (meaning probation).

Nothing is said in the sentences concerning the guilt of assassination ;
the punishments are based exclusively on the fact that the officers
were guilty of employing the Imperial Army without Imperial
sanction. Some of the .non-commissioned officers and privates
were found to have participated knowingly in the incident while
others were acquitted because they had only obeyed the orders of
their superior officers. No appeal will be granted and the executions
will be carried out by shooting.

Meanwhile the press publishes the complete details of the incident,
the ban having been lifted, and they are extraordinarily interesting
reading. These sentences of Army officers to death are, so far as we
can ascertain, unprecedented in Japan. It is impossible to foresee
just what effect this severity will entail; the press, no doubt taking
its cue from the Government, is practically unanimously in favour
6 *

170 FROM ABORTIVE REVOLUTION TO OPEN WAR

of the sentences; on the other hand, the guilty officers, when executed,
will have become martyrs to many of their fellow-officers in the Army,
and revenge in Japan is a traditional virtue* I think that further
“ incidents 55 are more than likely.

A visit to the United States to attend the Harvard Tercentenary celebration
interrupts the diary and correspondence at this point .

BACK IN TOKYO
November 27, 1936. Tokyo

And here we are, picking up the threads again, all too many of
them, but after a vacation like that, one feels ready for anything.
In fact, I am more than happy to be back in harness, and Dickover
said that he was more than happy to unload the responsibility, a
feeling which we’ve all many a time experienced. So on with the
dance—and, incidentally, the diary.

CHECKING IN WITH HIROTA
November 30, 1936

During my call to-day on the Prime Minister to pay my respects
on returning from leave of absence, the conversation at first entered
upon the recent election in the United States and the assurance that
the general foreign policy of the present administration, including
the policy of the good neighbour, would be continued for another
four years. I spoke also of the Harvard Tercentenary celebration
and the Japanese art exhibition in Boston.

When I asked Mr. Hirota how things were going in Japan, he
replied that his greatest difficulty at present had to do with taxation.
He said that the Japanese Army and Navy were seriously disturbed
at the great increase of armaments in Soviet Russia, which exceeded
even the military organization of the Tzarist regime, and it was largely
owing to these increasingly heavy Soviet armaments that the Japanese
Army and Navy were calling for greater increases of armaments in
' Japan, which in turn led to the necessity for higher taxation.

Since Mr. Hirota on his own initiative had touched upon foreign
affairs, I then asked him concerning the reports in the press about
an agreement between Japan and Italy. He replied that no agree¬
ment existed. The simple facts were that Italy was going to open a
consular office in Manchukuo and Japan would eventually do the
same in Abyssinia and that this was all there was to it.

The Prime Minister then said that as regards China the negotiations
were proceeding very slowly and that they were still based on the
three points which he had formerly enunciated, particularly the
demand that anti-Japanese activity in China should cease and that
steps would be taken to combat Communism. I asked him about
the reports to the effect that the Japanese demands included tariff

the soviet ambassador on the german-japanese agreement 171

questions and also the appointment of Japanese advisers. Mr. Hirota
said that these points had also come up ; that the question of the
tariff had already been settled and that as regards Japanese advisers,
the simple fact was that other countries had many advisers in China
whereas Japan had none, and that the Japanese merchants in China
were pressing for the appointment of such advisers. Mr. Hirota said
definitely that such advisers would be purely economic and not
political or militaiy. He said that obviously the Chinese Govern¬
ment was in a difficult position regarding the Bolshevist menace
because there were so many Communists in China itself.

AN AMBASSADOR DETECTS A GERMAN-JAPANESE
ALLIANCE

December 3, 1936

An ambassadorial colleague told me to-day that there is no doubt
in his mind that the German-japanese treaty includes a secret military
agreement. His appraisal of the matter is that the negotiations
have been conducted through Major-General Oshima, Japanese
Military Attach^ in Berlin, without the knowledge of the Foreign
Office here, and very likely without the knowledge of the German
Foreign Office. In other words, the negotiations had been conducted
entirely through military channels.

This theory is given weight, he said, by the fact that Colonel Ott,
the German Military Attach^ in Tokyo, was suddenly called to Berlin
last autumn during the presence there of the German Ambassador
to Japan and that Colonel Ott had returned to Tokyo just before the
signing of the agreement. He thought that Shiratori, Japanese
Minister to Sweden, who is very close to the Japanese military, may
also have had a hand in the affair. The Ambassador said he thought
it quite possible that in view of the lack of success in trying out the
German trade agreement with Manchukuo, negotiated last year, this
secret pact might well envisage the shipment of German arms to
Manchuria to pay for Manchurian soya beans and other commodities.

THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR ON THE GERMAN-
JAPANESE AGREEMENT

December 3, 1936

In my talk to-day with the Soviet Ambassador he spoke with con¬
siderable heat concerning the Japanese-German agreement and said
that his Government possessed definite evidence that a secret military
pact existed. He said that the military pact was undoubtedly directed
against Great Britain and on my inquiring how the pact worked in
that direction, he said that it envisaged the division of various British
overseas possessions and the Dutch East Indies between Japan and
Germany in case of war. He said that this was directly in line with
the Japanese programme for southern expansion as well as for

1 72 FROM ABORTIVE REVOLUTION TO OPEN WAR

Germany’s need for colonies. He spoke ironically regarding the anti-
Comintern agreement. The Ambassador emphasized the fact that
Soviet-Japanese relations had suffered a severe set-back as a result of
the German-Japanese agreement.

AS JAPAN PREPARED TO FIGHT THE WORLD
January i 5 1937

The New Year for Japan, so far as her international relations are
concerned, opens in an ominous key. Not only has her reputation
in the world, suffered an important deterioration during the past
year, but her relations with Great Britain, Soviet Russia and China
are on a far from satisfactory footing and recently have been growing
worse. With the Dutch East Indies relations have improved. Only
with the United States, among her nearer neighbours, can it be said
that the status quo has been maintained, but with the expiration of
the Washington Naval Treaty, due to Japan’s intransigeance, and the
risk of a race in sea power and fortifications, the long future as
contrasted with the immediate present holds out no evident grounds
for optimism.

For this unhappy situation Japan herself is primarily to blame, for
she has played her cards unwisely and is now reaping the logical
results. It is the old story of the defects arising out of a dual control
of foreign policy wherein the civil authorities of the Government,
including the Prime Minister and the Foreign Office, are overridden
by the military and are subject to the behests of the Army and Navy,
which know or care little about developing good relations with
foreign countries but without whose support the cabinet could not
long survive. We saw very much the same thing working out in
Germany in 1914.

United States

General Araki observed to the British Ambassador a year or two
ago that if it were not for the exclusion clause of the Immigration
Act of 1924, the relations between Japan and the United States
might be considered as thoroughly satisfactory. While it is true that
no current controversies of prime importance are at present sufficiently
acute seriously to disturb those relations, nevertheless we should not
close our eyes to the fact that several current issues may in due
course become acute and are potentially hazardous.

First and foremost is the naval issue which has automatically arisen
with the termination of the Washington Naval Treaty. How the
future will shape up in this respect we cannot yet foresee, but it is
safe to say that if a race in naval building and in the construction of
fortifications results, the suspicion and uneasiness engendered will
inevitably make for tenseness in those relations. Other issues which
appear to be potentially disturbing are Japan’s aggressive policy in
China with the possibility of that policy eventually interfering with

AS JAPAN PREPARED TO FIGHT THE WORLD jyg

American interests, and the flooding of American markets with
Japanese low-priced goods, against which we may ultimately be
obliged to protect ourselves with resultant international friction and
irritation.

The Philippine Islands also remain as a potential, although not
an immediate, source of danger to the relations between Japan and
the United States.

China

It does not appear necessary to deal extensively or in detail with
Japan’s diplomacy and activities in China during the past year.
Sufficient to say that the overt intention and efforts of the Japanese
military to detach the five northern provinces from the jurisdiction
of Nanking largely miscarried ; that the support of the Japanese
military of the widespread smuggling operations not only became
an international scandal but went far to bring down on Japan
the censure of foreign countries including the United States and
Great Britain ; and that, far from co-operating with Nanking in an
effort to control the anti-Japanese sentiment repidly developing
throughout China, the Japanese have constantly intensified that
sentiment by their truculent and aggressive attitude and tactics.

Now, at the opening of the New Year, the Japanese programme in
China, whatever it may be, appears to have come to a temporary
halt owing to the new developments arising out of the capture and
subsequent release of Chiang Kai-shek by Marshal Chang Hsueh-
liang. The Japanese are clearly marking time. Whether these
developments will lead to an intensification of the anti-Japanese
movement in China and whether, and to what extent, they will induce
a stiffening of the future policy of Nanking remains to be seen.

The Japanese nation seems to be somewhat thunder-struck by the
sudden and*unexpected determination of China to yield no more
to Japanese pressure. The nation is, figuratively, scratching its head
and wondering what it should do next. There has been some dis¬
cussion in the newspapers of a reorientation of policy towards China,
but there has been no indication as yet of the direction which that
reorientation will take. It is strange but true that Japan appears to
have been the last to appreciate the changed conditions in China.
Now that Japan realizes that its bluff* of military pressure no longer
works, some other aggressive method of dominating North China
may be tried. Economic co-operation, with emphasis on its aim
being c< improvement of the conditions of the people,” is an old Army
plan that is being advocated increasingly by Army spokesmen, which
might be an outlet for Japanese expansionist activities, not too
objectionable to the Nanking Government. For the present it appears
that Japan is not attracted by the thought of a frontal attack, on her
own volition, against Nanking. More probable is the method of
peripheral penetration and digging in in North China and along
the Mongolian frontier.

174 from abortiveTrevolution to open war

There can be no doubt as to the soundness of my survey of the
general situation facing Japan at the commencement of the last
year, which said, in relation to Japan’s policy with China :

The procedure to be followed and the methods to be pursued
are open to influence by many factors, but the expansionist urge
is fundamental, and I think there is no doubt that whether quietly
and gradually or openly and aggressively Japanese energies will
be found, from now on, steadily directed towards consolidating
Japan’s control in North China and Mongolia.

Soviet Russia

Good relations between Japan and Soviet Russia in the present
political era are an anachronism. Apart from frontier incidents and
other minor troubles it is perfectly obvious that Russia’s well-justified
fears of eventual Japanese expansion into Mongolia and Siberia on
the one hand, coupled with Japan’s fear of the spread of Communism
in neighbouring territory on the other hand, are in themselves suffi¬
cient to prevent the development of any basis of mutual confidence.
Nevertheless, up to the month of last November, diplomatic efforts
have succeeded in elaborating a fair modus vivendi under which Soviet-
Japanese relations might be carried along for the time being without
too great risk of critical developments. The appointment of a mixed
commission to consider frontier questions had been accepted in
principle, and a fisheries treaty, distinctly favourable to Japan, had
been initialled and was ready to be signed on November 20. The
Soviet defences in Siberia and Vladivostok, coupled with the double¬
tracking of the Siberian Railway, had been brought to a point of
effectiveness where Moscow could afford to regard the, bluster and
sabre-rattling of the Kwantung Army with a degree of cynical toler¬
ance, while the Japanese, on the other hand, were too busy modern¬
izing their army and aiming to strengthen their forces in Manchuria
to a point of reasonable balance with the Soviet forces to* the north
to seek further grounds for early conflict.

This temporary amelioration in Soviet-Japanese relations, however,
was rudely shattered by the conclusion by Japan of the anti-
Comintern pact with Germarfy. While ostensibly the pact aims only
at co-operation in combating the activities of the Comintern in
spreading Communistic propaganda and practice abroad and is
therefore not openly directed against the Soviet Government, never¬
theless the existence of a secret understanding or agreement between
the General Staffs of the two countries is generally accepted as fact,
and the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo asserts that Moscow is in
possession of precise evidence to that effect. Political opponents of
the cabinet in Japan maintain that if the news of this pact had not
been permitted to leak out before November 20, the Soviet-Japanese
fisheries treaty would have been signed and all would have been well,

AS JAPAN PREPARED TO FIGHT THE WORLD ^5

and they therefore charge the Foreign Minister with a grave blunder
in allowing this leakage. But it is inconceivable that Moscow was
not well aware, long before that date, of what was going on in Berlin,
and the blunder, if such it was, would seem to lie not with the leakage
before a certain date but in entering into any such pact at all.

The explanation is simple. The pact and whatever secret agree¬
ment may be attached to it were concluded by the Japanese military,
the negotiations with Germany having been largely carried on by
Major-General Oshima, the Japanese Military Attache in Berlin.
We do not know whether these negotiations were conducted with
the blessing of the Japanese Foreign Office, but since the Foreign
Office has long been assiduously working to improve and stabilize
Japan’s relations with the U.S.S.R. as a matter of major policy, it is
reasonable to question whether the shattering effect on those relations
of a pact with Germany would not have been abundantly clear in
advance and whether the civil Government in Tokyo could have
been in sympathy with so sharp a divergence in the political orienta¬
tion of Japan’s diplomacy. Certainly the pact has called forth
widespread criticism throughout Japan.

Here again the dual system of policy control in Japan would seem
to have manifested itself. At any rate, the die is now cast and it is
obvious that Japan’s relations with Soviet Russia have suffered a
rude set-back which is not likely to be overcome in the near future.
Moreover, we may be sure that the Soviet Government will continue
to act on the principle that the only language understood by the
Japanese is force, and that when struck, whether by a minor frontier
incursion or by some broader form of aggression, the wisest policy
to follow is promptly to strike back with double force.

Germany

That the treaty between Japan and Germany envisages anything
in the nature of a pact of military mutual assistance in case of war
seems highly unlikely. It is said that Japan did her best to get
Poland to participate in the arrangement with Germany but without
success, and with Poland independent of commitments, and with
France at Germany’s back, it is hardly likely that Germany would
undertake to attack Russia in case of a Soviet war with Japan. Never¬
theless, the existence of an agreement for the exchange of military
information and for the supply of arms and ammunition and technical
aid to Japan in return for commercial commodities from Manchuria
is a reasonable hypothesis. Whatever the precise nature of the agree¬
ment concluded, it is evident that a new orientation has arisen
in Japan’s policy, that her relations with Germany are likely to
be strengthened as time goes on and that this new orientation is bound,
whether intentionally or otherwise, to react unfavourably on any
improvement of Japan’s relations not only with Soviet Russia but
with Great Britain and other democracies as well.

176

FROM ABORTIVE REVOLUTION TO OPEN WAR

Italy

While there is no good reason to believe that Japan is purposely
aligning herself with a Fascist bloc, nevertheless her recent almost
simultaneous pacts with both Germany and Italy have naturally
given rise to such a theory. In actual fact, the agreements by which
Japan will withdraw her Legation from Addis Ababa and substitute,
therefore, a Consulate, while Italy opens a Consulate-General in
Mukden, thereby implying de facto recognition respectively of the
Italian acquisition of Ethiopia and of the “ independence ” of
Manchukuo, would appear to envisage reciprocally privileged trade
relations rather than to have any important political bearing.

Great Britain

Japan would like good relations with Great Britain but, as the
British Ambassador recently said to me, she would like them on the
basis of “ all take and no give.” Japanese cordiality is but skin deep
and is induced solely by the consideration that the Japanese Army
has at last awakened to the fact that in the event of a Japanese war
with Soviet Russia, Britain might not preserve even a benevolent
neutrality. This fact gives the Japanese pause. A large element of
the British people to-day are anti-Japanese in sentiment as a result
of the Manchurian episode, Japan’s aggressiveness in China, trade
questions, and other controversies.

In the meantime no serious set-backs in Great Britain’s relations
with Soviet Russia have occurred during the past three years. These
relations are not cordial but they are at least satisfactory. The
Soviets know that Communistic propaganda in Great Britain will not
be tolerated. Naval and trade agreements have been concluded.
Thus the former enmity of the two countries is largely evaporating
while Britain’s relations with Japan have steadily grown worse, and the
Japanese Army has at last grasped the possible future implications
of these developments which are beginning to cause anxiety. Under
these circumstances it is not surprising that Japanese Army officers
should go out of their way to be cordial to their British confreres.

Potentially serious is the Japanese programme of control in various
parts of China because such control is certain, sooner or later, to
interfere with British interests in that country. The notorious Amau
Statement and other pronouncements of Japanese policy relating to
China have not served to render any less determined Great Britain’s
intention to support and develop those interests, and it is reasonable
to surmise that, if carried to their logical conclusion, the respective
policies of Great Britain and Japan in China are bound to clash.

In the meantime Anglo-Japanese relations have been rendered
difficult by trade controversies in India, Australia, and elsewhere,
and by the oil question, while the Keelung incident, wherein British
naval seamen are alleged to have been assaulted and injured by

domestic

177

Japanese police in Formosa, has further embittered these relations
As the Japanese Government has, up to the present, refused to mate
adequate amends for this incident, the situation has come to an
impasse. The Commander-in-Chief of the British East Asiatic Fleet
has postponed his official scheduled visit to Japan while embarrassing
questions have been asked and resolutions introduced in the British
Parliament. Although Prince Chichibu, the Emperor’s brother, is to
represent the Emperor at the forthcoming Coronation in London in
May, it would appear, under present circumstances, that he may
not receive so warm a welcome as would have been the case a few
years ago.

In Japan itself, much outspoken criticism is heard by those who
dislike the agreement with Germany and who would prefer to
strengthen the old Anglo-Japanese friendship, a friendship which at
present is distinctly on the decline.

DOMESTIC

Protest from the people is the significant new factor in Japanese
politics. As the year 1937 opens, popular opposition to the Govern¬
ment’s policies is making itself felt with greater emphasis than at
any time since before 1931. Cabinets in the past have been subjected
to opposition pressure, but for many years no opposition has so
directly derived from the people themselves.

This does not mean that public opinion is even approaching control.
Far from it. There is, however, an encouraging growth of popular
sentiment that the people should have a voice in current discussion
of political questions. This sentiment, growing by reason of the
economic and political difficulties brought on the nation by the
military, lacks unification and leadership ; but there is in the move¬
ment some prospect of its eventually developing into a check on
the belligerent attitude of the country now dictated by the military
who, are still in the saddle. Observers have often felt that the greatest
international danger from Japan is the vulnerability of her system
of government to the provoking of a war not initiated by the desires
of the people. Any tendency for the people to demand the right to
be consulted is salutary. It is a long road to a mature appreciation
on the part of any population, no matter how advanced in political
experience, of the cost of war ; but the first stretches of that road—
possibly to be abandoned later—have at least appeared in the viru¬
lence of recent protest against the secret diplomacy which faced the
country with an accomplished fact. The country has recognized the
agreement with Germany as holding serious dangers to Japan’s
position in the world. The protest has rapidly spread to other
subjects also. Public opinion in Japan has a way of dissipating itself
ineffectually, and that may be the upshot of the present protest, but
as the year opens it is conspicuous and real.

In addition to the disapproval of the agreement with Germany, of

178 FROM ABORTIVE REVOLUTION TO OPEN WAR

the failure of negotiations with Nanking, and of the miscarriage of
relations with the Soviet Union, there are domestic factors contributing
to the insecurity of the Hirota cabinet. When Hirota formed the
cabinet after the incident of February 26, 1936, the military apparently
exacted from him a promise of action on clarification of the national
policy, improvement of the livelihood of the people, strengthening of
national defence, and the adoption of a positive foreign policy. On
the latter two points Hirota has been obliging : the military budget
is sharply increased, and the Army-favoured anti-Communism
agreement is certainly a concession to a “ positive 99 foreign policy.
On the other two points, however, Hirota has temporized. Certain of
the military were pushing, under the first point, various proposals
of administrative and Diet reform, which Hirota effectively side¬
stepped by endless reference to special commissions and committees.
Playing for time, he was finally aided by other and more pressing
political problems to distract attention. The second point, improve¬
ment of the livelihood of the people, has not been accorded even the
pretence of fulfilment. Rising prices, rising debt, and rising taxes
contradict the commitment; and what has been done in the direction
of control of the electric-power industry is poorly comprehended by
and of doubtful advantage to the people.

The military appear to be in a position to oust the Hirota cabinet
whenever desired, explaining their action, when they decide to take
it, on the ground of the cabinet’s failure to execute the platform;
but thus far there is no indication that the military agree that any
other cabinet could do. better. The military are still the dominant
influence in control of the Government and may continue to be so
during 1937, but as evils caused by military domination continue to
accumulate, sentiment against the domination increases in volume
and force. One field of notable opposition is in financial and industrial
circles, where business is more and more openly resentful of fascist
tendencies of control by the Government.

Meantime the Diet will meet with 44 per cent, of the seats of the
lower house held by the Minseito, 36 per cent, by the Seiyukai, and
the remaining 20 per cent, divided among Labour, other small parties,
and independents. The Minseito are represented in the Hirota
cabinet by the Minister of Communications and the Minister of
Commerce and Industry, the Seiyukai by the Minister of Railways
and the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry. The most important
ministers of the Hirota cabinet do not have party connections..

At the opening of 1937, t0 recapitulate, domestic politics in Japan
are characterized by popular criticism of the Government (particu¬
larly for its foreign policy), and public dissatisfaction with the mount¬
ing cost of living, budget increase, and pressure of taxes. Against
this opposition the advantages enjoyed by the Hirota cabinet in its
effort to stay in office are, first, that the military (still in control)
are not yet determined that a change would be an improvement, and
second, that the political parties still lack unity of attack.

military

179

MILITARY

While there is no doubt that the Japanese Army suffered a severe set¬
back in public estimation as a result of the incident of February 26
last, nevertheless subsequent developments have served to offset this
unfavourable opinion and to bring the Army back to a position of
strength and popularity in public opinion to a degree even greater
than formerly. The quick and Hoodless suppression of the insurrec¬
tion and the efficient manner in which order was restored by the
Army authorities met with public approval. In addition, the resigna¬
tion of the generals who held themselves responsible for the incident,
the drastic punishment of the officers convicted of direct responsibility,
and the announced determination of the military to purge the Army
of the “ direct actionists 99 and to exact discipline throughout all
ranks created a very favourable impression on the public at large.
General Terauchi, the.War Minister, has undoubtedly gone a long
way towards the suppression of the “ direct action 99 elements and the
establishment of stricter discipline in the Army, and has also had a
large measure of success in curbing the political activities of officers
on the active list. Furthermore, the Army is credited with the
definite intention of forcing reorganization of the Government and
of effecting various social measures for the good of the farming com¬
munity and other elements of the people, all of which has served to
enhance its popularity.

While there is a current outcry in the press against various blunders
and failures in Japanese diplomacy, for which the military are largely
responsible, most of this publicity comes from the politicians who
are threatening dire attacks on the cabinet in the coming session of
the Diet. With the public at large, however, these politicians are in
general discredited, as is the Diet as a whole, owing to the many
scandals arising out of individual corruption and the fact that few
deputies after election make any effort whatever to carry out their
election promises. The fact that these parliamentarians are at
present allowed to attack the cabinet in the press in unbridled terms
is in itself an indication that the military have full confidence in their
strength and popularity, and there is every probability that a good
deal of the present fire and slaughter aired in the press, by these
politicians will peter out when it comes to actual debate in the Diet.

Past experience with the Diet has shown that the attacks against
the military made in that body by isolated though courageous liberals
are apt to have little or no effect on the policy of the Government.

The people in general are inclined to hold the Foreign Office
rather than the Army responsible for the patent failures in diplomacy
which have occurred in various directions. On the other hand, the
enlightened minority feels perhaps more than ever that the Army is
responsible for the unpleasant diplomatic situation with which Japan
is now faced.

l8o FROM ABORTIVE REVOLUTION TO OPEN WAR

The important fact should not be overlooked that the cabinet’s
approval has been secured of military appropriations in the 1937-38
budget of ¥727,965,556, the largest Army appropriations in the
history of Japan and an increase of ¥219,648,856 over the 1936-37
figure. There is very little likelihood that this amount will be materi¬
ally reduced by the Diet.

In conclusion, there seems to be no diminution in the Army’s
nfluence on both the domestic and foreign policies of Japan.

NAVAL

With the expiration of December 31, 1936, of the Washington
Naval Treaty of 1921-22 and of the London Naval Treaty of 1930,
Japan enters the new year in a non-treaty status vis-a-vis the major
naval powers of the world. She faces the possibility of unlimited
competition in naval construction from the United States and Great
Britain and she is confronted with the possibility of greatly increased
fortification by these two powers of their Pacific and Far Eastern
possessions. This situation has been, of course, brought about by
the action of Japan (1) in giving notice in December, 1934, of her
intention to abrogate the naval treaties ; (2) in withdrawing from the
London Naval Conference of 1936 and refusing thereafter to adhere
to the Three-Power Treaty; and (3) in permitting the treaties to
lapse on December 31, 1936, without entering into any agreement
with the other naval powers either with respect to quantitative or
qualitative restrictions or with respect to the restrictions of fortifica¬
tions in the Pacific and Far East.

The main reason which impelled Japan to withdraw from the naval
treaties and to refuse to enter into further commitments was, and is,
her passionate unwillingness to bind herself legally and contractually
to a position of inferiority ; in short, the 5-5-3 ratio had, in the
■min ds of the Japanese, so humiliated this country and had so wounded
its amour-propre as to have become intolerable and the nation made
up its mind, probably shortly after the signature of the London Treaty
of 1930, to pay whatever price might be necessary to rid herself of
the stigma of inferiority.

Another, and perhaps no less cogent reason, was the conviction
that the Washington ratios no longer provided Japan with the measure
of security which she felt she enjoyed at the time the treaties were
signed. It cannot be denied that conditions have greatly changed
since 1922 and, especially with regard to aviation, developments have
undoubtedly reduced Japan’s security from attack. Furthermore,
the adoption in recent years by Japan of a role of stabilizing factor
in East Asia has rendered it necessary that this country free itself of
restrictions which might hamper the effectiveness of this new policy.

In appraising the results of Japan’s action in casting the naval
treaties overboard and choosing to remain in a non-treaty status

NAVAL

181

with the other powers, the following may be listed among the possible
benefits to Japan _ (i) due to her geographic position and her
natural defences arising from the insular character of her possessions
and mainland, with the many harbours, inland waterways, and so
forth, Japan feds that even with her relatively slender resources
she is in a position, if free from both quantitative and qualitative
restrictions, to build a navy of such a kind as to render her secure
from attack ; (2) Japan feels that her position in the Orient, especially
vis-d-vis China, will be immeasurably strengthened by this evidence
of her unwillingness to subpit to restrictions imposed by Western
powers; in short, she hopes to gain “ face ” with the Chinese ;
(3) Japanese naval experts are confident, and there is some evidence
to support this view, that they can attain a measure of parity by the
qualitative method, that is, by building vessels of new design, or
great size (45,000 tons to 60,000 tons), with high gun calibres, thus
rendering existing battleships obsolete. They recall that Germany
vastly improved her relative naval position vis-d-vis Great Britain
when the British brought out the Dreadnought dass in 1906, thus
rendering obsolete all her own ^^-Dreadnought battleships.

The disadvantages to Japan of the non-treaty status may, however,
prove to outweigh the benefits. In the first place, the Washington
Naval Treaty was an integral part of a political group of treaties,
and the Japanese by abrogating these have destroyed the collective
system of security which has governed the Pacific and Far Eastern
area since 1922. In order to correct this situation she may be forced
to seek security through new political agreements, perhaps of a
bilateral character. But the former Anglo-Japanese Alliance is
probably for ever lost to her and there appears on the horizon at
present to be no political arrangement which can possibly replace
either that alliance or the collective system which she has just
abandoned.

Furthermore, Japan’s actions in respect to the naval treaties has
completed her isolation, an isolation which was begun with her with¬
drawal from the League of Nations in March, 1934. In addition to
this, Japan will now be faced with the threat of a possible increase
in Pacific and Far Eastern fortifications of American and British
possessions and territories, a threat which, if not immediate or actual,
at least will prove a costly bargaining point in any negotiations
for naval or other political agreements which Japan might be in the
future forced to seek.

As far as the acquisition of “ face ” vis-d-vis China is concerned,
recent events have proven that expectations on this score have abjectly
failed to materialize. Japan was not only checkmated in her negotia¬
tions at Nanking last autumn, but she is at present faced with a
stiffer resistance and a more united C hi n a than she has ever before
encountered.

Other results have not been happy. The realization that isolation
constitutes a real danger to a country, especially in time of war, has

i 82

FROM ABORTIVE REVOLUTION TO OPEN WAR

made itself keenly felt during the past year, and Japan has conse¬
quently made real efforts during the past six months to emerge from
this condition. In November the Japanese Government announced
the anti-Comintern agreement with Germany, the arrangements
with Italy involving at least de facto recognition of territory brought
by extra-legal methods under the domination of the other, and shortly
thereafter the agreement with Poland for the increase of cultural
relations with that strategically important buffer state between
Germany and Russia. The reaction in Moscow was immediate and
vigorous, with the result that relations with that heavily armed
neighbour have been badly strained.

In the light of evidence now available it therefore may be argued
that in a political sense Japan has not improved her position by failing
to renew or to enter into new naval agreements with the great powers ■
in the technical naval sense, however, bearing in mind chiefly con¬
siderations of defence, it is quite possible to believe that Japan may
have been the gainer, although this remains to be seen.

QUEZON AND MACARTHUR VISIT TOKYO
February I, 1937

Last night President Quezon of the Philippine Commonwealth
arrived in Tokyo on his way to the United States. I met him a t the
station and motored him and General MacArthur to the Embassy,
where they will be our guests for a night. We welcomed Quezon and
MacArthur at an informal dinner.

This morning I presented President Quezon to the Emperor and
after the audience we remained to luncheon, at which were present
Prince Takamatsu, the two Matsudairas, and a distinguished gather¬
ing. The Emperor talked freely with Quezon, discussing the Davao
land question and other issues. In my own talk with the Emperor
at luncheon I told him a good deal about the Tercentenary celebra¬
tion at Harvard and the Japanese art exhibit in Boston, in which he
appeared greatly interested. We also thoroughly discussed golf and
he seemed much impressed when I told him that I had played on
twenty-four different golf links in Japan, which I considered a golfers’
paradise. I have seldom seen the Emperor so affable. Owing to the
political crisis and not knowing who was going to be in office at the
time of President Quezon’s visit, I had not arranged an official
reception, but we did have a fairly large informal tea this afternoon.
In the evening'Quezon dined with Foreign Minister Arita.

The speeches at the dinner were very significant because Arita in
his welcoming speech to Quezon made so mention whatever of the
United States, but Quezon in his reply talked of the United States
all the way through his speech and very gracefully spoke of the grati¬
tude which the Philippines owed to America for all we had done for
them. In replying to Arita’s suggestion that Japan and the Philippines
should in future develop the closest cultural and economic relations,

WHEN JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS WERE NEVER BETTER 1 83

Quezon said that of Course in any future relationship of that kind
the first duty and interest of the Philippine Commonwealth would
be to include the United States, but he saw no reason why there
should not be a three-cornered understanding which would be helpful
to everybody. That is not precisely the way he phrased it but that
is what he meant. His speech when published the next day filled me
with delight. I doubt if the Japanese will have realized what a
definite rebuff was contained in his phraseology, especially when he said
that so far as the future relations between Japan and the Philippines were
concerned, “ deeds speak louder than words.” General MacArthur
told us that he considers Quezon one of tire five great statesmen of
the world, and I dare say he is right. I found him thoroughly
stimulating and was very glad to have had him under our roof.

WHEN JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS WERE
NEVER BETTER

February is, 1937

This afternoon Alice, having a cold and feeling poorly, stayed at
home while I did the family duty by going to a reception at the
Chinese Embassy, and it was worth while because it gave me an
opportunity for a long and intimate conversation with Amau. Amau
said that he thought that Japanese-American relations had under¬
gone a great change in the last two or three years and that Japan’s
attitude towards America was very different from that of three years
ago. He said that there were really no important issues pending
between us at the present time and he thought it very significant
that the speech which the Minister for Foreign Affairs is about to
maty in a few days is going to state that Japan desires the most
friendly relations with both the United States and Great Britain; so
far as the United States is concerned he will stop right there, but
so far as Great Britain is concerned he will continue to the effect
that current controversies can be settled by diplomatic negotiations.
In other words, said Amau, the absence of comment with regard to
the United States would indicate that there are no prime issues worth
mentioning.

I said I thought that this situation was in large measure due to
Mr. Hirota and his efforts in curbing the Japanese press, which had
caused so much trouble in times past in its bitter comment about
the United States ; these comments were repeated by correspondents
to America, and of course the American press took them up there,
causing a vicious circle all around. Amau then told me of his own
efforts in this direction and how in the weekly meetings with repre-
sentatives of Japanese journals he had tried to influence the editorial
writers to lay off bickering with the United States. In this respect
he had been rather successful. I told Amau that although I had
ascribed the credit for our improved relations to Hirota I knew very
well that he himself had had an important hand in this development

184 from abortive revolution to open war

I mentioned the press report about Shiratori as possible Vice-Minister
but Amau brushed Shiratori aside, saying that he wanted war with
Soviet Russia and would therefore certainly not fit into the present
regime, I said I thought that Japan was at present in a very critical
position and that she really stood at the parting of the ways; Amau
agreed with me and said that this was why a moderate cabinet had
been appointed at the present time. On the whole this conversation
seemed to me significant because Amau emphasized so distinctly
the fact that the present cabinet is moderate and it looks at present
very much as if this might prove to be the case.

WARNING AGAINST THE CALM BEFORE THE STORM

arch 19, 1937

The past month has been especially interesting politically owing
to the strong attack on the Government in the Diet by Hamada,
Ozaki, and other interpellators, as well as to the comparatively
gentle replies of the Prime Minister and other members of the cabinet,
and particularly to, the indications that the Government really
intends at least for the present to follow a more moderate policy
in its relations with other countries, especially with China. How
long it will or can follow this policy is an open question. There is
no doubt that a certain degree of discipline has been instilled into
the Army so that military officers are being very careful what they
write and what they say. It is generally understood among the
younger officers that those who are reported as talking politics or
criticizing the Government’s policy are more than likely to be shipped
to undesirable posts in the next general shake-up, so they are care¬
fully watching their step. For the moment it might almost appear
that there was a tendency to revert to the “Shidehara diplomacy”
and that the moderate influences in the country are becoming more
articulate and possibly more influential than they have been fora
long time.

I do not for a moment, however, delude myself by believing that
the new orientation is likely to last very long. This in all probability
is merely an interlude or one of the periodic waves of retrocession
in the expansionist movement of which I have often spoken and
have compared it precisely to the waves on the seashore, being firmly
convinced that the tide is coming in and not going out and that recur¬
rent waves of aggressiveness and forward movement are perfectly
certain to go farther ahead than their predecessors. Therefore, in
shaping our policy towards Japan we should be very careful not to
be led astray by appearances of any permanent change of heart in
policy and tactics on the part of the Japanese Government. The
military are too firmly in the saddle and will continue to remain
there. Now the Diet has been dissolved because it refused to pass a
good many of the bills desired by the Government, and the cabinet
has no intention of continuing to bicker with the political parties,

JAPAN GREETS HELEN KELLER jg^

and we shall have to watch carefully to see just how the ship of
state is steered during the coming months, which, as always in Japan
are bound to be interesting ones. One feels a little like living on a
volcano here, never knowing when an explosion is going to occur
and I am quite sure that the day of possible explosions is by no
means past.

JAPAN GREETS HELEN KELLER

April 18, 1937

This afternoon a large meeting followed by a “ banquet 95 was held
at the Tokyo Kaikan to honour Helen Keller. The meeting showed,
better than anything else could do, the real sentiment that lies deep
in the character of the Japanese people. Their traditional politeness
is generally but a veneer, save in the case of the well-bred families;
that politeness does not comprise thoughtful consideration of others
in any degree. But sentiment is another matter. Here is a woman
of no official standing who, by her own efforts, having overcome her
terrible handicap of total loss of sight, speech, and hearing, has
devoted her life to constructive work for the blind and now comes to
Japan to spread her gospel and her assistance here. This appeals to
the Japanese more deeply than any case that I have seen during our
five years 5 stay here.

On the platform at the meeting were the Prime Minister, perhaps
in his capacity as Minister of Education, the Foreign Minister, the
Home Minister, the Governor of the Prefecture, the Mayor of Tokyo,
Prince Tokugawa, and Marquis Okubo, President of the Foundation
for the Blind. The great hall was literally packed with five or six
hundred people, every last seat taken, among whom I noticed Baron
Shidehara, Mr. Yoshizawa, and many of the highest people in the
country. Each of the high officials made a'brief speech extolling
Miss Keller’s work ; she replied through Miss Thomson and was
then presented with a beautiful Japanese incense burner.

When it came my turn to speak at the end I was so deeply moved
that I dropped my text and tried to tell the meeting how I really
felt about it all, thanking them on Miss Keller’s behalf. Alice, who
with several guests at the Embassy, heard my speech on the radio,
said there was no doubt about my feelings. Indeed, it was a meeting
that I shall never forget. I am sure that Miss Keller must have been
equally moved. But Asaki said : “ Had they [the Government and
the people] devoted a fraction of the attention they have paid to the
reception of Miss Keller to the promotion of the welfare of the blind,
deaf, and dumb, that would have pleased her much more than the
greetings extended her by the Premier, the cabinet members, and the
other leaders of the nation. But her visit to these shores had been
the occasion for the awakening of the people to the condition of
private institutions devoted to the promotion of the welfare of the
blind, deaf, and dumb. . . . Let us hope that the Government will
fix a definite policy and carry it out. . .

4

CHINA INCIDENT

(July 8, 1937—May 15, 1939)

Thwarted in their attempts to seize power inside Japan, the military
extremists committed their country to large-scale war in Chinq
This war not only rallied the people to the support of the extremists;
it committed the whole country to a military adventure of world¬
wide scope. The Japanese militarists had originally hoped that their
occupation of all the main China ports would give them control of the
entire country, but these calculations proved mistaken. Then, the
Nazi-Soviet Pact of August, 1939, which set the stage for Hitler’s
attack on Poland, caused almost as much consternation in Japan as
it had in Europe. Even the most fanatical militarists had not expected
the Germans to enter into any kind of deal with the Soviet Union,
for the strongest bond holding Germany and Japan together at this
time was the Anti-Comintern Pact. Thus, the outbreak of war in
Europe did not prove an unmixed blessing to the Japanese military.
It gave them a freer hand to the south, but it created new anxieties
to the east.

THE CHINA INCIDENT BEGINS

July 8, 1937

Fighting has broken out at the Marco Polo bridge not far from
Peiping between Chinese and Japanese troops. Not clear who
started the trouble, but Nelson Johnson says that considering the
fact that the Japanese conduct manoeuvres close to a Chinese garrison
it is only surprising that such an incident had not occurred long ago.

A UNIFIED JAPAN EMBARKS ON WAR
July 13, 1937

Cabled the Department that in the present crisis there seems to be
complete unanimity of opinion between the cabinet, the military, the
Foreign Office, the press, and the business men to resist any weaken¬
ing of Japan’s position in North China. . Of course it might readily
be said that when the Prime Minister consulted the various politicians,
financiers, and business leaders and asked them if they were behind
the Government they could hardly have said no, but in the present
situation we sense a greater unanimity than was ever present in the
Manchurian issue.

186

ASK THE TOURISTS

187

»

AMERICAN AND BRITISH REPRESENTATIONS
July 14, 1937

The Japanese and Chinese representatives in Washington yester¬
day called at the Department and the opportunity was taken to
express our hope that both sides would exercise restraint. The
British Government was informed of our action and the following
press release was issued by the Department:

The Japanese Ambassador and the Counsellor of the Chinese
Embassy each called at the Department this morning and com¬
municated information in regard to events in North China. In
the course of the conversations which ensued both were given
expression of the view that an armed conflict between Japan and
China would be a great blow to the cause of peace and world
progress.

No reinforcements have yet left Japan.

44 ASK THE TOURISTS ”

July 17, 1937

The following well-known story is applicable to the present situa¬
tion. During a Far Eastern crisis an American business man asked an
old resident in Japan what was at the bottom of it all and what was
going to happen. The resident replied : 44 1 don’t know.” 44 What,
you’ve lived here thirty-five years and you don’t know ? ” 44 No,”
said the old resident, 44 1 don’t know. But ask any of the tourists out
here. They’ll tell you.” There are plenty of people in Japan to-day
who are firmly convinced that the present crisis is a put-up, pre¬
determined job on the part of the Japanese, engineered with the
definite purpose and intention of taking over North China. They
adduce plenty of evidence : the smoothness with which the Konoye
cabinet came in, the various developments during the past year or
two leading up to the final stroke ; the theory that Soviet Russia has
been weakened by internal dissensions and would be incapable of
intervention \ the hazardous position of Great Britain in Europe pre¬
venting the use of her fleet in the Far East; the understanding with
Germany. But in spite of all this, I have to align myself with the
old residents. I don’t know. Ask the tourists. It’s all guesswork,
and all we can do is to watch developments, gather facts, and try to
the best of our ability to analyse them from day to day.

Mr. Hull has made an admirable public statement in Washington.
It is perfectly balanced; it accuses nobody; mentions no names, but
it leaves no doubt as to our policy towards the maintenance of peace,
the sanctity of treaties and the orderly modification thereof, respect
for international law, American economic policy, disarmament, and
co-operation without entangling alliances. Whether it helps the

188 CHINA INCIDENT

situation or not, it is a great deal wiser than direct representations
which not only would not help but would harm by engendering irrita¬
tion. The Japanese won’t like it because they will know it is directed
at them, but the form of the statement absolutely precludes their taking
umbrage.

CHINA’S REPLY TO JAPAN’S AGGRESSION
July 20, 1937

The Chinese Government has delivered an aide-memoire to the
Japanese Embassy in Nanking, covering four points :

1. The two countries should agree on a date when movements of
their military forces would cease and they would be recalled to their
original positions.

2. Diplomatic negotiations for the settlement of the dispute.

3. The authorization of the Nanking Government is essential for
any agreement concluded on the spot.

4. China is willing to accept any means of settlement recognized
by international law and treaties.

Apparently the Japanese want to know if this is intended to be a
reply to their own note and, if so, why their various points were not
answered. The Japanese press of course characterizes the Chinese
note as “ insincere ” and this evening’s papers indicate that the situa¬
tion is hopeless. It seems to me that when Nanking has offered
Japan an armistice and proposed a settlement by diplomatic negotia¬
tions, the Japanese are not going to have a very good case to present
to the world if they now go to war. Nevertheless, it would, from
their point of view, be inconsistent to agree to diplomatic negotiations
when they have insisted that the matter is a local issue to be setded
locally.

It is reported this morning that Soviet forces have again attacked
on the Manchurian frontier. I should think that the unknown factor
of Soviet action in case of war would at least enter into Japanese
calculations.

“ HOW CAN WE COMPROMISE WHEN YOU REFUSE
TO ACCEPT OUR VIEWS ? ”

July 21, 1937

An officer of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry told
Carey Crane that Suma’s 1 conversation with Hornbeck yesterday
revealed our pro-Chinese attitude and the fact that we don’t under¬
stand the situation in North China at all. That is precisely the
impression which would inevitably be created in Japanese minds by
the carefully balanced observations which Hornbeck undoubtedly
would have made to Suma. It reminds me of the naive remark

1 Then Counsellor to the Japanese Embassy in Washington; in 1940 he became
spokesman for the Japanese Foreign Office.

AMERICA STILL TRIES TO KEEP THE PEACE 189

made by the Japanese delegation in the Dutch-Japanese shipping
conference : “ How can we compromise when you refuse to accept our
views ? ”

TROOP ACTIVITIES EVERYWHERE

July 31, 1937

Somebody told me to-day a delicious story, and a true one, which
can only be appreciated if recounted in a rich Oxford drawl. An
English lady, rather high and mighty, was recently passing through
Japan, and on landing she said to her host: “ Ah, so this is Kobe.
Tell me, who is our Governor-General here ? 95

Cabled the Department to-day that the Japanese determination
to use decisive force against any Chinese military advance into North
China would appear to be increasingly firm. After a five-minister
conference yesterday, Prince Konoye went to see the Emperor, and
a press report said that a decision of the greatest importance had
been taken, a “ second step ” in Japan’s programme in China.
Troop activities are everywhere evident here.

AMERICA STILL TRIES TO KEEP THE PEACE
August 6, 1937

The British Government, repeating suggestions made to our
London Ambassador on July 28, now proposes an Anglo-American
offer of good offices to both the Japanese and the Chinese in providing
neutral ground where plenipotentiaries could meet and in helping
to smooth out such difficulties as might occur in the negotiations,
arrangements for withdrawing the troops to follow, but before acting
they wanted Dodds’ 1 and my opinion as to the probable reaction
in Japan to such an offer.

After a long conference in my study to-night with Dodds and
Sansom of the British Embassy and Dooman, who has succeeded
Neville as our Counsellor, I have come to the following conclusions :

1. We feel that there is no discernible enthusiasm among the
Japanese Government or people for war with China, although we
must obviously omit the military machine from this characterization.
The prevailing feeling among the Japanese is that Chinese manifesta¬
tions of enmity towards Japan brought about the present situation
and that while the Japanese Government and people would still be
glad to avoid a general war, they will support whatever military or
other measures the Government decides to take. A powerful and
practical argument for peace is involved in the appropriations of four
hundred million yen for military operations on the continent, together
with the assurance of steadily mounting costs in the event of an
extensive campaign.

2. The Japanese insist that the initiative for either peace or war
must now come from China. On the other hand, although I defer

1 British Charge d’Affaires in Tokyo.

X go CHINA INCIDENT

to Johnson’s opinion in this respect, it does not now look as if the
Chinese, considering that Chinese authority in the Peiping area has
now been virtually eliminated, would take any initiative towards
peace. If the Chinese forces continue to move towards Hopeh it
seems inevitable that a general clash is bound to occur.

3. It seems to me of the utmost importance that we should leave
no stone unturned to prevent war, and I therefore cannot con¬
scientiously recommend against a final effort by the American and the
British Governments by offering good offices on the basis of the British
Government’s practical proposal, although it should be made abund¬
antly clear that such action would in no sense constitute intervention.
We feel that in Tokyo the chances of acceptance are small but not
necessarily hopeless. Publicity should be carefully avoided and much
would depend on the manner and method of approach. If the two
Governments should decide to proceed, I feel that Dodds and I,
separately, should ask to see Hirota at his residence, not at the Foreign
Office, and should present the offer in complete confidence, asking
whether the Minister thought that the suggested plan would, from the
Japanese point of view, serve a useful purpose. If it should be con¬
sidered undesirable to sound out one Government before the other,
a similar and simultaneous approach might be made in Nanking.

4. As for the probable reception in Tokyo I believe that the best
prospects for forestalling any possible resentment would be a con¬
fidential and exploratory approach such as I have outlined. Indi¬
cations could be given that these channels for good offices would
be open now or later if desired.

5. My careful judgment is that an oral, exploratory, semi-informal,
and confidential talk with Hirota along the lines of the British proposal
would be more likely to avoid any possible resentment of “ inter¬
ference ” and more likely to bring favourable results than would a
formal “ diplomatic demarche.” In any case, publicity should be most
carefully avoided.

6. While fully aware that I have previously expressed the opinion
that we have left nothing undone which could favourably affect
developments, nevertheless I should like to feel that history will regard
the record of America’s action in this most pregnant and critical
period in Far Eastern affairs as exhaustive, impartially correct, and
unstintedly helpful.

Dodds and Sansom said that they agreed with my views.

CHINESE BOMBS ON SHANGHAI HURT CHINA’S
CAUSE ABROAD

August 29, 1937

It seems to me that nowadays the diary is generally written on
hot Sunday mornings and to-day, August 29, is no exception to the
rule. Everyone else, or nearly everyone, has gone off to the hills for
the week-end. Alice and Elsie are in Karuizawa and the rest of the

WARNING TO HIROTA

I9I

staff divided between Karuizawa and Ghuzenji. Only Crocker, who
is on duty this week-end, the clerical staff, and I remain. Dooman
proposed that he and I take alternate week-ends off, but I don’t like
to be away at such a time ; things happen too fast, and sometimes
something happens which only the Ambassador can handle, or ought
to handle. We diplomats have plenty of easy periods with plenty
of play ; our intensive work comes in cycles and I heartily welcome
such work when it does come, for every professional man likes an
opportunity to function at top speed once in a while. So Pm not
easing up just now. Alice rather went to pieces on account of the
heat and I bundled her off, with Elsie, to Karuizawa, the children
being already parked there in Carey Crane’s house. Personally I
thrive on heat and am fit as a fiddle. So on with the—no, I’ve used
that phrase too often. What I mean to say is that we’ll keep going,
regardless.

The bombing in Shanghai on August 14 was one of the most
horrible episodes in modern times. The bombs fell indiscriminately,
hitting the Cathay and Palace Hotels and killing hundreds of Chinese
civilians gathered on the Bund and elsewhere. Bob Reischauer, the
son of an American missionary, was fatally injured at the entrance
to the Cathay and other Americans may have been killed or injured.
I wrote to Dr. and Mrs. Reischauer in Karuizawa. Subsequently
we received the most heart-rending first-hand accounts from refugees.

FIRST CONVERSATION WITH SIR ROBERT CRAIGIE,
BRITAIN'S NEW AMBASSADOR TO JAPAN

September 8, 1937

The new British Ambassador, Sir Robert Craigie, came to call,
although he will not present his credentials until Saturday. We had
a pleasant talk which gave me the impression that he desires the
closest co-operative relations between us. He had talked with Clive 1
and I suppose that this initial frankness and friendliness may be due
to what Clive said to him of our own relations.

WARNING TO HIROTA
September 20, 1937. Kawana

Eighteen more holes of golf, sixty-three holes in the three days.
I ended in a blaze of glory with a birdie 3 on the sixty-third hole.
Sunburnt and physically tired but psychologically rested, and that
meant much.

Dooman had telephoned that it would probably be necessary for
me to see Hirota to-day, so we hurried back after lunch and I found
that the Japanese plans to bomb Nanking called for immediate
representations. I saw the Minister at 6 and talked to him in much
stronger terms than I had yet employed, feeling that the time had come
1 Sir Robert Clive had been replaced as British Ambassador by Sir Robert Craigie.

192 CHINA INCIDENT

for the most emphatic language. In the course of my remarks I said
that we must not forget history ; that neither the American Govern¬
ment nor the American people had wanted war with Spain in 1898,
but when the Maine was blown up nothing could prevent war. • The
American people are the most pacific and patient people in the world *
we lead the world in matters of international peace and disarmament
and the maintenance of the sanctity of treaties. But under provoca¬
tion we can become the most inflammable people in the world. It
is well not to forget history.

Evidently these representations made an impression because
Hirota went to see the Emperor early the next morning and later
we began to notice concrete indications that the Government was
getting disturbed about the effects of the indiscriminate bombings
and were taking steps to control the aviators. Of course it is
these young hotheads who cause the trouble ; having once smelled
blood they simply fly amok and “ don’t give a damn 55 whom or what
they hit. Probably as a result of our representations and of the
reactions they are getting from abroad, the Government later sent
an admiral down to Shanghai to discuss this situation with Hasegawa,
the Commander-in-Chief, and word was sent out that there would
be no further bombing of Nanking after September 25. This of
course was after they had destroyed about everything they wanted
to destroy in that city. Meanwhile Moore, who was Acting Secretary
of State, likewise talked to Saito, and later, under instructions, I
filed a strong note here. This is no time for pussyfooting.

STRONG WORDS TO A HELPLESS GOVERNMENT
September 20, 1937

My conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs at his official
residence at six o’clock this evening was prefaced by a word of ap¬
preciation from me with regard to the arrangements made by the
Japanese authorities to avoid bombing the Hankow-Canton railway
during the evacuation of Americans on September 22 and 26. The
Minister inquired if I had received his note concerning the bombing
of the American missionary hospital at Waichow, to which I replied
in the affirmative and expressed further appreciation of the Minister’s
expressions of regret and the offer to consider indemnification.

I then turned to the announced plans of the Japanese naval forces
to bomb Nanking commencing to-morrow at noon, and I made to
the Minister the most emphatic and earnest representations with
regard to the serious danger to which foreign diplomatic establish¬
ments and personnel, as well as other non-combatants, would in¬
evitably be subjected if such a course is pursued. I spoke of the
very serious effect which would be produced in the United States
on the American Government and people if some accident should
occur in connection with those operations, and I then spoke of the
steadily mounting feeling which is developing in the United States

Babe Ruth and “ Lefty” O’Doul stare at Ambassador Grew’s method of putting.

The Ambassador attends a geisha dinner.

STRONG WORDS TO A HELPLESS GOVERNMENT

193

and in other countries against Japan, which by her course of action
is laying up for herself among the peoples of the world a liability
of distrust and suspicion, popular antipathy, and the possibility of
Japan’s becoming ostracized from the family of nations. I said to
the Minister that the goodwill between our countries which he and
I had been building up during these past years was rapidly dissolving
as a result of Japan’s action in China and that while the American
people are patient they are nevertheless easily aroused by some
serious incident involving their legitimate interests abroad, and
that I am constantly dreading the effects in my country which would
undoubtedly be called forth if as a result of Japanese operations in
China some serious incident should occur which the American people
would feel had touched their honour.

I then spoke earnestly of the Minister’s own responsibility for
guiding Japan’s foreign relations and for restraining the Japanese
naval and military forces in China from their course of action which
is rapidly causing Japan to lose the world’s goodwill and is building
up abroad an almost universal sentiment of antagonism against his
country. I said that the military and naval forces did not understand
and appeared not to care about Japan’s foreign relations and her
position in the world and it was therefore his own responsibility to
guide the course of action which is now being pursued in China. The
force and directness of my statements and appeal left nothing whatever
to Mr. Hirota’s imagination. I tried to bring home to the Minister
with maximum effect the certain repercussion which would occur in
the United States if some serious accident involving American
interests were to happen in connection with the proposed bombing of
Nanking.

Mr. Hirota made no effort to counter my observations, but listened
gravely and silently throughout my talk. When I had finished he
observed that four hours ago from Tokyo he had ordered the naval
command in China to make every effort to avoid injury to the foreign
diplomatic establishments or to non-combatants in Nanking in
connection with the proposed bombing operations. I said that the
afternoon press had reported that certain bombing operations in
Nanking had already occurred yesterday, but the Minister said that
these were unimportant and far away from the diplomatic establish¬
ments. With regard to the warning by the Japanese Navy that the
bombing operations would commence at noon on September 21,
the Minister volunteered the opinion that the warning was “ too
short.”

Although I talked to the Minister to-day with an emphasis and
directness unprecedented since my arrival in Japan, he gave no
indication of resentment. His demeanour was naturally graver than
usual and he appeared to me to receive my observations rather sadly
but without any effort whatever at rebuttal. While recent develop¬
ments indicate that he has made and is making efforts to avoid
antagonizing the United States by cautioning the military and naval

7

* 94 CHINA INCIDENT

forces in individual local issues, we must reluctantly face the fact
that the civil government in Tokyo has very little influence with
these forces where their general objectives are concerned.

46 GOODWILL ENVOYS ”

October 5, 1937

Kojiro Matsukata came in for. a talk before departing for the United
States. In spite of my informal recommendations to Kabayama
Soyeshima, and others against sending so-called goodwill envoys to
America, a whole flock of them are going out: Matsukata, Ashida,
Takeishi, and Bunjiro Suzuki to the United States, Viscount Ishii
to England and France, Admiral Godo to Germany, Baron Okura
to Italy, etc. In America they will get nowhere.

Their fundamental theme is that they are fighting China in self-
defence, and no American will listen to such rot, however presented.
The American is a priori sympathetic to China and always has been,
and he is, furthermore, almost always sympathetic to the under-dog.
Japan is fighting on Chinese soil. What more need be said ? These
envoys will receive a rude shock if I am not greatly mistaken.

But Matsukata says that he is not going as a goodwill envoy but
simply to make business contacts and to buy needed commodities
such as oil, scrap iron, and trucks. I warned him that he would find
public opinion in the United States inhospitable to Japanese claims
that China is responsible for the present conflict, that Japan has
recently done much to render difficult the continued application of
the good-neighbour policy, and that in shaping its own policy and
action the American Government must listen to public opinion at
home. He claims that American influence is to-day paramount in
Japan and can play a prominent part in helping to stop the warfare.

On October 5, President Roosevelt delivered his famous “ Chicago speech ”
calling for a “ quarantine ” of aggressor nations. Shortly thereafter , the
Belgian Government invited the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty of xgss,
promising to respect the political and administrative integrity of China, to attend
a conference at Brussels.

WHAT CAN THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE
ACCOMPLISH?

October 9, 1937

As for the military and political situation, the Japanese are making
a big drive around Shanghai, doubtless with the purpose of impress¬
ing the Nine-Power Conference. They appear to have cleaned up a
good deal of ground. But what we ask ourselves is this : assuming
that the Japanese Army is able to occupy and control all the territory
it wishes ; supposing that the Chinese forces are partly annihil ated,
wholly disorganized, disrupted, scattered. What then ? Can they or

JAPAN REFUSES TO ATTEND THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE 1 95

anyone else force China to make peace ? And if peace is not made,
can the Japanese afford to withdraw any substantial number of their
troops ?

They must hold the ground already won. Their lines of supply are
becoming more and more attenuated. How long can they afford
to maintain this great force in China with constant guerrilla war¬
fare seeking to harry and deplete their strength ? And what about
Soviet Russia —after the Japanese forces are thus thoroughly in¬
volved and correspondingly weakened ? That, it seems to me, is the
big imponderable factor in the situation. But, in the meantime,
will China collapse, morally disintegrate and descend into utter
chaos ? That, of course, is what the Japanese are aiming at; it
explains their constant bombing of defenceless cities. These are just
a few of the headaches that confront us.

Meanwhile, what can the Nine-Power Conference accomplish ?
Press the combatants to negotiate for peace—and get thoroughly
rebuffed ? Try economic sanctions and ignominiously fail as they
did in the case of Abyssinia? Or content themselves with moral
thunderbolts which would have about as much effect in Japan as a
mild hailstorm in the country ?

Perhaps the answer to some or all of these questions will be clearer
by the time that this inadequate soliloquy reaches American shores.

JAPAN REFUSES TO ATTEND THE BRUSSELS
CONFERENCE

October 21, 1937

. A diplomatic colleague said that he had yesterday made renewed
representations to Hirota, repeating the representations made on
October 15, in an effort to persuade the Japanese Government to
participate in the Nine-Power Conference at Brussels. He advanced
the argument that the Japanese case had gone by default at Geneva
and that Brussels would offer a further opportunity to present Japan’s
case, which would be carefully considered by the assembled powers
who wished above all to be helpful towards arriving at a peaceful
settlement of the Sino-Japanese hostilities. The Minister replied
that since his last talk with the Ambassador he had consulted a
great number of prominent people here and that the sentiment
against participation in the conference, especially among the leaders
of the political parties, was practically unanimous. However, as no
invitation had yet been received, no final decision had yet been
reached.

October 22, 1937

Yoshizawa told Dooman yesterday that so far as the Foreign Office
was concerned, the Nine-Power Conference invitation would definitely
be declined, and that a favourable reply could not be expected so

196 CHINA INCIDENT

long as the invitation did not specify that the Conference does not
arise out of the League of Nations resolution and the American
Government’s announcement of October 6.

RUMOURS OF PEACE, BUT JAPAN’S WAR SPIRIT

GROWS

October 30, 1937

To-day came three telegrams from the Department indicating
interest in press rumours that Japan is ready to discuss peace terms
and desiring our comments and estimate of the situation. They
included a rumour that the German Ambassador in China, Traut-
mann, was actually negotiating as a mediator with Kawagoe in
Shanghai. We nailed this rumour to the mast by talking it over
frankly with Noebel, German Counsellor, who said that the German
Embassy here knew nothing of such negotiations, that the relations
between Kawagoe and Trautmann had not been very satisfactory
owing to Japanese suspicion that the latter is pro-Chinese and owing
also to the employment in China of German military instructors, and
that Trautmann had taken advantage of a recent visit to Shanghai
to get on better terms with Kawagoe.

I told the Department about the general press comment here,
which concentrated on the idea that Japan will tolerate no outside
interference when the time comes to talk terms with China, and I
then said that the only way really to ascertain the mind of the Japanese
Government would be for me to go to Hirota and “ explore.” I said
that I could best do this by asking to see Hirota at his residence to
avoid publicity and to open the conversation by referring to a remark
which I had made to him on August 6 to the effect that I hoped he
would let me know if he ever saw ways in which I could personally
be of help, and then to lead up to the Brussels Nine-Power Conference,
making it clear that I was acting on my own initiative and without
instructions. Thus nothing that transpired would commit or in¬
volve the American Government, and it might possibly elicit some
suggestions from Hirota, who might welcome the opening thus
afforded in order to mobilize elements in Japan which do not favour
war to the bitter end. In any case, I don’t believe in using “ go-
betweens ” in such important matters, for they are too liable to mess
things up or to get things twisted.

Hitherto the only Japanese terms known to us are Hirota’s famous
“ three points ” and these are open to such broad interpretation that
they can mean almost anything at a given moment that the Japanese
want them to mean. It will be remembered that the three points
envisage Chinese factual recognition of Manchukuo, cessation of
anti-Japanese activities and propaganda, and the suppression of
Communism. Whatever the final terms may be, it is safe to say
that they will undoubtedly involve practically complete Japanese
political and economic control in North China, whatever else they

RUMOURS OF PEACE* BUT JAPAN’S WAR SPIRIT GROWS 197

may include. I am rather sceptical of Hirota’s committing himself
to me even informally to anything more specific than his nebulous
three points, but it might do no harm to try to create an opening
for negotiations. I once helped to stave off war between Turkey and
Greece ; it would be a tremendous satisfaction to help to stop the war
between Japan and China.

The Department replied immediately, leaving to my discretion
the action proposed but suggesting that it might be well not to make
the approach specifically for the purpose stated but to utilize some
opportunity to broach the subject when I was seeing Hirota about
something else. I certainly appreciate the latitude the Department
allows me and the fact that it almost always e< suggests 55 rather than
“ directs."

Having got that particular telegram off, I then held a series of
conferences with Craigie, both at our Embassy and his, with Dooman
participating in the final drafting of a telegram which, it was sug¬
gested, we should send identically to our respective Governments
to help the Brussels Conference. In brief, the idea is that if good
offices or mediation are to result from the Conference, the Conference
must take care not to go beyond its mandate of attempting “ to
promote peace by agreement" and it should avoid expressing
judgment as to the origins of the conflict or the responsibilities in¬
volved. The more the Conference can maintain impartiality, the
better will be the prospect of eventually successful mediation.

Furthermore, mediation, if undertaken at all, should be entrusted
to one power, preferably to the United States or Great Britain, and
not to a group of powers or to America and Great Britain acting
together, for this would imply an element of pressure, and foreign
pressure, or any semblance of it, would be resisted to the last
ditch. The Conference, too, should carefully consider the possible
effects of its proceedings on the internal situation here. Hirota’s
position is shaky ; the military and the chauvinists want Matsuoka to
take his place, and if that should happen, not only would we have
to expect even greater ruthlessness in China, but American and
British interests here would inevitably suffer. The war spirit here is
noticeably growing.

We were able to subscribe to the essential part of the proposed
identic telegram and the final draft, which was satisfactory to both
Craigie and myself, was dispatched about 7 in the evening and I
hope it will be sent on to Norman Davis and Eden in Brussels and
that it may influence the tactics of the Conference. Our French
colleagues agreed to telegraph in the same general sense to Paris. I
felt that we had done a good day’s work.

Craigie was very much perturbed to-day ; Anglo-Japanese relations
are about as bad as they can be ; three more British soldiers have
been killed in Shanghai, probably by Japanese shells, and the anti-
Japanese feeling in England is steadily growing. He is worrying too
about the organization of a new Japanese fleet, the Fourth Fleet, and

198 CHINA INCIDENT

is fearful lest its main object may be effectually to blockade Hong
Kong. I think he really fears the possibility that the Japanese Navy
will intentionally provoke war with England. At any rate, we now
know that the animus of the Navy has definitely turned from the
United States towards Great Britain and we also know that the Navy
hates to have the Army steal the whole show and is chafing for action.
Pabst is equally worried that this new fleet may have designs along
the lines of the “ southward advance, 95 involving the Dutch East
Indies. And both he and Craigie are worried about the possibility
of another February 26 incident and think it may be possible.

But what, we ask ourselves, can the military elements and the
chauvinists be grousing about ? Certainly it looks as if the Army and
Navy were having their way, with very little interference on the part
of the Government or the Old Guard elements. Saionji, Makino,
Yuasa, and Matsudaira don’t seem to come into the picture at all
nowadays. What would be the use of further assassinations ? But
the Japanese military and chauvinists, with their samurai traditions
and swashbuckling ideas, are always an unpredictable element in the
political arena here. Almost anything can happen.

HIROTA ACCUSES AMERICA OF INITIATING AN
ANTI-JAPANESE FRONT

November 16, 1937

Hirota’s talk with me was along the following lines : according to
reports received from Brussels it appears that the draft final resolution
contemplates united action against Japan ; the Minister has seen
only the original draft and doesn’t know if it was passed without
alteration or amendment, but if it does call for united action he fears
that a very unfortunate effect on Japanese public opinion will be
created ; “ united action ” would appear to imply some sort of
sanctions, such as an economic boycott, and far from helping to stop
the hostilities, such action would merely encourage the Chinese and
would result in indefinitely prolonging them. According to informa¬
tion received through the diplomatic representative of 44 a certain
power,” the United States not only took the initiative in proposing
the Brussels Conference but is also taking the active leadership
there.

Hirota said that these rumours were sure to appear soon in the
Japanese press and that they would have a very unfortunate effect.
Hitherto the Japanese public have felt that the country foremost in
developing a solid front against Japan was Great Britain, but if the
press were now to report that the leadership at Brussels was being
taken by the United States, the onus would be largely shifted to
American shoulders. As the Minister had often told me, good rela¬
tions with the United States were his fundamental policy, and he
greatly “ feared ” the results of the possible developments which he had
described. Up to recently the Japanese felt that America was the

HIROTA ACCUSES AMERICA OF ANTI-JAPANESE FRONT 199

only country whose impartiality during the Sino-Japanese hostilities
had been genuine; the impartiality of all of the other countries
was doubted, owing to their special interest in China, but owing to
the position taken by the United States it was felt that we might
play an important role in helping to bring about peace just as we
had done in the Russo-Japanese War, as being the most impartial
of all the friends of Japan. This situation had been somewhat altered
by the speech of the President in Chicago, but in the President’s
address to Congress he had omitted mention of the Far East and
this had given the Japanese public the impression that the attitude
of the United States was perhaps not quite so “ strict ” as had at
first been feared.

Hirota then went on to say that the Japanese campaign in China
is going along smoothly, and although the Army can carry on if
they consider it necessary, it will probably not be necessary for
them to go much farther than they have already gone. It would
be in China’s own interest to bring about a peaceful settlement
now. If the Chinese Government evacuates Nanking it will be a
very foolish move ; some of the generals are already forming an
opposition to Chiang Kai-shek and his position is not too secure.
The Japanese terms, if peace were made now, would be “ reason¬
able ” and not a foot of Chinese territory would be kept by Japan,
but if the hostilities are long continued, this attitude might change,
and in view of the increased sacrifices involved, more drastic terms
might result. The way in which the United States could best help
would be to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to negotiate for peace. If a
willingness to negotiate were indicated by the Chinese Government,
Hirota would send a representative to Shanghai to talk, either publicly
or privately, with a representative of China.

At the end of Hirota’s remarks I repeated them point by point
and asked if I had correctly understood everything that he had said,
to which he answered in the affirmative. I told him that I would
repeat his observations to my Government, and in the meantime I
hoped he would do everything in his power to prevent the Japanese
press from publishing unconfirmed reports with regard to the attitude
of the United* States. I told him of what Eden had actually said
in the House of Commons and of the definite denials of the State
Department that our Government had taken the initiative in con¬
nection with the calling of the Brussels Conference, and I told him
once more just how its convocation had come about. Hirota said
that he agreed with me as to the importance of keeping the Japanese
press quiet and that he would do Ins best. I also pointed out that
the Chinese Ambassador was still in Tokyo and that diplomatic
channels for peace overtures appeared still to exist. Hirota assented
but made no comment.

It was significant that Hirota’s comments about the part we had
played in the Russo-Japanese War and the implication that Chiang
Kai-shek’s withdrawal from Nanking would render peace conversa-

200 CHINA INCIDENT

tions more difficult, were two of the points which Dooman had men¬
tioned to Yoshizawa last night. The latter must have passed them
on immediately to the Minister.

HULL DENIES HIROTA’S CHARGES
November 17, 1937

The Department cabled us the full text of the Declaration adopted
by the Brussels Conference on November 15.

The Embassy in Rome reports that a Havas dispatch from Tokyo
gives the purported terms which Japan intends to impose on China
and asks for our comment. We replied to the Department that the
Foreign Office spokesman on November 15 described the reports as
“ entirely groundless. 59

Referring to my talk with Hirota, the Secretary cabled me that the
words “ united action 59 nowhere appear in the Declaration adopted
by the Brussels Conference. Mr. Hull assumes that Hirota may have
had in mind the last paragraph of that Declaration, which was
phrased as follows :

Though hoping that Japan will not adhere to her refusal, the
States represented at Brussels must consider what is to be their
common attitude in a situation where one party to an international
treaty maintains against the views of all the other parties that
the action which it has taken does not come within the scope of
that treaty, and sets aside the provisions of the treaty which the
other parties hold to be operative in the circumstances.

The Secretary also authorized me to tell Hirota from him that there
is not an atom of truth in any report that we took the initiative in
calling the Conference. Mr. Hull also understands that no Govern¬
ment at the Conference has done more than to assume its share of
the common responsibility for an exchange of views, and is astonished
that any Foreign Office with the information publicly available
could have any misunderstanding with regard to these facts. He
asked me to tell Hirota of his appreciation of the latter’s wish to main¬
tain good relations with the United States, for which *he, Mr. Hull,
has constantly worked during the last five years, but that he must
frankly and in all friendliness express his apprehension lest the cause
of developing and fostering these good relations, which both have
always in mind, should be injured by the present situation in the
Far East.

WHY HIROTA MISUNDERSTOOD HULL
November 20, 1937

Yoshizawa, Chief of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office,
told me in private that there had been some misunderstanding
about the phraseology and substance of Mr. Hull’s message to Mr.

WHY HIROTA MISUNDERSTOOD HULL

201

Hirota, which I had communicated to the latter on November 18.
What happened was this. In order to be sure of conveying Mr.
Hull’s message precisely as cabled, I had written it down before
going to see Hirota and actually read it to him, taking no chances
on a casual oral communication. The message said that Mr. Hull
sincerely appreciated Mr. Hirota’s desire to maintain good relations
with the United States, that during the past five years Mr. Hull
had constantly striven to that end; and that in all friendliness and
frankness Mr. Hull must express his apprehension lest the cause of
fostering and developing those good relations which they both have in
mind be injured by the present situation in the Far East (paraphrase).

In view of the implied sting in the tail of the message, I was a
little surprised when Mr. Hirota expressed great pleasure at receiv¬
ing it and asked me to thank Mr. Hull. Hirota asked me if I would
leave with him the message as I had written and read it to him,
but I pleaded that the piece of paper was merely a rough record
and that I would send him a neater transcription as soon as I returned
to the Embassy. The reason for this was that I could not leave
with him the true reading because it had come in confidential code
and also because there were other notes on the paper which I didn’t
want to give him. As soon as I had returned to the chancery I sent
him a personal letter with a close paraphrase of the message.

When I saw him at the time of my call with MacMurray 1 this
morning I asked if he had received my letter. He said no and that
he had thought of telephoning me to ask for it. I said that I had
sent it two days ago, immediately after our interview, and that I
would investigate. Just as we came out of Hirota’s office we met
Yoshizawa going in with my letter. He said that it had gone first
to the Archive Bureau and had thus been delayed. Yoshizawa asked
Dooman to come to see him this afternoon and said that Mr. Hirota
had understood the message quite differently ; he thought that Mr.
Hull was saying that he was working for good relations with Japan
in spite of the situation in the Far East. Apparently Hirota had
misunderstood the significance of the word “ apprehension.”

Hirota was so pleased with the message, as he had understood it,
that he had cabled it to the Japanese diplomatic missions in several
capitals abroad. Now that he had received my letter he saw the
marked discrepancy between his understanding and the actual
meaning of the message, and he found himself in something of a
dilemma as to whether to correct the misunderstanding by sending
a revised version abroad. Yoshizawa thought that it would probably
be better to leave the matter as it is. All this arose through Mr.
Hirota’s inadequate grasp of English, and goes to indicate that one
can never rely on purely oral communications. I am glad at least
that the misunderstanding cannot be attributed to any carelessness
on my part because I read to Hirota the actual message from the
original text.

1 Former American Minister to China, at this time Ambassador to Turkey.

7 *

202

CHINA INCIDENT

LETTER TO A JAPANESE LIBERAL

Tokyo, December 3, 1937

Personal and Confidential

Dear -, Your circular letter of November 11 to friends in

England, a copy of which you were good enough to send me with
your letter of November 19, has been read with great care and
interest. It is full of valuable and significant material, and I thank
you for it.

A great deal of material, “ explanatory ” of Japan’s attitude and
actions, comes to me nowadays in the form of letters, memorandums,
and other documents from many sources. A very small portion of
this material is worth reading, being objective and representing
an honest effort to get at facts and to weigh them, but most of it is
not worth reading because it is based on ex parte , unconfirmed asser¬
tions, with no evidence to test the accuracy of these assertions. In
these days of international troubles it seems to me of prime im¬
portance that we should all of us take an objective attitude and
should be perfectly sure of the accuracy of our information before
arriving at judgments, recommendations, or decisions. Otherwise
our estimates are not worth very much and, unless we are sure of
the soundness of our premises , the world is very likely to class our
appraisals as biased or as outright propaganda.

It is because you yourself preserve an enlightened, courageous
attitude and are a searcher after truth, and because at the same time
you are a patriot and have the best interests of your country con¬
stantly at heart, that I venture to make a few comments on your
circular letter. Please be sure that I do so as a warm friend, not
only of yours but also of Japan. I have always felt that a friend
who is unwilling to speak frankly for friendship’s sake is not a real
friend. I said this in my initial speech before the America-Japan
Society in 1932 and have always tried to follow that course. But
sometimes a friend may speak when the diplomatist may not, and
it is in the former capacity that I am writing this letter.

On page 16 of your circular letter you say : . . it was China

that provoked Japan, after having consummated a carefully arranged
plan.” And on page 18 : . . a strong Chinese force, without

rhyme or reason, fired upon a small unit of our garrison who were
carrying out manoeuvres.” Obviously each side would charge the
other side with having commenced the hostilities, but the general
opinion of neutral observers is that the evidence of Chinese aggression
is not sufficient to prove the point. No one seems to know who started
the trouble, but there is a general consensus that with the Japanese
frequently holding manoeuvres in such close proximity to a Chinese
garrison on Chinese soil, it is only a wonder that the trouble did
not start long ago. If you have any reliable evidence to support

LETTER TO A JAPANESE LIBERAL

your point, other than the ex parte assertion of the Japane • . 3

it would interest me very much indeed to know of it. iv* r ^^ ai y>
to me, is a case where purely ex parte statements are insufH ^ seems
Secondly, I know as a definite fact (first-hand, not s f lent
information) that the Chinese Government proposed to c ° n d-hand
Government an armistice on July 17 and expressed its r e Japanese
withdraw its troops to their positions prior to the i nc i c j ea ^ ness to
Marco Polo Bridge, and to terminate all troop movem e ent at t ^ ie
affected area if similar action were taken by the Japanes^p 111 t ^ le
ment. No effort to occupy strategic positions was to be C ^ overn ~
by either side in the meantime ; in other words, a gentlema^ 61 * 1 * 3 ^
ment under which there would be no advantage talr<> n 0 p s ^Re¬
velling period of the armistice, until a settlement could be ^ il ? ter '
This proposal was conveyed to the Japanese Government 0 ed ‘
but it was ignored. I greatly fear that this fact will not l 0o £ ^ 16

the historical record, and this is fact, not rumour. K WeU on

Thirdly, on page 19 you mention only one instance of T
bombing (in Canton) in which the non-combatants (a V g apanese
number, you say) were killed through an accident. We hav^
deal of absolutely reliable evidence, based on the direct ob C & ® r ? at
of neutral observers, of many instances of Japanese bornh^* 10 ^
undefended cities, towns, hospitals, missionary and edu? g ,
establishments, in which great masses of bombs were dron^ d k
Japanese planes many miles from any Chinese military establish
and therefore not accidental, and in which a very large
non-combatant civilians were killed. Very few, if any of

bombings were reported in the Japanese press. They were ren
on the basis of absolutely reliable neutral observation, in the
press, and these reports are largely responsible for the wave
dignation which swept over my country from coast to coast, j e °, m '
for your own personal and confidential information, a list J? C ° SC>
of these incidents of which we are officially aware. some

I readily grant that the Chinese propaganda abroad has u
more effective than the Japanese propaganda, but these points
I have mentioned are not based on propaganda but on reliable ne trl
evidence. Japan has a substantial case to present to the U Id
if one goes back into the history of the past many years, but kg ° r °
is not strong if based on the current hostilities and the way
they have been carried out. I think the term “ self-defence ” W i_- C T
has been constantly used by Japanese propagandists in my C o
was unfortunate. The average American mil listen politely hn+Ti
merely ask : “ Well, you are fighting on Chinese soil, aren’t y 0 u ? ”

It needs a lot of historical background to attempt to justifr- th
charge, and the term “ self-defence ” was not well chosen. ^ tilat
I am sure you will appreciate from all this that quite apart fr
propaganda there has been a great deal of ground to expl a j n
to justify the feeling against Japan which has arisen in my cou . 7 * v
My constant and earnest prayer is that in spite of all that has happen^

CHINA INCIDENT

2°4

and is still happening, the old friendship between our two countries
will emerge unscathed. I think you know how hard I have been
working to that end.

This letter is, as I have emphasized, personal and confidential and
I beg you so to consider it. But you, who are a searcher after truth,
have a right, I think, to know these things.—Very cordially yours,

Joseph C. Grew

LETTER FROM A JAPANESE EXTREMIST
December 4, 1937

The following letter received to-day is significant of the general
feeling here :

[Translation] December 2, 1937

H. E. Joseph Clark Grew,

American Ambassador to Japan

Down with Great Britain !

Due to Great Britain’s instigation, China has assumed a challenging
attitude against Japan and the consequence was the issue of the
present Japan-China conflict. With the progress of military opera¬
tions in China, Hong Kong has now become the centre of anti-
Japanese movements. The Japanese Navy insists that Hong Kong
should be taken possession of by Japan, otherwise the blockading
of the Chinese coast line will be useless.

We hold that Japan should occupy Hong Kong and Singapore
first of all and thereby eliminate the fundamental cause of the Japan-
China conflict. Despite Great Britain’s assistance rendered to China,
Japan has already occupied five provinces in South China, namely
Kiangsu, Chekiang, and Anhwei provinces. A million Japanese
should henceforth be stationed in China for ever with a view to
maintaining peace in East Asia.

Lessons in English in middle and other schools in Japan should
hereafter be lessened. Only those who desire to study English
specially should do so.

The above statements were presented to the Japanese Army and
Navy on November 15.

[Signed]-

(Commander of Japanese Navy Retired)

WE RECEIVE THE NEWS OF THE PAMAY SINKING
December 13, 1937

This was a black day indeed. As Mondays are generally easy
days, owing to the comparative Sunday rest in Washington, we had
planned a golfing day at Takenodai with several foreign colleagues
and others, but as soon as I saw the morning flight of telegrams from
China I gave up all thought of an outing, changed my clothes, and

WE RECEIVE THE NEWS OF THE “PANAY” SINKING

205

went to see Hirota at 11.30. The Japanese military were shelling
the retreating remnants of the Chinese troops fleeing from Nanking
by way of the Yangtze and indiscriminately firing on all ships-,
whether native or foreign, having repeatedly been instructed by
the military command to do so.

The U.S.S. Panay > with members of our Embassy staff, and three
Standard Oil boats bearing American refugees were moving up
river from Nanking and were being followed by shellfire for at least
two miles, according to our information. Shells were falling all
around them. I reminded Hirota of my note of December 1 about
the Panay and gave him all the facts as received by the Embassy,
leaving with him an aide-memoire as well as excerpts from four of
Johnson’s telegrams, in one of which it was made clear that the
Japanese batteries had received orders to fire on all ships indis¬
criminately. I appealed to the Minister to take steps to restrain this
indiscriminate shelling of our ships and pointed out the deplorable
and serious effect which would be caused in the United States if an
incident should occur involving injury to American nationals. Hirota
merely observed that all foreigners had been warned to evacuate
the area of hostilities around Nanking but that he would bring my
representations to the attention of the military authorities. This
action was taken on my own initiative and without instructions and
later 1 was very glad to have done it, if only for the record.

I also took occasion to thank Hirota for the action of the Japanese
Government in sending a cruiser, a destroyer, and a merchant ship
to assist the President Hoover , which went on the rocks off Formosa
and may be a total loss. I also asked permission for the Augusta to
go there too. The Minister said he thought there would be no trouble
about that and that he would let me know if they wanted a formal
note on the subject.

Nothing more appeared until three o’clock, when Alice told me that
Hirota had just telephoned that he was coming to see me at the
Embassy. I said to her at once that if the Minister for Foreign
Affairs was coming in person to the chancery, an unprecedented
step, something terrible had happened, and of course I immediately
thought of the Panay. Hirota was in my office when I got down
there and he at once told me of the reports of the sinking of the Panay
and the Standard Oil ships by bombing by Japanese planes. He
made no effort whatever to pretend that it might have been caused
by Chinese planes and he expressed “ the profound apologies and
regrets ” of the Japanese Government. Hirota seemed as genuinely
moved as any Japanese is capable of registering emotion ; he said,
“ I can’t tell you how badly we feel about this.” I went downstairs
with him and saw him off in his car.

The account of my call on Hirota this morning was cabled to the
Department at noon and I reported Hirota’s call on me at 3 p.m.
The telegram added that both the Navy and War Ministers had
likewise expressed regrets through the respective attaches.

206 china incident

In the meantime the Department had cabled me (December iq,
11.45 p.m.—received at the Embassy December 13, 9.15 p.m.),
“ triple priority,” that reports of the incident had been received
from Hankow and directed me to call on the Minister, ask for in¬
formation, request that the Japanese immediately take appropriate
action, and impress upon Hirota the gravity of the situation and the
imperative need to take every precaution against further attacks on
American vessels or personnel. I replied at 9.45 p.m. that the
Department’s instructions had been anticipated and acted upon this
morning ; that we had as yet received no word of the sinking of the
Panay from American official sources, and that as the Department’s
telegram had taken nine hours in transmission I suggested that all
urgent messages be sent by radio instead of by cable via Manila and
' Shanghai.

At first a press ban was placed on the publication of the news in
Japan, but this was shortly withdrawn and the Foreign Office gave
out an official statement implying that the Panay and the Standard
Oil ships were mixed up with a lot of Chinese ships conveying the
fleeing remnants of the Chinese forces in Nanking and that the
incident was therefore purely accidental. Morin of the A.P., Thomp¬
son of the U.P., and Fleisher of the New York Herald Tribune all came
in to find out what we knew. I told them, off the record, that I had
been working for five years to build up Japanese-American friend¬
ship and that this incident seemed to me to risk shattering the whole
structure. Indeed, at the moment, I seriously feared a breach of
relations and already began to plan the details of hurried packing
in case we had to leave—precisely as we began to pack in Berlin after
the sinking of the Lusitania in *1915. I could not then foresee whether
the patience of the American Government and people would stand
the strain of this apparently gratuitous, if not intentional, insult.

AFTER THE PANAY SINKING
December 20, 1937

Once again the diary has fallen badly behind and I find it difficult
in these days of stress and strain to keep it up to date. We have
been working very hard, night and day and Sundays, and the crisis
arising .from the incident of the Panay has tended to exacerbate our
nerves and feelings. That incident does seem really incredible.
War never is and never can be a humane pursuit, but the action of
the Japanese naval and military elements first in bombing the Panay
and then in machine-gunning at close range and attempting to
exterminate the wounded and other survivors even after they had
crawled into the thicket on the shore is almost past comprehension.

Hitherto the Japanese have pleaded “ poor visibility ” and error
as an excuse for their various air bombings of non-military objectives,
including hospitals, missionary institutions, and universities, but no
such plea can be advanced with any weight in the case of the Panay .

after the “panay” SINKING 20 y

It looks very much as if, having sunk the ship by bombing from a
height, either knowing or not knowing that it was an American gun¬
boat (although the American flag was clearly painted or stretched on
the awnings), the planes dived low and Army launches approached
to machine-gun the survivors. There could then have been no
possibility whatsoever of failure to see the American flag. It looks
very much as if the intention was to exterminate the witnesses to the
original bombing. We hear on good authority that at least the
military, and probably the Navy too, had given orders that every
boat on the Yangtze was to be attacked, although they had been
definitely informed and knew very well that our ships were there—
knew, in fact, their precise positions.

My first thought was that this might result in a breach of diplomatic
relations and that Saito would be given his passports and that I would
be recalled, for I “ remembered the Maine” As the details come
out at home and the country begins to realize the incredible brutality
of the attack I still believe that this may happen. It certainly must
happen if further incidents of that kind occur. But the fact that
Hirota called on me immediately in person to express cc the profound
apology and regrets 55 of the Japanese Government, and the Japanese
Navy took similar steps, an unprecedented action, and that no
effort was made to deny responsibility for the bombing, seems for
the moment to have calmed public susceptibilities. In this respect
the Japanese Government was eminently wise. But there is a tend¬
ency in the local press at least to deny the possibility of the machine-
gun attacks; the spokesman of the Foreign Office has done so. Mean¬
while the evidence is being assembled by Admiral Yarnell in Shanghai
and the War Ministry here has sent a special officer to Shanghai
to investigate. An American naval court of investigations will be
held, witnesses heard, and affidavits taken. The Japanese Navy
meanwhile, we learn, has recalled and retired the admiral responsible
for the aeroplane bombing. It is a tense and critical moment.

But never before has the fact that there are “ two Japans 39 been
more clearly emphasized. Ever since the first news of the Panay
disaster came, we have been deluged by delegations, visitors, letters,
and contributions of money—people from all walks of life, from high
officials, doctors, professors, business men down to school children,
trying to express their shame, apologies, and regrets for the action
of their own Navy. One well-dressed Japanese woman stepped
behind a door in the chancery and cut off a big strand of her hair
and gave it to us with a carnation—the old-fashioned gesture of
mourning for the loss of a husband. Another Japanese broke down
and cried at his country’s shame. Wherever we go, people try to
express their apologies. Highly-placed women, the wives of officials,
have called on Alice without the knowledge of their husbands. That
side of the incident, at least, is profoundly touching and shows that
at heart the Japanese are still a chivalrous people.

We cannot yet foresee whither the incident may lead. As the

208

CHINA INCIDENT

details become known at home and Congress and the public become
more and more exacerbated, we may be forced into a breach of
diplomatic relations. But if we can weather the storm, it seems just
possible that the net result of the incident will be to jolt the Japanese
Government into the realization that unless it exerts control over the
Army and Navy, such a breach is inevitable—and they certainly
don’t want that, with all it would imply. The net result may there¬
fore just possibly be salutary. But the question exists, can they exert
control? If repressive measures are taken, another February 26
incident may well occur in Tokyo. The Government itself is between
the devil and the deep sea. We know, however, that the Emperor
himself desires to take a hand in the situation, but will he be per¬
mitted to do so ? Here we have one of the many paradoxes of Japan :
the Army and Navy are the Emperor’s “ children,” faithfully serving
him, subject to his every wish and order—yet arbitrarily taking the
bit in their teeth, running amok, and perpetrating atrocities which
the Emperor himself cannot possibly desire or sanction.

The British are in the same boat with us, for their ships on the
Yangtze have also been attacked and Englishmen killed.

EMBASSY STATEMENT TO JAPAN’S INVESTIGATORS
OF THE PANAT SINKING

December 22, 1937

Landon’s letter promising the President his support in matters
of foreign policy is published. I only wish that certain others would
board the same boat, but I should guess that their advocacy of our
scrapping our interests, national dignity, and prestige—if not our
national honour—in the Far East does not represent a majority of
American opinion. I should not think that the G.O.P. could make
much political capital out of the administration’s policy and action
in this part of the world.

To-day’s conference at the Embassy with Admiral Yamamoto and
other officers concerning the Panay incident took place in my study,
with the floor strewn with maps, and the group sitting around in a
circle included the Vice-Minister of the Navy, Admiral Yamamoto,
Commander Takada, Colonel Shibayama, Lieutenant-Colonel Nishi,
Mr. Yoshizawa, Mr. Dooman, Captain Bemis, our new Naval
Attach^, and Major Creswell, our new Military Attache, and it
lasted for more than three hours. We were all impressed with the
apparently genuine desire and efforts of both Army and Navy to
get at the undistorted facts, but for a good many reasons this has
not been easy. I closed the conference with the following remarks :

May I make a very brief statement ? Do these officers under¬
stand English? [The Ambassador was told by the interpreter
that the officers did understand English and that interpretation
was unnecessary.]

EMBASSY STATEMENT OF THE te PAN AY ” SINKING

209

I appreciate very much your coming here to-day and your
telling me all that you have told me. I appreciate the efforts which
have been made to get at the facts of this whole incident, and I
appreciate also the direct reports of Commander Takada and
Lieutenant-Colonel Nishi, which I have listened to with great
interest. There is being held a board of inquiry, a Naval Court
of Inquiry, by our Commander-in-Chief in Shanghai, Admiral
Yarnell. I have not yet received the findings of that court, nor
have I received the final report of the evidence which that court
has gathered. I know that it has been hearing witnesses of the
incident, among others the survivors, and has gone into the matter
as fully as possible. I hope shortly to have that report. I have,
however, received some of the evidence, and that evidence as
gathered by our Court of Inquiry coincides with many of the
facts presented by these two officers to-day, but that evidence
does not coincide with their evidence in all respects and there
are still certain discrepancies. A good deal has been said about
rumours. I am perfecdy ready to grant that some rumours have
been passed around which may not have substantial basis, but I
also think the final evidence will show that some of these rumours
are based on fact.

Now to go back I will just tell you very briefly the attitude of
our Government—what we Have done.

I first took up the matter the first of December, telling the Foreign
Minister about the fact that the Panay was there and that members
of our Embassy would be on board and asked that measures be
taken to avoid jeopardizing the ship. Then on the morning
of the 13th at 11.30, having received reports from Nanking and
Shanghai that shells were falling around the Panay , I called on
the Minister for Foreign Affairs and told him of these reports and
asked that measures be taken to avoid jeopardizing American life
and property. At 3 o’clock the same day Mr. Hirota came to
see me, informed me of the incident of the bombing of the Panay ,
and expressed deep apologies and the regret of the Japanese
Government, and the War and Navy Ministers did the same.

Subsequent expressions which have been conveyed to me from
Japanese people in all walks of life, who have come to see me or
who have written letters, have gone a long way to calm the feel¬
ings of the American people, which were deeply stirred by the
incident. On the 14th I received instructions to present a note
setting forth the attitude of my Government and at 4 o’clock
I asked for an appointment with the Foreign Minister, who was
occupied. I was unable to see him until 8.30 o’clock, when I
presented the note.

In the meantime, at 5 o’clock, Mr. Yoshizawa brought me the
Japanese note which was responsive to some of the points in our
note but not to all the points, so we are still awaiting a further
communication.

210 CHINA INCIDENT

On the 17th we had information which indicated that the
incident was even more serious than we first thought because
evidence was coming in from Shanghai and the most important
piece of evidence was that after the ship had been bombed it was
machine-gunned at close range, as well as the survivors who were
taking refuge in the reeds. At least one aeroplane came down
low and machine-gunned them. There was also the statement
made that the Panay was machine-gunned by Army launches.
These statements added to others presented to the Shanghai Court
of Inquiry made the incident appear very much worse than we had
first thought.

That is the situation at present. My Government does not want
to enter into controversy with the Japanese Government over the
details because such controversy would tend merely to obscure
the main issues and on those issues the substantial facts are clear
and undisputed and about them there can be no doubt what¬
soever. There can be no doubt that our ships were on the river
by right; that the fact that they were there and their approxi¬
mate location were known by the Japanese military authorities;
the ships were clearly marked with American flags both in vertical
•and horizontal positions ; the ships were bombed by Japanese
naval planes at low altitude ; they were approached by Japanese
surface crafts, fired upon, and the Panay was boarded but had
already been abandoned; and the survivors were machine-
gunned by Japanese planes ; there can be no doubt but that the
Japanese armed forces have committed offences which have fully
warranted the representations made by our Government and for
our expectations that full amends will be made.

I should like to say once again that I appreciate very much the
apologies that have been made, the expressions of regret, the
efforts to get at the facts, the reports that have been made to me,
and the assurance as to indemnities. I think that the most important
thing, however, is that the most drastic measures shall be taken
to make it utterly impossible for this sort of thing to happen again.
I am terribly afraid that another similar incident would bring about
the most serious results. So now the next step is that we shall await
a reply to our formal note as well as the findings and evidence of
the Court of Inquiry in Shanghai, and after that we shall be able
to see our way clear.

THE PANAY INCIDENT IS CLOSED
December 26, 1937

This was an eminently happy day and it showed that wisdom and
good sense of two Governments s which refused to be stampeded into
potential war in spite of the tendency of the one side to “ save face ”
at almost all costs, and in spite of an outrageous affront offered to

THE “PANAY” INCIDENT IS CLOSED 211

the other. The Japanese Government had expressed the most abject
apologies for the sinking of the Panay and we, without a moment’s
delay, accepted those apologies. I thought that our Government’s
note was a masterpiece; we had observed with satisfaction the
promptness with which the Japanese Government had admitted
responsibility, expressed regret, and offered amends; we accept the
Japanese action as responsive to our requests and expectations; we
each reply on our own evidence and conclusions as to the details; we
express the earnest hope that the steps taken by the Japanese Govern¬
ment will prove effective towards preventing any further attacks or
unlawful interference by Japanese authorities or forces with American
nationals, interests, or property in China.

Equally masterly was the Japanese arrangement that its note
should get to Washington on Christmas Eve and should be dealt
with by our Government on Christmas Day (our reply was dis¬
patched from Washington at 3 o’clock on Christmas afternoon). The
Japanese could hardly have failed to realize that the Christmas spirit
is strong in our country and that the thought 46 Peace on earth, good¬
will towards men ” must inevitably colour and influence our decision.
Anyway, I was so profoundly happy at the outcome that when I
called on Hirota at noon I entered his room wreathed in smiles (a
very different attitude from my call on him on December 17) and
told him that I brought good news. When I had finished reading
our note to him, his eyes were really filled with tears and he showed
as much emotion as any Japanese is capable of showing ,* he said :
44 1 heartily thank your Government and you yourself for this decision.
I am very, very happy. You have brought me a splendid Christmas
present.” I think his relief must have been tremendous, as was mine.
We have, for the moment, safely passed a difficult, a very difficult,
hurdle.

Yet I cannot look into the future with any feeling of serenity. Other
hurdles, perhaps even more difficult ones, are almost certain to
present themselves, and the patience of the American people is not
inexhaustible. War between Japan and the United States will not
come through mere interference with or even destruction of our
tangible interests in China, or yet from the breach of treaty rights,
or die breaking down of principles for which we stand, but war may
very easily come from some further act in derogation of American
sovereignty or from an accumulation of open affronts. Therein lies
the danger, and it is a real danger which no one with knowledge of
the irresponsibility of the Japanese military as distinguished from the
Japanese Government can eliminate from the future picture. I left
the Minister’s house realizing only too clearly that our satisfaction
at the settlement of the Panay incident may be but temporary and
that the rock upon which for five years I have been trying to build
a substantial edifice of Japanese-American relations has broken down
into treacherous sand.

212

CHINA INCIDENT

LETTERS AND POEMS FROM JAPAN’S TEACHERS
AND CHILDREN

Dear Sirs,—I hasten to offer you my profound sympathy for the
great grief that has fallen upon the great battleship, and also for your
countrymen.

News has rendered me of the disastrous accident and you cannot
know how enraptured in sorrow we Japanese are.

You must know that we had not the slightest intention to do harm,
and the great damage done came from pure accident.

Please be kind enough to extend our heartfelt sympathy and con¬
dolence to the bereaved family, who had lost their dear ones.

I wish you to accept this humble mourning song which I have
written in Japanese.

When the Chinese conflict occurred my brother was killed at
Tsushu, in a village between Peking and Tsienting. He was staying
at Kinsuiro Hotel when the protective military force there suddenly
fired to us Japanese who were all unarmed.

We could not get dispatches concerning, whether he was alive or
not for several months.

The anxiety which overtook us made our hearts in great grief.

Friends—unknown—from across the oceans gave us words of courage
and people offered services who were near us.

It was all a great comfort to me in my unhappiness to receive kind
words.

Though our situation is very difficult, I deeply express my heartfelt
sympathy and condolence.

My best wishes to all friends of the United States of America.

Yours cordially,

IN MEMORY OF THE ILL-FATED CRAFT PAN AY
AND HER CREW

(A Japanese poem by-)

Beguiled by the rough mischievous waves
And amid the din and turmoil of the battle ,

The heroes of the air , eager to chase the feeing foe.

Bombed , alas! by mistake , a ship not of the enemy ,

But of the friendly neighbour country , which sank with a few sailors aboard .
The source of the nation-wide grief which knows no bounds ,

That fatal missile was .

(Note.—The original with play upon words defies a literal transla¬
tion into any alien language. The above version is a mere repre¬
sentation of the meaning the poem conveys,—Translator Mogami.)

JAPAN BEGINS TO SEE WHAT THE CHINA INCIDENT IMPLIES 213

[Translation]

Tokyo, December 12, 1937

His Excellency

American Ambassador

My dear Ambassador, —The Japanese air force has dropped bombs
by mistake on a man-of-war of your country, the United States of
America ! I was taken aback at being told so by m amm a. Indeed,
I was dumbfounded at the news. I am sure that the mistake was due
to a dense mist that hung over the river. There can be no reason
why the Japanese air force would have aimed at an American man-
of-war in dropping bombs if the airmen had been aware that it
was an American ship. My great concern is that the mis hap may
have caused some casualties among the officers and sailors on board
the ship, and I hope that nobody was injured in the unhappy
accident.

My dear Ambassador, I sincerely wish that you would not take
the matter so seriously but be generous enough to forgive the Japanese
Navy airmen, who are not to be blamed after all. It is my sincere
wish that I may be allowed to apologize to you for the grave mistake
of the Japanese air force. I like your country so much. “ Banzai ”
for America ! “ Sayonara.”

Fifth year class,

Moriyama Primary School,
Setagaya-ku, Tokyo

JAPAN BEGINS TO SEE WHAT THE CHINA
INCIDENT IMPLIES

February 10, 1938

The year opened on an ominous note, for although in the true
Christmas and Christian spirit which applies so seldom to interna¬
tional affairs, and with admirable good sense on the part of the
American Government and people, the Panay incident had been
provisionally settled, nevertheless the future outlook for further
dangerous incidents was anything but serene. On the one hand, the
ability of the Tokyo Government to control the action of the Japanese
forces in China in jeopardizing American life, interests, and property
is negative. On the other hand, I cannot conceive that with all our
pacifist tendencies and longing for peace the patience of our people
under cumulative insult is inexhaustible.

Granted the accuracy of those two premises, there seems to be
plenty of ground for concern and very little ground for assurance.
My own concern can perhaps best be illustrated by the fact that I
have lately measured the bound volumes of this diary and of my
personal letters since coming to Japan five and a half years ago and
have ordered two or three leather containers in the shape of book

214 CHINA INCIDENT

suit-cases so that the diaries can be packed at a moment’s notice and
easily transported by hand to the ship in case we have to leave Japan
suddenly. I do not think that such a contingency is by any means
unlikely.

Hardly had the reverberations of the Panay incident begun to die
down when news came of the utter ruthlessness of the invading
Japanese forces in Nanking and their wanton violation of American
rights, including the looting of American homes and the desecration
of the American flag, which, in numerous cases, was torn down,
burned, and otherwise mutilated. Chinese were apparently murdered
more or less indiscriminately, while many Chinese women were
raped. Of course the Japanese have an answer for everything. With
regard to the desecration of the American flag they say that the
Chinese were themselves using it to protect their property, but that
does not explain why no attention was paid to the certificates in the
Japanese language signed by our Consul-General and posted on
bona fide American property. As for the cases of rape, they say that
hundreds of professional Chinese women had fled from the public
houses of prostitution and that the soldiers were merely bringing
them back to carry on their usual commerce, and, anyway, that the
reports which we had received came through missionaries who were
merely quoting their Chinese employees and had not themselves
witnessed the incidents of which they complained,

I was told that what the Japanese really wanted was that the
Chinese families and shopkeepers who had fled should return and
settle down peacefully to their customary occupations, but ' my
informant was somewhat at a loss for a reply to my observation
that in the face of the reports of wholesale executions, murders, and
cases of rape it was perhaps not surprising that the Chinese inhabi¬
tants, especially those who had daughters, should be a little chary
about returning. In fact, my informant went so far as to say that
he could understand their attitude.

JAPAN OPPOSES BRITAIN AND APPRAISES AMERICA
March 31, 1938

Life to us in the Embassy under present circumstances represents
a cinder track with a series of hurdles. There is a good deal of satis¬
faction as each is surmounted, but we do not'delude ourselves by
supposing that the final hurdle will ever be reached. New ones are
constantly appearing. Under ordinary conditions these hurdles
would be far more difficult than they are, simply because the Japanese
Government at present has the urge to avoid unnecessary friction
with our Government and people ; it knows that it has and will
probably continue to have plenty of trouble on its hands and it is
not deliberately courting more trouble than the military machine
presents it with. We therefore enjoy at present a certain degree of

JAPAN OPPOSES BRITAIN AND APPRAISES AMERICA 215

leverage in our diplomatic negotiations, arising out of the desire
of the Japanese Government to keep Japanese-American relations
on an even keel.

No sentiment is involved in this attitude ; far from it. The urge
is purely common political sense. They know that they are bound
to antagonize Great Britain constantly and progressively; in fact,
one of the things they are, without public announcement, fighting
for is to supersede British interests in China, gradually perhaps, but
none the less surely in the long run. The last thing they want is to
stir up the United States to a point of irritation where we will make
common cause to the extent of an active united front with Great
Britain in the Far East. They don’t think we will do this because
they believe the pacifist and isolationist sentiment in America is too
strong to permit it, but they, the Government, are taking no chances
more than the military machine obliges them to take. To that situa¬
tion I attribute the settlement of most of our troubles as they arise,
and there is every possibility that this situation will continue. So
while this cannot by any stretch of the imagination be called an easy
post under present conditions, nevertheless it might be a great deal
more difficult if we didn’t enjoy the leverage just mentioned. Our
diplomatic successes, if such they can be called, are due to this
situation plus the very sensible attitude of our own Government
in handling the various issues that arise.

The domestic political situation in Japan has been far from serene.
The Government has been badly* heckled in the Diet by the political
parties, and the National Mobilization Bill and Electric Power
Control Bill, which smack considerably of Fascist regimentation,
have aroused a great deal of opposition. But the Government will
in the end have its way in the Diet, as usual. There also appears to
be a difference of opinion within the Government itself as to the
strategy of the campaign in China : one school of thought believes
in pushing through to Hankow and bringing the warfare to an end
by sheer military force ; the other school favours less drastic methods
and prefers to consolidate the ground already occupied, relying on
time and economic and financial strain to bring the Chinese Govern¬
ment to terms. Strange to say, it is understood to be the civilian
element, led by the Prime Minister and Hirota, which prefers the
former method, while the Army leaders favour the latter on the
ground that insufficient troops are available to conquer and hold a
greater extent of territory.

At the end of March there is no indication of a march on Hankow.
Japanese forces are “ mopping up ” in Shantung and Shansi and
according to the radio news reports from abroad they are not having
too easy a time of it. In fact, recent reports come in of Chinese
victories. Of course no word of any Japanese setbacks is ever allowed
to appear in the local press, but when we read that the Japanese
have occupied a certain town, and when several weeks later we again
read that the same town has been occupied, it is not difficult to

CHINA INCIDENT

2l6

draw conclusions. Coloured pins on the wall-map in the office of
the Military Attach^ show fairly clearly what is happening.

Meanwhile we have the Anschluss , apprehension in Czechoslovakia,
marked progress by Franco in Spain, the Anglo-Italian conversa¬
tions, Chamberlain sitting on the fence. Maybe his policy has
relieved the imminent danger of war, but viewing the arena from
afar I can see little ground for optimism for the future. Everyone,
especially Great Britain and Germany, is simply getting ready once
again for Der Tag . As for the Anschluss , those of us who sentimentally
loved our old gerniitliche Wien deplore the thought of the Nazification
of that lovely city and that once smiling, happy land. Can anyone
under the Nazi system be really happy ?

MEMORIES OF PADEREWSKI

May 15, 1938

An incident in the Paderewski film shown recently reminded me
of a very similar incident in my own relations with the maestro. I
first knew Paderewski by name when I was a child, because his name
(of course wrongly pronounced) was then a household word in
America as the greatest living pianist; Alice remembers seeing him
at the Hotel Brunswick in Boston and being impressed by his aureole
of then golden hair. My first personal contact with him was during
the war in 1917 and 1918, when I was Chief of Western Europe
in the Department and had charge of controlling the relief funds
which Americans wanted to send to their friends or co-religionists
in the enemy countries. Of course these had to be restricted to a
minimum in order to avoid giving 44 help and comfort ” to the
enemy.

Paderewski used to come down with money for the Poles in Germany,
generally comparatively small sums of fifty or sixty thousand dollars;
he would plead as only a man like Paderewski could plead, with the
tears running down his face. The Poles had the ideal attorney to
plead their case.

My next contact with Paderewski was at the Peace Conference, when
again I heard him plead for the Poles, but this time for their political
independence, and again he was successful. Later he became the
first Prime Minister of Poland, the perfect figurehead for the new
nation, but in that capacity he was hot successful, for his great heart
was not adapted to the political arena ; he couldn’t get on with
Pilsudski and resigned at the end of 1919.

Then in 1924, when Minister to Switzerland, I went down with
Alice to Paderewski’s annual birthday party at Morges. Generally
he had fireworks, but it rained that evening and supper was served
inside. When the champagne was passed I proposed the birthday
toast, making a little speech about how greatly the maestro was
beloved in America and then said that I had known him as a great
patriot, a great philanthropist, and a great orator but had never

FIRST INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GENERAL UGAKI 217

known him as a musician because, while he played chiefly in America,
our life had been lived abroad and we had therefore always missed
his concerts. Paderewski got up to reply, with the tears as usual
coursing down his cheeks in emotion at my little tribute; he called
his wife over and said to her : “ The very next evening when we
are free we are going to invite Mr. and Mrs. Grew to spend
the evening with us alone and I shall play for them all the
evening ! 99

That was a wonderful thought and I’m sure he meant it at the
time. But soon afterwards I was transferred to Washington as Under
Secretary of State and had to leave before the promised evening
at Morges materialized. Then our eldest daughter, Edith, died,
and Alice, after closing the house in Berne, sailed for home with
the other girls—a sorrowful voyage. The night before their arrival
I went down to New York and, seeing in the paper that Paderewski
had also arrived and was giving a recital in Carnegie Hall that
evening, I took a single seat. At the end of the recitsd I moved up
under the piano just as the couple in the film Moonlight Sonata did,
to hear the encores. Paderewski saw me there; he must have
known of our bereavement; perhaps he remembered his promise.
At any rate he played encores for the better part of an hour—and
he played them to me. That was an evening that I can never forget.

FIRST INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
GENERAL UGAKI

May 31, 1938

General Ugaki, 1 the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, received
the diplomatic chiefs of mission individually to-day. Apparently
without knowledge of English, he spoke through an interpreter.

He said that he desired to do his utmost to develop good relations
with the United States, adding that having had no experience in
diplomacy he is unused to the intricacies of that profession and that
therefore he will always speak frankly. I replied that with thirty-
four years of experience in diplomacy I had become steadily more
convinced of the stupidity of indirection and that he could always
count on complete frankness from me in our relations. We had
therefore mutually arrived at the same conception by different
roads.

I said that it would be helpful if I might report to my government
about his attitude towards the protection of American interests in
China. The Minister replied definitely that he would guarantee
the protection of American interests in China and that if questions
should arise in connection therewith he wished me to inform him
of them.

1 An officer of liberal leanings who, when later the Emperor chose him as Prime
Minister and directed him to form a cabinet, failed to do so because the Army
regarded him as too liberal and refused to nominate a Minister of War.

2l8

CHINA INCIDENT

WHY FOREIGN MINISTER HIROTA LOST HIS JOB
July 21,1938

A prominent member of the Japanese Government, speaking with
full knowledge of the situation, has given the following picture of
the purposes of the recent change in the cabinet and the intentions
of the Government as they shape up at present. Prince Konoye
and other members of the Government realized that if progress were
to be made in consolidating Japan’s position in China and in avoid¬
ing serious friction with Great Britain and the United States the
conduct of everything except purely military affairs must be taken
out of the hands of the Army and lodged in the civil part of the
Government. Hirota had fallen because he was too weak in opposing
the Army while at the same time insisting that the Foreign Office
has control of Japan’s foreign relations in China. This the Army
would not tolerate, and it was for this reason that they were now
setting up the so-called “ China Organ 55 to deal exclusively with
questions relating to China.

General Ugaki and Finance Minister Ikeda had accepted office
only on condition that political and economic affairs in China
should be taken out of the hands of the military, and this explains
the appointment of General Itagaki as Minister of War, because
he has the confidence of the younger officers in the Army and at
the same time believes that the Army should stay out of politics
and should limit itself to its duties as an efficient fighting machine.
Both Ugaki and Ikeda realize that the solution of Japan’s problem
in China will be impossible unless good relations are maintained
with Great Britain and the United States and Ugaki therefore pro¬
poses to do everything possible to see that their respective interests
are protected. Obviously it is not going to be easy to take these
matters out of the hands of the military and to persuade them to
follow policies laid down by the civil elements in the Government,
and whether they can succeed is an open question. At the same time
the purpose of setting up the North China Development Company
and the Central China Renovation Company is to take economic
affairs in China out of the hands of the Army. In all these questions
“ the Big Five ” see eye to eye. The foregoing statement of the
Government’s position “ came straight from the horse’s mouth ”
and is considered entirely reliable.

THE CHINA INCIDENT BECOMES THE CHINA WAR
July 1, 1938

June brought chiefly the fearful bombings of Canton and Japanese,
preparations to advance on Hankow, which had to be materially
altered owing to the cutting of the dikes by the Chinese and the

THE CHINA INCIDENT BECOMES THE CHINA WAR

219

consequent floods. Furthermore, the remodelling of the Japanese
cabinet.

The bombings of Canton have been one of the worst episodes in
modern warfare and added to the appalling atrocities in Nanking
have blemished the Japanese escutcheon in a way which has given
foreign nations a new conception of the traditional Bushido and honour
of Japan. Japan's reputation can never recover from these things.

Following the bombings of Canton, the British and French Am -
bassadors and the Apostolic Delegate made formal representations
to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. We chose a different method and
expressed our well-justified denunciation at home through public
statements by the Secretary and the Under-Secretary of State. On
June 9 I took the occasion of my call on Horinouchi, the Japanese
Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, in connection with the Scovell case
(an American missionary shot by a drunken Japanese soldier) to say
that I wished to speak informally with regard to the bombing by
Japanese forces of civilian populations in China. I said distinctly
that I was not making official representations and that in fact I had
no instructions to do so, and that I was acting on my own initiative
and from the point of view of Japanese-American relations. I said
that having worked steadily during the past six years for the main¬
tenance and development of good relations between our two countries
I always felt constrained to point out to the Japanese Government,
at least informally, issues and developments which in my opinion
were likely to injure these relations.

I said that I did not wish to-day to go into the technical aspects
of these bombing operations or of fortified or unfortified areas. What
I did wish to do was to point out the deplorable effect on American
public opinion when large numbers of civilian populations were
killed or injured by large bombing operations anywhere and to raise
the question whether the military advantage to be gained from such
operations was sufficiently important to justify the inevitable harm
such wholesale slaughter must have on Japan's reputation abroad,
especially in the United States. I said that this seemed to me to be
an aspect of the problem which chiefly concerned the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, responsible as that Ministry is for Japan's foreign
relations. It seemed to me of the utmost importance that the Japanese
Government should constantly bear in mind the deep humanitarian
interest of the American Government and of the American people in
the bombings of civilian populations wherever and however carried
out.

The Vice-Minister expressed appreciation of the friendly way in
which I had approached the subject and said that General Ugaki
would be equally appreciative. He said that full consideration
would be given to my observations and that in fact the Foreign
Minister was now negotiating with the military authorities in con¬
nection with this problem.

This method of approach seems to have carried some weight. At

220

CHINA INCIDENT

any rate, we later heard that the Government had sent a liaison
officer to the front to try to control these indiscriminate bombing
operations, and we were told from various sources (it was even being
discussed at the Tokyo Club) that it was our representations, on
account of the method used, that had impressed the Government,
The Japanese, with all their military ruthlessness, are a sensitive
people and there can be no doubt that methods of approach
are more important here than in any Western country. These
things have to be learned by experience, long experience. Table¬
thumping is absolutely useless here and would defeat its own object.

We have analysed the changes in the cabinet. They indicate a
realization that Japan is in for a long pull, and for the first time
since the beginning of the hostilities a war-time psychology and
economy are being created which remind us of the old war days in
Germany. Food is not yet much interfered with but many materials
are now to be taboo to the public, including leather, so that shoes will
no longer be made and the people will be encouraged to return to
the old wooden geta. At last they are really digging in. Golf balls,
being made of rubber, are prohibited, and I foresee a dwindling if
not a termination of golf in the not distant future, with probably all
or most of the courses eventually closed. That, if anything, will bring
home to many Japanese that their country is really at war,

JAPAN AND RUSSIA CLASH, BUT AVOID WAR
August i, 1938

The chief development in July was the Soviet-Japanese fracas at
Changkufeng on the Soviet-Manchukuo border, in which the Soviet
forces occupied a strategic hill in disputed territory and, according to
local reports, the Japanese drove them back again with considerable
casualties on both sides. Similar incidents have been occurring in
that general region periodically during the past six years, ever since
we came to Japan, but this particular incident seems to have been
more serious than usual and reminded us of the trouble over the
islands in the Amur River last year, when the Japanese appeared to
be trying out the Soviet strength. In the present case it may be that
the Russians were testing the Japanese strength and determination,
or they may have staged the incident in order to draw Japanese
troops, away from the drive on Hankow, with a view to co-operating
with the Chinese. If this was their purpose, they seem to have been
at least partially successful, for considerable troop movements to the
north are reported, and Japan can now hardly afford to omit pre¬
paration for any eventuality in that area.

Being convinced that the Soviets do not want war with Japan at
present, and equally convinced that the Japanese cannot now afford
any such venture, I was not greatly perturbed by the incident and
felt from the beginning that it would be localized. General Ott, the
German Ambassador, who has close relations with the highest Japanese

221

JAPAN ON THE EVE OF MUNICH

military officers, told me that these high officers had said to him
that they want no trouble with Russia at present because they are
far too much occupied in China and that they would therefore not
allow the incident to develop. I knew that Ott would not mislead
me, because our personal relations are of the friendliest, and that
barring unexpected developments the incident would soon be settled.
Fortunately, it was settled, in the shape of an armistice, and while
the germs of conflict are always present there, the probabilities are
that the Changkufeng incident will take its place with the many other
incidents which have caused momentary excitement and then have
petered out.

Otherwise the month has been marked by our constant efforts to
obtain Japanese respect for our various interests in China, with some
slight success, but only slight. I have had three long interviews with
General Ugaki and asked for a fourth appointment, which he could
not grant at the moment, so I saw Horinouchi. The first interview,
which, appropriately, took place on the Fourth of July, lasted for
nearly two hours and a half, and I went over with the Foreign Minister
the entire field of American interests in China. Nothing was left to
chance in that interview and several days were spent in intensive
study of every subject to be discussed so that every wrinkle would
be at my finger-tips. The Minister might well have bridled at some
of the things I said and the forcefulness with which they were said,
and I expected that he would do so. But he didn't. He actually
thanked me for my sympathetic approach to the situation, and this
was after he had been told in no uncertain terms just how the American
Government and people felt about the hostilities in China in general and
their abhorrence of the bombing of civilian populations in particular.

I don’t know whether that conversation will help or not. It may
help, in spots. But unless or until the Japanese have reason to feel
that the United States will do something about it, we can expect
few constructive results. Assurances they will give, in plenty, but
they will always say : “ Be patient; the military situation prevents
fulfilment just now.” The British are in the same boat but in a worse
situation than we are because their interests are far more extensive
than ours and the Japanese are rapidly crowding them out. There are
signs that the British Government is getting pretty well fed up and
wants to show its teeth, but just as long as the Japanese know that Great
Britain cannot afford to fight, on account of her troubles in Europe,
just so long will they continue to snap their fingers in Great Britain's
face—in moderately polite language.

JAPAN ON THE EVE OF MUNICH
September 30, 1938

September 28 was a busy and important day. Europe was trem¬
bling on the brink of war. We gathered around the radio for the
afternoon and evening news from London, Hong Kong, and Sydney

222 CHINA INCIDENT

but received little enlightenment, only reports of general mobilization,
of Chamberlain’s final message to Hitler assuring him that Great
Britain and France would guarantee the obligation undertaken by
Czechoslovakia to surrender the Sudeten territory, and of President
Roosevelt’s second appeal for peace addressed directly to Hitler
himself, a powerful and enlightened document. But, of course, none
of these appeals was allowed to be published in Germany.

I have not lost hope that war will be avoided and unless Hitler
is utterly insane, some agreement may be reached at the eleventh
hour. But that Hitler may be insane I readily grant. Hitler has now
gone so far in his public speeches in Germany that it would be very
difficult to recede without serious loss of prestige.

Then came a triple-priority telegram from Washington instructing
me to see the Foreign Minister, or some other official of the Foreign
Office, and to suggest that Japan follow the President’s initiative in
appealing to Germany and Czechoslovakia for peace. The telegram
was decoded and typed at i, and realizing that minutes might count
in the present crisis I had Dooman take it over to the Foreign Office
and place the message in the hands of a responsible official at 1.05 in
anticipation of my appointment with General Ugaki at 2.50. When '■
I asked for an appointment, Kishi said that both the Minister and
the Vice-Minister were tied up all day and could not receive me,
but I told him that my business was of the utmost importance and
urgency and that I definitely must see the Minister himself; hence
the arrangement. Cabot Coville, a secretary in our Embassy, went
with me to check the interpretation of Tsuchiya of the Foreign
Office ; it was entirely accurate. I opened the conversation by saying
to the Minister that this was a moment of the utmost gravity in the
history of civilization and a moment at which decisions and actions
may fundamentally influence the future course of civilization. The
message of the American Government was then presented both
orally and in an informal paper so that the text would be clear on
the record, accompanied by a written transcription of the text of
the President’s appeal to the Chancellor of the German Reich, the
President of Czechoslovakia, and the Prime Ministers of Great
Britain and France.

After listening to the interpreting of the message into Japanese,
carefully followed by Coville, the Minister replied substantially as
follows : “I would express on behalf of the Japanese Government
full agreement with the action taken by the President of the United
States in the controversy between Germany and Czechoslovakia.
As you are aware, Japan is always desirous of peace, and although
unfortunately engaged at the present time in hostilities in China,
Japan hopes to establish there conditions of peace. We also seek a
peaceful settlement between Germany and Czechoslovakia ; but
there is a question whether action by Japan similar to that taken
by the President would be efficacious. We must give careful considera¬
tion to what action we, in Japan, may best take, from the point of

JAPAN ON THE EVE OF MUNICH 2123

view of our own position. At the same time we firmly share the
convictions expressed by the President. 95

Later in the afternoon Yoshizawa suggested that it might be a
good thing if the Foreign Office were to publish our message and
Ugaki’s reply; I immediately agreed and he obtained Ugaki’s
authorization to do so. I had no authority from the Department
to do this, but the Foreign Office might readily have done so without
inquiring, and, anyway, it would have almost certainly leaked,
perhaps in inaccurate form. Besides, it seemed to me distinctly
useful to have Japan go on public record as approving the President’s
action, even if they could not see their way to take similar action.
As Horinouchi said to Craigie later in the day, the fact that they
themselves were conducting hostilities made it rather embarrassing
for them to appeal to others to avoid hostilities. The Foreign Office
communique was given out at io in the evening ; I was a little dis¬
appointed in its form because it did not go quite so far as Ugaki
had gone with me in expressing approval both of the President’s
attitude and action, subscribing only to his “ wishes, 59 but it was
better than nothing. I guess Kawai, the chauvinistic spokesman,
toned it down after Yoshizawa had drafted it; such things often
happen.

Craigie came to see me at 7.15 and we had a long talk about the
situation.

Then, towards midnight, I was awakened by a message that the
Hamburg American Line had ordered its ships to remain in Japanese
waters, and that the British P. & O. had ordered its ships to leave
Japanese waters within twenty-four hours, an ominous develop¬
ment. This was promptly cabled to Washington, which must be
flooded with similar messages just now.

Dooman, Coville, Valenza, our code clerk, and I spent an hour
or so in the late evening going over the various telegrams I had drafted
and listening to the late radio news in my study. Even after the
midnight call about the ships I couldn’t sleep.

On the 29th Dr. Goodsell, American Congregational missionary,
came in to tell me the result of his interview with the Foreign Minister.
He had expected but five minutes, merely to express his thanks
for the letters Ugaki had given him to Japanese officials in China,
but the Minister kept him for an hour and a half and wanted to
know every last detail of his observations of the way the Japanese
military treated the American missionaries and their establishments.
Goodsell got right down to brass tacks, told the Minister frankly of
atrocities, murder, rape, truculence, cruelty, and left him with a long
list of notes which Goodsell had prepared. The Minister received
it all in good part and forestalled Goodsell’s repeated efforts to give
him a chance to terminate the interview if he wished. For the
Minister for Foreign Affairs to do this on the day before his resignation
was certainly worthy of note. Goodsell actually told Ugaki the story
of the inscription in large Chinese letters on the wall of a town

224 CHINA INCIDENT

adjoining the Marco Polo Bridge where the “ China Incident "
began, which Goodsell himself saw. It read : 64 Birthplace of Peace
in East Asia." The Minister, said Goodsell, loved the story and
chuckled over it.

At luncheon at the Bassompierres’ with many colleagues, the
Vellosos (Brazilian Ambassador), Thurnheers (Swiss Minister), Pabst,
etc., to meet Madame Peltzer, widow of our former Belgian colleague
in Berlin and Berne, who was later in Brazil, there was little note of
optimism about the European crisis. Alice and I stayed around the
radio until about midnight, getting no news of importance because
the Munich conference was not to start till 11 p.m. here, and then
we were up at 6.30 the next morning, the 30th, to find that there
was real hope in the situation. At 10.45 * n morning the welcome
news came through, 44 Agreement reached."

So we fare forth into October in a far happier spirit than has been
ours for many days.

TWO INTERVIEWS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ARITA
November 7, 1938

My initial interview to-day with Mr. Arita, 1 the new Minister for
Foreign Affairs, assumed on his part a negative and therefore unsatis¬
factory character. After the amenities as between two old friends I
referred to the assurances expressed to me by Mr. Arita’s three
predecessors in turn to the effect that the foreign policy of the Japanese
Government would undergo no change during their respective
administrations and that American rights and interests in China
would be respected and the Open Door and equal opportunity
supported. I then inquired whether the new Minister would renew
those assurances.

Mr. Arita replied that when he was formerly Foreign Minister
the attitude of the Japanese people towards the United States was
particularly friendly and that it is still friendly to-day, but that in
the meantime the attitude of the United States towards Japan has
considerably altered due to things that have occurred in China.
He supposed that by reading recent comments in the Japanese press
I must have gleaned some comprehension of the present attitude of
the Japanese people in that connection. The Minister said that in
estimating opinion in his own country he must proceed slowly and
44 with great prudence."

The Minister referred tp the public address of the Prime Minister
on November 3 as an indication of Japanese policy. I immediately
replied that we had carefully studied that address but that portions
of it required interpretation and I asked specifically whether he was
in a position to interpret the following excerpt:

Japan does not reject co-operation with other powers, neither

intends to damage the interests of third powers. If such nations

1 Former Vice-Foreign Minister, Appointed Foreign Minister October 29, 1938.

TWO INTERVIEWS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ARITA 225

understand the true intention of Japan and adopt policies suitable
for the new conditions, Japan does not hesitate to co-operate
with them for the sake of peace in the Orient.

I asked what policies 44 suitable for the new conditions 95 the Prime
Minister had in mind. Mr. Arita replied that he thought it important
that we should have a long talk concerning all these matters and that
he would be better prepared for such a talk after he had been a little
longer in office. He repeated the view that he must proceed slowly
and that the situation is 44 very difficult. 99 I asked whether he would
see me as soon as he returns from reporting at the national shrine at
Ise, whither he proceeds to-night. The Minister replied that he
needed a little more time but hoped that we could have the talk some
time next week.

On my stating that these matters are urgent and that they are so
regarded by my Government, Mr. Arita counselled patience and added
that if we should press for an immediate reply to our note of October 6
he was afraid that the Japanese reply would not be satisfactory. He
repeated and emphasized the word 44 patience."

I thereupon informed the Minister that I must bring specifically
and urgently to his attention the question of free navigation on the
Yangtze River between Shanghai and Hankow, and after vigorous
oral representations I left with him my note of to-day 9 s date. I told
the Minister that my Government would not be satisfied with an
indefinite reply and I pressed him for a favourable answer, including
the naming of an early date for the withdrawal of restrictions on
freedom of navigation on the Yangtze River below Hankow. The
Minister was non-committal.

November 21, 1938

In a long conversation this afternoon with the Minister for Foreign
Affairs I said I felt sure that the Minister would agree with me that
the historical record shows clearly that the United States has never
attempted to 44 exploit " China or to acquire any sphere of influence
whatever in that country. Our desire always has been and is to-day
to avoid spheres of influence and exploitation. Our interpretation
of the Open Door is totally contrary to those principles. With these
remarks the Minister expressed agreement.

I then turned from questions of principle to matters of fact, point¬
ing out that the Minister had asked for patience but that for our part
the patience of the American people is not inexhaustible and that my
Government must listen to public opinion in the United States. I
said that there could be no doubt that owing to Japan 9 s policies and
actions in China there was good reason why the Minister and I
should be disturbed with regard to the developing situation in
Japanese-American relations and that I for my part was more dis¬
turbed than I had been for a long time. I felt that it was of the
utmost importance in stemming this tide that the Japanese Govern-
8

226 CHINA INCIDENT

ment should forthwith take some of the more obvious steps to show
the American Government and people that there is no truth in
the repeated allegations reaching us from various Japanese sources
that all foreign interests are to be gradually turned out of
China.

I said that one obvious step of prime importance would be the
immediate cessation of bombing and otherwise interfering with
American missions and other American property in areas far re¬
moved from military or naval operations. Such unwarrantable acts
are taking place constantly, as daily reports pouring into our Embassy
clearly show. Moreover, the plea that these outrages are accidental
is obviously untenable in view of the volume and constancy of these
depredations, which recently have involved not only the loss of
American property but the loss of American life and the desecration
of our flag.

I also brought out an oral rejoinder to the Japanese note of
November 14 concerning navigation on the Yangtze River.

I furthermore again asked for an interpretation of Prince Konoye’s
observation in his broadcast of November 3 that Japan will co-operate
with foreign nations so long as they understand the true intention
of Japan and adopt policies suitable for the new conditions. I
said I would be glad to learn how this proposed co-operation is
expected to work out in actual practice. For instance, Americans
have continually been told in recent months by Japanese nationals
in China that American trade with China will be tolerated only
if American interests deal through Japanese middlemen. I asked
whether the Minister envisaged such “ co-operation ” in that light
since this practice is progressively being put into effect in China
to-day.

The Minister in reply thanked me for my frankness. He agreed
with me that complete frankness between us was most desirable
even if unpalatable truths had to be expressed* With regard to the
allegation that Americans would in future be expected to deal only
through Japanese middlemen he authorized me to give the Secretary
a categorical denial. He said that Japan desired and intended to
assure for herself certain raw materials, but that there would be a
very large and probably increasing field for American trade and
other enterprise which would be welcomed.

I once again appealed for immediate measures to meet our
desiderata, again emphasizing their great importance in meeting
American public opinion, and the formal part of our conversation
terminated.

I left with the Minister an informal record of my representations,
marked “ oral,” and said that this was in no respect a diplomatic
document but merely an aid to him in accurately recording what I
had said. The Minister expressed appreciation of this procedure
and said that he himself would follow it in his future talks with me.
We agreed that it would be mutually helpful to meet often.

REPLYING TO JAPAN’S OBJECTIONS TO OUR OPEN DOOR POLICY 227

REPLYING TO JAPAN’S OBJECTIONS TO OUR
OPEN DOOR POLICY

(Written Summary of Oral Report made to Foreign Minister Arita and left
with him after our conversation.)

November 21, 1938

I wish to say at the outset that I am very glad that Your Excellency
was good enough to receive Mr. Dooman on Saturday and to explain
at least part of Japan’s point of view regarding the new situation
created in China. I have been apprised of everything that you said
to Mr. Dooman, so, if you wish, we may proceed on the assumption
that I am familiar with that conversation.

I was very glad to note your wish expressed to Mr. Dooman to
have several future conversations with me with a view to smoothing
out so far as possible the present discrepancies between the points
of view of our respective Governments and I shall do my very best
correctly to interpret to my Government Japan’s point of view as it
may be set forth to me from time to time.

On the other hand, you will realize that I must as clearly as possible
set forth the point of view of my own Government because future
adjustments cannot take place unless we understand each other with
complete clarity.

I believe that our conversation to-day will be purely exploratory
and I wish to make clear to you the fact that I am not at this time
attempting any reply to the Japanese note of November 18, because
my Government will need time to study it carefully and in^ detail
and I shall expect to receive my Government’s observations in due
course thereafter.

There are a few points, however, which I would like to bring up
at once.

Your Excellency has discussed the question of the “ exploitation ”
of China and spheres of influence therein. I think you will agree
with me that the historical record shows clearly that the United
^States of America has never attempted to “ exploit ” China or to
acquire any “ sphere of influence ” whatever in that country. Our
desire always has been and is to-day to avoid spheres of influence
and exploitation by or in any one country.

Our interpretation of the Open Door is totally contrary to those
principles. The principle of equality of commercial opportunity
has been a fundamental principle of the foreign policy of the United
States ever since our country came into existence. The treaties
relating to the Far East to which the United States'is a party and in
which provisions relating to that principle appear, were in all in¬
stances concluded with a view to decreasing and avoiding frictions
which had developed in, or which might develop in, international
contacts in that area.

We feel that respect for an observance of those principles and pro-

2558 CHINA INCIDENT

visions will make for peace and general prosperity, whereas contrary
courses would inevitably make for friction and consequences in-
urious to all countries, including those which pursue such courses. The
American Government and people believe with conviction that those
principles and provisions are in the interests of all concerned.

My Government is anxious to take steps to arrest the present trend
towards international anarchy and to contribute towards an improve¬
ment of international relations and restoration of international
order. The adjustment of problems in international relations by
peaceful negotiation and agreement and the faithful observance of
international agreements are advocated by my Government.

My Government has pursued a trade policy whose object is to
induce the removal and reduction of restrictions upon the exchange of
goods in international trade in the belief that living standards would
be raised and enriched and more harmonious relations promoted
among nations as a result of a normal expansion of foreign commerce.

The principle of equality of commercial opportunity has always
been the belief and guiding principle of the people and the Govern¬
ment of the United States, and American opinion believes it to be
incompatible with the establishment and maintenance of American
and world prosperity that any country should endeavour to establish
a preferred position for itself in another country.

My Government also feels that no one Government can properly
expect throughout an extensive and important area of the world to
make its wishes and its will conclusive and exclusive, and that what¬
ever may be the motives, the attempt on the part of any Government
to do that will inevitably result in injuries to its own country and
itself and to other countries.

In my last talk with Your Excellency I asked for an interpretation
of Prince Konoye’s observation on November 3, that Japan will
go -operate with foreign nations so long as they understand the true
intention of Japan and adopt policies suitable for the new conditions.

I would be very glad to learn how this proposed co-operation is
expected to work out in actual practice. For instance, Americans
have constantly been told in recent months by Japanese nationals in
China that American trade with China will be tolerated only if
American interests deal through Japanese middlemen. Do you
envisage such “ co-operation ” in that light ? This practice is pro¬
gressively being put into effect in China to-day.

Your Excellency has asked for patience on the part of the American
Government, but it is obviously my duty to point out that whatever
the attitude of the American Government the patience of the American
people is not inexhaustible, and my Government is obliged to listen
to public opinion in the United States.

There can be no doubt that owing to Japan*s actions and policies
in China there is good reason why both you and I should be disturbed
with regard to the developing situation in Japanese-American relations.
For my part I am more disturbed at present than I have been for a

THE KERNEL OF DIPLOMACY

229

long time, and it seems to me that whatever may result from our
future conversations and negotiations Japan should now without
further delay proceed to take the obvious steps to prevent those
relations from steadily deteriorating.

One of the first steps would be to open up the lower stretches of
the Yangtze River to American shipping and commerce. We know
as a fact that, quite apart from provisioning the Japanese forces,
Japanese trade is proceeding both up and down the river at the
present time in regular and openly advertised commerce, so that
we are totally unable to accept the reasons advanced by the Japanese
Government for preventing such American trade.

My Government takes note of the recent assurance that the Japanese
Government has no intention whatever to hinder wilfully navigation
and commerce on the Yangtze River, and that the Japanese Govern¬
ment is now engaged in particular efforts in order to bring about at
the earliest possible moment a return of normal conditions ; but at the
same time die American Government is of the opinion that with every
day’s delay in rectifying the present state of affairs the seriousness of
this discrimination against foreign rights and interests is intensified.

Another obvious step of prime importance on the part of the
Japanese authorities would be forthwith to cease the bombings of,
and other interference with, American mission and other property
in areas far removed from military or naval operations. Such un¬
warrantable acts are taking place constandy, the reports of which
are daily pouring into our Embassy. The plea that these outrages
are accidental is obviously untenable in view of the volume and
constancy of these depredations which recendy have involved not
only the loss of American property but the loss of American life and
the desecration of our flag.

Other points brought forth in our note and in the Japanese reply
of November 18 I shall reserve for future discussion.

THE KERNEL OF DIPLOMACY

(From an Address delivered at the Farewell Dinner of the America-Japan Society
on November 22, 1938, for Mr. Horinouchi, newly appointed Japanese
Ambassador to the United States.)

Here, I think, lies the kernel of diplomacy. It seems to me that a
very minor part of diplomacy is or can be conducted by the written
word. What really counts is the interpretation of the written word
and of the spirit that lies behind it. And above all this, in our present
world, is the tremendous force of public opinion. Written documents
may reflect public opinion but they can never fully and accurately
interpret it or convey the real spirit which prompts the formulation
of those documents.

Here, then, lies the supreme purpose and duty of an ambassador.
He must be, first and foremost, an interpreter, and this function of
interpreting acts both ways. First of all he tries to understand the

230 CHINA INCIDENT

country where he serves—its conditions, its mentality, its actions, and
its underlying motives—and to explain these things clearly to his
own Government. And then, contrariwise, he seeks means of making
known to the Government and the people of the country to which
he is accredited the purposes and hopes and desires of his native
land. He is an agent of mutual adjustment between the ideas and
forces upon which nations act. International friction, indeed, is
often based not so much on radical disagreement as on nebulous
misunderstanding and doubt. How little of all this can be done by
the written word without oral discussion is patent to anyone in our
profession. I remember saying at the welcoming dinner which this
society was good enough to tender to my wife and myself on our
arrival in Japan six and a half years ago that sometimes our language
—indeed, all spoken and written languages—seems thin and super¬
ficial. We have to depend in such cases on a sort of X-ray language
which vibrates underneath the surface and is often more effective
than anything we can write or say. That comes, and comes only,
from personal contacts.

Thus, in effect, an ambassador’s potentialities for creating harm
and danger through misinterpretation are tremendous ; his oppor¬
tunities for constructive good are absolutely incalculable.

AN ITALIAN INFORMANT FORESEES JAPAN’S
NAVAL CHALLENGE

November 27, 1938

In strictest secrecy, I was informed yesterday by a prominent
member of the Italian Embassy who is in close and cordial personal
relations with me, that the Japanese Navy had definitely decided to
declare war, presumably in the near future, as the first step towards
war with Soviet Russia,

My informant emphasized his opinion that he <c wouldn’t give a
nickel for Hong Kong.” His explanation is that the Navy feels
it has been merely a beast of burden for the Army, which has had
all the glory since 1931 ; it is becoming restive in this role and has
decided to take advantage of the present war pitch of the nation
to remove Japan’s opponents in East Asia and so complete her
absolute domination in this sphere. England, as a result of the
lag in her armament programme during the past fifteen years, is
helpless, it is felt. The only fear which has so far deferred the Navy
is what the United States fleet might do, but this has been removed
within the last week since it is evident that the United States is
determined at any cost not to become involved in the Far East.

Although my informant is perhaps prone to exaggeration, the
assumption may be made that he is in a position favourable to access
to information the sources of which are not available to others. My
opinion is that he may reflect the wishful thinking of the younger
naval officers*

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TAKES A HAND

231

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TAKES A HAND
November 30, 1938

In September the emphasis was all on the European crisis. Now,
so far as we are concerned, all has shifted back to Japan, but I am
writing this at the very end of November, and so much has taken
place since then that it is difficult to remember just what took place
in October and what in November. The principal events, of course,
were the fall of Hankow and the fall of Canton. The Japanese
suddenly landed in Bias Bay and pushed on into Canton with
astonishing rapidity, practically unopposed. Of course the Japanese
public assumes that the war is now practically at an end, and care¬
fully regimented lantern parades by way of celebrating took place
in Tokyo for several days. But the authorities have told them that
they have a long way to go still. Of course there is no telling how
long Chiang can hold his forces together, but at least they are still
there, some of them, withdrawn but not annihilated, and so long
as those forces exist at all, I don’t see how Japan can risk weakening
her lines and her forces of occupation.

The most important diplomatic dimarche took place at the very
beginning of October. It began with a long telegram from the
Department, dated October 1, authorizing me in my discretion
to present a long note to the Foreign Office covering pretty much
the whole field of Japanese interference with American interests in
China, including such subjects as the Open Door and equal oppor¬
tunity, monopolies, exchange control, custom tariff, telephone and
telegraph communications, wharves and shipping, trade on the
Yangtze, restrictions on Americans desiring to return to their property,
Japanese interference with railway traffic, censorship of mail and
telegrams, etc. etc.

The text of the telegram, as it was laid on my desk, said that the
President, in the light of the situation herein reviewed, asks that
the Japanese Government forthwith implement its assurances already
given with regard to the Open Door and to non-interference with
American rights by taking prompt measures, and adding that the
Government of the United States believes that in the interest of
relations between the United States and Japan an early reply would
be helpful. I had no reason whatever to doubt that the President
had sent this message. He had done so once before in another
matter, and the importance of the representations now to be made
fully justified, in my opinion, the use and force of his name; in fact,
I recognized at once the important opening which it gave me to ask
for an immediate interview with the Prime Minister, who was still
acting as Minister for Foreign Affairs ad interim but was not yet
receiving the diplomats.

As a matter of fact, the President sent no such message. The word
“ President ” was purely and simply a code garble*

232 CHINA INCIDENT

Nevertheless, I immediately asked for an interview with the Prime
Minister on the ground that I desired to communicate to him a
message from the President of the United States. Of course Prince
Konoye could not refuse, and I was thus able to lay before him as
Prime Minister, without going over the head of any Foreign Minister,
the whole situation that confronts us in China, of which he very
likely had little comprehension. At first they said that the Prime
Minister didn’t have a moment free all day, but I insisted and finally
got a half-hour between 1 and 1.30, just before he went to see the
Emperor on another matter, which was all to the good. In order
to avoid any publicity they sent me the Prime Minister’s own car
with an ordinary licence plate, and I was taken in through the garden
of the residence and up the private stairs at the back of the house
to his office.

Prince Konoye listened to my full oral representations, which I
said would be embodied in a note to be delivered shortly to the
Foreign Office, and as usual I left an informal record of my remarks
for the sake of accuracy. At the end of these representations Prince
Konoye said that he was honoured by the message from the President.
He said that in spite of the change of Foreign Ministers there would
be no change in Japan’s policy towards affairs in China or towards
other nations, and that the assurances already given us concerning
the Open Door and equal opportunity in China would be steadfastly
maintain ed. (Strange that a month later, on November 3, he did
adopt a new policy and went back on all his assurances. So much
for international commitments.)

The Prime Minister said that the military situation in China
might cause delay in meeting all of our desiderata, but he gave explicit
assurances that this delay would be but temporary. He said that
he wished and intended to continue to do everything in his power
to improve relations between Japan and the United States as he
had in the past, and that he highly valued these relations. He also
observed that he was not familiar with many of the points which
I had raised (of course not) but that he would study them. I learned
later that after my talk with him, Prince Konoye had called on the
Foreign Office for a report on each of the points and issues which I
had raised.

In my report to the Department I said that the Department’s
telegram had come at a very favourable moment, and explained
why. It was something of a jolt when three days later another
“ rush ” telegram came from the Department saying that the President
had sent no message whatever. The Department assumed, however,
that its telegram had been received in garbled form, that it would
naturally not wish to impair any advantages which had resulted,
that the matter had been laid before the President and that he had
ratified the use which I had made of his name. I hate to think of
my position if he hadn’t ratified it. But I think that the President
may have had a merry little twinkle in his eye when he heard the

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TAKES A HAND

233

story. As for the Japanese Foreign Office, I believe they still think
there was something suspicious about that interview, especially as
Yoshizawa once said to Dooman in informal talk : “ We can’t quite
make out why the Ambassador’s oral representations were labelled
as from the President, while the supporting note of October 6 did
not mention the President at all ! 55 As for our code clerk who had
accepted the word 45 President ” without further exploration, I said
to him : “ God bless you, but don’t do it again.”

In connection with the note, we made one suggestion to the
Department to the effect that its references to the monopolies in
Manchukuo should be used merely as illustration instead of con¬
veying the possible implication that we were reopening the whole
Manchurian controversy at just the moment when the League of
Nations had invoked against Japan the sanction clause of the Cove¬
nant ; in other words, to make clear that we feared the same things
might happen in North China that had happened in Manchuria.
The Department said that it had meant the comment to be purely
illustrative, authorized the change, and the note was sent in on
October 6. That note has now become a document of world import¬
ance because the other interested nations realized that it involved
a showdown with regard to the Open Door in China, and several of
my colleagues were very complimentary about its contents and
admirable phraseology which was drafted in the Department, not by
me. The Japanese reply, for which the British and the French were
waiting as impatiently as we were, didn’t come in until November.

As early as October 4 I told the Department to be ready for a
move on the part of the Japanese to take Canton prior to the fall
of Hankow. This, of course, would cut off the flow of munitions
into China from Hong Kong.

Much went on during October which I haven’t ti m e to chronicle
here; there were many talks with Craigie, with whom I have con¬
sistently kept in closest touch, and several important talks at the
Foreign Office, besides the usual flood of protests against the bomb¬
ing and other interference with American property in China. When
the day eventually comes to settle these hundreds of claims, there
will be work aplenty. The Nyhus case, wherein an American mission
was bombed by Japanese planes, far from any Chinese military
objective as far as we know, the youngest daughter, Phoebe, killed
and her mother and sister wounded, made me even more sick at
heart than usual, while first-hand accounts, supported by photographs,
of the barbaric behaviour of the Japanese troops fill me with impotent
anger. If we were not surrounded here in Tokyo with gentle Japanese
who deplore these things as much as we do—even more, perhaps,
because it concerns their own country and their own honour—I
should find itjvery difficult to remain at this post. Once in a while
I do break loose and openly express my feelings, to a few of my
Japanese friends. I am sure they think I am being fed with Chinese
propaganda and exaggerated tales because they themselves have no

CHINA INCIDENT

234

access to the facts. Foreign magazines, such as the Reader's Digest ,
are carefully stripped by the censors of all offensive articles before
delivery’, if delivery takes place at all. Until they themselves go
abroad, or talk with Japanese returned from abroad, they have no
sources whatever from which to learn the truth. And the truth is
sickening.

PRESENTING THE PRESIDENT’S BILL OF
PARTICULARS TO JAPAN

(Record of Oral Statement left with Prince Konoye)

October 3, 1938

I am calling on Your Excellency Prince Konoye as Minister for
Foreign Affairs in order briefly to discuss a subject in which the
President of the United States is deeply interested.

Well knowing how busy is Your Excellency, I do not wish to bother
you with too many details, and I shall therefore confine myself to
discussing this subject on general lines and include such details as
are necessary in the form of a note to be delivered later at the Foreign
Office.

The subject to which I refer has to do with the relations between
Japan and the United States, with special consideration of the situa¬
tion of American interests in China.

I have had many conferences on this general subject with former
Ministers, especially Mr. Hirota and General Ugaki, who have
repeatedly given me precise and definite assurances that American
interests in China would be respected and that the principle of the
Open Door and equal opportunity would be steadily maintained.

The American Government to its regret is constrained to observe
that violation of American rights and interests, including violation
of the principle of the Open Door, has nevertheless persisted.

In the light of the situation which I am now reviewing, the President
of the United States asks that the Japanese Government implement
its assurances already given with regard to the maintenance of the
Open Door and to non-interference with American rights by taking
prompt and effective measures to rectify the situation which I am
about to explain.

On April 12, 1938, I asked the Foreign Minister for assurances
that the Japanese Government would not countenance financial
measures discriminating against American trade in North China;
although the Foreign Minister stated that the Japanese Government
would continue to support the principle of the Open Door, no specific
reply has yet been made to my representations.

# Tlie American Government now learns that the Japanese authori¬
ties have in effect established an exchange control at Tsingtao,
exercising discretionary authority to prohibit exports unless export
bills are sold to the Yokohama Specie Bank, the bank refusing to

PRESENTING THE PRESIDENT'S BILL OF PARTICULARS TO JAPAN 235

purchase these export bills except at a rate far lower than the open
market rate at Tientsin and Shanghai. r

A somewhat similar situation prevails at Chefoo.

Reports continue to reach' the American Government that a
comprehensive system of exchange control will soon be established
throughout North China.

The exacting, either directly or indirectly, bv the Japanese
authorities of control of exchange in North China would place
those authorities in a position to thwart equality of opportunity
or free competition between Japan and the United States in that
area, in view of the fact that control of foreign exchange transactions
gives control of trade and commercial enterprises.

In such a situation imports from and exports to the United States
as well as the choice of dealers in North China, would be entirely
subjected to the dispensation of the Japanese authorities.

The American Government has already pointed out to the Japanese
Government that alterations of the Chinese customs tariff by the
regimes functioning in those portions of China occupied by the
Japanese and for which the Japanese Government has formally
assured its support are arbitrary and illegal assumptions of authority,
the responsibility for which the Japanese Government cannot
escape.

It is hardly necessary to state that there can be no Open Door
in China so long as the ultimate authority to regulate, tax, or prohibit
trade is exercised, directly or indirectly, by the authorities of one
“ foreign ” power in furtherance of the interests of that power.

It would appear to be self-evident that a fundamental prerequisite
of a condition of equality of opportunity or Open Door in Ghinq
is the absence in the economic life of that country of preferences or
monopolistic rights operating directly or indirectly in favour of any
foreign country or its nationals.

On July 4 I spoke to the Foreign Minister of the desire of the
American Government that there be avoided such restrictions and
obstacles to American trade as might result from the setting up of
special companies and monopolies in China. The Minister was so
good as to state that the Open Door in China would be maintained
and that the American Government might rest assured that the
Japanese Government would fully respect the principle of equal
opportunity.

American nationals and their interests have suffered serious losses
in the Far East, arising from causes directly attributable to the
present conflict between Japan and China, and even under the most
favourable conditions an early rehabilitation of American trade with
China cannot be expected.

The American Government therefore finds it all the more difficult
to reconcile itself to a situation in which American nationals must
contend with continuing unwarranted interference with their rights
at the hands of the Japanese authorities in China and with Japanese

236 CHINA INCIDENT

actions and policies which operate to deprive American trade of
equality of opportunity in China.

In its treatment of Japanese nationals and their trade and enterprise
the American Government has been guided not only by the letter
and spirit of the Japanese-American Commercial Treaty of 19 n 5
but by those fundamental principles of international law and order
which have formed the basis of its policy in regard to all peoples
and their interests; and Japanese commerce and enterprise have
continued to enjoy in the United States equality of opportunity.

Your Excellency cannot fail to recognize the existence of a great
and growing disparity between the treatment accorded American
nationals and their trade and enterprise by Japanese authorities in
China and Japan, and the treatment accorded Japanese nationals
and their trade and enterprise by the Government of the United
States in areas within its jurisdiction.

In the light of the situation herein reviewed, the President asks
that the Japanese Government implement certain assurances which
it has already given. It is requested by the President that, with a
view to the maintenance of the Open Door and to non-interference
with American rights, the Japanese Government take prompt and
effective measures to cause :

(1) The discontinuance of discriminatory exchange control and
of other measures imposed in areas in China under Japanese control
which operate either directly or indirectly to discriminate against
American trade and enterprise ;

(2) The discontinuance of any monopoly or of any preference
which would deprive American nationals of the right of undertaking
any legitimate trade or industry in China or of any arrangement
which might purport to establish in favour of Japanese interests any
general superiority of rights with regard to commercial or economic
development in any region of China ; and

(3) The discontinuance of interference by Japanese authorities
in China with American property and other rights, including such
forms of interference as censorship of American mail and telegrams
and restrictions upon residence and travel by Americans and upon
American trade and shipping.

There are many other cases involving restrictions or violations of
American rights in China which I do not have the time to-day to go
into. However, I desire specifically to mention such cases as obstruc¬
tions which are being placed by the Japanese military authorities
in the way of the travel of American citizens in the interior of
China; of the censorship of and interference with American mail
and telegrams at^ Shanghai; the establishment of the Central China
Telecommunications for the avowed purpose of controlling com¬
munications in Central China; and the organization of a Japanese
controlled steamship company to monopolize water transportation
in the Shanghai area.

I earnestly appeal to Your Excellency to bring your important

JAPAN SHUTS THE OPEN DOOR 237

influence to bear towards the solution of these many problems in the
interests of Japanese-American relations, which must depend in large
measure upon the faithful observance by Japan of the assurances
frequently and categorically expressed.

JAPAN SHUTS THE OPEN DOOR
December 5, 1938

November saw no improvement in our relations with Japan ; quite
the contrary. Whereas we had previously received assurances from
every succeeding Foreign Minister that the Open Door and equal
opportunity in China would be maintained and that American
rights and interests would be respected, there came on November 3
a sudden reversal of policy. I should not call it so much a reversal
of policy in fact as in policy of official utterance. When Hirota and
Ugaki and Prince Konoye, the last as late as October 3, successively
and consistently gave me categorical assurances with regard to the
Open Door, they were honestly or not honestly trying to reconcile
the irreconcilable. Their slogan was : “ Have patience and all will
be well.”

Arita says that these assurances were not given in bad faith ; his
predecessors had merely tried without success to reconcile principle
with actualities, whereas he himself, realizing that this was impos¬
sible, proposed to call a spade a spade. He therefore declined to
confirm the assurances previously given. His attitude as expressed
to me, and publicly by the Government, was no longer “ Have
patience ; ” it was now in effect: “ A new situation has arisen in
East Asia; Japan must, for her own strategic and economic safety
control certain sources of raw material in China and certain industrial
opportunities. Those particular things you foreigners can no longer
enjoy. But there will be plenty of other things left over, in matters
of trade and economic and financial opportunities, in which respect
the Open Door will be kept well open. Please note that your trade
with Manchuria has increased by leaps and bounds since the estab¬
lishment of Manchukuo.”

That, as I see it, is the policy of the Japanese Government ex¬
pressed in a nutshell. But it is not at all die policy of the extremists
in the Government, the business world, and the Army. They want
and intend to crowd foreign interests and foreign trade out of China
completely and to make of China an exclusive mart and economic
and industrial stamping ground for Japan alone. These are the
people who have no conception of the practical working of economic
laws and who fail to perceive that without foreign co-operation and
foreign capital Japan cannot even begin to reconstruct and develop
the vast industrial and commercial potentialities which China offers.
They will see it eventually, to their cost and sorrow.

One more litde point might be included in that nutshell * Munich,
and the fall of Canton and Hankow to Japanese troops, had intervened.

CHINA INCIDENT

J238

The Japanese press constantly charges America and other foreign
countries with failing to grasp and understand 66 the new order in
East Asia. 59 When Arita himself complained to me that the American
press is so dull of perception in this respect and fails to understand
the assurances given that Japan has no intention (wholly) to
close the Open Door to foreign trade in China (this was on
December 26), I replied that not only the American press but the
American Government and public and I myself found it very difficult
to appraise his assurances when every official utterance of the Japanese
Government was so circumscribed with qualifying phrases as to leave
the real intentions of the Japanese Government quite nebulous.

As a concrete illustration I referred him merely .to two paragraphs
of a document which he had handed to me in which there occurred
at least five qualifying words or phrases in connection with the in¬
dustrial and commercial opportunities which were to be left open
to foreign countries, such as “ certain industries, 59 “ within the scope
of the established plans, 59 “ as a rule, 99 “ any special discrimination, 99
“ undue discrimination," et cetera. I said that we were naturally
more interested in results than in expressions of intention, especially
when these expressions were so hemmed around with qualifications
as to afford complete latitude in the Japanese interpretation thereof.
The Minister saw the absurdity of this situation and laughed outright,
asking me if he might copy down the phrases which I had underlined
in his own memorandum.

That is roughly the situation that faces us to-day. How on earth
were we to appraise the Prime Minister’s official statement: “Japan
does not reject co-operation with other powers, neither intends to
damage the interests of third powers. If such nations understand the
true intention of Japan and adopt policies suitable for the new conditions ,
Japan does not hesitate to co-operate with them for the sake of peace
in the Orient," What are Japan’s intentions ? What policies are
suitable for the new conditions? Official pronouncements of that
kind are simply puerile.

Meanwhile there were buzzings as to possible financial help to
Chiang Kai-shek from American and British sources, and discussions
as to possible economic measures against Japan. As to the latter, no
matter how much I might personally like to see retaliation for the
things that Japan is doing to us and to our interests in the Far East,
I have consistently recommended against such measures unless we
are prepared to see them through to their logical conclusion, and
that might mean war, for sanctions are always a potential incentive
to ultimate war. The British, at least some British, believe that
Anglo-American economist sanctions would bring Japan to her knees
in short order, I disagree with that thesis. I know Japan and the
Japanese pretty well. They are a hardy race, accustomed throughout
their history to catastrophe and disaster ; theirs is the “ do or die "
spirit, more.deeply ingrained than in almost any other people. They
would pull in their belts another notch and continue. They can live

THE YEAR OF ARMAGEDDON BEGINS

239

on rice and, if necessary, fight on rice* The deprival of oil, rubber,
and other necessities of war might cramp their style, once their con¬
siderable supplies had given out, but it would take a long time to
bring about capitulation, I think. Foreign support to Chiang
Kai-shek is another matter altogether, and this does not need to be
done officially, no matter what official blessings might accompany
the unofficial act.

Thus lay the land up to the end of November.

THE YEAR OF ARMAGEDDON BEGINS
January 31, 1939

Seldom in modern history has a year commenced under more
inauspicious circumstances than has 1939, for the totalitarian states
on the one hand and the democracies on the other are rapidly lining
up in battle array for what may well become another Armageddon.
It will be a critical year and I cannot see that optimism is justified.

The cabinet crisis foreseen in December came to a head on Janu¬
ary 4; Prince Konoye resigned and Baron Hiranuma, President of the
Privy Council, formed a new cabinet, the only important changes
apart from the Prime Minister being the dropping of Ikeda as Minister
of Finance and Admiral Suetsugu as Home Minister. After a good
deal of exploration we have come to the conclusion that the crisis
centred about Suetsugu, whose extremist views in advocating the
creation of a single national party and drastic measures along totali¬
tarian lines had made him absolutely unacceptable to the Diet, and
that it was not politically practicable simply to drop him alone.
Ikeda’s retirement may be explained by the inevitable Japanese
policy of compromise ; to drop the extremist it became necessary
at the same time to drop the pronounced liberal.

Apart from the Suetsugu factor, it is well known that Prince
Konoye, whose health is never very strong, has long wanted to divest
himself of the burden ; until Hankow and Canton were taken he
could not risk the adverse psychological effect of such a crisis, but now,
with the favourable progress of the hostilities in China, it was felt
that the change could be made without serious repercussions. Another
version of the affair is that there had been a definite let-down in the
feeling and attitude of the public towards the China conflict and
that a change in leadership was required to raise the pitch of popular
enthusiasm; in short, that a “ lift ” was needed. Hiranuma says
that he will carry on the same general policies. He has always been
classed as an extreme nationalist, but they say that his attitude
has mellowed with age, and that while possessing the confidence
of the extremists, he will not necessarily follow an extreme policy.
It is even thought that he will try to conciliate the democracies.
Arita, who remains, gives assurance that this will be the case. But
I look for no marked change, either way, in that respect just
now.

240

CHINA INCIDENT

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR AND THE AMBASSADOR
FROM MANCHUKUO EXCHANGE CALLS

February 23, 1939

Believe it or not, Mr. Ripley, I received to-day the official call
of the Manchukuo Ambassador, by appointment, and I officially
returned the call, also by appointment, five days later, in top hat
morning coat, and everything. No, gentle reader, the United States
has not thereby recognized the noble state of Manchukuo. The
Dean of the Diplomatic Corps has simply recognized, as is his duty,
an ambassador duly accredited to the Japanese Court, and it is the
Japanese Court, not the Dean, who determines the members of the
Diplomatic Corps in good and official standing. Mr. Yuan was very
affable, in Chinese of course, duly interpreted by Mr. Wu, but he
had nothing on the Dean in point of affability. The weather and
the beauties of Tokyo were discussed with the utmost thoroughness,
but the real crux of the conversation only came when we got on
the subject of hunting the long-haired Manchurian tiger. Then the
fur really flew. Be it said, however, that no notes or cards or any
other formal documents have passed or will pass between the two
missions except over the inscribed title “Dean of the Diplomatic
Corps, of) by, and for the Corps and not of) by, or for the Govern¬
ment or people of the United States of America.

AMBASSADOR SAITO’S ASHES CREATE A
DIPLOMATIC PROBLEM

April 3, 1939

Hitler unmasked. The international highwayman no longer
deludes the trusting public by assurances that he was taking back
only what belonged to him (the German minorities) and that he
had no further territorial ambitions in Europe; the mask is off and
at the point of his gun he appropriates all of Czechoslovakia, at
whose birth we assisted at Versailles. Hungary already in effect a
vassal; Rumania on the ragged edge; Memel taken; Poland
menaced; Lithuania, Denmark, Holland, Belgium waiting for the
juggernaut. And how about a port on the Adriatic ? Isn’t that, too,
merely a question of time ? No, I can’t believe that Mussolini can
be happy. But now at last the old British Hon seems to be stirring
uneasily in his serene drowsiness and at the very end of the month

there was actually an indication of bristling with a sligh t growl or
two. Don’t touch that bone (Poland). a sugar growl or

rJ5f t J le , m ? antime I am deep in one of the most difficult problems
“i* c , om fS t0 Japan, namely, the arrangement of the
attendant upon the arrival in Japan of the U.S.S. Astoria,
b «T§ tbe ashes of the late Ambassador Saito.

When the proposal of our Government to take this unprecedented

AMBASSADOR SAITO’s ASHES CREATE A DIPLOMATIC PROBLEM 24 1

step (unprecedented, so far as I am aware, because Saito was no
longer in office when he died) was presented by me to the Japanese
Government and gratefully accepted, I was merely informed that
the Astoria would remain in Yokohama for nine days, from April
17 to 26. The reaction here was immediately and inevitably political.
The Japanese interpreted the gesture as of deep political significance,
and a tremendous reaction, both emotional and political, immedi¬
ately took place. Not only did the Government and people of
Japan assume that a new leaf had been turned in Japanese-American
relations and a wave of friendliness for the United States swept over
the country, but there promptly developed a determination to express
Japan’s gratitude in a concrete way. A programme of entertain¬
ment, dinners, luncheons, receptions, radio broadcasts, garden
parties, sightseeing touts was elaborated.

At this point, on March 26 to be exact, we received from the
Department the first cautionary word to go slow. This caution
apparently arose from a press dispatch published in America that
the Embassy had accepted twenty pearl necklaces for the wives
of the officers of the Astoria . What happened was this. A jeweller
from Osaka came up to Tokyo and handed the necklaces to Captain
Bemis, our Naval Attach^, saying that he desired in this way to
express his emotion at the generous action of the American Govern¬
ment ; that he only wished he were able to give six hundred neck¬
laces for every member of the Astoria's crew. In Japan it is very
difficult to refuse such a gift point-blank without giving serious
offence, and as the donor had to return at once to Osaka, Captain
Bemis said he would keep the necklaces temporarily in his safe until
Captain Turner of the Astoria could be consulted, there being no
naval regulation prohibiting the acceptance of such gifts.

But Bemis did not accept the necklaces ; he made it clear that
he was merely according them temporary custody. We did not believe
that Captain Turner would accept them and it was felt that the
necklaces could be returned quietly, after his arrival, with less em¬
barrassment than by peremptory rejection. We had no reason to
believe that publicity would result. But the jeweller gave the story to
the press, thereby clearly indicating that whatever might be his senti¬
ment, he was using the proposed gift to publicize himself and his
firm. We then promptly sent one of the naval language officers to
Osaka to return the necklaces, which he did, and that part of the
episode was over.

But then another difficulty arose. So intense and widespread
had become the feeling in Japan of friendliness and gratitude to
the United States that a monster public mass meeting to express
these sentiments began to take shape. A committee of 117 prominent
members of the Diet and others was formed under the chairman¬
ship of old Count Kaneko (who is surrounded with a sort of
traditional aura of being America’s best friend in Japan, although
I know by bitter experience in 1932 that fundamentally he is any-

CHINA INCIDENT

242

thing but friendly) and plans went ahead for a tremendous blow¬
out of national anthems, waving flags, regimented students, and a
blast of oratory, to be followed by demonstrations of judo and
other Japanese warlike sports, and later, in the afternoon, a big track
meet or baseball game with the Astoria's crew. I realized at once
that such a gathering would certainly not accord with our Govern-
ment’s wish to avoid publicity and demonstration or with its concep¬
tion of the Astoria's mission, and that this sort of ballyhoo would
intensely irritate the American people, whose reaction would be :
“ Show us your appreciation in acts, not words.”

So I put my foot in the door as quickly as possible, while fully
realizing that this new situation must be handled with finesse and
that the Japanese must be provided with some kind of cushion on
which to loose their pent-up emotion. Otherwise only annoyance
and bitterness would be created, and once again the constructive
effects of our gesture would be imperilled. Many telephone talks
and conferences resulted, and I was at least able to delay the visit
of the committee to Hayama to apprise Count Kaneko of the
plans.

In one midnight conference with Yoshizawa at the Embassy, in
which Dooman participated, I provisionally accepted a compromise
solution of the problem by which a quiet athletic meet would take
place, with only a single speech by Kaneko and a brief reply by
Captain Turner. The next morning, a Sunday, by routing several
sleepy people out of bed before their normal hour, I arranged a
meeting of the committee at the Embassy and talked to them about
the solemnity of the occasion, the importance of avoiding anything
in the nature of a demonstration, and the essential desideratum of
obviating the kind of publicity which would lead the American
Government and people to feel that their act of courtesy was being
misinterpreted. This meeting was held after I had passed a sleep¬
less night trying to think the problem through and had been up
since 5. The members, at least some of them, were clearly impressed
by my presentation ; Uyehara, one of the ablest lawyers in Japan,
saw the point clearly and gave me assurances that another meeting
of the committee would be called, my views explained, a modified
plan proposed and presented to me before further action were taken.
This prompt action at least caused the committee to delay in going
down to Hayama early Sunday morning to apprise Count Kaneko
of the plans, and it was for that reason that I had dug them out
of bed.

This was the situation to-day, April 3. To-morrow I shall try
to see Sawada, chairman of the Japanese reception committee, to
put the whole problem before him, personally and “ off the record,”
and it will require, I fear, some very plain speaking to head off
the movement. I am becoming more than ever convinced that even

a quiet athletic meet with a single speech,” or any mass meeting
of any kind, would defeat our intentions. Flags, national anthems,

243

AMBASSADOR SAITO’S ASHES ARRIVE IN JAPAN

parades would be the order of the day and the details would appear
in the American press, conveying an impression of political bally¬
hoo. I want to stave this whole thing off if it can possibly be done
without risk of grave irritation here. At the very least it will have to
be reduced to the utmost simplicity—no waving of flags, no students’
parades, no speeches save that of Count Kaneko and Captain Turner’s
brief reply, and I shall have to be given explicit assurances on these
points if I am to permit the officers and men of the Astoria to attend.
The matter is of prime importance ; I want only good results to
accrue from our Government’s gesture in sending Saito’s ashes
home on an American cruiser—good results both in Japan and at
home—and in this I am between the devil and the deep sea. It is
not an easy problem. But it seems to me that the least the Japanese
can do to show appreciation of our gesture is to receive it in the
spirit in which it was made, and in no other spirit.

AMBASSADOR SAITO’S ASHES ARRIVE IN JAPAN
April 17, 1939

The big day, and a day which neither Alice nor I shall ever forget,
for it was replete with impressiveness and deep emotion. I placed
our flag at half-mast. The Astoria arrived with the ashes of the late
Ambassador Saito, and at 1.30 the ceremony of receiving the ashes
was carried out at the Yamashita Pier at Yokohama. On the dot
of the hour set, the launch put off from the Astoria , accompanied by
minute guns from the Astoria and the Japanese cruiser near by.
(Alice had gone to see Mrs. Saito yesterday; she is a wonderful
person, and we intensely admired the splendid way in which she bore
up with grace and dignity throughout these two toying days.)

When the American sailors carried the little Japanese shrine
containing the urn and ashes ashore, we all formed a procession
and marched to the larger shrine erected on the pier where, in a brief,
dignified, and most impressive exchange of speeches, Sawada, chair¬
man of the reception committee, accepted the ashes from Captain
Turner of the Astoria . Then we all went into the shrine and bowed
in turn and the funeral procession formed and marched through the
streets of Yokohama, deeply lined with people, to the funeral train
drawn up on another pier, the guard of honour being composed
both of American and Japanese sailors and a Japanese band playing
the Chopin funeral march.

The President’s wreath was carried first, then the Foreign Minister’s,
and then mine, the American ones, of course, in the hands of the
American sailors. The American community was represented, at
my instance, by Bishop Reifsnider, Dick Andrews, and Dr. Iglehart,
three of the oldest residents in Japan. Captain Bemis acted as my
aide. The solemnity of the occasion and the absolute precision of
every move in the carefully prepared programme were tremendously
impressive.

CHINA INCIDENT

244

Alice and I went in the funeral train to Tokyo, where the Foreign
Minister and other high officials were gathered in the station. The
Japanese then followed the hearse to the Saito home for a private
service, but we thought it best not to invade the privacy of the home
and left the cortege at that point. It is interesting that a bottle of
Old Parr whisky, Saito’s favourite brand, was prominently displayed
on the altar and is clearly evident in the photographs, and that
three of his favourite cigarettes were burned in the incense burners.
To Americans this might seem profane, but from the Japanese point
of view nothing could be more pious or consistent. In the Shinto
rites, food for the departed is placed on the altar, and if the departed
liked whisky, let him have it by all means.

Alice and I, together with the Bemises and the Boyces, our Consul
in Yokohama, dined quietly with Captain Turner on the Astoria.

The President sent his messages to Hitler and Mussolini. I felt like
cabling him : “ I am prouder than ever before to be an American.”
The message may or may not be helpful, but I feel that America’s
moral influence should be exerted to the fullest extent in this crisis.
If we could have done it in 1914, the World War might have been
avoided. It may conceivably avoid war now. The handwriting
is on the wall for Hitler to read, if he can read. But I doubt it.

April 18, 1939

I half-masted our flag again. The funeral service in the big Hong-
wanji Temple was more impressive than anything that had gone
before. All the highest people in Japan were there. First} the
High Priest chanted the Buddhist rites, then, in turn, Arita, myself,
and Hotta (Saito’s friend and contemporary) went up to the shrine
and read our respective addresses. Arita’s was wonderfully phrased
and he hims elf was deeply moved so that his voice shook (as, in fact,
did mine). He ended:

With the spring coming, everything on earth is being refreshed.
But you are no more. I cannot hear you answer even if I speak
to you. I cannot see you even if I try to look at yon. I am indeed
filled with sorrow. What a sorrow. I respectfully beseech you to
accept my message.

There followed the burning of incense by everyone in turn, first
Saito’s eldest daughter, a child of thirteen, as his legal heir, then his
mother and widow and the other daughter, Arita, Alice and myself,
and so down the line. We did not go to the cemetery, feeling again
that this would be intruding on the family’s privacy. Iwanaga, Mrs.
Saito’s uncle, took some of die ashes to bury on the family estate. So
ended the most impressive funeral I have ever witnessed. The
solemnity, dignity, and precision of the whole ceremony from the
moment of the Astoria's arrival were unforgettable.

Captain Turner and his staff called.

245

AMBASSADOR SAITO’s ASHES ARRIVE IN JAPAN

Our dinner for Captain Turner. Alice, the only lady present, was
hostess and she helped me greatly. Debuchi said afterwards that my
asking the Minister of War was a “ master stroke.” It was an
eleventh-hour inspiration on my part. Probably never before have
the Foreign Minister, the Imperial Household Minister, the War
Minister, and the Navy Minister been present at the same time in
any foreign house in Japan.

Alice had arranged a delicious dinner with terrapin; my best
wines were trotted out, and it was really as nice a dinner as could
be staged anywhere. Everyone was in the best of humour. I proposed
the health of the Emperor, and Arita responded with a health to the
President; it was the only function during the entertainment of
the Astoria , I think, at which there were no speeches ! To the
Japanese a formal dinner without speeches is unthinkable, but the
American Embassy is American soil and I am dictator for that one
evening. But we did have to surrender to the photographer, for the
pressure there was too great; there was no use in antagonizing the
press. Anyway, the Embassy looked perfectly beautiful, with gorgeous
sprays of cherry blossoms on the tables in the loggia and small
chrysanthemums on the dinner tables, of which there were two of
eighteen places each. We had a right to be proud of the Embassy
and indeed of the whole shindy, which went off like clockwork and
with no official stiffness whatever. Of course, as usual, Alice deserves
the credit. I said to Arita that I supposed it must seem rather unusual
in Japan for the lady of the house to be present at a stag dinner, but
he said that on the contrary it was often done. At our sedate age,
it’s a good custom.

April 19, 1939

Luncheon given by the Foreign Minister to Captain Turner and
his officers. After lunch we sat on the lawn and exchanged stories,
which enabled the press to publish an excellent picture of Arita,
Turner, and myself, headed “ Japanese-American Smiles.”

In the evening a big dinner given by the Navy Minister, Admiral
Yonai, at the Navy Club, at which some superb pictures of Fuji, the
temple of Nikko, and so on were presented for the captain, the ward¬
room, and the warrant officers 5 mess on the Astoria . The one for the
wardroom was promptly hung in the place of honour and was there
when the captain gave his farewell dinner on the 25th. After dinner
at the Navy Club there was some excellent juggling by pretty girls
and then some lovely Japanese dancing. Navy officers are always
better mixers than Army men, probably because they have travelled
abroad, and the spirit at this dinner was splendid.

After dinner A dmir al Yonai took Dooman aside (the Minister
doesn’t speak English very fluently) and asked him to tell me that
my concern- about the possibility of Japan’s bec om i ng involved in
Europe had come to his attention and that he wished to tell me that
I need have no further concern because “Japanese policy has been

246 CHINA INCIDENT

decided. The element in Japan which desires Fascism for Japan
and the consequent linking up with Germany and Italy had been
‘ suppressed. 5 ” Japan, the Minister said, while co-operating for the
maintenance of friendly relations with both the democracies and
the authoritarian states, must stand apart from either group, her
own ideology being different from both of them.

Yoshizawa, to whom this talk was repeated, said that the decision
to stay out of an alliance with Germany and Italy must have just
been taken because he had not known of it. The Minister’s state¬
ment to me might be taken as a definite indication that Japan in¬
tended to avoid embroilment in European troubles, and he knew
that the Navy had held the balance of power in this important
question, but we must not assume that there would be no strengthen¬
ing of the Anti-Comintern Pact.

In further conversation with Admiral Yonai he said that the need
for restoring good relations with the United States was being keenly
felt. On his being informed that our difficulties, such, for
as the bombing of our property in China, could readily be
eliminated, he replied that he knew all about this and that effective
steps would be taken to correct these attacks, which were now being
investigated. 6

The Minister then turned to the question of naval limitation and
expressed regret that such limitation is not feasible at the present
time, but navies are “ dangerous toys ; 55 the progressive increase in
naval requirements could lead only to bankruptcy or a general
explosion, and some day an agreement must be reached. “ There
must be disarmament, 55 he repeatedly said.

This was one of the most important and significant conversations
that we have had, and I regard it as marking a new trend, indeed a
milestone, in Japanese-American relations, for Yonai can be trusted.

JAPAN STEERS AWAY FROM THE AXIS
May 15, 1939

The high fight of the first half of May until we sailed on leave of
absence was the effort to keep Japan from tying up in a general
affiance with Germany and Italy. Up to our departure this effort
was successful and I was given categorical official assurances that
there would be no general affiance, although there would be some
arrar^ement by way of strengthening the Anti-Comintern Pact with
applicability only to Soviet Russia. But I know very well that the
° n Gove *?i n “ t wiU continue, and if Great Britain
S °y iet Ru ®ia it is not beyond the bounds
of possibility that either the Government will be forced into a totali-

SaST 6 to be succeeded posfibly by

GeneralMinami, Marquis Kido, or Navy Minister Yonai But the
appointment of Yonai would still mean no totalitarian affiance.

JAPAN STEERS AWAY FROM THE AXIS 247

I think that the present political situation in Japan is full of
dynamite and that further assassinations are possible, if not likely.
The country is sick of the hostilities in China, with no outlook for
peace, and wants concrete results which do not appear to be maturing.
This does not at all mean that Japan is weakening ; on the contrary,
there is every evidence of determination to see the whole thing
through, and there is very little evidence of any financial or economic
crisis in the near future. But there is plenty of dissatisfaction with
the failure to achieve final results and to get the “ China Incident ”
over with. The people are restive.

The line that I have taken in talking with Japanese high and low—
and I have plenty of evidence that my arguments have penetrated
to the top—is this : if a general war breaks out in Europe it is almost
inevitable that the United States will be unable to stay out of it;
things would be bound to happen which would inflame the American
people, and history has shown that the American people are among
the most inflammable people in the world. In such a case the pacifists
and isolationists would be in the forefront of those supporting war—
at least, the great majority would be. If Germany were to bomb
London and Paris and kill a great many civilians, that alone would
stir the American people to the depths. And then, even if Germany
and Italy had overrun Europe in the first few weeks of the war, the
determination and unlimited resources of the United States would
with mathematical certainty have won in the long run, as they did in
1918. If Japan were then tied up in the German camp in a general
mili tary alliance, it would be almost impossible for the United States
to remain at peace with Japan.

It therefore behooves Japan to look into the future and decide where
her friendship ought in her own interests to be placed. Japanese-
American relations are temporarily strained owing to difficulties
arising out of the campaign in China, but these difficulties should
eventually be overcome and Japan should look at the long haul
rather than at the immediate present. From every point of view—
economic, financial, commercial, sentimental—the United States
can be a better friend to Japan, if Japan plays the game with us,
than any other country in the world. A Japanese-American war
would be the height of stupidity from every point of view. In the
meantime, what can Germany and Italy do for Japan? What
concrete results are to be gained from their friendship in the long
run ? These considerations are worth weighing now, before it is too
late.

These arguments, as I have said, appear to have been widely
discussed and weighed. I have reason to believe that they reached
the Emperor, and several highly placed people have encouraged
the line I was t akin g. Some, including the Navy Minister on his
own initiative, spoke of my “ anxiety 55 and said that I need worry
no more as things were going to turn out the way I wanted them
to do.

248 CHINA INCIDENT

So we leave Japan for these few months of furlough feeling that,
whatever the final result, at least nothing has been left undone to
steer Japanese-American relations into healthy channels, which, after
all, is my job.

A jive-month furlough in the United States interrupts the diary at this
point .

5

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

(October io, 1939—December 7, 1941)

The opening months of the war in Europe gave all Japanese an
uneasy time. Those who did not fear Germany feared Russia.
Hope for any understanding with the United States dwindled, though
efforts to patch up an understanding took on a new lease of life. But
with the fall of France the die was cast. Relations with the United
States had gone from bad to worse. Britain appeared to be on the
verge of defeat. French Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies
lay defenceless to the south, while a neutral but feverishly arming
Russia looked with increasing concern to the east. If only to get
the jump on the Germans, the Japanese determined to concentrate
for a while on southward expansion. At the end of September, 1940,
Japan entered the Axis as a full-fledged partner. This move had
two main purposes. One was to promote southward expansion. The
other was to serve notice on the United States that war between
America and Germany would also lead to war between America
and Japan. The United States refused to be intimidated and con¬
tinued its firm stand against aggression in the Far East. War between
the two countries thus, at the end, became inevitable, and Japan
struck at Pearl Harbour.

THE CRISIS PERIOD BEGINS
October 10,1939

On the job once more and quite ready for it. I feel very fit and
keen to get going again.

The voyage on the Tatsuta Mam was, according to the captain, the
smoothest he had ever encountered on the Pacific, and during the
last several days the sea was like a quiet lake.

The Embassy looked more lovely than ever and, of course, was
chockablock with gorgeous gifts of flowers. The faithful staff were
at the door, beaming their welcome. The very first t h i ng Alice did
was to telephone to Madame de Romer, the Polish Ambassadress, to
ask to come to see her; she said she had been seeing nobody but
would receive Alice, and was obviously touched. I did the same to the
Polish Ambassador, and said that I wanted to come to see him before
any of the other colleagues.

*49

1250

ONE WORLD *. TWO WARS

THE POLISH AMBASSADOR FINDS JAPAN ANTI-
GERMAN

October 12, 1939

Having told Mr. de Romer, the Polish Ambassador, that I wished
to call on him before any of the other colleagues, I went to see him
this morning and, endeavoured to express my feelings. He was
visibly touched. He said that the action of our Government in
recognizing the new Polish Government had helped him very much
here, because the Japanese, owing to their difficult relations with
Soviet Russia, were doubtful what to do, but as soon as we had acted
he was able to persuade them to continue to recognize him without
more ado.

The Ambassador said that the Japanese still remembered my feel¬
ing before leaving for America last spring, that if war should break
out in Europe the United States would almost certainly become
involved, and they wondered whether I still felt the same way about
it. I replied that my visit to the United States had opened my eyes
to the intense and almost universal determination to stay out of the
war, a very different attitude from that obtaining in 19x7, and while
many unpredictable tilings might happen, I now felt that the chances
of our staying out were immeasurably increased. Mr. de Romer
said he thought that my arguments advanced to many influential
Japanese last spring had had a marked effect in keeping Japan out
of a military alliance with Germany. The Japanese were now more
than ever eager for friendship with the United States. He said that
except for a comparatively small group the Japanese are now intensely
anti-German.

THE “ HORSE’S MOUTH ” SPEECH
October 15, 1939

Worked all day on my forthcoming speech before the America-
Japan Society. During weeks of quiet thought at our home in the
hills of New Hampshire I had determined to make this speech, and
fortunately both the President and the Department had approved the
idea. It is a ticklish business. The Far Eastern Division had made
an original draft which I amplified in Washington and then re¬
touched almost daily during the voyage over. But now I find that
the present cabinet and its backers, Hiranuma and Prince Konoye,
axe apparently genuinely anxious to improve relations with the
United States, and that it would be very short-sighted to embarrass
them by the publication of the sort of speech that we had drafted.
I am now convinced that much more can be accomplished in in¬
formal talks with groups and individuals. So I must sail between
Scylla and Charybdis, not m i nimiz ing the resentment of the American
Government and people against the actions of the Japanese Army

“ STRAIGHT FROM THE HORSE’S MOUTH ”

251

in China, but avoiding so far as possible the dynamite and any “ bill
of particulars 55 which would be going to the public over the heads of
the Japanese Government.

I am well aware that our own Government would deeply resent
anything of that kind on the part of the Japanese Ambassador in
Washington. The tone of my speech will be important. What are
needed now are “ brass tacks 59 —an appeal to stop the bombings,
indignities, trade restrictions, and other concrete interferences with
American rights. The high principles will, however, not be over¬
looked. As the draft stands now, the staff consider it a well-balanced
speech, and I think it is. There will be some unpleasant reverbera¬
tions, but there is precious little in the speech to which exception
could properly be taken. We shall see. Fortunately the Department
had sent me a telegram, eminently wise, suggesting that I might
find trends in Japan which would render the original draft inad¬
visable and that it would not be well to injure thereby such personal
influence as I possess. Although it was I myself who originally sug¬
gested the speech, that telegram gave me a great sense of relief.

“ STRAIGHT FROM THE HORSE'S MOUTH ”

(From an Address before the America-Japan Society, October 19, 1939)

We have a phrase in English “ straight from the horse's mouth/'
I never knew why the particular animal chosen was a horse, especially
as most horses are generally not very communicative. But the
meaning is clear enough. What I shall say in Japan in the ensuing
months comes “ straight from the horse’s mouth ” in that it will
accurately represent and interpret some of the current thoughts of
the American Government and people with regard to Japan and the
Far East. I had the privilege of also conferring repeatedly with the
President and with the Secretary of State during my stay at home.

Before I left for America last May a Japanese friend of mine begged
me to tell my friends in America the situation in Japanese-American
relations as he conceived it. It ran somewhat as follows :

American rights and interests in China are suffering some minor
and unimportant inconveniences in China as a result of Japanese
military operations ; the Japanese military take every possible
precaution to avoid inconvenience to American interests; reports
published in the United States in regard to damage to American
interests by the Japanese in China are intentionally exaggerated in
order to inflame the American people against Japan; in large
measure those activities of the Japanese to which Americans object
are the result of differences in customs, differences in language, and
a legalistic attitude which has been adopted by the United States;
the attitude of the Government of the United States in regard to
impairment of American rights and interests in the Japanese-occupied
areas of China is in large part due to internal political conditions
in the United States ; in the near future the situation in the occupied

252 ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

areas of China will be so improved that the United States will no
longer have any cause for complaint. That was the point of view
of my Japanese friend.

Alas, the truth is far otherwise. The facts, as they exist, are accu¬
rately known by the American Government. They are likewise
known by the American people, and in the interests of the future
relations between Japan and the United States those facts must be
faced. Only through consideration of those facts can the present
attitude of the American Government and people towards Japan
be understood; only through consideration of those facts, and through
constructive steps to alter those facts, can Japanese-American relations
be improved. Those relations must be improved.

Having said all this I do not propose to-day to deal in detail with
the causations which have brought about that feeling in my country.
This is not the occasion to enter any “ bill of particulars. 5 ’ Those
facts, those difficulties between our nations, are matters for considera¬
tion by the two Governments ; indeed, some of them are matters
which I have been discussing with the Japanese Government during
the past two years, and I shall continue to approach these matters.
But I believe that the broad outline of those facts and difficulties
is known to you. Some of these difficulties are serious.

Now, many of you who are listening to me may well be thinking :
“ There are two sides to every picture ; we in Japan also have our
public opinion to consider.” Granted. In America, as I have already
said, I did my best to show various angles of the Japanese point
of view. But here in Japan I shall try to show the American point of
view. Without careful consideration of both points of view we can
get nowhere in building up good relations. I wish you could realize
how intensely I wish for that most desirable end and how deeply
I desire, by pure objectivity, to contribute to a successful outcome.
Let me therefore try to remove a few utterly fallacious conceptions
of the American attitude as I think they exist in Japan to-day.

One of these fallacies is that the American approach to affairs in
East Asia is bound by a purely “ legalistic ” attitude, a conception
which widely prevails in this country to-day. What is meant by a
“ legalistic ” attitude? If we mean respect for treaties, official
commitments, international law, yes ; that respect is and always will
be one of the cardinal principles of American policy. But the very
term a legalistic attitude,” as it has often been used in my hearing
m Japan, seems to imply a position where one cannot see the woods
for the trees, where one’s vision of higher and broader concepts is
stultified. Let me therefore touch briefly on a few of the cardinal
principles of American policy and objectives, moulded to meet the
requirements of modern life, which, it is true, are fundamentally
based upon but which seem to me far to transcend any purely

legalistic ” approach to world affairs.

The American people aspire to relations of peace with every
country and between all countries. We have no monopoly on this

“ STRAIGHT FROM THE HORSE’S MOUTH ”

253

desire for peace,, but we have a very definite conviction that the
sort of peace which, throughout history, has been merely an inter¬
lude between wars is not an environment in which world civilization
can be stably developed or, perhaps, can even be preserved. We
believe that international peace is dependent on what our Secretary
of State has characterized as cc orderly processes 59 in international
dealing.

The American people desire to respect the sovereign rights of
other people and to have their own sovereign rights equally respected.
We have found by experience that the successful approach to the
resolving of international disputes lies not so much in merely abstain¬
ing from the use of force as in abstaining from any thought of the
use, immediately or eventually, of the methods of force. Let cynics
look about them and contemplate the consequences of resort to
menacing demands as a process in the conduct of international re¬
lations ! Is it being purely “ legalistic 99 to put to wise and practical
use the finest instincts common to all mankind ?

The American people believe that the day is past when wars can
be confined in their effects to the combatant nations. When national
economies were based upon agriculture and handicraft, nations were
to a large extent self-sufficient; they lived primarily on the things
which they themselves grew or produced. That is not the case
to-day. Nations are now increasingly dependent on others both
for commodities which they do not produce themselves and for the
disposal of the things which they produce in excess. The highly com¬
plex system of exchange of goods has been evolved by reason of
each nation’s being able to extract from the ground or to manu¬
facture certain commodities more efficiently or economically than
others. Each contributes to the common good the fruits of its handi¬
work and the bounties of nature.

It is this system of exchange which has not only raised the standard
of living everywhere but has made it possible for two or even three
persons to live in comfort where but one had lived in discomfort
under a simple self-contained economy. Not only the benefits of our
advanced civilization but the very existence of most of us depend
on maintaining in equilibrium a delicately balanced and complex
world economy. Wars are not only destructive of the wealth, both
human and material, of combatants, but they disturb the fine adjust¬
ments of world economy. Conflict between nations is therefore a
matter of concern to all the other nations. Is there then any stultifica¬
tion through 46 legalistic 99 concepts when we practise ourselves and
urge upon others the resolving of international disputes by orderly
processes, even if it were only in the interests of world economy?
How, except on the basis of law and order, can these various concepts
in international dealing be secured ?

The American people believe in equality of commercial oppor¬
tunity. There is probably no nation which has not at one time or
other invoked it. Even Japan, where American insistence on the

554 0NE WORLr > • two wars

Open Door is cited as the supreme manifestation of what is character¬
ized as a “ legalistic ” American attitude—even Japan, I say-—has
insisted upon and has received the benefits of the Open Door in
areas other than China, where, we are told, the principle is inapplic¬
able except in a truncated and emasculated form. That highly
complicated system of world economy of which I have just spoken
is postulated upon the ability of nations to buy and sell where they
please under conditions of free competition—conditions which cannot
exist in areas where pre-emptive rights are claimed and asserted on
behalf of nationals of one particular country.

I need hardly say that the thoughts which I have just expressed
are of universal applicability.

Another common fallacy which I am constrained to mention is
the charge that the American Government and people do not under¬
stand 6£ the new order in East Asia.’ 5 Forgive me if I very respect¬
fully take issue with that conception. The American Government
and people understand what is meant by the “ new order in East
Asia ” precisely as clearly as it is understood in Japan. The “ new
order in East Asia ” has been officially defined in Japan as an order
of security, stability, and progress. The American Government and
people earnestly desire security, stability, and progress not only for
themselves but for all other nations in every quarter of the world.
But the new order in East Asia has appeared to include, among
other things, depriving Americans of their long-established rights in
China, and to this the American people are opposed.

There’s the story. It is probable that many of you are not aware
of the increasing extent to which .the people of the United States
resent the methods which the Japanese armed forces are employing
in China to-day and what appear to be their objectives. In saying
this, I do not wish for one moment to imply that the American
people have forgotten the long-time friendship which has existed
between the people of my country and the people of Japan. But
the American people have been profoundly shocked over the wide-
spread use of bombing in China, not only on grounds of humanity
but also on grounds of the direct menace to American lives and
property accompanied by the loss of American fife and the crippling
of American citizens ; they regard with growing seriousness the
violation of and interference with American rights by the Japanese
armed forces in China in disregard of treaties and agreements entered
into by the United States and Japan and treaties and agreement?
entered into by several nations, including Japan. The American
people know that those treaties and agreements were entered into
voluntarily by Japan and that the provisions of those treaties and
agreements constituted a practical arrangement for safeguarding—
for the benefit of all—the correlated principles of national sovereignty
and ol equahty of economic opportunity.

The principle of equality of economic opportunity is one to which,
over a long period and on many occasions, Japan has given definite

“ STRAIGHT FROM THE HORSE’S MOUTH 55

255

approval and upon which Japan has frequently insisted. Not only
are the American people perturbed over their being arbitrarily de¬
prived of long-established rights, including those of equal oppor¬
tunity and fair treatment, but they feel that the present trend in the
Far East, if continued, will be destructive of the hopes which they
sincerely cherish of the development of an orderly world. American
rights and interests in China are being impaired or destroyed by
the policies and actions of the Japanese authorities in China. American
property is being damaged or destroyed ; American nationals are
being endangered and subjected to indignities. If I felt in a position
to set forth all the facts in detail to-day, you would, without any
question, appreciate the soundness and full justification of the American
attitude. Perhaps you will also understand why I wish to-day to
exercise restraint.

In short, the American people, from all the thoroughly reliable
evidence that comes to them, have good reason to believe that an
effort is being made to establish control, in Japan’s own interest, of
large areas on the continent of Asia and to impose upon those areas
a system of closed economy. It is this thought, added to the effect
of the bombings, the indignities, the manifold interference with
American rights, that accounts for the attitude of the American
people towards Japan to-day. For my part I will say this. It is my
belief, and the belief of the American Government and people,
that the many things injurious to the United States which have been
done and are being done by Japanese agencies are wholly needless .
We believe that real security and stability in the Far East could be
attained without running counter to any American rights whatsoever.

I have tried to give an accurate interpretation of American public
opinion, most carefully studied and analyzed by me while at home.
The traditional friendship between our two nations is far too precious
a thing to be either inadvertently or deliberately impaired. It seems
to me logical that from every point of view—economic, financial,
commercial, in the interests of business, travel, science, culture, and
sentiment—Japan and the United States for ever should be mutually
considerate friends. In the family of nations, as between and among
brothers, there arise inevitable controversies, but again and again
the United States has demonstrated its practical sympathy and desire
to be helpful towards Japan in difficult times and moments, its
admiration of Japan’s achievements, its earnest desire for mutually
helpful relations.

Please do not misconstrue or misinterpret the attitude which has
prompted me to speak in the utmost frankness to-day. I am moved
first of all by love of my own country and my devotion to its interest;
but I am also moved by very deep affection for Japan and my sincere
conviction that the real interests, the fundamental and abiding
interests, of both countries call for harmony of thought and action
in our relationships. Those who know my sentiments for Japan
developed in happy contacts during the seven years in which I have

556 ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

lived here among you, will realize, I am sure, that my words and my
actions are those of a true friend.

One Japanese newspaper queried, on my return from America,
whether I had concealed in my bosom a dagger or a dove. Let me
answer that query. I have nothing concealed in my bosom except
the desire to work with all my mind, with all my heart, and with
all my strength for Japanese-American friendship.

To-day I have stated certain facts, straightforwardly and object¬
ively. But I am also making a plea for sympathetic understanding
in the interests of the old, enduring friendship between our two
great nations. In a world of chaos I plead for stability, now and in
the long future, in a relationship which, if it can be preserved , can
bring only good to Japan and to the United States of America.

THE BACKGROUND OF A HISTORIC ADDRESS
October 19, 1939

The background of the speech is described in the following
memorandum which I gave to Dooman, Creswell, and Smith-Hutton
after my return to Tokyo:

During my stay in the United States American public opinion
was steadily hardening against Japan. The denunciation of the
Treaty of 19x1 was almost universally approved and there is an
almost universal demand for an embargo against Japan next winter.
The present attitude of the administration is that we will not allow
American interests to be crowded out of China. If Japan retaliates
against an American embargo, there is every probability that our
Government will counter-retaliate in some form or other.

I have pointed out that once started on a policy of sanctions
we must see them through and that such a policy may conceivably
lead to eventual wax. There is, however, no sign whatever of weak¬
ness in the administration’s attitude now or in the attitude of the
public. The President and the Secretary of State seem determined
to support our position in the Far East. The full naval manoeuvres
are to take place in Hawaiian waters. There has been talk of
landing further American marines in Shanghai, but such a step,
just before I left Washington, was held in abeyance. There can
be little doubt, however, that if the Japanese military in China
continue their depredations against Americans and American
interests, and if they progressively take measures to drive them out
of China, our Government will take retaliatory measures regard¬
less of the eventual outcome, and the administration will be sup¬
ported by the great majority of the American public. Very little
is now heard of the wisdom of folding our tents and withdrawing
gracefully from a possibly untenable position. Our position in the
Far East is regarded as an important factor in our position in world
affairs at large and not at all as an isolated problem.

Having in mind this attitude of the American Government

A dinner gathering at the American Embassy in honour of Captain Turner and the
officers of the U.S.S. Astoria, including (second from left) the late Mr. Iwanaga,
director of the Domei news service ; Captain Turner; War Minister General
Itagaki; Foreign Minister Arita; Ambassador Grew; Imperial Household
Minister Matsudaira ; Navy Minister Admiral Yonai; former Foreign Minister
Yoshizawa. Former Foreign Minister Admiral Nomura is directly behind Yoshizawa.

A meeting with prominent Japanese. Front row, left to right: Mr. Shigemitsu, for¬
mer Ambassador to the Court of St. James’s ; Ambassador Grew ; Prince Chichibu,
the Emperor’s brother; Mr. Hirota, former Foreign Minister; Count Kabayama!
Second row : Mr. Kishi, private secretary to Hirota ; Mr. Horinouchi, former Am¬
bassador to the United States ; Prince Konoye, former Prime Minister ; Count
Maeda, secretary to Prince Chichibu ; Baron. Harada, secretary to the Genro ;

Prince Saionji.

Meeting with Townsend Harris’ houseboy. Front row, left to right: Captain Martin,
Mrs. Crane, Ambassador Grew, Baron Masuda, who served Townsend Harris during
his mission to Japan m 1859, Colonel Crane, and Mrs. Masuda. Standing : Miss
Ueul^t Mt^Hutton, Mr. Fukukita. Back row: Count
ivabayama, Mrs. Grew, Admiral Unu, who attended Annapolis in his youth, and
unknown woman.

the Background oB a historic address 257

and people, we must reach the inevitable conclusion that the
time for exclusive reliance on the goodwill and efforts of the
Japanese Government, as contrasted with the Japanese military,
is past. Hitherto we in the Embassy have aimed to follow, as far
as reasonable, a policy of avoiding words or actions which might
tend to irritate the military. In view of the determined attitude
of the American Government and people, I believe that more
is now to be gained by discreetly conveying this present attitude
to the Japanese Government and people in order to offset the
prevailing feeling in Japan (at least prevailing before my de¬
parture in May) that in the last analysis the United States will
back down. I do not now think that we will back down, and I
believe that the efforts of the Embassy should now be directed
towards letting that fact gradually penetrate to the Japanese
consciousness. Only danger, and no good, can come from leaving
the Japanese under a misapprehension on that score. But those
efforts of the Embassy will have to be carried out with discretion.

During the past summer the Department of State was seriously
considering writing another strong note to Japan, but Mr. Dooman
advised against it and I supported him, on the ground that such
a note would do no practical good and would merely anger the
military, and that the record of our position was already complete.
I did, however, take the position that something should be done
to bring before the Japanese people the facts regarding the de¬
predations against Americans and American interests by the
Japanese military in China.

Those facts, so far as I am aware, are not generally known even
by influential Japanese, who are therefore inclined to regard
American opposition to Japan and Japanese policy, and to “ the
new order in East Asia/* as arbitrarily based on what they consider
to be obsolete legal technicalities on the one hand and a traditional
sympathy for China on the other. If any movement is to be
started by influential Japanese to restrain the military in their
efforts to force American interests out of China (I have in mind,
for instance, the members of the Privy Council, who presumably
are influential), those Japanese must first become aware of the
determined attitude of the American Government and public
and the facts on which that attitude is based. As long as mis¬
apprehension on those points continues to exist, we can hardly
expect constructive steps to be taken to improve our relations.
It is, of course, questionable whether any constructive steps or
effective steps can be taken to curb the military, but we must not
let that desideratum go by default.

There must be no tone of threat in our attitude. To threaten
the Japanese is merely to increase their own determination. The
attitude of the American Government and people must be pre¬
sented merely as a patent fact which exists and should therefore
be given full weight in formulating Japanese policy.

9

258 One world : two WAfes

It therefore seemed to me, and the President and the Depart¬
ment concurred, that in my initial address to the America-Japan
Society on returning to Tokyo, an effort should be made to get
across to the Japanese the real feeling in the United States and
the facts on which that feeling is based. The fact that I shalj
merely be reporting my observations in the United States du ring
the past four months will lend particular force to this opportunity,
and I believe that full advantage should be taken of it. Later
speeches will not have this advantage. My thought is to present
in as friendly a manner as possible, the points which the Department
had intended to include in its proposed but eventually abandoned
note. The America-Japan Society is about the only forum that
we possess. My speech would be fairly widely discussed and if
published at least in the Japan Advertiser would come to the attention
of a considerable element of influential Japanese both in the Govern¬
ment and out of it. Any complaint that I was going to the
Japanese public over the heads of the Japanese Government
could be met by the fact that prominent Japanese have in tim^
past used the Society to present the Japanese point of view (cf.
Viscount Ishii’s speech at the initial dinner after our arrival in
Japan in 1932) and that I can properly'claim an equal privilege.

After the speech was made, some of the American newspaper
correspondents were using such terms as “ dumbfounded,” “ as¬
tounded,” etc., in describing the reaction of the audience. As a matter
of fact, only Thompson of the United Press was present and he
scooped all the others, who had expected the usual diplomatic plati¬
tudes, but Morin of the A.P. and Hugh Byas very quickly began to
receive calls from New York for voluminous reports. The Japanese
press reacted just as I had expected, some of the papers accusing
me of arrogance, impertinence, and surprising lack of diplomatic
propriety. The general trend was that in spite of what I said, the
American people simply don’t know the facts and have construed a
few unintentional “ accidents ” into wholesale depredations. Also
that we still don’t understand the “ New Order in East Asia.” But
a few of the papers, notably the Tomiuri , which in the beginning had
castigated me personally for arrogance, eventually were courageous
enough to intimate in veiled language that there, might be some
merit in the American point of view and that it should be carefully
examined. Such attitudes here are generally regarded as sheer
heresy, but they showed that the inoculation was 66 taking. 55

SOME JAPANESE SIT UP AND TAKE NOTICE
October 25, 1939

One of my liberal Japanese friends has told me that ever since
my epoch-making” speech he had been discussing it with the
highest officials, notably the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister,

TWO CRITICAL MONTHS

259

Yuasa, one of the Emperor’s close advisers, and Count Makino, all
of whom had been studying the speech in detail. He said that he
had talked for between an hour and a half and two hours with each
of them. The speech, he said, had made a very deep impression ;
I had started the ball rolling at precisely the right moment, and now
the people mentioned, plus the War Minister, General Hata, and
General Yanagawa, who is heading the China Board, would form a
team to keep it rolling in the right direction.

He said that some doubt is felt with regard to solving the problem
of the New Order in East Asia versus the Nine-Power Treaty but
there is a genuine determination to take steps to clear the atmo¬
sphere with a view to improving public opinion in the United States
and to demonstrate Japan’s desire for good relations. He said he
believed that General Nishio, who had been sent to China to unify
the command and to stop the constant bickerings between the
military in the north and the military in the south, is likewise sym¬
pathetic to such a programme. The time had come to stop the
laissez-faire policy of letting America and Japan simply argue back
and forth across the Pacific without constructive action in Japan
and that my speech had turned the trick. He said that there was a
general consensus among the high personages he had talked with
that my more than two hundred notes of protest, which had lain
dormant in the Foreign Office or had been answered with empty
assurances of favourable action, should be constructively dealt with ;
that Admiral Nomura, the new Foreign Minister, would send for me
soon and was ready to listen in sympathetic vein to anything I might
say. He said that I must also have a talk with the Prime Minister,
who would be equally ready to listen.

TWO CRITICAL MONTHS

November 1, 1939

While the text of my speech was promptly given to the American
news agencies, I did not give it to the Japanese press, in spite of the
advice of a prominent Japanese to do so, because I wanted the
Foreign Office to know that I had observed this minimum of discretion
in not going over the heads of the Japanese Government in that
respect, and we so informed Yoshizawa, who was present, together
with Kishi and Mitani of the Foreign Office, and heard the address
delivered. I was banking on a public demand for publication of
the text and, sure enough, two days later the Foreign Office itself
asked me to release the text to the local press and it was promptly
done. This was perhaps a small point, but such points loom large
in Japan and it was duly noted.

The next two months, in my opinion, are going to be the most
critical in the.history of American-Japanese relations. Unless we can
get concrete results promptly and not only negative but also positive
Steps to show the American people that Japan desires and intends

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

260

to respect the interests and rights of* the United States in Ghina, the
pressure for an embargo against Japan next winter is going to be
great and Congress may demand it. By negative steps I mean
cessation of the bombings, indignities, and other flagrant inter¬
ferences with American rights ; by positive steps I mean something
like the opening of the Yangtze to foreign trade as concrete evidence
to present to the American public. That thesis I am presenting to
all with whom I talk and shall continue to do so unreservedly. This
is not a threat but the statement of an objective fact. If and when
we impose an embargo we must expect to see American-Japanese
relations go steadily downhill; it will then be too late for any possible
hope of improvement, and that is why the coming months will be
critical.

AMERICA’S ALTERNATIVES IN ITS RELATIONS
TOWARDS JAPAN

December 1, 1939

A Japanese recently remarked that what Japan most needs at
present is a statesman of the calibre of Prince Ito. No such figure,
alas, has emerged nor is likely to emerge, and through lack of strong
statesmanship Japan is bound to suffer. The Government is weak
and is “ floundering.” Yet to control and unify the heterogeneous
forces in Japan to-day would require a statesman of almost super¬
human ability.

The crux of Japanese-American relations lies in the fact that
while the Government is prone to give us soothing assurances, no
individual or group in Japan is strong enough to bring about the
full implementation of those assurances. There is little doubt that
the great majority of Japanese, both in the Government and out of
it, who know anything about foreign relationships want good rela¬
tions with the United States, but they have yet to grasp securely the
power of directing policy and taking measures in the effective way
which alone can bring about good relations. International relations
cannot thrive on mere pious expressions of intentions. I have told
them this, and am steadily continuing so to tell them, but it does
little good. The outlook for the future relations between the United
States and Japan does not now appear to be bright.

It is this outlook that now requires our most careful study and
concern.

Two Main Desiderata

Before proceeding further with these observations, I wish to make
clear the following points : my functions as American Ambassador
to Japan, as I conceive them, and therefore the functions of the
Embassy, involve two fundamental duties : first, the maximum pro¬
tection and promotion of American interests in this field ; second,
the maintenance and furtherance of good relations between the

America’s alternatives in its relations towards japan 261

United States and Japan. Even if and when these duties are found
to be in conflict, we are not relieved of either responsibility. Our
efforts must be to endeavour to align, so far as may be possible, these
two main desiderata. Our analyses and recommendations must keep
both of these primary purposes constantly in view. It then of course
devolves upon the administration rather than upon the Embassy,
in the light of larger policy, to determine the course to be followed
by our Government.

In shaping the future course of the United States in the Far East
our Government, I believe, should have in mind two distinct con¬
siderations. First and foremost, the fundamental principles of our
international policy, which are based upon our own respect for legal
commitments and our expectations of a similar respect on the part
of other countries. Second, a sense of realism which takes cognizance
of the existence of objective facts. When principle clashes with realism
and when no one can be found to align them, then the question in¬
evitably presents itself: to what extent, if at all, can we or should
we seek adjustment by compromise? Should we ever compromise
between principle and realism ? We have now attained the desired
maximum of our own national entity as well as adequate national
strength. International morality, including respect for legal com¬
mitments and permanent abandonment of force as an instrument
of national policy, has become for us at once a watchword and a
religion.

The United States is solemnly (to use that somewhat overworked
Wilsonian term) committed to uphold the principles of the Nine-
Power Treaty, primarily to uphold the territorial and administrative
integrity of China and the Open Door. Therein lies the point of
principle.

On the other side of the picture, nothing in international affairs
can be more mathematically certain (if anything in international
affairs is ever certain) than that Japan is not going to respect the
territorial and administrative integrity of China, now or in future,
has not the slightest intention of doing so, and could be brought to
do so only by complete defeat. Observance in practice of the Open
Door is and will continue to be a matter of degree governed by
expediency, not by principle. Herein lies the point of realism.

Can Japan Be Defeated?

Given the situation now existing in Europe, there does not now appear
on the horizon the possibility of such a defeat being inflicted by any
nation or by any set of circumstances, military, social, economic, or
financial. There may be temporary set-backs or a stalemate in the
militar y field or even, over a course of time, under increasing Chinese
pressure, what the military experts call <c strategic withdrawal to
previously prepared positions ”—in other words, withdrawal into
North China, the control of which was the primary purpose of the

262 one world : two wars

so-called “ China Incident ; ” there may be financial and economic
difficulties and depressions ; a pulling in of the belt ; perhaps serious
hardships ; there may be increasing social unrest at home ; but of an
overwhelming debacle there is little present outlook.

I have already drawn attention to the beginning of an inflationary
movement in this country, and I shall later discuss the further de¬
velopment of this movement as reflected in slower absorption of
government bonds, a large increase in the paper currency, and
mounting commodity prices, along with far-reaching measures de¬
signed to control prices. Attempts to control the supply and demand
of rice are causing wide agrarian unrest. It is my opinion, however,
that even if worse came to worst there is realization that Japan has
irrevocably committed herself to the continental adventure and is
determined to see it through. The majority opinion in the Embassy,
which I myself share, does not believe that an American embargo,
even if it covered all American exportation and importation to and
from Japan, would bring about such a debacle as would cause the
Japanese to relinquish their programme in China.

Statisticians have proved to their own satisfaction, and will con¬
tinue so to prove, that Japan can be defeated by economic pressure
from without. But the statisticians generally fail to include psycho¬
logical factors in their estimates. Japan is a nation of hardy warriors,
still inculcated with the samurai do-or-die spirit which has by tradi¬
tion and inheritance become ingrained in the race. The Japanese
throughout their history have faced periodic cataclysms brought
about by nature and by man : earthquakes, hurricanes, floods,
epidemics, the blighting of crops, and almost constant wars within
and without the country. By long experience they are inured to
hardships and they are inured to regimentation. Every former
difficulty has been overcome. Estimates based on statistics alone
may well mislead.

“ The Mew Order in East Asia ”

During the months since my return from the United States I have
carefully and thoroughly studied opinion in Japan, including opinion
in the Government, the Army, the influential elements in civil life,
the business world, and the masses, and on one issue that opinion
can definitely be said to be unanimous : the so-called “ new order
in East Asia has come to stay. That term is open to wide interpre¬
tation, but the minimum conception of the term envisages permanent
Japanese control of Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and North China.
In the Army and among certain elements of the Government and
the public the conception is very much broader; those elements
would exert Japanese control throughout all of China, or as much
of China as can now or in future be grasped or held, Winding the
treaty ports and the international settlements and concessions.
Control m Manchuria is already crystallized ’ through the puppet

America’s alternatives in its relations towards japan 263

state of “ Manchukuo ; ” control in Inner Mongolia is a problem
for the future. It is hoped and expected here that control of North
and Central China will be exercised by setting up the two regimes
under Wang Keh-min and Wang Ching-wei. These plans, of course,
envisage long-term and probably^ permanent Japanese garrisons to
compel subserviency to Japanese interests. It would be difficult to
find any Japanese who visualizes “ the new order in East Asia ” as
less far-reaching than the foregoing minimum conception.

The pill will be most carefully sugar-coated, and the Japanese arc
past masters at sugar-coating their desiderata and intentions. They
say, and many of them actually believe, that all this is being done
to bring permanent peace to China in the interests of the Chinese
themselves ; theirs is a “ holy war.” They also say, and many of
them believe, that it is being done to prevent the spread of Co mmuni sm
into Japan proper, thereby casting aspersions, it would seem, on the
generally accepted ability of the Japanese police to control and
eradicate “ dangerous thoughts ” within the country. They will tell
you, and they do tell you, that once the Wang Ching-wei regime is
fully established and peace once more reigns among the bellicose
Chinese who are themselves incapable of maintaining peace, why
then American interests will be fully respected, the Open Door and
equal opportunity will flourish in the land, and everything will be
serene. Only a little patience is needed, they say, until all this lovely
dream gets stabilized, as it is quite certain to do. We need not be
misled by these assertions.

We ourselves can epitomize Japan’s fundamental desiderata
perhaps better than many Japanese can. They desire :

(1) Strategic protection against a future attack by Soviet Russia,
particularly an attack on Manchuria.

(2) Economic security through control of the raw materials in
flViina which Japan herself does not adequately possess. Japan is
economically vulnerable.

(3) Eradication of both anti-Japanese and Communistic activities
and propaganda in China, especially in North China.

The Japanese extremists desire much more, but the foregoing de¬
siderata represent the fundamental and minimum purposes of Japanese
aggression, beginning with the Manchurian campaign in 1931.

To await the hoped-for discrediting in Japan of the Japanese
Army and the Japanese military system is to await the millennium.
The Japanese Army is no protuberance like the tail of a dog which
might, be cut off to prevent the tail from wagging the dog: it is
inextricably bound up with the fabric of the entire nation; its
ramifications are far too deep for any effective amputation, or any
effective withering through discredit. Certainly there are plenty of
Japanese who dislike the Army’s methods; there is plenty of restive¬
ness at the wholesale impressment of the able-bodied young men to
fight in China, of the death and crippling of many, and of the restric¬
tions and handicaps in everyday life entailed by the expenses of the

264 ONE WORLD i two wars

campaign. But that the Army can be discredited in the eyes of the
people to a degree where its power and prestige will become so
effectively undermined as to deprive the Army of its control or at
least of its preponderant influence in shaping national policy is an
hypothesis which, I believe, no one intimately conversant with Japan
and the Japanese would for a moment entertain. It is reluctantly
felt that the entertaining of such an hypothesis is unfortunately but
unquestionably a case of the wish being father to the thought. Should
any coup d'etat occur in Japan through social upheaval, there is little
doubt that it would immediately lead to a ruthless military
dictatorship.

So here we find ourselves squarely faced with a problem which, from
all present indications, is to be permanently with us : the problem
of principle versus realism. What are we going to do about it ?

First of all, I do not think that our Government can, or should,
or will compromise with principle. It is unthinkable to me, and
presumably unthinkable to the administration and to the great
majority of the American people, that in this day and age we should
do so. We need not do so. Unless or until the provisions of the
Nine-Power Treaty are modified by “ orderly processes ” we should
and must respect and honour our own commitments under that
agreement. . . .

Is an Isolated Japan Desirable ?

The argument is often advanced that Japan should and can be
brought to terms through isolation. The corollary is furthermore
advanced that unless isolated and reduced by economic and financial
attrition to the rank of a second- or third-class power, it is only a
question of time before Japan continues her continental and overseas
expansion, involving the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies,
and other Western possessions in the Far East; that the time to
restrain her expansion is now.

With regard to this thesis, I raise the following considerations.
The resort to methods calculated to bring about the isolation of
delinquent nations must presuppose in the final analysis the use of
force. Sanctions commenced but not carried through bring in their
wake a loss of prestige and influence to the nation declaring them.
Sanctions carried through to the end may lead to war. This state¬
ment seems to me to be axiomatic and hardly open to controversy.
In my view, the use of force, except in defence of a nation’s sovereignty,
can only constitute an admission of a lack, first of goodwill and,
second, of resourceful, imaginative, constructive statesmanship. To
those who hold, with regard to the specific situation with which we
are dealing, that it is not enough for goodwill and statesmanship
to exist only on one side, my rejoiner would be that these factors
exist also in Japan, albeit in latent form until now, and that one of
the functions of diplomacy is to bring those factors into full vigour.
Shidehara diplomacy has existed ; it can exist again.

THREE CONVERSATIONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER NOMURA

265

There will be time enough to speak of sanctions when the resources
of diplomacy shall have been exhausted. At the moment of this
writing, those resources have not yet been exhausted. By nature
not a defeatist, I believe that those resources may yet win the day.

THREE CONVERSATIONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER

NOMURA

December 4, 1939

The Foreign Minister, Admiral Nomura, asked me to call on him
in his official residence at 2.30 to-day. Having been closeted with
the Prime Minister, he came fifteen minutes late, very apologetic
for the delay. The interview lasted for one hour and a half.

The Minister said that he was glad to resume our talks, the last
of which had occurred on November 4, and that he was sorry for
the delay in continuing them. He said that he had carefully studied
the statements which I had made at our last meeting as well as the
documents left with him. He considered very valuable the sugges¬
tions which I have made to him with regard to the importance of
fiimishing direct evidence of the intention of the Japanese authorities
to put an end to the bombings of American property, the insults
to American citizens, and the encroachments on American com¬
mercial activities in China which must be removed. Admiral Nomura
realizes that the impression exists in the United States that these
various acts have been deliberate and that there is an intention on
the part of the Japanese authorities to expel American interests from
China. He wanted to give me categorical assurances that such an
impression is a misunderstanding and contrary to fact. Military
operations on an unprecedentedly gigantic scale over extensive
areas are going on in China and all of the incidents and cases of
which we have complained have been accidents. The Japanese
forces have been ordered to pay every possible attention in then-
power to protect and respect American property and citizens in
China. The Minis ter said that he had discussed this matter with his
competent colleagues in the cabinet and he could tell me as a fact
that the personnel of the military commands in China has been so
arranged as to ensure this protection and respect.

Admiral Nomura went on to say that such limitations to the com¬
mercial activities of Americans in China as have occurred are a result
of the militar y operations, including control of the occupied areas,
such operations not being consonant with the peaceful enjoyment
of ordinary commercial rights. These limitations are, however,
exceptional and temporary and our rights will be restored when
peace comes. It will only lead to misunderstanding and confusion
to generalize and to forecast future conditions on the basis of these
temporary circumstances.

At this point I mentioned some of the different ways in which
American commercial rights and interests were being injured,

9*

206 ONE W0RLD : TWO WARS

including the setting up of monopolies which ruined the business of
various American interests. It seemed to me difficult to explain these
monopolies ind other restrictions as due to military necessity. The
Minister said that in wartime it became necessary to control com¬
modities and that the monopolies and other handicaps could be
explained on this basis. I countered, however, with the observation
that many of these measures gave the American Government and
people the impression that they were intended to be permanent and
that I would welcome concrete evidence to the contrary.

Admiral Nomura repeated the assurances given me by his pre¬
decessors that the Japanese forces in China have not the slightest
intention to drive out American interests and that they have the
strictest orders to the contrary. He said that our commercial problem
in China should be dealt with both in Tokyo and in the field and he
requested that American officials in the field should keep in close
touch with local Japanese officials.

Admiral Nomura said that the cases both of bombings of American
property and insults to American citizens were decreasing. In
Pakhoi and Nanning, for instance, he has heard of no damage to
any American property in that area. Constructive measures were
also being taken to facilitate American commerce, as in the case of
shipments of wood oil from Hankow and of lace and drawnwork
from Swatow. The Minister was thus in a position, he said, to point
out that possible measures were being taken in line with the valuable
suggestions which I had made at our last meeting. He appreciated
my honest desire to improve relations and by way of reciprocating
this attitude he was now studying with the proper authorities such
measures as could properly be taken.

Admiral Nomura expressed the regret that while he and I were
making joint efforts to improve relations these efforts were being
injured by the sometimes too-liberal expressions of opinion by im¬
portant people in the United States, including statements with regard
to a possible embargo against Japan,

At this point I called his attention to the freedom of the American
press and of public discussion. I said that experience had taught
us that measures to control the utterances of the press or of in¬
dividuals often defeated their own object by causing an intensification
of those utterances. I added that the public statements of individuals
outside the Government, even though those individuals might be in
close touch with the Government, did not necessarily represent the
Government’s views. The Minister smilingly observed that the same
situation, especially with regard to the press, obtained also in Japan.

The Minister then said that he desired to present certain figures
to meet some of my representations in our last conference and my
concrete proposals for the settlement of pen ding questions. He said
that the list of cases which I had presented to him had been care¬
fully analysed and a resume drawn up on the basis of available
documents. He thereupon handed me an informal document in

THREE CONVERSATIONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER NOMURA 267

Japanese which he thought I would probably wish to have translated
and he read to me the following resume :

A. Representations acknowledged or answered

B. Representations not acknowledged or answered

(1) No acknowledgment or reply required

(2) Not acknowledged but the contents dealt
with by communication to the appropriate
officials in China

(3) Not answered but settled locally or dealt
with

(4) Investigations still going on but not yet
answered

(5) Miscellaneous

*79

203

27

8

no

36

Admiral Nomura expressed regret that some of our representa¬
tions had not been acknowledged or answered, owing to clerical
oversight, but he assured me that all of our representations were
receiving attention and that the competent officials were seeking
solutions.

Some cases had been settled or were about to be setded, and they
amounted to thirty-nine in all. In these cases the investigations had
been completed and the Japanese officials were in touch with our
own officials in Shanghai, trying to find solutions. The Minister said
that Mr. Yoshizawa would explain either to Mr. Dooman or to me
the details of the informal document which he had handed to me
and would also be glad at all times to discuss pending questions. He
said he thought it would be well for us to have periodical and frequent
talks with Mr. Yoshizawa and he recommended that the officials
of the Foreign Office and the Embassy constitute themselves as a
sort of permanent committee to deal with these pending matters.
Thus, speedy settlement of these questions could be made or agree¬
ment reached as to how to solve them and this should lead to more
stable relations between Japan and the United States.

The Minister alluded to the press reports that there are over six
hundred cases awaiting solution. Such incorrect reports mislead the
public and injure our relations. He thought it would be useful to
publish the actual facts and suggested that Mr. Yoshizawa get in
touch with us with that end in view.

The Minister then said he would now like to talk “ off the record,”
With regard to our treaty of commerce and navigation he said that
“ even if the treaty expires, I hope that relations may be maintained
in a normal way and that there will be no cause for the people of
both countries to get excited about.” Japan’s trade with the United
States represents a very large percentage of Japan’s entire trade, and
if commerce with the United States should be impaired Japan would
obviously have to seek other commercial channels.

As this seemed to me to contain an implied threat and as I felt
it might also be interpreted as an indirect move to open negotiations

268 0NE WORLD : TWO WARS

for a new treaty or for a modus vivendi, I read to the Minister a close
paraphrase of Secretary Hull’s remarks to the Japanese Ambassador
on November 24, emphasizing the considerations contained in the
last paragraph to the effect that the American Government did not
feel it incumbent upon itself to take the initiative in proposing practical
measures for removing the obstacles for friendly relations between
the two countries.

I then took up with the Minister the following matters :

1. Further attack on August 1 on the Lutheran Brethren Mission
at Tungpeh, Honan (Nyhus case).

2. Interference with the property of the Catholic Mission at Sinsiang.

3. I read to the Minister the pertinent parts of Peiping’s telegram
of October 20 with regard to mob attacks on the Free Methodist
Mission at Chenliu.

4. I asked the Minister to give his personal attention and interest
to a subject discussed by Mr. Crocker with Mr. Suzuki concerning
the setting up in the Embassy of a radio receiving set in order that
we might obtain direct information and news bulletins from our
Government in Washington. I said that such sets existed in most of
our important Foreign Service establishments, Japan being one of
the main exceptions ; that it was in the interest of both our countries
that we should maintain close and rapid communication with Wash¬
ington, and that while I did not wish to ask permission for establish¬
ing such a set in the Embassy (because this was a diplomatic right
which we could properly exercise without permission), nevertheless
I would prefer to obtain the definite approval of the Foreign Office
before proceeding.

5. I told the Minister of the facts concerning the Tucker case and
of the widespread interest which the case had aroused in the United
States. I said that I had received many telegrams from important
people at home expressing interest in the case and that our Govern¬
ment also took an official interest in it. I said that Mr. Tucker had
been released from prison after some six weeks in jail but that he
was to be tried within the next two weeks for what I understood
was an alleged indiscretion in passing out certain literature not ap¬
proved in Japan ; that the final result of the case would undoubtedly
be published in the United States and might have an important
effect on the American public as well as on Mr. Tucker’s friends.
I added that, not wishing to interfere with the normal process of
Japanese justice, I had made no formal representations in the case
but I wished the Minister to know of the general interest, including
official interest, evoked in the United States by the case. The Minister
said that it would be very difficult even for him to interfere in this
case, which was in the hands of the Department of Justice, and he
felt certain that Mr. Tucker would receive full justice.

The following press release was agreed upon : “ The Minister for
Foreign Affairs and the American Ambassador to-day continued their

; JrtiREE CONVERSATIONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER NOMURA 269

talks covering the general field of Japanese-American. relations in a
mutually constructive spirit. 59

December 18, 1939

Admiral Nomura asked me to call on him to-day at the Foreign
Office and in a conversation which lasted one hour and a half he
read to me, through Mr. Iguchi as interpreter, and then handed to
me the pro memoria that I at once conveyed to the Department.

The Minister informed me definitely that the Japanese Govern¬
ment intends to open the Yangtze River to general navigation as
far as Nanking “ in about two months.” The Minister added that
for the time being certain restrictions would probably have to be
imposed on such navigation owing to the military operations in China.

The Minister definitely proposed a modus vivendi to carry on Japanese-
American commercial relations after the expiration of the present
treaty of commerce and navigation and expressed the hope that,
as little time is now left before the expiration of the treaty, negotia¬
tions for a new treaty could commence shortly, if possible before
Christmas. I replied that I had no instructions with regard to this
matter and asked if the Minister desired me to communicate this
to my Government as a definite proposal from him. He replied in
the affirmative.

The Minister also touched on the following points :

1. Our problems were divided by the Minister into cc positive 55 and
“ negative 59 categories. I replied that between our two countries
there exist certain differences of opinion involving matters of funda¬
mental principle, which as the Minister conceived them might not
fall within either of the above-mentioned categories.

2. In my conversation with the Minister on November 4, I do not
recall mentioning the possibility of bringing about in the United
States “ a speedy 55 reversal of public opinion.

3. After Nomura had completed his statement and I had ex¬
pressed my own appreciation of the Japanese Government’s efforts
to improve relations between our two countries, I conveyed to him,
informally and fully, as under my Government’s instructions, the
reaction of the Department to the statements made to me by
the Minister on December 4. 'This included the observation of the
Department that it feels that the efforts of the* authorities of Japan
thus far have litde more than “ touched the fringe of the problem.”

4. With regard to the two “ companies 95 and monopolies Nomura
said that it had become necessary to set up “ economic blocs ” among
Manchukuo, Japan, and China in order to overcome difficulties
in questions of national defence. But he declared that Japan has
no intention of excluding other .countries and is “ quite ready to
welcome foreign capital.” When ,1 asked the Minister “ On a non-
discriminatory basis ? ”, he replied merely that foreign participation
would be welcome in those enterpri ses.

270 ONE WOftLD i TWO WAk§

5. The Minister observed that with regard to currency questions
they “ had to finance the Army ” but that these discriminations
“ when the fighting stops and a Government of China is set up will
be modified.’ 9

6. The Minister said, “ off the record/’ at the end of our conversation
that we must prevent, in the interests of both our countries, the war in
Europe from spreading to the Far East and that Japanese-American
conciliation will be a powerful factor in avoiding such a contingency.

December 22, 1939

In an interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs this evening
I conveyed to him orally the two separate statements substantially
as set forth in two paragraphs from the State Department, dated
yesterday. I also quoted the Department’s instruction of December 18,
'which I handed to the Minister in the form of a pro memoria .

Admiral Nomura replied orally in Japanese and the interpreter
[later handed me the following translation of his remarks :

“ The fact that the American Government has decided to take
measures to facilitate normal commercial relations even after the
termination of the effectiveness of the Japan-America commercial
treaty and Your Excellency’s efforts in this direction are greatly
appreciated. However, the question of the commercial treaty is not
limited to the commercial relations between the two countries but
does, rather, in many ways relate to the general relations between
our two countries. For example, even if commercial relations are
maintained on a nearly normal basis without specific agreement, it is
impossible to forecast day-to-day conditions in such relations. This
is an uncertain prospect. In view of these considerations and looking
to the improvement of relations between the United States and
Japan from the broad viewpoint, I earnestly request that Your
Excellency’s Government give very careful consideration to the
question of concluding a modus vive?idu

“ 1 ma Y inform Your Excellency that, as Mr. Yoshizawa, Chief of
the American Bureau, has already communicated to Mr. Dooman,
Counsellor of Your Excellency’s Embassy, the Japanese Government
after careful study of the question from the above viewpoint has
prepared a draft modus vivendi and has telegraphed this draft to
Ambassador Horinouchi in Washington ; and has informed him that
he may submit the draft plan to the State Department in Washington
at a propitious moment during his conversation there.”

In our subsequent conversation I repeatedly made clear that Japan
now had to give concrete implementation of its assurances that
American rights and legitimate interests in China will be respected
on a nondiscriminatory basis.

The following press release was mutually agreed upon in sub¬
stance and definite assurances were given me that no publicity beyond
this release would be given out by the Foreign Office :

The Minister for Foreign Affairs and the American Ambassador

ANGLO-JAPANESE INCIDENT PUTS AMERICAN AMBASSADOR m SHADE 27I

this afternoon continued their conversations with regard to matters
of interest to the two countries. Both the Minister and the Ambas
sador indicated a mutually helpful attitude towards a solution of the
problems under discussion. Progress was made. The conversations
will be continued.

ADMIRAL YONAI HEADS A NEW JAPANESE CABINET
January 14, 1940

The cabinet resigned and Admiral Yonai formed a new cabinet
with Arita as Foreign Minister and my old friend Fujihara as Minister
of Commerce and Industry. Yonai was the man who put the blocks
to a military alliance with Germany last spring ; I go t to know him
at the time of the visit of the Astoria with Saito’s remains ; he dined
at our Embassy and I dined with him at the big Navy dinner, after
which he told me that I need have no further anxiety about an alliance
with Germany.

ARITA RETURNS TO JAPANESE FOREIGN OFFICE
January 18, 1940

Arita received the ambassadors individually, on assuming office
in succession to Admiral Nomura. He told me that he had instructed
Horinouchi to call on Mr. Hull to arrange the status of “ treaty
merchants ” after the expiration of the treaty and he hoped that I
would support the matter in order to avoid injury to the nationals of
both countries. I merely reported the statement of fact. The De¬
partment knows my views. Later the Department cabled that the
Japanese Counsellor who called on Hombeck, Horinouchi being ill,
was told that the conversations regarding the treaty status should be
carried on in Tokyo, so I shall now probably be called by Arita and
can only cable his proposals back to Washington. This is something
like a game of battledore and shuttlecock, but I think the Department
is wise in concentrating the conversations in one place. I spoke to Arita
briefly and informally of the unfortunate publicity in Tokyo which had
misled the public into believing that I had given Admiral Nomura
assurances that a treatyless situation would not arise. Now, however,
the situation is being presented by the press in its proper perspective.

AN ANGLO-JAPANESE INCIDENT PUTS THE AMERICAN
AMBASSADOR IN THE SHADE

January 23, 1940

The incident in which a British cruiser stopped the Asama Maru
and took off twenty-one Germans, said to be liable to naval service
in Germany, promises to cause a first-class scandal, especially due
to the fact that the incident occurred almost in sight of the Japanese
coast. One Japanese paper says that “ the soul of Japan has been

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

272

polluted,” and when Sir Robert Craigie pointed out in a public
statement that there have been more than 191 cases of visit and search
by Japanese warships of British vessels off Hong Kong, the Japanese
press rose in its wrath and, after charging the Ambassador with
impertinence for publishing any explanatory statement at all, shrieked
with fury at the idea of comparing noble Japan with a mere colony
like Hong Kong. The emotional patriotism and chauvinism of the
entire country have been let loose.

Incidentally, when I called for Craigie to-day to take him to the
American Club luncheon, he smilingly apologized for having for
the moment crowded me out of the limelight. I replied that he was
more than welcome to the limelight and begged him to stay right
where he is and to leave me peacefully in the shadow.

APPROVAL FROM F. D. R.

February 14, 1940

The pouch came in to-night. I had sent personally to the President
the preamble to my November diary, written and dated December
1, with regard to the policy that I felt should be pursued towards
Japan, saying that “ I am reluctant to inflict you with a lot of read¬
ing material but I guess that your practised eye can get the pith of
any document in short order.” F. D. R. wrote me a very pleasant
reply, adding : “ I am delighted with your handling of delicate tasks
in a difficult situation. My kindest regards to Mrs. Grew.—Yours in
common effort,” etc.

MORE SIGNS OF HESITATION IN JAPAN
April 10, 1940

The Diet ran its course and faded out. Wang Ching-wei opened
shop and I wonder how long it will take for him to fade out too.
The fundamental essentials for stability and permanency, apart
from Japanese bayonets, appear to be lacking, and unless Japan is
willing and able to keep a very considerable number of bayonets in
that part of the world for a long time to come, it does not now appear
that Mr. Wang will continue to feel quite sure of his footing. Pre¬
dictions as to future developments are just as futile as they usually
are in the Far East because of the many imponderable factors in the
situation, but we can at least say that the futility of the China campaign,
in its larger aspects, is steadily coming home to the great majority
of thinking Japanese.

The foregoing assertion is based on many observations and many
talks with important Japanese. A very small proportion of these
observations and talks is covered in the diary, but just as health
diagnoses are based on symptoms, I find peculiarly symptomatic a
recent conversation with a well-known and influential Japanese
publicist who in recent years has periodically indulged in published

more signs of HESITATION IN JAPAN 273

broadcasts of defiance against the United States and Great Britain
in vitriolic terms and enunciating Japanese chauvinism at its worst.
In two long talks of several hours this Japanese made inter alia two
astonishing statements. One statement was that he had carefully
examined all of Mr. Hull’s published utterances since the beginning
of the China campaign and had reached the conclusion that Mr.
Hull was profoundly right in everything that he has said and that
Japan is wrong.* The fact that the Japanese under reference is a
substantial and hardheaded type is sufficient to disprove the thought
that he might have been using soft soap for ulterior motives. The
second thing he said is even more significant, namely that, in his
carefully considered opinion, the China Incident can never be solved
until Japan makes up her mind : (1) to deal directly with Chiang
Kai-shek ; (2) to permit the interference (I think he meant media¬
tion) of third interested powers, and (3) to define the “ new order in
East Asia.” For a nationalistically minded Japanese to say this to
the American Ambassador was, I submit, highly symptomatic.

Time, I believe, will play into our hands if we allow nature to
take its course unhindered by us. By hindrances I mean steps in the
nature of sanctions. What I have felt—and preached—for a long
time, I feel still more certainly now. To-day I have been talking
separately with two Americans—Brooks Emeny, author of The Strategy
of Raw Materials , and Jimmie Young, whose recent imprisonment,
trial, and conviction for allegedly spreading false rumours about
the Japanese Army might well have adversely affected his objective
views concerning Japan. Each of these men, separately, agreed
completely and genuinely with my thesis.

One of them, Emeny, recently asked a prominent Japanese what
he thought would happen if the United States declared a legal em¬
bargo against Japan. The Japanese replied that the result would
depend somewhat on the way it was done. If the step were taken
in a way that would injure Japan’s “ face,” retaliation would occur
regardless of the outcome. It is difficult to see how a legal embargo
could be imposed without injuring Japanese face because, even if
it were labelled ostensibly for the purpose of conserving American
resources, the Japanese would know better simply because a punitive
embargo has so long been threatened, and things would almost certainly
happen here which might well render Japanese-American relations
precarious.

Many American writers and speakers discount the possibility of
Japan’s declaring war on the United States under any circumstances,
especially while the former has her hands full in China, but what
those speakers and writers do not understand is the potential intensity
of Japanese nationalistic fanaticism, represented by important
elements in the Army as well as the civilian population, which not
only could and would halt in its tracks the efforts of the present
Government and the liberal-minded elements in the country to steer
a course of conciliating the United States, but also could and probably

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

<274

would take steps which could subject Japanese-American relations
to a serious if not dangerous strain. If war comes between the two
countries it will probably not come through plans carefully weighed
and calculated by either side in advance but through spontaneous
combustion arising from an act or acts of an inflammatory nature.
The American people do not want war with anyone ; certain
prominent Americans discount the possibility of* war and they tell the
people that there is no risk of war. The voices raised against this
thesis include a few far-seeing men like Walter Lippmann, but the
others appear to have almost a clear field.

General Abe, the former Prime Minister who has been appointed
envoy to the Wang Ching-wei regime and is to proceed to Nanking
on April 15, is going ostensibly to negotiate with Wang Ching-wei
a basis for Japanese recognition and a treaty, but his real negotia¬
tions will be with the Japanese military authorities on the spot, and it
remains to be seen how much he can secure of the Konoye programme
in principle arid in practice. The future as regards Japanese-American
relations will depend in large degree on the outcome of these
negotiations.

The next few months may be important, perhaps even critical,
but that is a trite observation which I make periodically. I do not
yet know whether I ought to go on leave to the United States this
spring or not. If there appears a real opportunity for constructive
work here I shall not go. On the other hand, there is little more
that I can say to the Japanese Government; our position has been
made abundantly clear ; we can only await results. It may be that
I can do more useful work at home and, furthermore, gain in wisdom
by listening more closely to the voice of our Government and people
as I did last summer, with profit. I shall talk to Arita and see what
he has to offer, and shall again consult Washington towards the end
of April or the beginning of May.

ARITA ENDS THE CONVERSATIONS NOMURA BEGAN
April 26, 1940

When Mr. Arita came to the Embassy this evening I asked whether
he desired our conversation to be formal or informal. He replied,
“ Entirely informal.” He then said he wished to apologize for
having failed to carry out his intention expressed to me when he
took office last January, to continue the conversations begun with me
by his predecessor, Admiral Nomura. After studying the situation,
he had come to the conclusion that because of the wide discrepancy
in the views of our two countries in matters of principle, a continuance
of the conversations looking towards the negotiation of a new com¬
mercial treaty at this juncture would be futile.

' I agreed with Mr. Arita that important discrepancies in questions
of principle existed in the views of our two Governments, but I added
that more acute phases of the difficulties between the United States

AklTA ENDS THE CONVERSATIONS NOMURA BEGAN

275

and Japan centred in the continued and recently aggravated inter¬
ference on the part of the Japanese armed forces with American
rights and interests in China which I felt should be obviated before
the problems involving questions of principle could successfully be
solved. At this point I showed to the Minister and read the headings
of a statement of more than twenty typewritten pages covering the
instances of renewed bombings, personal indignities, et cetera, which
have occurred since the first of this year, as well as a great number
of instances of current interference with American business, trade,
and commerce through monopolistic measures and exchange control,
and import and export control restrictions in China.

I said that I had become greatly discouraged by this recrudescence
of bombings and other acute cases of interference with American
rights, and by the absence of visible effort to implement the assurances
continually given us with regard to the intention of the Japanese
Government to ensure in practice the principle of equal opportunity
and respect for American commercial and other interests in China.
The Minister replied that Mr. Tani had informed him of my recent
representations concerning the bombings and the difficulties at the
barriers in Tientsin, and that he was doing his best to ameliorate
these conditions. He hoped that the barriers in Tientsin would soon
be raised. At least some of our complaints regarding monopolistic
measures and exchange control and import and export restrictions
would be solved when the hostilities in China were terminated. The
Minister referred to his efforts to settle claims for damages in China
which, even though the results might not be entirely satisfactory to
the claimants, nevertheless represented an effort made in good faith
to meet these claims. I acknowledged these efforts but added that
thus far they had barely touched the fringe of the whole problem.^

The Minister then spoke of the rumours of my return to the United
States on leave of absence. I replied that the question of leave of
absence arose annually, and that my plans for this year were not
yet settled, but that frankly, after waiting in vain for the last several
months for some evidence of implementation of the assurances given
me with regard to an improvement in the situation of American
rights and interests in China, and seeing only a recrudescence and
intensification of interference with those rights and interests, I was
becoming doubtful of my ability to accomplish constructive work
here, and felt that personal contact with my Government at this time
might be more helpful than remaining in Tokyo. I said that I had
already made the position and attitude of my Government perfectly
clear to the Japanese Government and that we were now waiting
patiently but apparently futilely for results.

The Minister said that he hoped that I would not leave Japan at
this juncture because the Japanese public, which at present is very
much disturbed at tire worsening of Japanese-American relations,
would interpret my departure as a partial rupture of relations and
that the public reaction might be “ very serious.” I replied that I

276 OtoE WORLD : TWO toAfes

would consider the matter in the light of the Minister’s views and
would let him know of my decision shortly. If I should decide to
abandon my leave of absence, I hoped that the decision would prove
to be justified through a positive improvement in the situation of
American interests in China.

A desultory discussion of the war in Europe followed. In spite of
some acrid comments, the conversation, which lasted approximately
one hour, was conducted in friendly vein and tone. I ended on the
note that statesmanship must look to the long future rather tha n to
the immediate present, and that the reasons for Japanese-American
friendship are fundamental and must win out in file long run simply
because, in the long run, Japan cannot get along without the friend¬
ship of the United States.

JAPAN AND THE NETHERLANDS INDIES
May 1, 1940

The future status of the Netherlands East Indies, in case Holland
should be invaded by Germany, has become an important issue
The official statement of Arita on April 15, that Japan could not
view with equanimity any alteration in the status quo of the island
was inspired, we have reason to believe, by reports in various European
neutral capitals that the United States was contemplating taking the
islands under our protection in such circumstances, and we also
have reason to believe that it was a German who circulated these
reports. Anta’s statement led to a counter-statement by Mr Hull
that we also are interested in the fate of the islands. Arita remarked
ruefully to an informant that when he made his statement he had
no idea that the American Government would interpret it as an
indication that Japan herself intended to “ protect ” the islands.
At any rate, the exchange of pleasantries has served to put our own
Government squarely on record in this important issue.

“ PUT ME DOWN AS AN ORIGINAL WILLKIE MAN ”
June 10, 1940

Tt 7 t0 fc ! Mee who the ^publican presidential
wnrw be ' own choice wouId unquestionably be Wendell
V™°f’ a . nd *°f e tun e ago when I read his first speech and a descrip-

he wnf,M S ^ a< t 8r n Und ’ and character, I told Alice that

oriSf wmw TT she could P ut me down as an

ho^fn^S 6 ^ He hasn t emerged yet, but I think he will. I

bSTSJ^ ® ■«>** nnd be re-elected
Siryr 311(1 “ deabn§ effectively with the outstanding
^ 5 “ atwoa i interests to-day, namely, the paramount import¬
ance of getting ready to meet the coming Nazi penetration—I do

traiuSds m S S do~~ y ri~° f T? e Westem Hemisphere. That issue
transcends all domestic problems, and my guess is that if Roosevelt

A JAPANESE FUNERAL RECALLS THE OTHER JAPAN 277

is re-elected he will promptly veer to the right, so far as domestic
affairs are concerned, and lay all emphasis on preparedness. But
if Roosevelt for some unknown reason does not run again, or if,
contrary to indications, he should fail of re-election, then I should
like to see Willkie as our new President. He seems to me, from
this distance, to have honesty, strength, and experience, clear vision
and executive ability, and, above all, a clear conception of our
national problems in their perspective, and I base this judgment on
the very few but not the less significant utterances of his that I have
read. From now on we must base all our future calculations on the
hypothetical loss of the British fleet. Roosevelt appreciates that fact,
and from what I know of Willkie’s outlook I guess that he does too.

June 18, 1940

The diary has fallen back lately. We are already past the middle
of June, and with the appalling developments that are going on in
the world I have little stomach to sit down and record our trivial
Hnings an d interests here. When history comes to be pieced out,
however, even the trivial pieces in the puzzle-picture will fall into
place, so with reluctance I shall try to keep up the continuity of
this inadequate sketch. Events in Europe are bound to exert an
impor tant, possibly a drastic, influence in the Far East, and are likely
to lead to developments of far-reaching consequence. I am pro¬
foundly thankful that I didn’t leave the job at this, perhaps, crucial
period.

A JAPANESE FUNERAL RECALLS THE OTHER JAPAN
June ix, 1940

The Buddhist funeral rites for Prince Tokugawa to-day were
intensely impressive, as all such ceremonies are in Japan. Alice
and Doom a n and I and the Thai Minister were the only foreigners
visible at the intimate service, which lasted for nearly two hours,
from one till three o’clock, the other diplomats and the crowd merely
filing by after three o’clock to bum incense at the altar. After eight
years in Japan I had the feeling to-day of being not outsiders but
an intimate part of that group, almost as if the gathering were of
old family friends in Boston and not in Tokyo. We knew well a
great many of the Japanese and their wives who were sitting around
us, members of the outstanding families and dans. The Tokugawas,
Konoyes, Matsudairas, Matsukatas might have been' Saltonstalls and
Sedgwicks and Peabodys. We knew their positions, their ^ influence
and reputations, their personalities, and their interrdationships as well
as those of a simil ar group in Boston. And we felt too that they
regarded us as a sort of part of them.

This may sound a little snobbish, but that is not the idea at all.
It would be just the same as if we called them Okubos and Suzukis
and Hayashis in Tokyo and Smiths, Joneses, and Robinsons at home.

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

278

The simple fact is that we no longer feel like outsiders in such a
group, gnrl that the solemnity of honouring the memory of a friend
who had gone and the deep significance of the Buddhist ritual in
close association with other Japanese friends were just as significant
and solemn and intimate as if the ritual had been the Christian
service for the burial of the dead and the place Emanuel Church in
Boston.

GERMANY’S VICTORIES MAKE JAPANESE-AMERICAN
RELATIONS TAIL-SPIN

July 2, 1940

The political turmoil in Japan recorded in May has not relaxed ;
rather has it assumed increased intensity. The German victories,
the collapse of France, and the generally predicted defeat of England
are having their logical repercussions and effects here, particularly
in the Army, and of course among the extremists and the pro-Axis
elements. The military—blusteringly—and the Government—in some¬
what more moderate language—are demanding the complete cessa¬
tion of the flow of war materials into China from Indo-China, Hong
Kong, and Burma, as well as the removal of British troops from the
International Settlement in Shanghai. Meanwhile they are demand¬
ing that the Netherlands East Indies guarantee a free flow of com¬
modities desired by Japan regardless of the normal quotas and needs
of other countries, as well as co-operation with Japan in matters of
immigration and industrial exploitation in the islands.

The implication is that all these various demands must be met
—or else. Whether, in the event that all of these demands are not
satisfactorily met, Japan will adopt strong-arm methods, remains to
be seen. The Japanese Government is moving slowly and carefully,
but the extremists are increasingly vociferous and anything can
happen, including the early fall of the cabinet either peacefully or
through a coup <Titat as in the “ February 26 Incident.” The public
is increasingly anti-British and to a large extent anti-American. If
and when the cabinet falls there is talk of Prince Konoye succeeding,
but we do not think that he is ready to take over the reins of govern¬
ment. Our guess is Baron Hiranuma. The former is said to be
busy organizing his single-party system.

My private conversations with Arita on June 10, 19, 24, and 28
have led to no concrete results, but they have at least served to keep
the door open between our two Governments, which was their
p rimar y purpose. By meeting at the private houses of mutual friends
we have largely avoided publicity, although rumours of the talks
have of course leaked, and at least one newspaper mentioned the fact
that they were going on.

It is obvious that we cannot expect very much from a mere debat¬
ing match between the Foreign Minister and myself, although we
hear from a reliable source that the Prime Minister, Admiral Yonai,

first conversation with foreign minister matsuoka 279

was annoyed with Arita for not giving me more encouragement.
American-Japanese relations have got into a vicious circle. On the
one hand, we ourselves take the position that there are three main
obstacles to an improvement in our relations, namely, (1) Japan’s
use of force as an instrument of national policy ; (2) Japan’s
failure to respect treaty commitments, and (3) Japan’s multifarious
interferences with American rights and interests in China. On the
other hand, Japan takes the position that these various obstacles
cannot be removed as long as the hostilities in China are in progress,
and that even after the termination of hostilities, only some but not
all of our grounds for complaint can be removed. Furthermore, she
tcVpg the position that the absence of a commercial treaty between
the United States and Japan is in itself an important obstacle to an
improvement in our relations. The vicious circle is complete, and
how to break it is a puzzle which taxes imagination.

FIRST CONVERSATION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
MATSUOKA

July 26, 1940

The new. Minister for Foreign Affairs, Yosuke Matsuoka, to-day
received the diplomatic chiefs of mission individually in the usual
purely formal reception. Instead of the customary five minutes he
detained me in conversation for the better part of half an hour.

The Minister said at the outset that he had not yet had sufficient
opportunity to formulate policy, but he wished to say that when
the press asked him what his policy was going to be as compared
with the Hirota policy and the Arita policy and that of other ministers,
he replied that they need look for no so-called Matsuoka policy but
only for the policy of Japan.

The Minister then asked me to convey to Secretary Hull, for whom
he expresses the highest respect and admiration, the assurance
that he has always attached great importance to Japanese-American
relations. Mr. Matsuoka said that he had always been a very frank
t*lW and that in our contacts he might frequently say things which
could be regarded as undiplomatic, but he believed that much was
to be gained by frank and direct speaking. He then referred to an
article which he had written some time ago, stating that if the United
States and Japan ever have to fight each other they should know
precisely the causes and reasons for which they were fighting, and that
if war comes it should not develop, as in so many other cases in history,
through misunderstanding. I said for my part that I also had no
use for old-school diplomacy, that I also believed m straight¬
forward talk, and that I believed the Minister and I would both
profit by basing our relations on such an understanding. I thought
that we might rule out the word “ war.” , .

Mr. Matsuoka then said that history is based largely on the operation
of blind forces which in a rapidly moving world cannot always be

2 8 o one worli > : TWO WARS

controlled. I admitted that blind forces have played their part in
history, but I added that one of the primary duties of diplomacy and
statesmanship is to direct those forces into healthy channels, and
that I hoped before long to explore with him the present state of
American-Japanese relations in the confident belief that he and 1
approachiig the subject in the right spirit would accomplish a great
deal in giving helpful directive to the blind forces which he had
in mind.

I then asked Mr. Matsuoka if he would care to read the informal
record of my last talk with his predecessor, Mr. Arita, in which I
had presented various points of view of the American Government,
and I hoped that this record might afford a useful basis for our next
conversation. The Minister said that he would be very glad to read
the record, which he accepted and put in his pocket.

MATSUOKA TO ROOSEVELT

July 126, 1940

In the course of my first official meeting to-day with the new
Imperial Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, His
Excellency asked me to transmit a personal message from him to
President Roosevelt in the following tenor:

While passing through the United States several years ago follow¬
ing his departure from Geneva, Mr. Matsuoka, although at that
time he held no official position other than that of Member of
Parliament, had called upon Mr. Roosevelt at the White House
in order to pay his respects and as a friendly gesture because of
previous association with him. Mr. Matsuoka asked me now to
express privately to the President that he shared his lifelong hope
and interest in the preservation of world peace. He added, however,
that he had come to understand that since the world is constantly
evolving, changing, and growing, peace cannot be safeguarded by
adhering to the status quo. The League of Nations failed, he said,
because its member states had not had the courage to implement
Article 19 of the Covenant, which provides for adjustments to meet*
such evolution and changed circumstances. A new order must come
into being in the world, and the peace of the world must have as its
foundation our adaptation to the development and change.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT REPLIES TO FOREIGN
MINISTER MATSUOKA

August 3, 1940

President Roosevelt made the following informal comments on
the private message sent to him by Mr. Matsuoka, and I transmitted
them orally:

The assurance given by Mr. Matsuoka of his interest in maintain¬
ing world peace and his wish to preserve it, as well as the frankness

JAPAN GOES HELL-BENT TOWARDS THE AXIS £>8l

with which his views were expressed concerning the necessity for
adaptation to the growth of the world and world change in the
interest of realizing world peace, are a source of gratification. Reply¬
ing to Mr. Matsuoka in the same spirit and with the same frankness,
a genuine and durable world peace, in our opinion, cannot be achieved
by other than orderly processes and by dealing fairly and justly,
both of which entail respect for the rights of all concerned and which
allow all nations to attain their legitimate aspirations. Every nation,
including the American and the Japanese, naturally and rightly,
has its aspirations for progress and security. Changes which are
effected to these ends and by these means are healthful and are viewed
with satisfaction by the United States. The fact that there exists
among Japanese and American leaders a zeal for the preservation
of world peace provides an opportunity, taking for granted mutual
goodwill and sincerity, for exploration of a constructive nature in
the direction of advancing relations between the peoples and Govern¬
ments of Japan and the United States.

JAPAN GOES HELL-BENT TOWARDS THE AXIS
August i, 1940

It would be overstating the case to claim that during the life of
the Yonai cabinet we had been able to erect any structure in
American-Japanese relations, but we had at least laid a fairly
useful foundation upon which some sort of structure might have
been built had that Government continued in office. A typhoon
could hardly have more effectively wrecked a foundation than the
change of cabinet—with all that change implies—now appears to
have accomplished. For at first sight the Konoye Government,
interpreting popular and especially military demand, gives every
indication of going hell-bent towards the Axis and the establishment
of the New Order in East Asia, and of riding roughshod over the rights
and interests, and the principles and policies, of the United States
and Great Britain.

Those Japanese, especially in the Army, who favour such a policy
— and we must now reluctantly accept the patent fact that they are
vastly in the majority—see in the present world situation a “ golden
opportunity” to pursue their expansionist desires unhampered by
the allegedly hamstrung democracies. France is out of the picture ;
Holland could do no more than put up a nominal defence of the
East Indies in the fact of Japanese naval and mi litary power ; Great
Britain's hands are tied by the European war, her fleet fully occupied
in the West; while the United States, in the opinion of these
expansionists, dares not get embroiled with Japan while a poten
daily dangerous Hitler talks of eventually conquering the. Western
Hemisphere. The German military machine and system and their
brilliant successes have gone to the Japanese head like strong wine.

That is the new set-up. How it will perform in actual practice

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

£282

remains to be seen. In all probability Prince Konoye, reflecting the
presumable attitude of the Emperor and the elder statesmen, will
exert reasonable control over the “ wild men ” and will endeavour to
move slowly and with some degree of caution, at least until it becomes
clear whether Great Britain is going to win or lose the war. But
in the meantime the “ wild men,” aided and abetted by certain
elements of the press, are already engineering incidents calculated to
incite public opinion against the United States and Great Britain
and magnifying those incidents by incorrectly reporting and inter¬
preting the facts, and if we judge by previous anti-American and
anti-British campaigns in times past, there is good reason to believe
that this movement may well become progressively intense. Gener¬
ally such anti-American and anti-British campaigns have been waged
separately and at different periods, with the idea of driving the two
democracies apart, but now we, the British and ourselves, are regarded
as in much the same boat and will probably receive much the same

treatment. ... ,

Among the photostats of interesting clippings from the American
press received from the" Department in the last pouch I note that
with one exception these editorials and articles oppose a policy of
“ appeasing ” Japan, and that the single exception is an editorial in
the New York Daily Mews, whose arguments are presented by the
“ UVilna Information Service ” merely as a target to shoot at. It is
therefore amp ly clear, if these clippings represent a fair cross section
of the American press and of American opinion, that not many
voices are being heard in favour of trying to “ appease ” Japan. The
feeling appears from these clippings to be nearly unanimously the
other way.

“ Appeasement ” has acquired since Munich a connotation which
should for ever bar the word from the vocabulary of good states¬
manship. The attitude for which it stands is one from which I
utterly and conclusively disassociate myself. That term connotes
The recommendations which I have made at various
times during the past three years were calculated—if acted upon—
to avoid need or occasion for the use of “ appeasement ” in any phase
of our relations with Japan. The point which has possibly been
overlooked by those who share the views described in these clippings
is that, in the situation now existing, “ appeasement ” would be as
distasteful to Japan as it would be to the United States. Our series of
telegrams on Japanese press comment has not overlooked emphatic
statements to the effect that Japan will not respond to proposals
for adjustment of relations which the United States may make
on grounds of expediency or other considerations growing out of
the impact on the United States of the military situation in Europe.
I have before me an editorial which, commenting on the question
put by Sir Robert Graigie to Mr. Matsuoka whether Great Britain
can expect to improve her relations with Japan, states :

“ We know that British desires for improved relations with Japan

japan’s “ NEW STRUCTURE ” RISES FAST 283

are inspired only by British military defeats in Europe, and we cannot
expect that approaches in such circumstances to Japan for improve¬
ment of relations will be entertained.”

After reading these clippings, which I assume are a fair cross
section of the American papers, I have the impression that the
American press and therefore the American public do not differentiate
between “ appeasement ” and that form of adjustment of mutual
problems which should not be beyond the wit and goodwill of man to
bring about consistently with our honour, our interests, and our
obligation to third countries.

MATSUOKA AND STEINHARDT GET TOGETHER
August 24, 1940

For the first time since I came to Japan eight years ago, a Foreign
Minister has called me directly on the telephone ! It was Matsuoka,
just to thank me for the dinner last night, which he said he had
enjoyed enormously, and also to say that he had greatly enjoyed his
talk with Laurence Steinhardt, our Ambassador to Russia, this
morning. Matsuoka after last night’s dinner said that he would
welcome a further talk, and asked Steinhardt to come to see him this
morning. They talked for an hour and a quarter, and of course
Steinhardt told me everything. He particularly refused to discuss
Japanese-American relations, as he said that that was my bailiwick
on which he did not wish to presume. The talk was mainly about
Soviet Russia. Perhaps Matsuoka, in telephoning me, merely wanted
to make it clear that he was saying nothing behind my back.

Another interesting item is that Matsuoka sent his private secretary
to my private secretary to say that he was sending an English-speaking
Japanese to accompany Steinhardt all the way to Peiping and then
to the Siberian frontier, just to make sure that he would have no
difficulties with detectives and customs people en route . But what is
more interesting is that at our next meeting Matsuoka said that he
had told his private secretary to say to my private secretary that if at
any moment Steinhardt should feel that the purpose of this Japanese
was to spy on him, he was to send said Japanese packing back to
Tokyo. And what is most interesting of all is that Matsuoka’s private
secretary refrained from delivering that particular message. Evidently
he felt that he must censor his chief’s indiscreet remarks !

JAPAN’S “ NEW STRUCTURE ” RISES FAST
September i, 1940

August was a month of building up the ce new structure ” in Japan
under the Konoye Government and of more or less marking time in
foreign affairs while awaiting the result of the “ Batde of Britain ”—
upon which many things everywhere seem to be waiting.

, The “ new structure ” is going ahead fast and Japan is rapidly

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

284

becoming a regimented nation, although in its main outlines this
regimentation cannot be said to be either Fascism or Nazism. It is
very far from either. There is to be no single political party, as in
Italy and Germany, but rather an absence of all parties, the whole
country being held together in individual loyalty to the Emperor.
While there are as yet no concentration camps, the police and the
gendarmes are busy cracking down hard on all who violate the
principles of the “ new structure,” which involves an economical way
of life and a general frowning upon most forms of light-heartedness,
bright colours, fun, sport, and general gaiety, so much loved by the
Japanese, and, of course, “ dangerous thoughts. I fear that the
traditional Japanese smile will become less and less evident. Every
day the press announces some new restriction, some important, some
trivial, and their cumulative effect is imposing.

We are preparing a dispatch in which some of these restrictions
will be listed. They run all the way from announcements in matters
of foods and dress and behaviour to one perfectly serious statement
that concubines may no longer have telephones. What a blow to the
Romeos ! Several of the golf clubs have announced that hereafter
there shall be no tournaments for trophies, no caddies, no week-day
playing, no players under the age of twenty, no arriving at the courses
in automobiles, no wearing of knickerbockers in trains or trams, and
that all silver trophies possessed by members shall be turned in to be
mel ton up for the good of the nation. It is furthermore emphasized
in the announcement that golf is to be played hereafter only for the
purpose of building up physical sta min a. Again, what a blow to a
golfer’s paradise, as I have often called Japan. Gambling in all
forms is likewise frowned upon. Music is still permitted, but the
radio is more than ever inclined to blare martial airs and patriotic
songs, which, with the Japanese nasal method of singing, are too
horrible to tolerate. Alas, alas, what a life !

American-Japanese relations are marking time. In a recent instruc¬
tion I saw indications that our Government may be getting ready
to show its teeth, an instruction which I highly applauded. Outright
invasion of French Indo-Ghina has been held in check in spite of
milit ary pressure, but if it should become evident that Germany
is going to win the “ Battle of Britain ” I would look for an early
move not only on Indo-Ghina but likewise on Hong Kong and
probably, eventually, the Netherlands East Indies. I assume that an
attempted invasion of the Netherlands Indies would inevitably bring
us into a frontal dash with Japan, but I do not think that this
is likely to happen just now, first, because I have never for a moment
doubted and do not now doubt Great Britain’s ability to win the
war in the end, and second, because the Konoye Government will
probably take a long time attempting peaceful penetration into the
Indies through pressure diplomacy before embarking on the hazards
of an outright invasion; that is, if the Government can control
the Army and Navy. If their control is too strong, I look for further

A WARNING THAT JAPAN FAILED TO HEED 285

assassinations in due course, for the Japanese Government, with all
its totalitarianism and regimentation, will never be able to control th<*
military and the fanatics as they are controlled in Germany and Italy.

From my three or four talks with the new Foreign Minister*
Matsuoka, I have the impression of a loose talker but of a man who
is patently straightforward and sincere according to his lights. I
think that he genuinely wants to bring about better relations with the
United States and will do what he finds it possible to do in that
direction. But what he may find it possible to do remains to be
seen and we can only judge from facts and actions. At any rate,
he is the first Foreign Minister that I have known in Japan with
whom one can talk 44 off the record ” with entire frankness. Arita’s
habitual <c caution 95 is not evident in Matsuoka, and when I compare
him with the sphinx Count Uchida, I see the exemplification of the
extremes of diplomatic technique.

Prince Konoye I regard as a man of w’eak physique, poor health,
and weak will, who was most reluctantly catapulted into his present
position owing to his family name and tradition and by the force of
irresistible circumstances. He has a mighty job on his hands and it
will be intensely interesting to see what he can do with it.

That, roughly, is the set-up at the end of August.

A WARNING THAT JAPAN FAILED TO HEED
September 2, 1940

One of my liberal Japanese friends says that he has just seen Count
Kaneko 1 at Hayama, and that although the old gentleman is still
suffering from kidney trouble and skin disease he intends to come
to Tokyo soon for a meeting of the Privy Council, and will call on
me then to thank me for my visit last summer. I told my friend
that I would gladly call on Count Kaneko myself if this would save
his strength.

My friend said that Count Kaneko has heard rumours that American
business men are not disposed to conduct business with Japan at
present. He assumed that this report is not true but that General
Haraguchi is going over to the United States to find out what the
trouble is. I told my fiiend, and asked him to repeat it to Count
Kaneko, that the depredations of the Japanese military people in
China against American business and other interests are steadily
getting worse rather than better, and that the general situation
which I explained to Count Kaneko through my friend last spring
shows the reverse of any improvement. I sketched out this situation
in some detail, and told him that American trade and business in
China which have been built up through generations are being
effectively stopped by Japanese monopolies, exchange restrictions, and
other totally illegal methods because the Japanese want to control
the whole business field economically, financially, and politically.
x Elder statesman ; former friend of Theodore Roosevelt.

S$6 ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

My friend expressed astonishment and said that Kaneko had no
comprehension of this situation. I asked him to repeat to Count
Kaneko everything that I had said.

I then talked at length of the utter short-sightedness of the present
Japanese programme, not only with regard to its dependency on the
Axis, which would render Japan nothing but the tail of a kite, but
with regard to the proposed economic bloc in East Asia. I said a
good deal about the unwisdom of trusting Hitler in anything, and
told him why Germany would never countenance a Japanese victory
in China. I furthermore told him why the Germans were doing
everything in their power to embroil Japan with Great Britain and
the United States. I said that as a genuine friend of Japan I de¬
plored her future outlook, and feared that if she followed her present
course she would eventually emerge no longer a great power. All
the dictates of wisdom pointed to a course of developing friendship
with the United States if only from the practical, commercial,
economic, and financial points of view. But just as long as Japan
continued to interfere with our rights and proper interests in this
part of the world, any improvement in our relations was impossible.

My Japanese friend was visibly impressed and said that he would
return at once to Hayama to report my views to Count Kaneko. I hope
that the old gentleman will spill some of them at the next meeting
of the Privy Council. He knows that I am speaking as a friend of
Japan, and indeed it would be very difficult to say the things I do
say if that were not a fact and generally known as a fact. I 'feel
very strongly that Japan is headed straight for the rocks if she
persists in her present policy.

MATSUOKA EXPLAINS JAPAN’S ULTIMATUM
ON INDO-CHINA

September 20, 1940

An appointment was made 'with Mr. Matsuoka on the afternoon
of September 20, after the Department’s telegram of September 19
had been received and decoded, and I precisely acted upon the
instructions of the Department.

Mr. Matsuoka said that apart from some minor changes, the
particulars of which were not mentioned, it was true that an
ultimatum had been presented to the Governor-General of Indo-
China by General Nishihara. Matsuoka then explained the situation
to be as follows:

On August 30, the French Ambassador, under instructions of the
French Government and the Japanese Government, had signed an
agreement in Tokyo. The agreement provided, inter alia, for the
movement of troops of Japan through Indo-China and the temporary
use of air-ports. The Governor-General of Indo-China was, on
September 6, ready to sign an agreement which would have imple¬
mented the agreement signed in Tokyo on August 30, but he refused

mAtsuokA explains japan’s ultimatum on indq-china 287

for reasons not evident to the authorities of Japan and obstructed the
implementation of the agreement signed in Tokyo. The Japanese
Government felt obliged, although with reluctance, to ask the French
Government whether the actions of the Governor-General were
subject to control by the French Government, since the Governor-
General continued to be unco-operative, and whether on the basis
of the agreement signed in Tokyo the French Government was
exhibiting good faith. The French Government said that it was,
and since the Governor-General was evidently not acting in good
faith, and since the Japanese authorities were aware that to foreign
consuls stationed in Indo-China the Governor had boasted that he
was using obstructive tactics, the Japanese felt it necessary to present
their ultimatum.

Matsuoka said that the purpose of the measures was to enable
Japanese forces to attack Chiang Kai-shek and to bring peace to
China. As soon as hostilities have ceased, he added, the Japanese
forces will be withdrawn at once; the integrity and sovereignty of
Indo-China will be accorded full respect, and as a consequence there
will be no interference in East Asia with the status quo . The Minister
said that he, Prince Konoye, and other Government members repre¬
sented a minority opinion in Japan, and that it was their determination
that Japan should not oppress, exploit, or interfere with other
countries 5 integrity. He said that a struggle was taking place against
extreme elements within the country on this issue. My interruption
at this point was to the effect that the agreement with France included
clauses pertaining to commerce and economics in Indo-China
Matsuoka did not deny my statement but assured me that no
exploitation would occur.

The terms of agreement between France and Japan signed on
August 30 were confidential, said the Minister, and their divulgence
by either of the signatories would nullify them. He said he could
confidentially tell me, however, that France had broached the
subject first and had requested a renewal of guarantees pertaining
to France and Japan. This was negotiated at approximately the
same time that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was concluded. He did
not recall the exact date but said that the agreement was in effect
and registered with the League of Nations. (This presumably is the
agreement of June 10, 1907, between France and Japan.) I then
interrupted Matsuoka to ask what country’s encroachments France
desired guarantees against. Mr. Matsuoka said that this was a moot
question. He then went on to say that Japan had asked permission
to move forces across Indo-China and to be given temporary use of
air-ports as “ compensation ” for complying with the French request.
This information was given me in confidence, he emphasized, and
its accuracy would of necessity be denied,if any publicity followed.

The Minister talked lengthily, but in spite of this and in spite of
his illogical reasoning I reported the meaning of his remarks to
the Department with all possible precision. The Minister, upon the

2 gg ONE WORLD : TWO WAfefc

conclusion of his remarks, left at once to fulfil another engagement
and I had time only to say that if Japanese troops moved into Indo¬
rsing. my Government would regard it emphatically as an infringe¬
ment of the status gw which the Japanese Government had already
pledged to preserve, and that a farther statement of the attitude of
my Government must await further consideration of my report.

JAPAN BECOMES A FULL-FLEDGED AXIS PARTNER
October i, 1940

September has been one of the most momentous periods in Japanese
history and in American-Japanese relations. The alliance between
Germany, Italy, and Japan became a potential consequence of
the trend of Japanese policy from the moment of the establishment
of the Konoye Government, but the pact itself came to a head with
unexpected swiftness. A veil of secrecy had been drawn over the
proceedings, which were carried on principally by Herr von Stahmer,
a special German emissary, in Tokyo, and although speculation
was of course rife, very few people in Tokyo had any idea that the
negotiations would evolve so rapidly. Even some of the American
press men thought up to five o’clock on the afternoon of the signature
that the pact was to be signed in Tokyo, not Berlin, and some of my
colleagues pooh-poohed the possibility of such an alliance up to the
very day of its conclusion.

In spite of the fact that we were all groping more or less in the
dark, the thought of such an alliance was reported by us on the
basis of press comment as far back as August 3, and on September 20
I cabled that according to a reputable source, the Emperor, at a
three-hour conference the previous day, in the presence of the entire
cabinet and the highest military and naval authorities, had given
his sanction to the conclusion of a defensive alliance with Ger many
This information, however, could not be confirmed or elaborated
and we were sure of nothing until the last moment.

The pact was signed in Berlin on September 27, and on the 29th,
after trying to consider the event from every angle, my thoughts
were running along the following lines :

Clearly the primary aim of the alliance is against the United
States. The advantage of the pact to Germany and Italy, through
stimulating American apprehensions in the area of the Pacific, is
obvious, but less obvious are the advantages accruing to Japan.
In fact, disproportionate benefits would appear to be involved unless
there are secret clauses having reference to one or more of the
following points: (a) in French Indo-China and the Netherlands
East Indies, control or exploitation by Japan to receive support;
(b) mediation by Germany in the China conflict through interven¬
tion in Chungking; (c) Japan’s anxieties in the north to be set
at rest through Soviet Russian co-operation. ,

As to point (a), Japan can presumably be guaranteed a clear field

Office building and apartment houses of the American Embassy. The Imperial Diet
building is in the background.

A view of the rooftops of Tokyo, taken from the American Embassy. The prominent
building in the background is the Imperial Diet.

JAPAN BECOMES A FULL-FLEDGED AXIS PARTNER 289

in French Indo-China through Germany’s control of the Govern¬
ment at Vichy, while pressure might well be brought to bear on
Batavia through the ruthless use by Germany of her leverage in the
Netherlands, and I feel that one of the most dangerous potentialities
of the alliance is this latter consideration. Adverting to point (b)
effective pressure on Chiang Kai-shek could presumably be brought
to bear only in the event of co-operation by Soviet Russia. With
regard to point (c), the situation is far from clear. A colleague
was yesterday told by the Soviet Ambassador without hesitation
that the terms of the pact had been unknown to him in advance
but on the other hand speculation as to an eventual Soviet-Japanese
pact of non-aggression is rife.

In strict confidence a Japanese who is known to be sympathetic
to the United States and Great Britain said, after the announcement
of the pact, that the visit of an American naval force to Singapore
would be .the most effective counter-move that could be made by the
democracies, and such a step would undoubtedly carry weight in
giving pause to the extremists in Japan. The same purpose might
be served, however, if Great Britain were to announce her willing¬
ness to allow vessels of the American Navy to avail themselves of
that base.

Clearly, by the conclusion of this pact, Japan has embarked upon
a tremendous gamble on Great Britain’s defeat by Germany. While
talking off the record and informally in a recent meeting with the
Foreign Minister, I expressed the opinion that Japan is headed straight
for the rocks in pursuing her present course ; that whatever may be
the final result of the war in Europe, Japan, by tying up with Germany,
would become merely the tail to a kite ; that Germany, whatever
her promises, could not and would not furnish effective support to
Japan, and that by sacrificing for an economically unsound bloc in
East Asia a free flow of world trade and commerce, the future finann>l
and economic outlook of this country seemed to me to be Utterly
hopeless. Mr. Matsuoka did not contest my observations but merely
said that all this was a matter of individual view.

Another important event, from my point of view, was the sending
to Washington in September of what I can only call my “ green
light ” telegram, perhaps the most significant message sent to Wash¬
ington in all the eight years of my mission to Japan. The record
will show in future that up until the fall of the Yonai cabinet in
July, my recommendations have consistently been of the “ red light ”
variety, advocating not “ appeasement ” but constructive statesman¬
ship through conciliatory methods and the avoidance of coercive
measures. In the face of progressive Japanese depredations against
American rights and interests, especially in China, it had become
more and more difficult to talk of conciliation, yet I knew that out¬
right sanctions would set Japanese-American relations on a downward
curve from which they might not be resurrected, and so long as
there was any possibility of setting the pendulum swinging towards
10

2 Q0 ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

the democracies and away from the totalitarian, I felt that our
efforts should continue to be applied in that direction. To relinquish
those efforts seemed to me to spell defeatism. . . .

I think there have been no recommendations from this mission
which, in the light of after events, I would now have altered, although
it is easy to be wise after the event. Diplomacy has been defeated
by trends and forces, both at home and abroad, utterly beyond its
control.

After the fall of the Yonai cabinet and the setting up of the so-called
“ new structure 95 under Konoye and Matsuoka, some six weeks or
more were spent in observation and cogitation, and now I summarize
in the diary my diagnosis of the situation as follows :

The views of Mr. A. T. Steele, China correspondent of the Chicago
Daily News , regarding the situation in Japan have been carefully
studied and in my opinion are well grounded. Nevertheless, his
basic views that the sanest and safest naval policy for the United
States is firmness, and that in the United States a tendency is to over¬
emphasize the risks involved in a firm policy, are of such grave
scope as to merit the most painstaking and considered analytical
comment.

I am keeping constantly in view, while setting forth the current
trend of my observations in this general connection, the fact that
the formulation of American policy towards Japan must rest upon
the more comprehensive point of view of the administration in
Washington as well as upon many factors possibly not apparent to
this mission.

•There is no doubt, whatever the intentions of the present Govern¬
ment in Japan may be, that the military and other extremist elements
here view the situation which now exists throughout the world as
an ideal occasion to put their aspirations for expansion into execution.
The victories of Germany have intoxicated them like strong wine.
Their belief in the downfall of Britain has until recently been implicit.
They have had complete faith in a rapid victory for Germany, and
they believe it would be wise to consolidate the position in Greater
East Asia of Japan while Germany is still acquiescent and before the
ultimately expected strengthening of Germany’s power at sea might
preclude far-flung domination of the Orient by Japan. Although
they have been carefully observing our attitude, these elements
have minimized any opposition of an effective nature by the United
States. The capability of sounder heads, both in the Government
and outside of it, to keep these elements under control has been and
remains dubious.

At present, nevertheless, I perceive a slow cooling of the sudden
optimism which was manifested when the new Government assumed
office. The Government, Army, Navy, and the people of Japan are
now beginning to perceive that Great Britain may not be defeated
by Germany after all—a possibility which I have plainly stressed
again and again to the Japanese with whom I have come in contact

JAPAN BECOMES A FULL-FLEDGED AXIS PARTNER 2 gj

—and, in addition to that gradual realization, thev have seen our
country and Great Britain drawing together more and more closely
in undertakings for their mutual defence, as, for example, in the
acquisition of naval bases by the United States in the British terri¬
tories in the Atlantic Ocean, as well as in our assistance to the
British Navy by transferring to it fifty destroyers. Reports are reach¬
ing them of American haste to construct a two-ocean Navy ; of a
possible strengthening of American Pacific naval bases; and even of
our ultimate use of Singapore.

These reports and developments are producing on Japanese
consciousness the effect that might be expected. Their tendency,
on the one hand, is to accentuate the possible danger which confronts
Japan from ultimate positive action by the combined strength of
Great Britain and the United States, or by the United States acting
alone. The peril of joint Anglo-American defensive measures has
been understood in Japan for a long time, as is witnessed by Japan’s
efforts to refrain from antagonizing the United States and Great
Britain at the same time. . They furnish, on the other hand , t illing
reasons for those groups in Japan which desire to obtain political
and economic security by acquiring sources of raw materials and
markets entirely under Japanese domination. The Japanese are
co mm encing to wonder whether, even were Germany victorious, a
new risk to their programme of expansion both in China and in the
South Seas would not. thereby be created. In the meantime, the
attitude and policy which the Soviet Union may adopt in the future
remain an unknown factor in their deliberations.

The various factors outlined above are beginning to maW> the
Japanese hesitate. Especially in the Dutch East Indies, diplomatic
negotiations under pressure will continue. However, a mn dicnm 0 f
caution is indicated by the fact that, even for a time, Tokyo was
able to prevent the military from executing their plans for a pre¬
cipitate invasion of Indo-China, which, I fed certain, was in part,
at least, due to our attitude. It appears probable that what is
described by Mr. Stede as Japan’s policy of nibbling is apt to be
continued until the situation throughout the world, and more
especially the position of the United States, have received clarification.

The opinion has been expressed that were sanctions to be imposed
by us, they .would have the effect of setting rdations between Japan
and the United States on a downward trend. Our recently initial
programme of national defence, it is true, at present justifies steps
not necessarily coming within the purview of out-and-out sanctions.
We must keep in mind, however, the likelihood that export embargoes
of a drastic nature on products so important as petroleum—which are
known to be possessed in abundance by the United States—would
be viewed by the Government and people of Japan as imperfectly
disguised sanctions, which might, and probably would, cause some
sort of retaliatory steps. The hazards seen by Mr. Steele as greatly
over-emphasized in the United States will be controlled less by the

2 g 2 0 NE WORLD : TWO WARS

studied deliberations of the Japanese Government than by the
reckless and headstrong temperament of the Army and Navy,
should they lay at the door of the United States responsibility for the
wrecking of their plans for expansion. This retaliation might assume
the shape of measures by the Government to counter our export
embargoes, but there would be a still greater probability of some
sudden move by the Army or Navy taken unbeknownst the Govern¬
ment or without its prior authorization. These hazards are im¬
ponderable and not susceptible of being weighed accurately at any
given juncture. To deny that they exist, however, or to proceed to
formulate policy and adopt steps without giving these possible risks
full weight and deciding as to the wisdom of confronting them
squarely, would be short-sighted.

I am carefully bearing in mind, in the following observations, the
two basic purposes of my mission to Japan, Le. the promotion and
protection of American interests, and the preservation of good
relations between our two countries. In the event of conflict between
the two objectives mentioned, the greater emphasis to be laid upon
the former or the latter is a question of high policy not within my
competence. It is my sole purpose to clarify the chief factors in the
situation as viewed from this mission. I now take up the risks entailed
in a policy of drift, having set forth with care those inherent in a
strong policy.

It is impossible to discuss the direct question of relations between
the United States and Japan or to place the matter in its proper
perspective without viewing it as an integral part of the world
problem, which offers in brief the following angles :

(a) Our own country and Britain are the leaders of a large group
of English-speaking nations in various parts of the world. These
nations stand for a manner of living which is to-day threatened in
an appalling fashion by a group of countries—Germany, Japan, and
Italy—whose declared objective is to force their will, upon nations
conquered, by force of arms. Diplomatic methods are in general
ineffective in endeavouring to treat with such nations. On occasions
diplomacy may delay, but it cannot adequately block their onslaught.
Only force or a readiness to show that force will be employed can
stop those nations from realizing their objectives. At the present
time Japan must be placed among the predatory nations. It has
put aside all sense of morals or ethics and has become avowedly and
shamelessly opportunistic, endeavouring on every occasion to exploit
the weakness of other nations to its own profit. Its southward
expansion policy constitutes a definite menace to the Pacific interests
of the United States as well as a vital threat to the position of the
British Empire in the Orient.

(b) It may be admitted that the security of the United States has
rested to a certain extent upon the British fleet, which in its turn
has had its support, and can only have its support, from the British
Empire.

SOME JAPANESE HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT THEIR AXIS PARTNERSHIP 293

(s) If we view it as our interest to render support to the British
Empire in this period which is vital to it (and it is my emphatic
conception that such is the case), it behooves us by every means to
keep conditions in the Pacific in statu quo at least until the issue of
the European war has been decided. This cannot be done, in my
view, nor can our interests any longer receive their full and proper
protection, merely by expressing our disapproval and carefully
placing it on record. Japan, it is apparent, has been restrained from
dealing more high-handedly with the interests of the United States
only by respect for the potential power of our country. With equal
clearness it follows that to the extent to which Japan has disregarded
our rights, it has done so in precise proportion to the measure of its
conviction that the use of that power would not be allowed by the
American people. If that conviction is once undermined, it may be
that the effectiveness of diplomacy will again return.

(d) If, by a firm policy, we can maintain conditions in the Pacific
in statu quo until such time as Britain may be successful in the
European war, Japan will be confronted with a situation which will
render it impossible for the present outlook of opportunism to remain
dominant. At that time it might be feasible to set about a readjust¬
ment of the entire problem of the Pacific to the permanent benefit
both of the United States and of Japan—on a just basis. Until the
time when a thorough-going regeneration of outlook takes place in
Japan, only a show of force, coupled with the intention to utilize
it if necessary, can effectively conduce to the attainment of such an
outcome, as well as to the future security of the United States.

In view, therefore, of actual conditions here in Japan, and the
present outlook, it is my belief that the time has arrived when a
continuance of the use of patience and restraint by the United
States may and probably will tend to render relations between the
United States and Japan increasingly uncertain. I cherish the hope
that, if the Japanese Government and people can be brought to
believe that they are overplaying their hand, eventually the
pendulum will swing the other way, at which time it will be possible
to reconstruct good relations between our country and Japan. To
me the alternative appears hopeless.

My heart is heavy as I close the diary for September. This is not
the Japan which I have known in times past.

SOME JAPANESE HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT THEIR
AXIS PARTNERSHIP

October 2, 1940

Any certain estimate of public reaction in Japan to the Tripartite
Pact with Germany and Italy is difficult for two reasons : (a) the
present strict censorship of the press and control of public utterances,
and (b) the fact that our reliable and important Japanese channels
of information are in general no longer available, partly because

2 <J 4 0NE W0RLD : TWO WARS

the contacts of Japanese with the American and British Embassies
are likely to bring trouble from the police, and partly because most
of our Japanese friends appear to have given up all hope of improv¬
ing relations with the United States. (We know that several of our
erstwhile Japanese friends, including women, are on a black list
and are being most carefully watched, and close friends who used
to see us constantly now are afraid to be seen with Americans at all.
One Japanese friend who got a little tight recently told me the whole
sad story.) The privately and forcibly expressed opinions of Japanese
business men, whose interests have been wrecked by the new orienta¬
tion away from the United States and Great Britain, to which their
interests were geared and who deplore the 64 new structure ” and
especially the alliance with the Axis, must now be taken as a fair
criterion of public opinion as a whole.

Nevertheless, in the case of a large element of public opinion,

, including, we believe, the Navy and even certain circles in the Army
and the Government, there is a marked absence of enthusiasm over
the pact. We know that the Prime Minister was dead against the
alliance and was simply defeated before the Emperor by the forceful
aggressiveness of the War and Foreign Ministers, although the
Emperor himself was far from happy about it. There has been
no demonstration in the way of lantern parades, flag processions, the
decoration of the city, and so forth, which, in the case of the .Anti-
Comintern Pact in 1937 indicated at least some degree of spontaneous
enthusiasm. Indeed the Hochi naively wrote : “ Something must be
done to set the people’s blood to boiling. The Tripartite Pact is a
stirring march for Japan, not an elegy ! ” And the fact that the
Emperor thought it necessary to issue an Imperial Rescript, for the
first time since Japan withdrew from the League of Nations in 1934,
was significant. That, of course, prompdy killed all open expressions
of opposition.

As for repetition in the Japanese press of American comment,
the papers have very carefully avoided publishing any of the strong
editorials from the foremost American papers and have emphasized,
often in bold type, the published conciliatory utterances of such men
as Hamilton Fish, Roy Howard, Arthur Krock, Cornelius Whitney,
and others, while certain passages of a conciliatory tone in Sumner
Welles’ speech in Cleveland were taken out of their context. The
alleged desire of America for “ appeasement ” was writ large in the
Japanese press, and that is precisely the impression conveyed to the
Japanese public.

With regard to future Japanese tactics, we must guard against the
flood of suppositions and opinions based on pure speculation that
come to us, and we must wait and watch developments. The widely
mooted conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Soviet Russia
would, of course, greatly affect the situation. I look with a degree of
anxiety on the forthcoming German military mission to Japan,
under the terms of the pact, because quite apart from technical

MATSUOKA EXPLAINS WHY JAPAN JOINED THE AXIS 295

assistance and material, the members will undoubtedly carry on
intense propaganda, especially among the Japanese military, to drive
them into hastening the southward advance and into war with the
United States, if possible.

When asked by some of my colleagues what Japan was to gain
from the alliance, the Vice-Foreign Minister, Mr. Ohashi, has said
that the pact is aimed directly against the United States, which
ever since the Immigration Act of 1924 and the Manchurian Incident
has hampered' Japan’s necessary expansion; that world totalitar¬
ianism will take the place of Anglo-Saxonism, which is bankrupt
and will be wiped out, and that Japan has to ally herself with the
other camp which is not intransigent^ set on preserving the status
quo. He said almost the same to me.

MATSUOKA EXPLAINS WHY JAPAN JOINED THE AXIS
October 5, 1940

The Foreign Minister handed to me a statement in Japanese,
entitled “ A Statement to the United States concerning the Three-
Power Alliance,” to the general effect that the pact is aimed at no
particular country (although Ohashi said to some of my colleagues
that it was aimed (directly at the United States) and that there will
be no trouble between the two countries if America understands the
New Order in East Asia. Our Embassy’s translation of the original
document follows :

A Statement to the United States Concerning the Three-Power Alliance

The recent Three-Power Alliance is not aimed at any particular
country. If Japan, Germany, and Italy unite, the probability of being
attacked by another country is decreased, the spreading of world
disorder may be prevented, and in this sense the alliance contributes
to world peace. By this treaty Japan has further clarified its intention
to establish a new order in Greater East Asia including the South
Seas.

The construction of a new order in East Asia means the construc¬
tion of a new order under which Japan establishes the relationship
of common existence and mutual prosperity with the peoples of
each and every land in Greater East Asia, that is East Asia including
the South Seas. In a position of equality with every other country,
Japan may freely carry on enterprises, trade, and emigration in and
to each and every land in Greater East Asia and thereby be enabled
to solve its population problem. This does not mean these areas are
to be exploited and conquered, nor does it mean these areas are to
be closed to the trade and enterprise of other countries. Japan has
long tried to solve its population problem through emigration, trade,
and enterprises abroad, but the various countries of Europe and
America have nullified Japan’s reasonable and peaceful efforts con¬
cerning its population problem since those countries have turned back

2 g6 ONE world * TWO WARS

Japanese immigrants to their great territories and have obstructed
trade and enterprise.

In the Greater East Asia sphere of mutual prosperity, the en¬
deavour is being made to abolish such unnatural restrictions on the
free activities of mankind. It is expected that this endeavour will be
accomplished in so far as possible through peaceful means and with
the least possible undesirable change in the status quo .

Japan’s policy towards China forms an important part of the above
endeavour. However, owing to the lack of understanding on the part
of some Chinese people and to the attitude taken by England and
the United States in not recognizing Manchukuo, which gave rise
to Chiang Kai-shek’s hope of recovering Manchukuo, an unfortunate
clash of arms broke out. This clash is, in fact, war, and therefore it is
impossible for the Japanese Army during its activities to avoid affect¬
ing rights and interests of the powers in China. This is particularly
true when such rights and interests hinder the prosecution of Japan’s
war against China. Accordingly, if the effects upon these rights
and interests are to be brought to an end, it is most desirable to
encourage and promote peace between Japan and China. This fact
notwithstanding, the powers are not only checking Japan’s actions
through legalistic arguments and treaty pronouncements which have
become inapplicable because of changed conditions, but are also
oppressing Japan through such means as restrictions on the exporta¬
tion of important commodities to Japan and at the same time are
giving positive aid to Japan’s enemy, the Chiang Kai-shek regime.
These actions spring from hidden motives to keep the Orient under
conditions of disorder as long as possible and to consume Japan’s
national strength. We must believe that these actions are not for
the love of peace and are not for the purpose of protecting rights and
interests. Japan concluded a defensive alliance with Germany and
Italy for no other purpose than to resist such pressure from the powers,
and there is not the slightest intention to proceed to attack another
country. If the United States understands the aforementioned
conditions and circumstances and Japan’s intentions with regard to
the establishment of a new order in East Asia, there will be no change
whatever in the relationship between Japan and the United States
following the conclusion of the treaty. Japan is determined to settle
all pending questions and to promote and foster friendship with the
United States.

This is the first time, so far as I am aware, that the Japanese Govern¬
ment has committed to writing some of the points that frequendy
arise in my conversations with Japanese officials of the present regime,
and it is going very much farther than any previous Japanese regime
ever went in calling a spade a spade. Certain salient points are to
be noted:

(a) The “ New Order 59 now embraces Greater East Asia including
the South Seas .

MATSUOKA EXPLAINS WHY JAPAN JOINED THE AXIS 297

(b) Within this great sphere, Japan “ may freely carry on enter¬
prise, trade, and emigration, 5 ’ but this, they say, doesn’t'mean con¬
quest or exploitation or that these areas are to be closed to the trade
and enterprise of other nations.

Various thoughts immediately arise in this connection. Are enter¬
prise and emigration to be forced on the Netherlands East Indies,
for instance, and if so, how can that be done without conquest ? It
is against the policy of the Indies to permit either enterprise or mass
immigration by Japan. There is a very small, if any, difference
between enterprise and exploitation.

If Japan once gets a foothold in those areas, the other nations will
have a swell chance of “ free trade and enterprise 55 if the Japanese
remain true to form.

(r) The statement is directly aimed at our Immigration Act and at
our quotas, established to stem the overwhelming tide of cheap
Japanese goods entering the United States, as well as at our moral
embargoes and our licensing system under the national-preparedness
programme.

There is no answer to these charges except that Japan in our position
would have done precisely the same things.

(i d ) Japan will endeavour to carry out her programme with 66 the
least possible change in the status quo”

(i e) The China Incident broke out because England and the United
States refused to recognize Manchukuo and owing to the lack of
understanding on the part of some Chinese people.

The first point above is an entirely new thought which I have
never seen recorded before. As for the Chinese, they must indeed be
dull of comprehension.

(/) Legalistic arguments—obsolete treaty pronouncements—
oppression of Japan through embargoes—support of Chiang
Kai-shek.

Nothing new there.

(g) “ These actions spring from hidden motives to keep the Orient
under conditions of disorder as long as possible and to consume
Japan’s national strength. We must believe that these actions are
not for the love of peace and are not for the purpose of protecting
rights and interests.”

There are no hidden motives. Quite simply, we want Chiang
Kai-shek to win because he legally and rightfully represents China.
Furthermore, whatever might happen to our rights and interests
after Chiang’s victory, we know very well that it could be no worse
than what is happening to them now under Japanese domination.
As for consuming Japan’s national strength, there will never be
peace in the Far East unless or until the Japanese military become
discredited, and that can come only when the military strength of
Japan has been heavily weakened.

io*

298

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

MATSUOKA TALKS FOR TWO HOURS AND A
QUARTER

°i tO « 01 ed on 4 Foreign Minister Matsuoka to-day at his invitation,
and we talked, for the most part infonnally and off the record,
for two and a quarter hours. As usual Mr. Matsuoka did about
Q _ per cent of the talking because his continuous monologues can
be broken only by forceful intrusion. Although from time to time
he brings up points of marked interest, his volubility flows on by the
hour with little or no punctuation, and his discourses are therefore

difficult to chronicle. ...

On this occasion Mr. Matsuoka’s mam thesis was that the present
world situation results logically from the clash between tradition
and the machine age. Only once during the conversation were
heated words evoked, and those came from me when the Minister
attempted to justify, on the ground of imperative necessity, national
expansion by war, especially in the case of Germany. I had, as I
pointed out, personally known the old Germany when within its
own boundaries it was a happy, contented country, progressive and
prosperous. The action of Germany’s present leaders m grinding her
weaker neighbours into the dust to satisfy their own megalomaniac
ambitions could not possibly be condoned on the ground of necessity :
to try to do so was utterly preposterous. In the case of Japan, I
personally appreciated her economic needs. Japan’s relations with
die United States have not, however, been brought to their present
deplorable pass by the reasonable urge of those needs, but rather by
the employment of methods of force in following that urge instead
of the methods envisaged in Mr. Hull’s logical and practical plans
for following orderly processes in the solution of economic troubles.
At that point Mr. Matsuoka characterized the Anglo-Saxon countries
as smugly convinced that they are right in everything they do and
intransigently unwilling ever to acknowledge themselves m the
wrong. On that point I said that I had never yet found a Japanese
willing to acknowledge the patent fact that Japan had violated the
provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty, to which Mr. Matsuoka to my
surprise said that he was perfectly willing to admit that fact to me,
but he added naively that of course he could not do so politically
as he had been urged to do before the League of Nations.

The Minister said that he had retired from public affairs for a
long riitti-. and had thrice refused posts in the last Konoye cabinet,
but that he had finally been led by his intensive pondering on the
sorry state of his country to urge Prince Konoye to emerge again, as
he felt that Konoye was the only person who could rescue Japan
from impending revolution and chaos. Konoye was no longer the
vacillating politician of his former premiership but an entirely different
person, inflexibly determined to save his country, where even now

JAPAN FEARS AMERICAN INITIATIVE 299

revolution threatens. In answer to my question as to what kind of
revolution he feared, Mr. Matsuoka replied, 66 political, economic,
and social revolution,” and expressed his feeling that the danger
was by no means past. He then discussed at some length the vacil¬
lation and weakness of the former Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Matsuoka said that now the alliance with Germany and Italy
was consummated and off his mind, he intends to get to work immedi¬
ately and do all that he can to clear up the accumulation of American
complaints which I had presented to him. It had been a sine qua non
of his taking office that he was to direct Japan’s foreign relations, and
he says he does not propose to let the military, particularly the hot¬
headed younger officers, dictate to him.

In the course of his talk the Minister said that Japan has no in¬
tention of driving the interests of other nations out of East Asia, but
welcomes their co-operation in the development of the New Order. I
immediately took him up on this point and said I was delighted to
hear him say what he had. As I had clearly indicated in former talks,
however, the fact of the matter is that many legitimate American
interests built up through generations have already been driven out
of Japan, and that the process goes on apace. Mr. Matsuoka’s reply
was, as usual, that as soon as the hostilities in China are terminated
and Chiang Kai-shek is defeated, these questions will be solved.
He also expressed his usual appeal that the United States should
cease giving aid to Chiang. Also, as usual, I repeated the American
position relating to that question.

When I was just about to leave, the Minister earnesly requested me
to urge that my Government impose no further embargoes against
Japan. He said that such embargoes “ would not seriously handicap
us ” but would intensely anger the Japanese people. He added that
the thought of war between Japan and the United States made him
shudder. (I believe that Mr. Matsuoka is right as to the immediate
effect of such embargoes as contrasted with their long-term effect.)

JAPAN FEARS AMERICAN INITIATIVE
October 9, 1940

For the first time in many weeks I went out to Kasumigaseki to-day
to play in the semi-annual American Club golf tournament, about
seventy minutes from Tokyo, and of course the Foreign Office took
just this occasion to call me back in a hurry. The chancery said
that I would be back by six o’clock, but Ohashi replied that this was
not soon enough—he wanted to see me at once. Fortunately the
message did .not reach me until I stepped off the last green, and even
then I took my time, finally arriving at the Vice-Minister’s official
residence at 5.35. There was no reason whatever for hurry, except
that the Foreign Minister clearly had the jitters over the action of
our Government in cc ordering ” American citizens in the Far East

gOO ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

to evacuate, and also over press reports that the American Govern¬
ment had decided to declare a total embargo against Japan, and
Matsuoka had told Ohashi to summon me immediately.

With regard to an embargo I said that I had no information, and
with regard to the evacuation I said that our Government had issued
no “ order 55 but only a suggestion as a precautionary measure.
When Ohashi spoke of our “ embargo 55 on iron and steel scrap I told
him exactly what Mr. Hull had said to Horinouchi on that subject
—to the effect that it was a purely domestic measure in accordance
with our preparedness programme, and that Japan, in view of her
constant violation of our interests in the Far East, was hardly in a
position to protest on that point. Fortunately the Department’s
telegram reporting that conversation had come in just before my
interview, showing how helpful such reports can be.

Ohashi spoke ofjapan’s desire for peace with the United States and
the fact that she has no thought of attacking America, to which I re¬
plied that we are like-minded towards Japan and that the American
people, as Mr. Ohashi is aware, are strongly peace-minded. Never¬
theless, the recent inflammatory utterances of the highest Japanese
statesmen have led the American Government and people to have
doubts ofjapan’s real intentions, and those utterances have brought
about in my country precisely the reaction which might have been
expected. I spoke also of the inevitable effect of those statements on
our programme of preparedness.

This conversation and the urgency with which I had been sum¬
moned convey the clear impression that Mr. Matsuoka is disturbed
by the course of developments in the United States to which the
recent provocative statements by members of the Japanese govern¬
ment have given rise. It bears out what I said in suggesting that at
a given moment our Government should consider the evacuation of
Americans in the Far East—that the move would have a powerful
effect on Japanese consciousness.

WHAT HIROHITO AND KONOYE REALLY THOUGHT
ABOUT THE TRIPARTITE PACT

October 22 , 1940

I was told to-day on excellent authority that both the Emperor and
Prince Konoye were dead against the Tripartite Alliance but that
it was brought to the Emperor’s attention that he might not survive
a refusal and that he said to Konoye : “ Well, you and I will have
to stand or fall together.” This came indirectly from a member of
the Imperial family. There is constantly talk of the fall of Konoye
and his replacement by a military dictator, a sort of revival of the
old shogunate, but this obviously represents extremist views and
now that the alliance has been concluded, Konoye may weather the
storm, for a time.

AN AMERICAN EDITOR CALLS AT THE AMERICAN EMBASSY

301

AN AMERICAN EDITOR, NOW SERVING TIME FOR PRO-
JAPANESE ACTIVITIES, CALLS AT THE AMERICAN
EMBASSY

October 24, 1940

In view of the statements in the Japanese press reported to have
been made by Mr. Walker Matheson, publisher of the Living Age
and a member of the editorial board of Current History , I asked Mr.
Matheson to call at the Embassy to-day. I told him that from
earliest childhood I remembered having sometimes climbed on the
big table in the hall of our family house and still remember finding
on it a pile of the issues of a single magazine. It was the only one
we could afford in those days, the Living Age , and out of sentiment
I myself had later subscribed to it for many years. I introduced the
subject in this way in order to show to Mr. Matheson that I was
interested in his periodical, and therefore naturally interested in its
publisher, and with this background I felt that I could without any
misunderstanding frankly approach the matter which I had in
mind.

During the past eight years I had worked steadily to improve
Japanese-American relations, but these relations had unfortunately
now assumed a state of great tenseness, and that especially during
the present period the utterances of American citizens were very
carefully scanned by the Japanese in order to appraise the attitude
of the American Government and people towards Japan. At this
difficult moment Mr. Matheson had come to Japan and had made
statements to the Japanese press which, when carefully examined,
conveyed the impression (1) that the American people were in
general ignorant of the Far East, (2) that the policy and recent
measures of the American Government were predicated upon the
domestic political situation and their effect on the coming election,
and (3) that the American people were not in accordance with that
policy and those measures.

I said to Mr. Matheson that in the United States we highly prized
the privilege of free press and free speech, but that when an American
citizen comes abroad especially at a time of political tension it is
distinctly disloyal and unpatriotic to convey to a foreign people
adverse criticism of his own Government and its policy and measures.
I said that Mr. Matheson’s reported utterances were aimed directly
against the work that I was trying to do here, and tended to undo
that work by creating an impression precisely contrary to the im¬
pression which I myself had been trying to convey. Such utterances
could therefore be most harmful to American interests. I fully
recognized the fact that visitors were often incorrectly quoted in the
Japanese press, but I had heard no denial of the accuracy of Mr.
Matheson’s utterances as reported. I appealed to him as a loyal
American to give out no further statements of that nature.

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

302

Mr. Matheson did not deny the accuracy of the reports. He said
that he had come to Japan to familiarize himself with conditions
in the Far East and that he had not wished to talk to the press, but
that it had been very difficult to avoid the importunities of the
newspaper men who approached him. He said that he recognized
the justice of my attitude, that he was extremely sorry for what he
had done, that he had not fully appreciated the considerations which
I had set forth to him, and that he would make no further public
statements in future.

SECOND THOUGHTS ON JAPAN’S ADHERENCE
TO THE AXIS

November 1, 1940

In the light of fast-moving developments I scarcely dare read back
in the diary nowadays because of its many inconsistencies which
show it up for the patchwork sort of day-to-day scribbling it is. At
least it shows our thoughts and our information, some of it reliable
and some of it wholly unreliable, at any given moment—the moment
of writing. It shows how often we are groping and fumbling in the
dark. Less and less are we able to know what is going on behind the
scenes, simply because many of our reliable contacts are no longer
available and also because, even behind the scenes, the right hand
often doesn’t know what the left hand is doing. It is painful now to
see that even as late as August I wrote that the Japanese Government
was getting fed up with the Germans in their efforts to embroil Japan
with the United States.

Many members of the Government, and probably the majority of
Japanese out of the Government, were decidedly fed up. Yet a
month later the Japanese had let the Germans draw them into the
Tripartite Alliance for the specific purpose on the part of the Germans
of getting Japan and the United States into eventual war. The
pro-Axis Shiratori faction had won. The opinion was also expressed
that Matsuoka genuinely desired to bring about better relations
with the United States and that he would do what he found it possible
to do in that direction. Yes, he certainly desires better relations
with the United States, but he desires them on the basis of our first
giving up our rightful stake in the Far East. On that basis we can
enjoy a most agreeable friendship. When the Konoye Government
came in, with Matsuoka and Ohashi and Shiratori on board, we
were given an undeveloped photograph negative, the general type of
which we knew in advance but not the precise outline of the picture
that would appear. Now the negative is pretty well developed,
the picture is taking shape, and it is not the sort of picture to afford
complacency with regard to the future relations between Japan and
the United States.

Now that the Tripartite Alliance has been concluded, we can no
longer regard and treat with Japan as an individual nation. She

MATSUOKA ON ROOSEVELT AND NOMURA

O w j

has become a member of a team, and our attitude towards Tapan
must be our attitude towards the team as a whole.

Meanwhile, something is getting rottener in the state of Denmark.
The new structure is not sitting well, and a growing dissatisfaction
is brewing. Even the War Minister himself announced the other
day that the new structure need not be interpreted as taking all the
joy out of life ; he apparently sees the way things are going? There
is much bickering and divided counsels, and much talk that Konove,
who is hardly more than a figure-head, cannot last. The pendulum
in Japan is always swinging; the moderates say that it will soon
swing back towards normal, but I fear not. I fear that it must swing
still farther towards the extreme, and that if Konoye falls, either
through resignation or through a coup d’etat, he is likely to be
succeeded by a mil itary dictatorship, even by a sort of revival of the
shogunate.

As for American-Japanese relations, we now await the election
and what may happen after the election. The Japanese are waiting
too. For once, we have them guessing. They are wondering whether
they still occupy the driver’s seat, and are beginning to doubt it.

ADMIRAL NOMURA APPOINTED JAPANESE
AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON

November 7, 1940

At the Soviet reception to-day to celebrate their national holiday,
Matsuoka told me that he was going to have another try at Admiral
Nomura to-night to persuade him to go to Washington as Ambassador,
and he thought he would be successful.

November 8, 1940

Matsuoka telephoned me that he had been successful with Admiral
Nomura last night and that the Emperor had approved the appoint¬
ment as Ambassador to Washington. I cabled Washington that
Nomura, as a man of high personal character who through long
association had my esteem and respect, and as a former Foreign
Minister was believed to be fundamentally friendly to the United
States, should be personally acceptable to the American Government.
Incidentally, Matsuoka has on more than one occasion said to
me that of course he himself was the ideal man to go to Washington
but that he couldn’t be spared from Tokyo. So Nomura is clearly
second-string !

MATSUOKA ON ROOSEVELT AND NOMURA
November 10, 1940

A considerable part of my two-hour talk to-day with the Minister
for Foreign Affairs was taken up with my presentation of a number
of miscellaneous cases.

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

304

The Minister said that he had invited me to come to his private
residence for a cup of tea without any specific purpose but merely
so that we might keep in touch through periodic informal talks and
to tell me of his constant efforts to obviate our grounds of complaint
arising from Japanese interference with our rights and interests in
China.

Mr. Matsuoka first asked me to convey to the President in one of
my telegrams his hearty personal congratulations on the President’s
re-election.

The Minister said that Admiral Nomura had twice refused the
Embassy in Washington because he did not wish to be placed in the
position of giving assurances to the American Government when
those assurances might later be invalidated through the fall of the
cabinet and the appointment of a new Foreign Minister who might
not support Mr. Matsuoka’s views. The Minister said that his
determination to persuade Admiral Nomura to accept the post and
his final success in overcoming the Admiral’s reluctance were eloquent
testimony of his own attitude towards the United States.

The Minister said that it was almost impossible for him to read all
the correspondence between the Embassy and the Foreign Office.
His day’s work sometimes extended to more than twenty hours, but
in spite of that he had told his highest subordinate officials that he
would not stand for bureaucratic replies to our representations and
that he wanted the complete facts in every case so that he could give
me, at least orally, a true picture of the Japanese position. This he
proposed to do. He said that he recognized the absurdity, for instance,
of making the new regime in China rather than the Japanese Govern¬
ment responsible for various developments. He wished to correct
such an attitude on the part of the Foreign Office.

In connection with future developments, I told the Minister that
the United States would be impressed less by official statements than
by acts and facts.

I also expressed my surprise when Mr. Ohashi had said to me that
the Foreign Office received very little material from the Japanese
Embassy in Washington reporting American press comment, whereas
I was in the habit of telegraphing to Washington full daily reports
of comment in the Japanese press. I expressed the view that especially
at this time it was most important that the Japanese Government
should know what the American press, and therefore the American
public, was thinking and saying.

THE JAPANESE EMPIRE CELEBRATES ITS
2600TH BIRTHDAY

November 10, 1940

To-day was the first of two days of celebrating the 2600th anniver¬
sary of the founding of the Japanese Empire, and fortunately the
weather smiled on Japan during both days, which were sunny and

THE JAPANESE EMPIRE CELEBRATES ITS 260OTH BIRTHDAY 305

crisply cold. The first was the day of ceremonial greetings, and the
second the day of celebration. For several months squads of men and
schoolgirls have been working in the big plaza opposite to the
palace, levelling it off, setting up decorative poles, laying out an
enormous number of flowers, and finally building a big pavilion
and rows of seats in front of it for about 50,000 people. They were
the only people, all specially invited, who could witness the cere¬
monies, because no one was allowed on the roofs or in the windows
of the big office buildings in Marinouchi, which would have afforded
observation spots for many more thousands. No one may look down
upon the Emperor, and I noticed how completely vacant those roofs
and windows were.

On both days the Emperor and Empress, most of the Imperial
princes and princesses (excepting Chichibu, who has been seriously
ill with pneumonia), and all the highest officials in the country were
present. Prince Konoye was master of ceremonies, and read the
speech to the Throne and led the banzais.

November 11, 1940

At the national celebration to-day we were seated at tables, whereas
yesterday we had no chairs and were obliged to stand throughout,
a little over an hour, which wasn't so bad. To-day a Japanese meal
was served with sake and everything, but we were expected to take
it home in a furoshiki , or big silk napkin, given us for the purpose,
instead of eating it on the premises, and of course we turned it over
to our servants, to whom it is always a tremendous privilege to eat
“ Imperial food. 55 There were also a ceremonial dance and a lot of
chorus singing of patriotic songs and band music. Prince Takamatsu
made the welcoming speech in Japanese to the Emperor and then I
had to speak for the Diplomatic Corps.

It was quite an ordeal to walk sedately in front of all the guests
in the pavilion and then in front of the 50,000 people below in com¬
plete silence, then to face the Emperor, bow, get out spectacles and
manuscript, read, bow, replace manuscript and spectacles, bow
again, turn backwards, and pace solemnly back to my place; but it
went off all right, and since I made a point of reading slowly and of
carefully enunciating every word, the amplifiers enabled everyone
in the crowd to hear perfectly, as I was told afterwards. Even Mitzi
and the other Embassy servants clustered around our radio and
heard every word, the speeches being broadcast throughout Japan.
The Emperor, who had preserved an almost rigid expression through¬
out the rest of the programme, nodded at each of my points and
nodded vigorously when at the end the hope was expressed that
Japan would contribute to the general culture and well-being of
mankind. Arsene-Henry, the French Ambassador, came to see me
the next day on purpose to tell me that he had watched the Emperor’s
face and was convinced that his nods of approval were given to
impress the Government and the higher officials of the Empire with

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

306

his own desire for peace. Arsene-Henry was so impressed with this
that he cabled the Government about it as an important political
indication. Even the official Court release to the press announced
that “ His Majesty seemed greatly pleased ” with the speech. Any¬
way, it was a relief to have it over. Am not yet sufficiendy brazen
not to find such jobs an ordeal.

Incidentally, the Department was responsible for the text of the
speech. I had taken the precaution, in these days of political tensity,
of cabling my original text, which the Department shortened and
simplified, and it was very‘good, dignified without any slopping over.
They left me full latitude to change it but I made no changes.

To-day I called Matsuoka on the telephone and asked if he were
coming to the Tokyo Club, at 6, to drink a toast to the 2600th anni¬
versary. He said that he didn’t know about it and I said : “ Well,
if you do come, we might have another little chat.” He replied :
“ Ill be there.” He came in at 6.45 and after greeting the few
members who were left, he and I adjourned to a private room and
had a long talk. It was a great advantage to be able to call Matsuoka
on the telephone directly at any time, according to his own suggestion,
a practice which has certainty never been welcomed by any previous
Foreign Minister.

MATSUOKA AS THE MAN BEHIND THE
TRIPARTITE PACT

November 18, 1940

The vernacular press is full of a story that the United States, Great
Britain, and Thailand have concluded a secret military alliance,
and one paper alleges that America has made a loan to Thailand
of ten million dollars. It looks very much as if the Japanese were
beginning to cook up an excuse, according to their usual methods,
for bringing some sort of pressure, military or diplomatic, on Thailand
for the use of air bases and other facilities which could be used for an
eventual extension of their southward advance. I expect that we shall
see developments along those lines.

With regard to the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance, we have
had to swim out gradually from the welter of speculation and in¬
accurate reports that come to us from many sides, but I think it is
now fairly clear that in spite of the original story that the hands of
Prince Konoye and Matsuoka were forced by the extremists, re¬
luctantly on their part, it was Matsuoka himself who put it through,
bringing Konoye along with him. We are told on very good authority
that other cabinet ministers were not consulted until the end and
knew little or nothing about it. I now have it straight from a person
closely in touch with the Imperial Court, that the Emperor was most
reluctant to approve the pact and was finally led to do so only when

FUTILITY OF a JAPANESE GOODWILL MISSION TO AMERICA 307

Matsuoka gave the Emperor his studied conviction that war with
the United States would be inevitable if the alliance with the Axis
were not concluded. Judging from Matsuoka’s subsequent statements,
I think that this version rings true.

JAPAN LOOKS SOUTH

November 25, 1940

Prince Saionji, the last surviving Genro, died last night. In view
of his distinction and his high place in the life of Japan, I placed
the Embassy flag at half-mast, besides telegraphing our condolences
to the heir, Mr. Hachiro Saionji, and to Baron Harada, his private
secretary.

There are indications that the Japanese Government has made
some sort of peace offer to Chiang Kai-shek, it is believed at German
instigation, and that if the offer is not accepted, Wang Ching-wei
will be formally recognized. There is little doubt that Japanese
interest is shifting more and more towards the southward advance,
the first main objective being control of Indo-China. Some three
divisions are believed to be concentrated in Hainan to be used if
. and when developments in the war in Europe and the attitude of
the United States appear to warrant.

THE FUTILITY OF A JAPANESE GOODWILL
MISSION TO AMERICA

December 7, 1940

A series of conferences with a prominent member of the Japan
Economic Federation acting as a go-between for a prominent Japanese,
whom I shall refer to as “ Mr. Y., 33 led to some correspondence with
the Department and a brief attempt on my part to analyse the present
political situation. Mr. Y. wants to go to the United States with some
big idea or plan which he believes would bring about an immediate
improvement in American-Japanese relations. My guess is that his
plan, which has not been divulged to us, is the usual one to get
the United States to mediate for peace with Chiang Kai-shek.

I discouraged Mr. Y.’s proposal for a good many reasons, but later
he modified his approach and said that he would go to the United
States not on any so-called goodwill mission and not to conduct
propaganda but merely to learn the views of the American public
vis-i-vis Japan so. that he might report this first-hand information
to the highest statesmen in Japan with whom we know that he
has close contacts and influence. I therefore told the Department
that I thought it might be worth while to let him come, of course in
a purely private capacity, and this recommendation was accepted
subject to certain conditions. The Japanese, even most of the highest

g 0 8 ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

officials in the Government, are amazingly ill-informed of American
public opinion, and I am all in favour of anything that will enlighten
them.

In this connection I gave photostats of some of the more
impressive editorials from outstanding American newspapers, includ¬
ing Walter Lippmann’s article of October 8, to our go-between to
suggest to Mr. Y. that he show them to his contacts. Later I was
informed that those editorials had been translated to several of the
higher officials, who had expressed astonishment at their lack of
information regarding the American attitude. This, I think, is
thoroughly healthy procedure.

My analysis may be summarized as follows :

Mr. Y.’s attitude and his wish to go to the United States represent
the almost despairing cry of those in Japan who realize the dangerous
policies now being followed by the Government and the ultimate
disaster to which those policies may lead. Yet his attitude in believing
that his “ plan ” would immediately improve our relations indicates
a basic misconception of the position of the American Govern¬
ment and people. He and his associates cannot understand that
we are not to be swayed by mere expediency and that our position
is based upon principles deeply embedded in the American creed.

It is to be questioned whether any great number of Japanese are
temperamentally capable of grasping those basic facts. In their
conception there is little comprehension or logic, for their views have
been shaped over a long period of time by their controlled and
chauvinistic press. They interpret our policy as a blind adherence
to allegedly obsolete legalistic concepts, a selfish determination to
obstruct Japan’s reasonable expansion, and an arbitrary resistance
to any alteration in the status quo .

These Japanese continually maintain that just beneath the surface
there exists a great body of moderate opinion in Japan ready to
emerge and to wrest control from the extremists if supported by
some practical gesture of friendship from the United States, and they
find it hard to understand why the American people feel that it is
now up to Japan to take the initiative in any such gesture.

It is true that a large element of such moderate opinion exists
in Japan, but unfortunately that element is just as powerless and
inarticulate now as ever. The Konoye Government, which for a
time was very shaky, has been considerably strengthened by the
inclusion of Baron Hiranuma and by the publicly expressed support
of the Ministers of War and Navy. From present circumstances
we believe that when the present Government is overturned there
is every likelihood that it will be followed by other Governments
with the same determination to follow the course already mapped
out, namely, to secure for Japan the position in “ greater East Asia
including the South Seas ” to which she considers herself entitled
as a result of her growth as a first-class power in the modern world,
territorially and economically restricted as she is.

“ THE AXIS POWERS ARE NOT GOING TO WIN THIS WAR

309

As for Japanese-American relations, ever since the partial with¬
drawal of Americans from the Far East there has been a shift in
the control of those relations. The effect is now being felt in Japan
of the firm and unhurried but inexorable trend of American policy
which has been given effect in the progressive steps taken since the
abrogation of the Treaty of 1911. The reaction in Japan to the
Tripartite Alliance and to the provocative statements of the highest
Japanese statesmen immediately thereafter has been one of dismay.
It is now perceived that the intended intimidation of the American
people did not work out as planned, of which concrete evidence has
been given by the American loan to the Chinese National Government
immediately following Japan’s recognition of Wang Ching-wei.

Matters have now come to a pass where the Japanese realize that
something must be done to prevent the worst from happening, yet
they are far from ready to consider the basic reorientation of policy
which alone could serve to improve relations with the United States.
It would be utterly unthinkable for any leader or group of leaders
in Japan at present to advocate withdrawal from China and abandon¬
ment of their dreams of southward advance. Thus a vicious circle
is established in American-Japanese relations. Admiral Nomura’s
appointment to Washington may represent the last effort of those
now in control in Japan to save those relations from disastrous de¬
terioration, but it would be futile to hope that the new Ambassador
could undertake any revolutionary move to meet the views of the
United States.

In this connection I repeated what had been said in my telegram
of September 12, to wit, that while inevitable risks will be involved
in a policy of firmness, nevertheless future dangers of far greater
magnitude would result from a policy of laissezfoire.

“ THE AXIS POWERS ARE NOT GOING TO WIN
THIS WAR ”

January 1, 1941

Another year has faded into history, a grim and cruel year, yet a
year that has brought out in some parts of the world the finest quali¬
ties in human nature, heroism, gallantry, self-sacrifice, determination
to fight, and to die if need be, for the highest principles—freedom,
tolerance, right. I have never for a moment lost faith in Britain’s
ultimate victory—a faith that was surely not justified by facts during
the dark days of last summer, had we known those facts at the time
—but the best New Year’s message that could come to us was in the
President’s radio talk on December 29 : “I believe that the Axis
powers are not going to win this war. I base that belief on the latest
and best information.”

With all our desire to keep America out of war and at peace
with all nations, especially with Japan, it would be the height of

3I0 ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

folly to allow ourselves to be lulled into a feeling of false security.
Japan, not we, is on the war-path, and that path is not a whit the
less dangerous to our own future welfare because it is camouflaged
in such righteous-sounding terms as the “ New Order in Greater
East Asia including the South Seas ” and the “ Greater East Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere,” If those Americans who counsel appease¬
ment could read even a few of the articles by leading Japanese in
the current Japanese magazines wherein their real desires and in¬
tentions are given expression, our peace-minded fellow-countrymen
would realize the utter hopelessness of a policy of appeasement.
The time for that has passed. And to those well-intentioned fellow-
countrymen who might charge me with a destructive rather than a
constructive outlook, I would say that only through the discrediting
of the Japanese extremists by the failure of their plans can we hope
to see peace in East Asia. Unarrested, the cancer will progressively
invade everything within reach until its malignant control can
perhaps never be checked. But if the cancer is arrested and rendered
impotent in its earlier stages, we may yet see Japan return to healthy
ways, when constructive instead of destructive forces may again
control. Then, as I wrote to the President, we may approach a
resumption of normal relations with Japan and a constructive re¬
adjustment of the whole Pacific problem.

Britain’s victory in Europe would of course alter and render
infinitely simpler our present problem out here, but it may become
open to question whether we can afford to await a British victory
or whether we should allow Japan to dig in throughout the areas
where she now visualizes far-flung control. That question, I think,
will depend upon the tempo of the Japanese advance. In the mean¬
time, let us keep our powder dry and be ready—for anything.

The turning-point in the war seems to me to have come. If it
was not the entry of Greece it was surely the President’s address of
December 29. We heard it on the radio ; I have read it five times and
know it almost by heart, and of course am making every effort to get it
to the attention of influential Japanese because only carefully chosen
excerpts were published in the vernacular press. It was a tremendous
speech, and if I had had the slightest doubt as to the wisdom of
Roosevelt’s re-election (which I did not have), this speech would
effectually have removed any such doubt. To those of our fellow-
countrymen who want to get into bed and pull the covers over their
heads, it is an invincible clarification and an unanswerable warning.

On December 14 I wrote the following letter to the President:

Dear Frank, —. . . About Japan and all her works. It seems
to me to ibe increasingly clear that we are bound to have a showdown
some day, and the principal question at issue is whether it is to
our advantage to have that showdown sooner or to have it later.

“ THE AXIS POWERS ARE NOT GOING TO WIN THIS WAR 311

The chief factors in the problem would seem, from this angle,
to be :

(1) Whether and when Britain is likely to win the European
war ;

(2) Whether our getting into war with Japan would so handicap
our help to Britain in Europe as to make the difference to Britain
between victory and defeat ;

# ( 3 ) T ° what extent our own policy in the Far East must be
timed with our preparedness programme and with respect to the
relative strength of the American and the Japanese navies now and
later.

Those are questions which, with our limited information here,
I am not qualified even approximately to answer.

From the Tokyo angle we see the picture roughly as follows :

After eight years of effort to build up something permanently
constructive in American-Japanese relations, I find that diplo¬
macy has been defeated by trends and forces utterly beyond its
control, and that our work has been swept away as if by a typhoon,
with little or nothing remaining to show for it. Japan has become
openly and unashamedly one of the predatory nations and part
of a system which aims to wreck about everything that the United
States stands for. Only insuperable obstacles will now prevent
the Japanese from digging in permanently in China and from
pushing the southward advance, with economic control as a pre¬
liminary to political domination in the areas marked down.
Economic obstacles, such as may arise from American embargoes,
will seriously handicap Japan in the long run, but meanwhile they
tend to push the Japanese onward in a forlorn hope of making
themselves economically self-sufficient.

History has shown that the pendulum in Japan is always
swinging between extremist and moderate policies, but as things
stand to-day we believe that the pendulum is more likely to swing
still further towards extremes than to reverse its direction. Konoye,
and especially Matsuoka, will fall in due course, but under present
circumstances no Japanese leader or group of leaders could reverse
the expansionist programme and hope to survive.

Our own policy of unhurried but of inexorable determination
in meeting every Japanese step with some step of our own has been
eminently wise, and that policy has sunk deep into Japanese con¬
sciousness. But while important elements among the Japanese
people deplore the course which their leaders are taking, those
elements are nevertheless inarticulate and powerless and are
likely to remain so. Meanwhile, the Germans here are working
overtime to push Japan into war with us. I have told Matsuoka
point-blank that his country is heading for disaster. He has at
least seen that his efforts to intimidate us have fallen flat and have
had an effect precisely the reverse of that intended.

312

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

It therefore appears that sooner or later, unless we are prepared
with General Hugh Johnson, to withdraw bag and baggage
from the entire sphere of “ Greater East Asia including the South
Seas ” (which God forbid), we are bound eventually to come to
a head-on clash with Japan.

A progressively firm policy on our part will entail inevitable
risks—especially risks of sudden uncalculated strokes, such as the
sinking of the Panay, which might inflame the American people
—but in my opinion those risks are less in degree than the far
greater future dangers which we would face if we were to follow
a policy of laissezfaire.

In other words, the risks of not taking positive measures to
maintain our future security are likely to be much greater than
the risks of taking positive measures as the southward advance
proceeds. So far as I am aware, the great majority of the American
people are in a mood for vigorous action. The principal point at
issue, as I see it, is not whether we must call a halt to the Japanese
programme, but when.

It is important constandy to bear in mind the fact that if we
take measures “ short of war ” with no real intention to carry
those measures to their final conclusion if necessary, such lack
of intention will be all too obvious to the Japanese, who will proceed
undeterred, and even with greater incentive, on their way. Only
if they become certain that we mean to fight if called upon to do
so will our preliminary measures stand some chance of proving
effective and of removing the necessity for war—-the old story of
Sir Edward Grey in 1914.

If by such action we can bring about the eventual discrediting
of Japan’s present leaders, a regeneration of thought may ultimately
take shape in this country, permitting the resumption of normal
relations with us and leading to a readjustment of the whole Pacific
problem.

In a nutshell that is about the way I regard the present and future
situation. No doubt you have seen some of my telegrams which
have tried to paint the picture as clearly as has been possible at this
post where we have to fumble and grope for accurate informa¬
tion, simply because among the Japanese themselves the right hand
often doesn’t know what the left hand is doing. Their so-called
ee new structure ” is in an awful mess and the bickering and con¬
troversy that go on within the Government itself are past belief.
Every new totalitarian step is clothed in some righteous-sounding
slogan. This, indeed, is not the Japan that we have known and
loved.

• . . You are playing a masterly hand in our foreign affairs and
I am profoundly thankful that the country is not to be deprived
of your clear vision, determination, and splendid courage in piloting
the old ship of state.

THE PRESIDENT SUMS UP THE FAR EASTERN CRISIS

3*3

THE PRESIDENT SUMS UP THE FAR EASTERN

CRISIS

The President replied :

The White House
Washington
January 21, 1941

Dear Joe,—I have given careful consideration to your letter of
December 14.

First, I want to say how helpful it is to have your over-all estimates
and reflections—based as they are upon a rare combination of first¬
hand observation, long experience with our Japanese relations, and
masterly judgment. I find myself in decided agreement with your
conclusions.

I also want you to know how much I appreciate your kind words
of congratulation on my re-election and your expression of confidence
in my conduct of our foreign affairs.

As to your very natural request for an indication of my views as
to certain aspects of our future attitude towards developments in the
Far East, I believe that the fundamental proposition is that we must
recognize that the hostilities in Europe, in Africa, and in Asia are
all parts of a single world conflict. We must, consequently, recognize
that our interests are menaced both in Europe and in the Far East.
We are engaged in the task of defending our way of life and our vital
national interests wherever they are seriously endangered. Our
strategy of self-defence must be a global strategy which takes account
of every front and takes advantage of every opportunity to contribute
to our total security.

You suggest as one of the chief factors in the problem of our attitude
towards Japan the question whether our getting into war with Japan
would so handicap our help to Britain in Europe as to make the
difference to Britain between victory and defeat. In this connection
it seems to me that we must consider whether, if Japan should gain
possession of the region of the Netherlands East Indies and the Malay
Peninsula, the chances of England’s winning in her struggle with
Germany would not be decreased thereby. The British Isles, the
British in those isles, have been able to exist and to defend themselves
not only because they have prepared strong local defences but also
because as the heart and the nerve centre of the British Empire they
have been able to draw upon vast resources for their sustenance and
to bring into operation against their enemies economic, military,
and naval pressures on a world-wide scale. They live by importing
goods from all parts of the world and by utilizing large overseas
financial resources. They are defended not only by measures of
defence carried out locally but also by distant and widespread
economic, military, and naval activities which both contribute to the
maintenance of their supplies, deny certain sources of supply to their

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

3*4

enemies, and prevent those enemies from concentrating the full force
of their armed power against the heart and the nerve centre of the
Empire.

The British need assistance along the lines of our generally estab¬
lished policies at many points, assistance which in the case of the
Far East is certainly well within the realm of “ possibility ” so far as
the capacity of the United States is concerned. Their defence strategy
must in the nature of things be global. Our strategy of giving them
assistance towards ensuring our own security must envisage both
sending of supplies to England and helping to prevent a closing of
channels of communication to and from various parts of the world,
so that other important sources of supply will not be denied to the
British and be added to the assets of the other side.

You also suggest as chief factors in the problem the questions
whether and when Britain is likely to win the European war. As I
have indicated above, the conflict is world-wide, not merely a European
war. I firmly believe, as I have recently declared publicly, that the
British, with our help, will be victorious in this conflict. The conflict
may well be long, and we must bear in mind that when England
is victorious she may not have left the strength that would be needed
to bring about a rearrangement of such territorial changes in the
western and southern Pacific as might occur during the course of
the conflict if Japan is not kept within bounds. I judge from the
remarks which appear at the bottom of page 4 and at the top of
page 5 of your letter that you, too, attach due importance to this
aspect of the problem.

I am giving you my thoughts at this length because the problems
which we face are so vast and so interrelated that any attempt even
to state them compels one to think in terms of five continents and
seven seas. In conclusion, I must emphasize that, our problem being
one of defence, we cannot lay down hard-and-fast plans. As each new
development occurs we must, in the light of the circumstances then
existing, decide when and where and how we can most effectively
marshal and make use of our resources.

With warmest regards, as ever

Franklin D. Roosevelt

• GENERAL HARAGUCHPS HOLIDAY GREETINGS
January 1, 1941

The following somewhat baffled but not the less inspired attempt
of the Christian General Haraguchi to express his sentiments on his
Christmas and New Year card is worthy of something more than
mere derision :

Grant all your hopes a singing breeze.

Happy harbour safe to win
Quick upon un-troubled seas
May your ships sail in !

ROOSEVELT VERSUS LINDBERGH

315

SEASON’S GREETINGS

Merry Crystal America Mass
and

Happy Prosperous New Year.

H. J. Haraguchi.

Thanks giving for Unity
We the people, eternal people !

United immortal Childs America, who stand with Virgin Liberty
at almighty foundation of Mt. Freedom. They play the musics
and beautiful developed arts through speed communications
and transportations and all understand the words of God. He
gathered gems words with passion for unity and put on the hands
of Universities Machines, shine above .them as they are almighty
stars in the heaven. We thanks to them, come to stand on the
diamond step, ready to serve our country behind their God
. . . inspite of Athenians give hemlock and Roman nailed. They
meet at high light, a spiritual national unity with faiths and courage,
we believe in them, can march shoulder to shoulder, of different
creeds, races and nationalities. They have revealed its splendour,
and inspired its passionate devotion to Childs America. Mani¬
fested in them, glory to God highest in heaven and peace to men of
goodwill on earth everlasting.

ROOSEVELT VERSUS LINDBERGH
January 2, 1941

I have been giving to as many friends as possible not only the
complete text of the President’s radio address of December 29, 1940,
but also the editorial comments from prominent American papers
which have appeared in our daily radio bulletin. I also got Wills
to publish the whole speech in the Japan News Week , which goes to
some 3200 subscribers in Japan, including high officials, business
firms, and teachers, as well as selling 1200 copies on the news-stands.
Sumitomo alone takes 100 copies to distribute among the staff. Thus
the highlights of the speech will penetrate to at least some important
circles who will note the passages deleted in the vernacular press.

Thus, the comments in the vernacular press on the President’s
address, include such items as this from Chigax “ In view of the
opposition to war participation by Lindbergh and others, Roosevelt’s
broadcast can be regarded as merely a private opinion not necessarily
representative of the American people.” Opposition and isolationist
utterances by well-known Americans are always prominently displayed
here but seldom anything on the other side of the story. ^ So, of
course, the Japanese public gets an unbalanced and distorted
impression.

316

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

GERMANY WORKS FOR A JAPANESE-AMERICAN

BREAK

January 3, 1941

Information from a certain source brought out the already well-
known fact that the Germans here are doing everything possible to
prevent Admiral Nomura from going to Washington and to bring
about a partial or complete break in diplomatic relations with the
United States, and that they are also about to intensify their efforts
to embroil the two countries and to propel the southward advance.
The following points were suggested as worthy of impression on the
Japanese authorities :

1. If Japan follows the German urgings she will become in¬
volved, to her great disadvantage and probably without ultimate
profit, in useless expenditures and risks.

2. If Japan enters the war on the side of the Axis she will either
be defeated or, if her Axis partners should win, she will never
be allowed by her partners to hold what she temporarily may have
gained.

3. The opposition of the entire world to the Axis is steadily
growing and crystallizing, while a Nazi and Fascist victory is daily
becoming less probable.

4. If Japan allows herself to be misled by Nazi blandishments
and to become involved in new military adventures, she is likely
to alienate countries which do not wish to injure Japan but which
have the power to do so if Japan forces them to act against her in
self-defence. Japan has infinitely more to gain and less to lose
by refusing to allow herself to be so misled.

5. That her Axis partners can render effective military support
to Japan is not believed to be the case.

6. Japan may well pause to consider the tremendous risks with¬
out compensating advantage which she would be assuming were
she to enter the war with the Axis or openly to assault or imperil
important American or British interests, or interests important to
those countries.

I told the Department, by the way, that we are well aware of the
efforts of the Germans to embroil Japan with us and that I have been
continually impressing the foregoing points on my Japanese contacts,
including the Foreign Minister. Also that I am making every effort
to get the full text of the President’s speech of December 29 to the
attention of influential quarters.

THE JAPANESE PRESS WARNS OF WAR WITH
AMERICA

January 7, 1941

A long editorial in to-day’s Kokumin warns the Japanese people
that war between Japan and the United States will be necessary

THE ONLY VIRTUE IN THE NOMURA APPOINTMENT 317

because of the collapse of Great Britain, and America’s entrance into
■ the hostilities is expected to occur sometime this year. These events,
it is said, will shift the major scene of hostilities from Europe to the
Pacific, with Japan and the United States as the “ main forces of the
belligerents.” The editorial refers to the recent remarks of War
Minister Tojo and to the messages exchanged between Matsuoka
and Ribbentrop, quoting Ribbentrop as stating that Britain will be
44 wiped out by autumn of this year at the latest,” and declares that
the Axis powers have had ample provocation from the United States
to declare war against that country.

CLASH WITH MATSUOKA

January 18, 1941

At the farewell luncheon given by Matsuoka for Admiral Nomura
to-day, I was talking with them both and was expressing the hope
that the Admiral would be able to exert his influence (I didn’t say
where the influence was to be exerted) to improve American-Japanese
relations. Matsuoka remarked : “ They certainly couldn’t be worse,”
and turned away.

At the luncheon Matsuoka also practically threatened the United
States with war, and I immediately replied to the following effect:
“ The Minister, too, has lived long enough in the United States to
know that the American people are fundamentally peace-minded
and, furthermore, that they stand for justice and equity. He also
knows that the American people are firmly determined on certain
matters among which, on the one hand, are their obligations and,
on the other hand, their rights. Their profoundest wish is to see
peace, prosperity, security, stability, and happiness assured to all
nations. In the present state of world affairs we. must inevitably
realize that what counts in international relationships to-day is the
concrete evidence of facts and actions, regardless of the persuasive
garb in which such facts and actions may be dressed. Let us say of
nations as of men : c By their fruits ye shall know them.’ ”

THE ONLY VIRTUE IN THE NOMURA APPOINTMENT
January 20, 1941

In the numerous times that I have met Admiral Nomura on the
round of farewell parties given for him, even though I sat with him
for half an hour on the sofa to-night, he has not said, a single word
to me about the prospects of his job or of his observations during .his
recent visit to China. He is clearly not at home in spealdng English.
I can hardly picture him in a group of hard-boiled American Senators
or Congressmen or newspaper men or officials holding up his end in a
discussion. Yet Bishop Baker, visiting Methodist bishop, told me that
he had had a long talk with the Admiral in the latter’s home and
that he had been impressed by his choice of language and familiarity
with long words. In any case, language is not what counts now or

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

318

what will count in the immediate future. The only potential usefulness
I can see in Admiral Nomura’s appointment lies in the hope that he
will honestly report to his Government what the American Govern¬
ment and people are thinking, writing, and saying.

JAPANESE COURTESY

January 25, 1941 .

« Chip ” Bohlen 1 arrived from Moscow to-day. He had wired
from Tsuruga that he would arrive in Tokyo at a certain hour “ if
still alive.” It was a pretty grim trip from Vladivostok and poor
Bohlen had to take to bed with a feverish cold on arrival. He said
that the mann ers of the Japanese officials in Tsuruga and of the staff
on the ship were appalling; whenever he held out his passport or
other papers they were rudely snatched out of his hand, and the
service on shipboard was practically non-existent. This was Bohlen’s
first glimpse of Japan and the so-called courteous race that inhabit
it. Wiley’s 2 initial experience in Japan will also be remembered,
how on crossing the frontier from Russia he was rudely elbowed off
the pavement by Japanese soldiers. The other day in Tokyo station
I was queueing up to go through the ticket barrier when a Japanese
thought that he had the right of way and strong-armed me out of
the line with a heavy push. Luckily I counted ten before hitting
him ) and then discretion overcame valour. There are rough-necks
in every country, but in Japan just now they seem to predominate.
One’s blood boils but there’s nothing to be done about it.

It is interesting to note that when recendy someone on the U.S.S.
Mindanao was seen to take a photograph of a Japanese warship,
the Japanese naval authorities in Canton made a big row about it
and demanded an apology and the surrender of the film. The matter
finally came up to Admiral Hart, who sent back word through Rear-
Admiral Glassford to Admiral Shimada, Commander-in-Chief of
Japanese naval forces in Chinese waters, that he (Admiral Hart)
“ was amazed that the Japanese naval authorities in Canton should
matff any such demands and that he personally had witnessed the
photographing of his own flagship by persons on Japanese men-of-
war, notably the Idzumo , and that he had never dreamed of protest¬
ing such action.” The Japanese demands were promptly dropped.
Old Shimada had a little common sense, evidently.

FIRST RUMOURS OF A SURPRISE ATTACK ON
PEARL HARBOUR

January 27, 1941

There is a lot of talk around town to the effect that the Japanese,
in case of a break with the United States, are planning to go all out
in a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbour. Of course I informed
our Government.

1 Served as President Roosevelt’s Russian interpreter at Teheran conference.

* American Minister to Latvia and Estonia.

JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS NEVER LOOKED DARKER

319

WAR-MONGERING AMERICA THROUGH JAPANESE

EYES

January 31, 1941

“ Considering relations with Great Britain and in connection with
the Pacific question, State Secretary Hull of the American Govern¬
ment has intimated that should Japan make any proposal, America
would be ready to consider it. This intimation is an insolent expres¬
sion which is worthy to be spat upon. What country is it which
is aggravating the situation to disturb the peace of the Pacific ?
America, without doubt. Advocating the Monroe Doctrine and
emphasizing the peace of the world, it is America which has played
the part of a kindler in the European disturbance. Not stopping there
pnd t h p p , it is busily hatching heinous schemes to extend the war to
the Pacific. Should Japan make a proposal it would be for instant
withdrawal of the American fleet from the Pacific.”

—Keijo Mppo (Korean Japanese-language daily newspaper).

JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS NEVER LOOKED

DARKER

February 1, 1941

One of my colleagues in Tokyo recently characterized the present
situation in Japan as one of “ unstable equilibrium.” We can fully
subscribe to the instability, but as to the equilibrium, that seems to
be hardly the right word, and if the tilt is really held in balance,
that balance is not obvious to the naked eye. It is true that the
moderates are steadily working to maintain that balance, especially
behind closed doors in the current sessions of the Diet, where com¬
mittee meetings are being held in camera in order to avoid public
censuring of the Government’s policy. We know that Arita has been
interpellating the Foreign Minister for days on end; we know that
Hirota has said that Matsuoka is following a foreign policy “ fatal
to Japan ; ” we know, according to several prominent members of the
Diet, that assurances have quietly been given by the Government that
a policy to avoid a clash with the United States will be followed.

Yet in practice the southward advance is being pushed with all
energy by the military ; their stranglehold on Indo-China, in contra¬
vention of the agreement with Vichy, continues with ever-increasing
intensity, while Japan’s insistence on mediating the Thailand-Indo-
nhina dispute and, according to reports, on being paid for such
mediation by the acquisition of naval bases in Camranh Bay is patent
evidence of her firm intention to acquire jumping-off facilities for
an eventual attack on Singapore. 11 Equilibrium ” between the
moderates and extremists seems hardly the right word. The latter
are firmly in the saddle, and in practice there is ample evidence that
they intend to push rapidly ahead, obviously stimulated by the
Nazis, either in the belief that the United States will remain quiescent

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

320

or, if we do not remain quiescent, discounting the results of American
intervention. The outlook for the future of the relations between
Japan and the United States has never been darker.

JAPAN’S NIBBLING CONTINUES
February 7, 1941

The following recent developments, both factual and reported,
are concrete indications of the rapid progress Japan is making in
her southward advance policy:

(a) Rumours that a Japanese force had landed at Songhkla, a
Thai base close to the northern frontier of the Malay States, the
presence of Japanese naval vessels in Camranh Bay, and the
presence in the Gulf of Siam of one or more Japanese cruisers, a
seaplane tender, and destroyers.

(b) Japan’s military encroachments in Indo-China, exemplified
in Japanese control of the Saigon air-port, and mediation in the
Thai-Indo-China dispute. It is reported that Japan expects to
be granted the use of naval bases for having mediated the dispute.

Just as Japan has seized Hainan, Waichow, the Spratley Islands,
and northern Indo-China in the course of the past two years, so
Japan continues to carry out its nibbling policy, as foreshadowed
by the Embassy. This policy, which consists of tentative thrusts
and sallies in the desired direction, followed by periods of inaction
when the results and effects of the steps taken are felt out, is now
being pursued with increased vigour due to Nazi stimulation.

Japan has already attained a position in south-eastern Asia whence
an investment or attack upon Singapore and the supplying of Axis
ships in the Indian Ocean are possible with some added preparation.
It is likely that such a move against Singapore is planned to syn¬
chronize with the expected German attempt to land in England.
Apparently the conservative elements in the Army and Navy counsel
delaying any action against Singapore until the European situation
is favourable, and yet it must be remembered that the reckless do-
or-die spirit of the military extremists may force the issue before
Great Britain or the United States could or would intervene.

The Department’s unofficial memorandum dated December 4,
1940, describing the vital role of Singapore in the defence of the
British Isles, may be accepted as final and fundamental. Great
Britain is in no position to-day, and presumably will not be in the
near future, to part with important naval units for the defence of
Singapore. In conformity with our admitted policy of aiding
Britain, we must see to it that this strategically important base does
not become the possession of a hostile power.

It is supposedly upon hopes of eventual American assistance that
the morale of the Netherlands East Indies, the Chinese National
Government, and of the British in the Far East is based. With great

THE INSIDE STORY OF MATSUOKA’s MEDIATION OFFER 32 %

pressure being brought to bear on the Dutch in Batavia and with
the British facing the possibility of sudden and sharp pressure, the
moral is clear that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.
Without the determined efforts of the Dutch, it is doubtful whether
the East Indies and Singapore could be defended. The taking of
Singapore by a hostile power would necessarily have grave reper¬
cussions upon Chinese morale as well as upon Britain’s position in the
Near East and in the eastern Mediterranean.

This Embassy is in no position to determine what action the United
States should take or at what moment such action should be taken,
for these are matters of high strategic policy. We recommend avoid¬
ing any half-way measure, which would not only be ineffective but
would also entail all the possible undesirable results. As I have
said in the past, we are faced with a momentous question, which is
not whether we should check Japan’s southward advance, but when.
There are inevitable risks of war entailed in a concentration of
American naval units in the Far East and it would be difficult to
estimate the gravity of those risks, but at all events the United States
should not undertake them unless prepared for war. Yet we believe
that to allow the Japanese to advance indefinitely unchecked would
be to court far greater future dangers than if we were to call a halt
to its southward advance in time. The Japanese, in our opinion,
are relying on the passiveness of our country. We believe that if
definite action is to be taken, it may have to be taken before long.

A typical report comes from Kunming describing the bombing of
the American Catholic Mission at Poyang, in Kiangsi, on November
15 : “ One Japanese plane dived to approximately 300 feet and re¬
leased bomb on its church, although the compound was marked
with two large American flags, all the buildings being marked with
white crosses and the visibility excellent. This plane later returned
to survey the damage and to machine-gun the compound. The
Mission states that there are no military establishments within a mile
of the compound.” Another unavoidable mistake ; excuse it, please.

THE INSIDE STORY OF MATSUOKA’S MEDIATION

OFFER

February 21, 1941

A report came to me to-day, from a source whose reliability I
cannot confirm, to the effect that a movement is on foot by an im¬
portant group in Japan, including influential Army officers, to stage
a coup d'etat and to overthrow the Government, by assassinations,
by methods similar to those of the February 26 Incident. This group
believes that the Government is leading Japan straight towards war
with the United States, a war in which Japan would certainly be
defeated in the long run. The names of the principal people who
are, allegedly, to assume the Government if the revolution succeeds
were given me, but I shall not put them down here. While there is
11

J22 ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

no way of checldng the accuracy of this report, I know of the dissatis¬
faction with Konoye and Matsuoka, and knowing also the way things
go in Japan, the report is not at all unplausible.

Plenty of dust has been stirred up by Matsuoka’s reported offer to
Mr. Eden to mediate for peace in the European conflict; the press
abroad was full of it and questions were asked in the House of
Commons. My original guess as to how the thing happened event¬
ually proved correct and Matsuoka told me the whole story on
February 26. It appears that in the face of criticism of Japan’s
action in mediating in the Thailand-Indo-China dispute, Matsuoka
wrote a memorandum to Eden, through Shigemitsu in London,
in which, in the course of a long exposition, he said :

Lastly, the Minister for Foreign Affairs [Mr. Matsuoka] would
like to make it clear that Japan, deeply concerned as she is with
an early restoration of peace, is fully prepared to act as a mediator
or to take whatever action calculated to recover normal conditions,
not only in Greater East Asia but anywhere the world over.

What actually happened was that Ishii, deputy spokesman of the
Information Bureau, ran across this memorandum in the Foreign
Office and gave out certain parts of it to the press, in precisely the
same way that Amau had given out one of Hirota’s instructions to
the Minister in China in the celebrated “Amau Statement,” and
in both cases the publicity was given without the prior knowledge
or approval of the Minister. Matsuoka told me that he had been
very angry with Ishii and had issued to him “ a severe warning,” but
that, of course, Ishii’s face had to be saved in public. However, the
harm had been done and it was considerable. Matsuoka said that
the British had used it to imply that Germany was in bad straits
and needed peace, which was the last thing he had intended to
convey. At this point in our talk he got much stirred up and his eyes
became bloodshot with suppressed anger.

GOLF AS A DIPLOMATIC BAROMETER
February 22, 1941

In a group at the French Embassy at one of their Friday “ at
homes ” Baron Fain, Counsellor of the French Embassy, asked how
my golf was going. I said : “ Why is it, my dear Baron, that when¬
ever a colleague or a Japanese opens a talk with me, instead of
commenting on the weather he almost always asks about my golf? 55
“ Why, Mr. Ambassador,” replied Fain, “ your golf is the ther¬
mometer which measures the temperature in the Diplomatic Corps.
If a week goes by without your playing golf, the fact is cabled to every
chancellery the world over, for the situation is then indeed critical.”
I said : “ Well, call me up to-morrow night and I’ll tell you in strict
confidence whether I was able to get my now once-a-week Saturday
afternoon game.”

REFLECTIONS ON A TALK WITH MATSUOKA

323

REFLECTIONS ON A TALK WITH MATSUOKA
February 26, 1941

In the course of a discussion of the Thailand-Indo-China dispute,
Foreign Minister Matsuoka went out of his way to accuse the British
Government of taking measures in the Far East which were a direct
incitement to Japan and which rendered very difficult an improve¬
ment in the situation. He referred in this connection to the reported
mining of Singapore and the dispatch of Australian troops to the
Malaya-Thailand border.

I said that it seemed to me extraordinary that the Japanese should
interpret and characterize obviously defensive measures as measures
of offence. As I had said to the Minister at the America-Japan
Society luncheon, we must inevitably be guided by “ facts and
actions,” and the facts and actions relating to Japan’s southward
advance certainly offered concrete cause for serious anxiety not only
on the. part of Great Britain but of ourselves. Having occupied in
succession Waichow, Hainan, the Spratley Islands, and other areas,
the Japanese military were now pouring troops into Indo-China
and, according to our information, had occupied the air-port in Saigon
and engaged in naval activities in those regions. These steps, together
with the public utterances of many Japanese statesmen, generals, and
admirals concerning Japanese intentions to the southward, had
created a situation which could hardly be regarded with equanimity
either by the United States or Great Britain, since they threatened
not only our interests but our possessions.

Mr. Matsuoka replied that Japan was not the only country that
gave voice to inflammatory utterances, and in this connection he
mentioned the names of certain Americans. He denied that the
air-field at Saigon had been occupied, murmured something about
Tongking, and said that the Japanese troops in Indo-China were
there in strict accordance with the terms of the official agreement
with the Vichy Government. I said that according to our own
information these troops were very much in excess of the number
originally stipulated, but the Minister replied that this was merely
a question of replacement.

After we finished our talk, I wrote thirteen separate memorandums
on the subjects touched upon, and even they were not enough to
cover all he said. One emerges from such a conversation with one’s
head feeling like a whirlpool, for the Minister’s volubility is sur¬
passed in my experience only by that of Foreign Minister Tewfik
Ruschdi Bey in the old days of Turkey—and that was all in French.
Fortunately, I acquired the knack of remembering the points in
such a talk from experience as Under-Secretary of State, when it
was sometimes necessary to receive six or eight foreign diplomats
in rapid succession and with no time to dictate the memorandums
until afterwards, and every memorandum had to be complete,

3 24 ONE WORLD : TWO WAKS

because to have forgotten any single point might then have had
serious results.

THE ROUGH-NECK JAPANESE AT HOME
February 28, 1941

The rough-neck Japanese are not rough only with foreigners but
with their own people as well, and the papers have recently reported
that jostling, disorder, and actual fighting are occurring in the waiting
lines before the movie houses. When Mr. Kita, Director of the
National Life Guidance Department of the Imperial Rule Assistance
Association (how’s that for a title !), was asked for his view, he is
reported to have said : “ I should say that it resulted from lack of
training on the part of the crowd. Pleasure-seeking,* as long as it
is limited to once or twice a month for relaxation from hard daily
work, is quite all right, but even those whose pleasure-seeking is
justified have no right to push and elbow one another at the entrance
of a theatre.” The manager of the movie house said : “ This shows
how heatedly the general public is seeking amusements.” The
fact is that amusements, and in fact all the joy of life, are now so
restricted that people are getting ugly. It is natural. The German
slogan should in Japan be altered to Kraft durch Unfreude.

A JAPANESE STATESMAN UNBENDS
March 20, 1941

Diplomatic dinner at the official residence of the Vice-Foreign
Minister and Mrs. Ohashi. Ohashi was affable, almost genial, and
seems to have mellowed personally since he took office. Anyway,
Alice kept him in gales of laughter during dinner. After dinner
Ohashi talked with me for a long time and very interestingly—about
education in Japan, the classics, and the faults of their educational
system, which taught the young to memorize continually without
using their minds in a discriminating way; on this subject he was
very outspoken. Then he got on to the subject of the President’s
recent speech, and said he had been scratching his head in an attempt
to understand what the President had in mind when he referred to
dictatorships in the Far East; certainly the President couldn’t have
been referring to Japan because, with her many faults, Japan at
least was not under a dictatorship; and then he had got it; why,
of course, he was referring to Chiang Kai-shek, the perfect dictator.
As for America supporting the democracies, he couldn’t imagine any
country less democratic than Chiang Kai-shek’s China.

He spoke of Admiral Nomura’s t alks with the President and Mr.
Hull, and had been glad that both sides had agreed that a Japanese-
American war would be an absurdity. He inveighed against the bad
treatment of foreigners in Japan. He talked with surprising interest
and with a good deal of humour, and was perfectly willing to discuss

A BRIEF CASE HISTORY OF JAPANESE SELF-DECEPTION 325

the faults of his own country—although perhaps not all her faults !
What we had anticipated as a grim and ghastly evening proved to
be quite the contrary.

A BRIEF CASE HISTORY OF JAPANESE
SELF-DECEPTION

March 26, 1941

To what extent the intelligent Japanese were guilty of intellectual
dishonesty, or to what extent they arrive at honest convictions from
the propaganda with which they are fed, is always to me an open
question. Since they are not allowed to know the facts, perhaps we
can give them the benefit of the doubt, yet it is a little difficult to
understand how an intelligent and scholarly man like the President
of Waseda University, which has long stood for liberalism, can write
such stuff as the following :

As stressed in the Konoye statement made some time ago, Japan’s
purpose in the present conflict is not a petty territorial acquisition.
... It is rather to safeguard China’s independence, and, respect¬
ing her sovereignty, to establish a New Order in East Asia. In
order to fulfil this noble mission, Japan has had to venture the
greatest war in history. . . . Where in the world can another
example of a battle fought with such a lofty ideal be found ? This
may truly be termed a Sacred War. . . . The countries that are
most strongly insisting upon the maintenance of the “ Open Door
policy ” and the principle of “ equal opportunity ” in the world
to-day are the least willing to put into practice what they are
advocating. Can international justice be established while such
inconsistency prevails ?

Yet some of them have a sense of humour in spite of all, and
the following item recently appeared in the Japan Times and
Advertiser :

Because Britain has occupied Danish Iceland illegally the
German Government has denounced it and applied the submarine
blockade thereto. That should teach the British not to take over
other people’s territory without due process of law.

The hide of the Germans is far too thick ever to see the irony intended.
A certain Japanese once remarked about the Germans: 11 What do
they think we are ? Vassals ? ” And the other day he told me
he thought that the touchiness of the Germans springs from a marked
inferiority complex. That from a Japanese is good.

On another occasion the same newspaper published a phrase^from
one of Hitler’s speeches—the HerretwoUt , the mas ter race ss
“ the hairy horde, the monster ape.” I don’t believe that the printer’s
devil could have been responsible for that one.

326

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

TRIBUTE TO WILLKIE

March 30, 1941

In the bitter controversy in the United States over the Lend-
Lease Act and over the question of the degree to which we should
aid Britain, having in mind the risk of ourselves getting into the war,

I fear that the intensity of feeling sometimes obscures objective
thinking. For instance, an intelligent friend at home writes :

If a man or woman sincerely and enthusiastically believes that
a course of action is really best for the country, it is wicked to
keep silent for any personal reasons whatsoever.

Yet in another place the same friend writes :

He [Willkie] seems to have lost his head completely, has become

a publicity hound and a political adventurer. As - says,

“ He does not understand the game and permits himself to be exploited
by the administration. 95

The italics are mine. What game? The game of partisan politics
while the world is burning and America at the cross-roads ? Is it
beyond the bounds of reason that Willkie just possibly may be an
honest man, intellectually and otherwise, and that it would be
“ wicked to keep silent ... if a man or woman sincerely and enthusi¬
astically believes that a course of action is really best for the
country ? 55

Yes, we have a two-party system. A healthy opposition by the
minority is part and parcel of that system. But does that mean that
in national issues of vital importance to the country no member of
the opposition, especially an outstanding member, shall support the
administration in any policy which that member sincerely believes
is right ?

I ask these questions because, in what seems to me to be an incon¬
sistency in the two passages quoted above, the basic thought about
Willkie is that “ he does not understand the game. 59 Alas, there
must be something wrong with my own intellectual equipment or
else in my appraisal of a man and his motives. Ever since last spring,
when I first read some of Willkie 5 s speeches (and my opinions were
recorded in the diary at that time), I have believed him to be an
honest man, intellectually and politically honest. I know very well
that he has moved pretty far afield from some of his campaign
speeches, but my conception of an intellectually honest man is
not of one who fears to modify previously expressed views in the
face of modified circumstances, broader observation, and maturer
thought.

So fair as Willkie is concerned, that seems to be the crux of the
matter—whether he is or is not intellectually honest. If he is merely
seeking publicity—" a publicity hound and a political adventurer 55

japan’s southward advance marks time 327

—then my estimate of his character is all wet and I retire from the
debate. But if he is, as I firmly believe, honest to the core, would it
not then be wicked for him to keep silent or to oppose a course of
action which he thinks is really best for the country ? Should he not
vigorously support that course of action, as he has done ? My own
feeling is that Willkie grows steadily in stature and will in future
play a prominent part in the political life of our country

JAPAN’S SOUTHWARD ADVANCE MARKS TIME
April 10, 1941

March was a month of marking time in the Far East. The
Thailand-Indo-China “ mediation ” came to a head, practically in
the form of a Japanese ultimatum to the French, who had to sign on
the dotted line. They knew that Indo-China was not strong enough
to resist Japanese incursion, and believed that it was better to give
up a part than to have it all taken away, which would probably
have been the case if they had tried to thwart Japan. Incidentally
we know that the chief Thai delegate remarked afterwards that the
settlement dictated by Japan was “ devoid of all common sense.”
The net result seems to be that Japan gets a stranglehold on Indo-
China and at least a semi-stranglehold on Thailand for use at such
rimp in the future as it suits the purpose of the Japanese to prepare
to attack Malaya, Burma, or Singapore. The southward advance
is, however, marking time pending developments in Europe, and
while the Japanese have at least one eye cocked towards the United
States.

Meanwhile, Matsuoka has gone on his historic visit to Europe.
He is known to have remarked that Ribbentrop is supposed to be
the biggest liar in Europe and that he wanted to find out if this
were true. As for Moscow, we are told on the best authority that in *
his one-hour meeting with Stalin, Matsuoka lectured on Japanese
ideology for precisely fifty-eight minutes, concluding his lecture
with the amaring statement that while the Japanese were not
Communists, politically or economically, nevertheless a close parallel
existed between Communism and Japanese family life; Stalin is
said thereupon to have remarked that he saw no reason why Russia
and Japan should not be friends in spite of differences in ideology,
and left the room.

I would give a lot to know whether Matsuoka managed with
equal success to hold the floor in his talks with Hitler; it would
take a superman to out-talk Matsuoka, but maybe Hitler is a super¬
man. Matsuoka is reported to have said to the German press, in
effect, all the world’s troubles were due to Anglo-Saxon machina¬
tions, and I dare say that he did say just that. But if I know
any thing about the Germans they will have overplayed their hand
withfhim, and with their usual technique of cajolery and threats
they may well have weakened rather than strengthened the Axis ties.

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

328

About that, we shall see in due course. At any rate, Mr. Matsuoka
could hardly have picked a worse moment for his visit, for on his
arrival in Berlin the Nazi celebration of getting Yugoslavia into the
Axis had turned to complete discomfiture, while on the very day of
his arrival in Rome, or thereabouts, the serious Italian defeat in the
naval battle of Matapan was announced. The appearance of a
black cat could hardly have been more untimely than Matsuoka’s
arrival in the two capitals.

The domestic situation in Japan, both politically and economically,
was steadily growing worse and dissatisfaction with Konoye and his
cabinet was growing. This dissatisfaction led, in the early days of
April, to a revamping of the cabinet with the inclusion of Ogura,
Admiral Toyoda, and General Suzuki. Ogura is the head of the
great business firm of Sumitomo and, incidentally, President of the
America-Japan Society of the Kwansai (Osaka). Toyoda is sound
and sensible. I know both of them, Ogura very well and Toyoda
fairly well. Hiranuma is no doubt responsible for these changes and

is, we believe, directing affairs behind the scenes, lending strength
to Prince Konoye’s weakness. The result should be healthy and we
may expect to see a restraining influence on the hothead extremists.
In fact, we begin to see symptoms of at least a slight cooling of pro-
Axis sentiment.

But in the last analysis, as I have continually said, future develop¬
ments will depend in large measure on the result of affairs in Europe,
particularly the Battle of Britain.

With great reluctance and disappointment I have given up all
thought of taking leave of absence this spring. This is no time for
vacations while the world bums, and since these coming months
may well be critical for Europe, they may bring equally critical
* developments in the Far East. It would be very easy to persuade
myself that other hands could run the Embassy adequately during
the comparatively brief period necessary to enable me to accept an
important academic invitation in the United States in June, and that
during that period nothing of importance might happen. But, on
the other hand, something of importance might happen when only
the Ambassador could exact influence. It nearly breaks my heart
because, in the quiet watches of the night, I have sometimes dared
to let myself hope that such an academic invitation might some
day be extended, and now that it has been extended I can’t accept

it. The old New England conscience wins.

RUMOURS OF A JAPANESE ATTACK ON SINGAPORE
GO THE ROUNDS

April 15, 1941

During my absence in Kawana a report was circulating in Tokyo
that Japan intended to attack Singapore within a few days, even
before Matsuoka’s return. It became so persistent that some of the

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE NON-AGGRESSION PACT 329

correspondents cabled it home and, since the diplomats were all
worked up about it, the Embassy had to cable the report to Wash¬
ington. The rumour lasted for some three days, from the 12th to the
15th, but on the 15th Dooman met Ohashi at lunch and received
from him a categorical denial “ with great vigour.” At Ohashi’s
suggestion we put Hill of the A.P. up to asking the question of Ko
Ishii, who said, “ I can absolutely flatly deny that Japan intends to
send Army or Navy forces against* or to Singapore,” and he added
that Japan’s intentions in the south are entirely peaceful and ex¬
clusively economic as recently stated by Prince Konoye. He char¬
acterized the reports as the “ work of war-mongers.” At least one of
the sources of the rumour was General Ishihara, retired because he
had published an article advocating a Japanese attack on Singapore.

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE NON-AGGRESSION PACT
April 17, 1941

As for the pact with Soviet Russia, the press as a whole tends to
regard it with guarded approval rather than with enthusiasm, and
points out that it is merely a first step in the direction of stabilizing
Japan’s relations with that country. There are indications that the
complete confidence which would impel a southward advance is not
yet felt with regard to the northern neighbour.

By and large there seems to be considerable opposition to Japan’s
pushing the southward advance by force. The Government is care¬
fully watching developments in Europe and their effect on American
policy, but it must be admitted that there have been noticeable
repercussions in Japan in a direction favourable to the pro-Axis
elements as a result of the unfortunate trend of military operations
in the eastern Mediterranean during the past fortnight.

Yesterday the Government issued the following confidential instruc¬
tions to the Japanese press in commenting on the treaty with Russia:

(1) The press is not to convey the impression that Japan is not
enthusiastic over the conclusion of the pact;

(2) The opposition of certain anti-Soviet circles in Japan is not
to be mentioned ;

(3) Nothing is to be said with regard to the weaknesses of Soviet
Russia which led to the conclusion of the treaty ;

(4) The conditional provisions respectively exchanged by the two
countries are not to be touched on.

These instructions are, of course, very significant; they speak for
themselves.

I learned on good authority and so reported to the Department
that German fifth columnists are steadily increasing in Japan and
are causing real concern. It is said that growing activity on the part
of members of the Gestapo is noticeable and that these gentry are
reporting to the Japanese police the names of Japanese whom they
believe to be harbouring anti-Axis sentiments.

330

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

BACKGROUND ON THE SOVIET-JAPANESE PACT
April 22, 194 *

I have already written, in the March diary, of Matsuoka’s first
talk with Stalin on the former’s way to Berlin and how he lectured
Stalin on Japanese ideology for fifty-eight minutes out of the sixty-
minute interview, maintaining that there is a close parallel between
rinmmiinkm and Japanese family life. On returning from Berlin,
Matsuoka told Steinhardt that he had little hope of concluding a
treaty with Stalin because he was not willing, and the Japanese
public would not stand for the concessions which the Russians were
qsfrtng for a non-aggression pact. But then at the last minute it
appears that Stalin suddenly suggested a neutrality pact, which was
signed in a few minutes, with no concessions (unless there were
secret concessions) on the part of Japan. Nobody, apparendy,
was more surprised than Matsuoka.

In my analysis of the results of the neutrality pact, in the absence
of information as to any secret commitments or understandings, I
have come to the following conclusions :

(a) Due to the fact that Japan, at least publicly, was not obliged
to pay a price for the pact, it represented a great personal succes
for Matsuoka;

(£) Instead of defining the policies and obligations of the respective
signatories, the treaty was apparently concluded chiefly for the
effect which each party believed it would exert on the other party
and on third parties (on Germany, from the Soviet point of view,
and on the United States and Great Britain, from the Japanese
point of view);

(r) The treaty should tend to help rather than to thwart a con¬
clusion of the conflict in China, regardless of any reservations on
the part of the Soviets with regard to China or any subtleties in
phraseology;

(</) With respect to Japan’s relations with Soviet Russia, the treaty
will tend to balance the one-sided nature of the Tripartite Alliance,
especially considering the somewhat formalistic Japanese mind ;

(e) The pact will tend to stimulate and support the Japanese
^trotniats who advocate a vigorous prosecution of the southward
advance because it guarantees Soviet neutrality in case Japan gets
into war with a third country (i.e. the United States).

During Matsuoka’s talks with Stdnhardt, who gave a luncheon
for him, the following points emerged, and I have no hesitation in
setting them down because Matsuoka, if he has time when he returns,
will tell me everything that he told Steinhardt:

(1) No commitments were made by Matsuoka in either Berlin or

Rome. . ,

(2) The chief purpose of Japan in entering the Tripartite Alliance

background on the soviet-japanese pact 331

was to preserve peace—a theme upon which Matsuoka constantly
harps both in public and in private.

(3) Japan would be obliged to go to war with the United States
only if we should declare war on Germany, but that Japan would
of course confer with Germany first.

(4) Matsuoka does not believe that Germany will declare war on
the United States, but if that should happen he hopes that Japan
will be given time to make her position clear before we make any
move in the Pacific.

(5) Japan will strictly carry out her obligations to the Axis.

(6) Matsuoka had been told by both Hider and Ribbentrop that
they did not want war with the United States.

(7) They had also suggested that anti-American agitation in Japan
be stopped.

(8) All three of them had expressed a wish for peace, but they saw
no possibility of peace until England had capitulated.

(9) Hitler had created a personally favourable impression on
Matsuoka, who characterized him as a genius. He had been reason¬
able and calm in all their talks and had shown none of the excitable
characteristics usually attributed to him.

(10) Ribbentrop admired the fight that Britain was putting up
and realized that she was stronger now, from the point of view of
defence, than when the war began. He expressed the opinion that
the British Empire should not be destroyed.

(n) Hitler would invade Britain only under necessity and fully
expected to win through aviation and the submarine.

(12) Matsuoka did not believe that Britain could drive a wedge
between Germany and Italy, the latter being largely under German
control while mutual personal admiration existed between Hider and
Mussolini. But the Germans had been instructed not to “ look down
or talk down ” to the Italians. Mussolini showed no discourage¬
ment over' his recent reverses and was sure that he would shortly
stage a “ come-back.”

(13) Owing to the excessive demands of the Soviets, Matsuoka
had made little progress in talking with Molotov.

(14) Japan had the choice of coming to an agreement with Moscow
or becoming embroiled with the Soviet Union.

(15) Matsuoka earnestly desired an end of the war in China and
felt that this could be brought about if the President would tell
nh i*r, g Kai-shek that if he refused to accept reasonable and fair
peace terms, American aid would cease. Nevertheless, the Japanese
would not accept mediation and peace could be effected only through
direct negotiation between the two nations.

(16) Unless the Soviet Union substantially reduced its delivery of
supplies to Germany, the Germans would not invade Russia, although
they were fully prepared to do so. He thought that it was for the
purpose of frightening the Soviets into continuing supplies that the
Germing Jiad given put rumours of a possible attack*

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

332

(17) Matsuoka hoped that the President and Mr. Hull would
have confidence in him.

Steinhardt later took the precaution of reading the foregoing
points to Matsuoka, who confirmed them as an accurate record of
what he had said.

WILL GERMANY ATTACK RUSSIA ?

April 22, 1941

Whether a German attack on Soviet Russia to acquire the granaries
of the Ukraine and the oil of the Caucasus will take place soon is
an open question. I think that eventually it is almost inevitable.
Meanwhile, the Germans will circulate rumours that such an attack
is imminent, with a view to intimidating the Russians into increasing
their delivery of supplies and perhaps into forcing the Soviets into the
Axis. The Germans maintain that an invasion of Soviet Russia
would be little more than a skirmish. Perhaps they are right; but
the Russians are unpredictable. They certainly cleaned up the
Japanese at Nomonhan, but perhaps that was not a fair test.

MATSUOKA REPORTS TO THE BLACK DRAGON
SOCIETY

April 25, 1941

We learn that immediately after the return of Matsuoka from
Moscow the anti-Fascist and anti-Communist Black Dragon Society
sent a delegation to call on him in order to ascertain the extent of
the agreement which he had signed with the Russians. According to
our reliable informant the most categorical assurances were given by
Matsuoka that no secret clauses were contained in the agreement
and that neither Japan nor the Soviet Government gave any oral
commitment of any nature. They did not discuss the reduction of
their respective military forces in Siberia and Manchuria.

Matsuoka said that after all the facts had been studied and after
all elements of the situation had been carefully weighed without bias,
Japan’s policy had been decided upon. This policy, while steadfasdy
holding in view the great ambition of finally bringing about on
earth the condition envisaged in the Japanese term Hakko Ichiu ,
was aimed at fulfilling Japan’s conception of that term, namely, a
universal peace under which there would be no conquest, no oppres¬
sion, and no exploitation of any peoples. Once that policy was
determined, Matsuoka said, it would be carried out resolutely but
with complete circumspection, having in mind every detail of chang¬
ing circumstances. (Altered circumstances ! That is the loop-hole
which Japan always leaves herself. She will scrupulously abide by
all her commitments—until, in Japan’s opinion, altered circum¬
stances have rendered such commitments obsolete.)

VISIT TO THE DOWAGER EMPRESS

333

MATSUOKA OVERPLAYS HIS HAND

May 2, 1941

Matsuoka returned from his visits to Berlin, Rome, and Moscow
on the crest of toe wave, and his achievement of the neutrality treaty
with Soviet Russia plus the recent German military successes in the
Balkans and Libya has momentarily consolidated his stock with the

VU 1S ? e , neraUy believed tb at his ambition is to become Prime
Minister (God help Japan if he does) and that he will exploit his
diplomatic successes to promote his personal interests.

But we learn on the best of authority that he is sailing very close
to the wind. It is known that in his speech at the big public meeting
to welcome him on his return he made several thinly veiled allusions
critical of his cabinet colleagues. He indirectly charged them with
wilfully causing the breakdown in the system of commodity dis¬
tribution, and. he implied treasonable action in clipping the wings
of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association by mentioning the
name of the one man in Japanese history, in the Middle Ages,
Ashikaga Takauji, who is execrated for having attempted to usurp
the throne. r

Furthermore, it appears that when he reported to Prince Konoye
on his return, both the Prime Minister and the cabinet were very
angry on learning that in concluding the Neutrality Pact he had
given the Soviets a certain undertaking on his own responsibility
without the cabinet’s authorization. It is not possible to ascertain
just what that undertaking was, because anyone who told us would
be liable to prosecution under the new National Secrets Law, but it
is. not unlikely that it had to do with the number of troops on the
Siberian border.

It is not likely that Matsuoka will be replaced in the immediate
future, because his stock with the public is too high, but he is not
liked and is regarded as a dangerous element in the Government,
especially in risking war with the United States, and we understand
that Prince Konoye and the cabinet will under no circumstances
allow him to visit Washington as he wishes to do.

VISIT TO THE DOWAGER EMPRESS
May 10, 1941

Not having been in touch with the Dowager Empress since we
came to Japan nine years ago, Alice on her own initiative asked for
an audience, which was arranged through Mrs. Matsudaira and
then through Viscount Matsudaira, Grand Master of Ceremonies,
and took place on the 9th. The ostensible purpose of the audience
was in order to express congratulations on the engagement of the
Empress’ son, the youngest brother of the Emperor, Prince Mikasa,
as well as the engagement of her grand-daughter, the Emperor’s

234 ONE WORLD r TWO WARS

eldest daughter, to young Prince Higashikuni, and the audience
was granted to Alice only as Doyenne because to receive her as
Ambassadress would set a precedent for a series of other requests, and
it was an unusual step, anyway. But Alice has always admired
the Dowager Empress and really wanted to get in touch with her
again.

As things turned out, the audience was delightful and very warm.
They sat down and chatted for half an hour, the interpretation
being through Alice’s friend, Madam Yamanaka, lady-in-waiting,
and she also saw old Nishimura, who has aged terribly since his
wife’s death. The Empress, Alice said, seemed to know more about
her than anyone except myself. She thanked Alice for the fashion
books (Vogue, etc.) and the jazz records which Alice sends regularly
to Princess Chichibu, and when Alice regretted that her gifts were
so frivolous, the Empress said she must not scorn jazz records because
they were played to Prince Chichibu during his illness in Hayama
and he gready enjoyed them.

She mentioned the fact that Princess Chichibu had dined with
her the evening before and had spoken of the records and also of
the flowers which Alice had sent her on her young brother’s death.
The Empress also knew of Alice’s interest in the deaf-and-dumb
school, and thanked her for what she had done. Alice was amazed
that die Empress knew so much about her and, being somewhat
embarrassed by her thanks, she told several amusing anecdotes and
had the Empress laughing heartily, which at least must have been a
pleasant relief from the strict etiquette, of the Court. The Empress
also asked in detail about all our children and grandchildren.

Alice had brought some of the delicious oranges, lemons, and
grape-fruit which Walter Dillingham had sent us from California,
and we later learned that the Dowager Empress sent some of them
over to the Emperor and Empress. The Dowager Empress gave Alice
a magnificent bunch of orchids from the palace gardens, and lata:
Mrs. Yamanaka told Mrs. Hagiwara that the audience had been “ a
great success ” and had given Her Majesty great pleasure, and that
it was the first time in history that she had, with her own hand, pre¬
sented a foreign ambassadress with flowers. The Dowager Empress
said she hoped that there would soon come a time when all the
ladies of different countries would be assembled there once more to
admire the flowers, and she affectionately held Alice’s hand a long
time when the latter said good-bye and curtsied herself out of the
room.

I write of this meeting in such detail because it seemed to me
significant of the eagerness of the Imperial family for good relations
with the United States, and it will help because the story of it will
go the rounds from the Emperor down, although we ourselves shall
take the utmost care in mentioning it to nobody.

UNORTHODOX DIPLOMACY : FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA

335

AN APPARENT CLEAVAGE IN JAPANESE

foreign policy

May 15, 1941

Sent a long telegram to Washington reporting and commentino-
on the apparent cleavage between Honda, Japan’s Ambassador to
Nanking and Foreign Munster Matsuoka on the subject of China
Honda advocates strengthening the Wang Ching-wei regime and an
all-out effort to create m the areas under the control of the Nanking
Government a condition which can be presented to the Japanesi
people as a settlement 55 of the China Incident. The press was
instructed to play up the news of military operations in China, and for
the next several weeks the Japanese newspapers were foil of reports
of tremendous Japanese victories and the annihilation of one Chinese
army after another, which didn’t quite click with reports from the
other side of the fence. I said to the Department that Honda’s
views concerning a new trend in Japan’s policy in China might
more properly have emanated from the Prime Minister or the
Foreign Minister. Foreign diplomatic circles therefore saw in them
a significant indication of divided councils within the Tapanese
Government. ^

May 16, 1941

The apparent cleavage set forth above was given further substance
by remarks made by Matsuoka to the French Ambassador and related
to me by Arsine-Henry himself. Matsuoka, it appears, considered
himself largely instrumental in bringing about Wang Ching-wei’s
flight from Chungking, and he therefore felt obliged to support Wan=r
in every possible way. However, in view of Wang’s attitude towards
Japan, Matsuoka felt that Wang had no further -claim on him for
support, and that in his opinion Chiang Kai-shek was-the only
person who could now carry out any settlement with Japan.
No third-party nationals or Chinese had been authorized to
make any approach to Chiang, but he, Matsuoka, was ready at
some auspicious moment to permit somebody enjoying the con¬
fidence of both sides to approach Chiang with some prbDOsal
satisfactory to Japan.

A CHAPTER IN UNORTHODOX DIPLOMACY:

FEATURING FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA
May 27, 1941

As a chapter in not quite orthodox diplomacy the expressed attitude
of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Matsuoka, towards the
Tripartite Pact of September 27, 1940, and its bearing on the question
of war between Japan and the United States in case war should
occur between the United States and Germany, are interesting.

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

336

Witness the circumstances which gave rise to my oral and written
exchanges with Mr. Matsuoka. After an absence of some six weeks
in Europe the Japanese Foreign Minister returns to Tokyo ; I
immediately write requesting an appointment at the Minister’s
convenience ; he keeps me (and other foreign ambassadors) waiting
for some three weeks and finally receives me officially at the Foreign
Office. In the course of the conversation the Minister expresses the
opinion that the “ manly, decent, and reasonable 99 thing for the
United States to do would be to declare war openly on Germany
since our attitude towards Germany is provocative. He adds that
Hitler has been very patient and generous in not declaring war on
the United States, but that Hitler’s patience and restraint cannot
be expected to endure indefinitely. On my taking exception to the
Minister’s remarks he withdraws the implication that the United
States is guilty of unmanly, indecent, and unreasonable conduct,
and he later writes me that owing to his inadequate knowledge of
English he inadvertently used the word “ decent 99 whereas he meant
“ discreet."

The Minister thereupon makes perfecdy clear his interpretation
of the Tripartite Pact to the effect that if the United States should
convoy its ships to England and if Germany should sink such ships,
and if war with Germany should result, he, Mr. Matsuoka, would
regard the United States as an aggressor in the sense of Article 3 of
the pact, and it is his belief that war would thereupon ensue between
Japan and the United States. He adds that this is only his own
opinion and that there would have to be deliberation not only with
his colleagues in the Japanese Government but with Japan’s allies,
in which deliberation Japan would have but one out of three votes.
(In this connection it is interesting to note that when Germany
attacked Greece this spring, Mr. Matsuoka, according to the Greek
Minister here, informed Mr. Politis that Japan herself would deter¬
mine her obligations under the Tripartite Pact, that her decision
would be guided by common sense , and that Mr. Matsuoka thought that
it was quite clear what the decision would be. Nothing was then said
of Japan having but one out of three votes.)

I express my surprise at the Minister’s interpretation of Japan’s
obligations under Article 3 of the pact which provides for mutual
assistance between the allies only if one of them is attacked by another
power, and my astonishment that Japan could thus surrender her
future freedom of action and could entrust her future destiny to
deliberations in which she would enjoy but one out of three votes.
I set forth the attitude of the United States towards the freedom of
the seas and the determination of the United States to sail those
seas at will and to take all necessary measures of self-defence.

In reply to Mr. Matsuoka’s first letter of May 14, I write on
May 15 to thank him, while at the same time expressing regret at
the “ grave and far-reaching implications 99 of his remarks in our
conversation on the previous day. On the 17th, Mr. Matsuoka writes

UNORTHODOX DIPLOMACY 1 FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA 337

me a long letter, marked <e Entirely Private,” emphasizing the fact
that while he knows how to be “ correct 55 as Foreign Minister, such an
attitude on his part would not be conducive to better understand¬
ing between us, and that he often forgets that he is a Foreign Minister
and is seldom conscious of that position. He expresses, his honest
hate of the so-called correct attitudes taken by many diplomats,
which “ hardly get Us anywhere; 55 he acknowledges that he often
indulges in thoughts in terms of one thousand or two or even three
thousand years, and if thijs strikes me as a sign of insanity, he cannot
help it as he is made that way.

The expressions which he had used in our talk on May 14, he
says, would not have been uttered as Foreign Minister, and those
words have no place in our official relations ; he had confided them
to me as a world citizen and he had always regarded me as some¬
thing more than an Ambassador, namely, a human being to whom
he might reveal his deeper thoughts and ideas. He, however, still
writes of Germany’s patience in the face of American provocation
and of the terrible Armageddon with which civilization will be faced
if the United States is drawn into the European war by attacking
or being attacked, and he regards that latter point as “ rather
immaterial. 55 He, furthermore, does not know what I mean by the
phrase in my letter “grave and far-reaching implications, 55 and believes
that there must have been some misunderstanding because he cannot
recall any remarks of his own upon which I could have placed such an
interpretation. He suggests a further meeting in a day or two.

The Minister receives me at his private residence on May 19. We
have tea and then stroll in his garden, both smoking pipes in entire
informality, and chatting freely. He at once expresses his astonish¬
ment that Mr. Hull had sent for Admiral Nomura, the Japanese
Ambassador in Washington, and had told him that Mr. Matsuoka
had sought to “ intimidate 55 me in our conversation on the 14th. The
Minister denies that he had any intention of intimidating me or
that he had intimidated me, and he, furthermore, expresses surprise
that I had reported our conversation to my Government because he
was speaking to me as Mr. Grew and not as the American Ambas¬
sador. I tell the Minister that in my report I had used the term
“ bellicose 55 as applying to the tone and substance of what he had
said to me, and I thereupon repeat the pertinent remarks winch he
had made to me which I had been led to characterize as having
“ grave and far-reaching implications. 55 The Minister does not
question the accuracy of my report but says smilingly that while his
words may have been bellicose, his heart and thoughts are peacenik
I make clear to the Minister the fact that one of my primary duties
in Japan is to ascertain correcdy and to report^ to my Govern¬
ment the policy of the Japanese Government, just as Admiral
Nomura is doing the same thing in Washington with respect to die
policy of the American Government, and that he, the Mimster for
Foreign Affairs, is the only official channel through which I can

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

338

learn that policy. When, therefore, he discusses policy with me even as
Mr. Grew and not as the American Ambassador, I am still in duty
bound to report his views to my Government because he speaks for
the Japanese Government. The Minister disagrees on this subject of
reporting b.ut he still confirms his views as expressed to me on
May 14.

In the course of the two-hour conversation I speak of America’s
inalienable right of self-defence and of the applications of inter¬
national law to the freedom of the seas, and I express the view that
if Japan really desires peace with the United States our own measures
of self-defence could not possibly be interpreted as acts of
aggression. I also read to the Minister the entire text of Mr. 'Hull’s
address of April 24 before the American Society of International
Law. Mr. Matsuoka listens carefully, nodding his head in com¬
prehension of each point.; he calls it a very fine and clear presentation
of the American point of view, but observes that there are other
view-points and that it seems to him that we Americans are unable
to put ourselves in the place of the other parties concerned. I reply
that we must be guided by facts and actions which have rendered
the position and attitudes of the other parties perfectly clear.

The foregoing is merely a discursive account of some of the prin¬
cipal points which emerged in the two conversations and exchange
of letters with Mr. Matsuoka. While reluctant to take advantage of
remarks and private letters addressed to me as an American friend
rather than as an American Ambassador, I am firmly of the opinion
that all of these exchanges, however unorthodox, which arose from
my first interview with the Foreign Minister at the Foreign Office
after his long absence from Japan, can only be regarded in an official
light. The question as to whether the expressed views of Mr. Matsuoka
represent the views of the Japanese Government as a whole is perhaps
another story.

In this general connection it may not be out of place to add that
my personal relations with Mr. Matsuoka are of the best, that I rate
him among my personal friends in Japan, that I enjoy his directness,
or at least his ostensible directness, in our contacts, and that our
discussions, even when unduly strong expressions are used and some¬
times expressions of a nature which require me to take emphatic
official exception, are conducted with a minimum of heat, and some¬
times a freedom of give-and-take surprising in exchanges between a
Foreign Minister and an Ambassador. Expressions which might be
interpreted as openly insulting to one’s own country, such, for instance,
as his use of the phrase “ the manly, decent, and reasonable thing
to do,” are uttered with an unstudied naivete and a willingness
to withdraw such utterances if challenged that leave no rancour
afterwards.

On the point of Mr. Matsuoka’s intellectual and political honesty
I am reluctant to express a doubt. In the political manoeuvring that
constantly goes on in Tokyo he is sometimes quoted as saying one

GERMANY PRESSES FOP ATTACK ON THE NETHERLANDS INDIES 339

thing in one quarter while making a totally divergent statement in
another quarter. .He talks so flowingly and freely, by the hour if
time affords, that it is inconceivable -that he should never mat-#.
conflicting statements. I, however, incline to the opinion that in his
talks with me he follows the carefully studied policy of painting the
darkest picture of what will happen if the United States gets into
war. against Germany, probably, in the mistaken belief that such
tactics may serve to exert a restraining influence on American policy.

Soon after Mr. Matsuoka took office he indicated that his platform
would be that the United States could and should be intimidated
into adopting an attitude of complete isolation with regard to both
the Far East and Europe. That platform was implemented by the
Three-Power Alliance, which action not only failed to have the
desired effect but was one of the major factors in stimulating the
trend of American opinion away from isolationism. It would seem
that, despite the egregious failure of that attempt, Mr. Matsuoka
would prefer to persist in a course fraught with the gravest dangers
than to chart a new course which would constitute admission on
his part that he had completely misread the character and temper
of the American people, and which would inevitably make his position
as Foreign Minister untenable.

GERMANY PRESSES FOR A JAPANESE ATTACK
ON THE NETHERLANDS INDIES

June io, 1941

A member of the Diet, friendly to us but afraid to come to the
Embassy owing to his well-known American sympathies, to-day sent
me a message that Matsuoka was under very strong pressure both
by the German Embassy and from certain Japanese extremists to
take strong action against the Netherlands East Indies, which have
now replied to the Japanese demands in a dignified and reasonable
note that politely refuses to give up their shirt to Japan or to any
other country. It appears that the Germans are pressing on the
ground that the United States is in no condition to fight a war in
both the Atlantic and Pacific. As for the Japanese extremists, they
want to acquire the Indies before the war ends in German victory,
since they fear German designs on the islands.

My informant tells me that Japanese cultural and other societies
are much more deeply penetrated by Nazis than is generally known
and that they are trying to force Matsuoka’s hand by stirring up
popular feeling against the Netherlands East Indies. There is also a
belief in Government circles that an important part of the American
fleet has been moved from the Pacific to the Atlantic, and that belief
is of course having its obvious effect here.

In commenting on this information I told the Department that I
could not with any assurance appraise the risk of a Japanese descent
on the East Indies at the present time. As long as the campaign m

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

China is still unsettled, a Japanese attack on the Indies, from the
tactical view-point, would seem to involve the gravest dangers. On
the other side of the picture, we must remember that Mr. Matsuoka
is very much in the pocket of the Axis and amenable to pressure
from Germany. He also commands a large and important following
in Japan. In everything that he does and says he disregards and
discounts forceful steps by the United States to curb his country's
expansionist ambitions. It would, in fact, be short-sighted to under¬
estimate the strength of the influence of the Japanese extremists both
in military and political circles.

JAPAN’S INTERNAL SITUATION ON THE EVE OF
THE RUSSO-GERMAN WAR

June 19, 1941

According to rumours persisting in Tokyo, there exists within the
cabinet a divergence of views with regard to matters of high policy,
and in spite of Japan’s public commitment to the Tripartite Pact
there has recently become apparent an attitude of strong resistance
to totalitarianism, particularly the Nazi type. The “ stand-still"
atmosphere now prevailing in Tokyo may be ascribed pardy to the
foregoing consideration and pardy to the question of trends in the
policy of the United States and possible future German moves with
regard’ to Soviet Russia, as well as to other developments in the
international field.

Certain indications of this conflict of opinion in Japan may
be found of interest. One notable reflection of it is to be found in
the exceedingly moderate character of the Japanese reply to the
Netherlands East Indies.

According to information imparted at a recent meeting of the
Co-operative Council of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association,
during discussions by the delegates, the text of the address which
Mr. Matsuoka had delivered at the meeting at Hibaya Hall on
May 28 had been suppressed. On that occasion the Foreign Minister
had vigorously defended the totalitarian system of the Nazis; he added
that the economic structure of Japan was far inferior to that of
Germany, and he charged the Japanese Government leaders and
"Japanese business men with a lack of sense of responsibility and general
incompetence. It is probable that the foregoing reasons and also
the extremely Hitleresque tone of the speech caused the Home
Ministry to prohibit circulation of the 200,000 copies of the pamphlet
printed from the complete text furnished by Mr. Matsuoka himself.

It is understood that the' Minister of Justice, General Yanagawa,
has caused the arrest of 440 subordinate government officials during
the past few months on the ground that the expression of their totali¬
tarian views had rendered them amenable to the provisions of the
Thought Control Law, which specifies penalties for persons who
advocate the overthrow of the capitalist system. We now learn

japan’s QUANDARY IN THE RUSSO-GERMAN WAR 341

that the direct cause of the resignation on June 11 of Mr. Ishiguro,
Minister of Agriculture, was the recent imprisonment of the Director
of the Agricultural Policy Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture for
appropriating official funds to be used for totalitarian propaganda.

On June 17 it was announced by the press that there would be
set up within the cabinet a new Bureau for Thought Control and
that the suppression of dangerous thoughts held by government
officials would be one of its primary objectives.

An indication of dissatisfaction with Japan’s policy and of opposi¬
tion to the trend towards the Nazi and Fascist ideologies was revealed
in a very enlightening way by the speeches of delegates to the Co¬
operative Council of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. At
that meeting it was admitted by various speakers that important
pro-American and pro-British elements existed within Japan, and it
was urged by at least one speaker that Japan should not imitate the
Nazi totalitarian system.

The lack of unity in the nation is strongly suggested by the fore¬
going indications as well as by careful expressions of criticism in
newspaper editorials. That the diplomatic policy of Japan has not
been finally settled and that a sudden change in orientation is not
impossible are implied by the foregoing indications.

GERMANY ATTACKS RUSSIA : FIRST IMPRESSIONS
June 22, 1941

News of the war between Germany and Soviet Russia came to-day.
We had long expected it but I was surprised at its suddenness, be¬
lieving that it would break somewhat later. From the beginning of
the war in Europe I have ventured only two certain predictions—one,
that Great Britain would not be defeated and, two, that Germany
and Soviet Russia would eventually be fighting against each other.
One prophecy has materialized ; the other will materialize in due
course.

This nevfe seems to prove two things : first, that the Germans have
abandoned the intention of trying to invade England this summer
and, second, that the Germans are getting hard up for supplies,
primarily oil. I don’t know, nor do any of us know with certainty,
the potential fighting ability of the Soviet Army.

JAPAN’S QUANDARY IN THE RUSSO-GERMAN WAR

June 23, 1941 .

Japan is in a quandary as a result of the German-Soviet war \ she
is pledged to the Axis and also pledged to neutrality vis-a-vis Soviet
Russia ; what policy will she now follow ? One highly placed Japanese
said that he thought Japan would sit on the fence until the com*
batants had fought it out and then step in and pick up the pieces.

342 ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

At any rate. Tokyo is humming (and continued to hum for many
days) with almost continual cabinet meetings, conferences among
high military and naval officers and conferences with the Emperor.
We don’t yet know just what is coming out of it all, but this is the
time, if ever, for Japan to adopt a new orientation of conciliation
with the United States, which might well be possible if Japan would
take certain steps of constructive statesmanship. It is a moment
pregnant with possibilities for a new turn in the road.

How this situation must chafe General Araki and his tribe, who
have consistently held that Japan can never feel safe until she has
taken Vladivostok and the Maritime Provinces. I have reason to
believe that one high Japanese statesman, a former Prime Minister,
intends to charge Matsuoka with having brought Japan into the
following situation through his policies :

1. With regard to Germany, Japan’s hands are tied through the
Axis Pact ;

2. With regard to Soviet Russia, Japan’s hands are tied through
the neutrality treaty ;

3. The China conflict is no nearer settlement;

4. Negotiations with the Netherlands East Indies have failed to
produce the results which the public, through official propaganda,
have long been led to expect ;

5. The relations of Japan -with the United States have materially
and steadily grown worse.

It must be remembered that when Germany, after the conclusion
of the Anti-Comintern Pact, double-crossed Japan by signing a
non-aggression pact with Soviet Russia, the then Hiranuma-Arita
cabinet resigned by way of accepting full responsibility. The thought
is being expressed that the Konoye-Matsuoka cabinet ought to
do the same thing now, or at least that Matsuoka himself ought to
get out.

JAPAN ADOPTS A WATCHFUL WAITING POLICY
TOWARDS RUSSIA

June 26, 1941

We learn that on June 24 the Soviet Ambassador did ask the
Foreign Minister as to Japan’s attitude in the Soviet-German war
and was told that the policy of Japan had not yet been formulated.
This policy, said Matsuoka, would be largely influenced by a deter¬
mination as to where the responsibility for the outbreak of war lay,
and he added that the fundamental policy of Japan was based on
the Axis. Japan must therefore determine whether Soviet-Japanese
relations could now be brought into line with this fundamental
policy of Japan.

It is clear that when Japan joined the Axis, it was done on the

JAPAN DENIES DESIGNS ON RUSSIA g^g

assumption that the close association of Germany with Soviet Russia
would continue and that this basic pro-Axis policy has been destroyed
by the outbreak of the Soviet-German war. At least in theory. We
shall see.

JAPAN DENIES DESIGNS ON RUSSIA
July * 94 i

Received to-day a communication sent by the Secretary at the
specific request of the President to convey to the Prime Minister an
expression of hope that there was no truth in the reports that Japan
intended to attack Soviet Russia, upsetting the hopes of the American
Government, which it understood were shared by Japan, that peace
in the Pacific area might be rendered more secure and strengthened,
and the President said that he would deeply appreciate an assurance
from Prince Konoye to that effect.

I immediately wrote a letter to the Prime Minister which was sent
to his private residence by safe hand, asking if I could see him to
deliver a message from the President, and saying that I would be
glad to meet him at any suggested place in order to avoid publicity.
His private secretary, Ushiba, called on me shortly thereafter and
said that the Prime Minister would be glad to see me but he feared
publicity if I should come to his residence, and suggested that we
might meet on some golf course. It happened, however, to be a
Sunday when all the courses were crowded and the next day was to
be a holiday, so that Prince Konoye thought it would be difficult to
meet until Tuesday or Wednesday. I said that as the matter was very
urgent I could not delay, but that in order to spare the Premier any
embarrassment I would send the President message through Ushiba
himself, and I thereupon communicate it to him, saying that I
would remain in the Embassy all day awaiting a reply. The reply
came in the evening, thanking me for the message and saying that
Prince Konoye’s answer would be given me as soon as possible by
the Foreign Minister after he had returned from Gotemba.

Mr. Ushiba in delivering this reply expressed his regret at its in¬
complete nature, but said that there was no precedent in Japan for a
Prime Minister to deal directly with foreign ambassadors in foreign
affairs. I politely but with emphasis asked Mr. Ushiba to point out
to Prince Konoye as from me that it would be erroneous to assume
that I had on purpose gone over the head of the Foreign Minister,
and that my procedure was directly in line with the discussions which
Admiral Nomura had conducted directly with President Roosevelt
in Washington, and indeed that the President had told A dmir al
Nomura that he would be happy to see him at any time. I made quite
clear to Mr. Ushiba my regret that Prince Konoye had not felt able
to reply directly to the message.

I said to the Department that I did not interpret Prince Konoye’s
attitude as in any way implying a rebuff. It was simply a question of

ONE WORLD *. TWO WARS

344

the strength of precedent and tradition in Japan, and I well re¬
member that when Bill Castle came on his special mission to Japan
for the specific purpose of putting through the Naval Treaty, he did
not try for direct access to the then Prime Minister but dealt only
with the Minister for Foreign Affairs in spite of the prime importance
of the issue.

To carry this incident to its conclusion, it is here recorded that
Matsuoka sent for me on July 8 and gave me the Prime Minister’s
reply for delivery to the President, to the effect that the Japanese
Government had not so far considered the possibility of going to
war with Soviet Russia, and he also handed to me a statement which
he had made to the Soviet Ambassador on July 2 to more or less
the same effect, but adding that future developments would largely
decide Japan’s future policy. I asked Matsuoka what kind of future
developments he had in mind, to which he replied that a good many
possible developments came into the picture, such, for instance,
as whether Soviet Russia should conclude an alliance with Great
Britain or whether an attempt should be made by the United States
to send war supplies to Soviet Russia through Vladivostok for use
against Japan’s ally, Germany. Matsuoka said that he was under
great pressure by powerful elements in Japan to go to war with
Soviet Russia, and that the hand of the extremists would be greatly
strengthened and his own sincere efforts to preserve peace would be
rendered much more difficult than at present if such provocation
should be given. Matsuoka said that he had appealed both to Stalin
and to Molotov not to render more difficult his own present very
difficult position.

As the result of this long conversation with Matsuoka, I said to
the Department that I should find it very difficult to believe that at
this time Japan had decided to go to war with Soviet Russia.

Incidentally, in the reply handed to me, the Minister could not
resist the temptation of asking whether it was really the intention
of the President and the American Government to intervene in the
European war. On July 11,1 received the Department’s reply asking
me to tell the Foreign Minister, among other things, that whatever
action we might take would be of a purely defensive character and
that Mr. Hitler could best furnish information on this point by
revealing his future contemplated steps of aggression.

The ball, however, was not allowed to stop there, because on July 17
Ohashi called me to the Foreign Office and handed me an oral state¬
ment from the Foreign Minister stating that the Japanese Govern¬
ment was not disposed to enter into a debate over the points raised
in our reply, but that it could not pass unnoticed any suggestion that
we or any other Government could invoke without limit the so-
called right of self-defence, nor could it agree to the indictment of
Germany implied in our communication nor in the claim of our
Government that any country which suggested that the United
States should desist from its policy of self-defence would in fact be

REPORTS OF IMPENDING RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 345

ranging itself on the side of aggressor nations whose aims were to
conquer the whole world.

As Matsuoka, who was then ostensibly confined to his bed by ill¬
ness, had resigned on the previous evening, and as his successor took
over very shortly thereafter, the foregoing communication was in all
probability his last gasp as Foreign Minister and its vitriolic nature
was quite in keeping with Matsuoka’s bellicose attitude towards the
United States during the greater part of our association over the
past year. He died, politically, true to form, and his final com¬
munication terminated an interesting period in the intensely interesting
diplomacy of these times.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT ASKS PREMIER KONOYE TO
DENY REPORTS OF IMPENDING RUSSO-JAPANESE
WAR

Message sent by the Secretary of State at the specific request of
the President for delivery to His Excellency the Prime Minister
of Japan, Prince Fumimaro Konoye, dated July 4, 1941.

From a variety of sources reports are reaching the Government of
the United States that it is the intention of the Japanese Government
to enter upon hostilities against the Soviet Union.

As is well known to the Japanese Government, the maintenance
and preservation of peace in the area of the Pacific have been the
earnest desire of the American Government, which has contributed
its greatest efforts to the achievement of that high purpose.

From statements made in recent months by the Japanese Am¬
bassador in Washington, Admiral Nomura, to the Secretary of State,
Mr. Hull, in the course of conversation between them, as well as
from the utterances of responsible Japanese officials, the Govern¬
ment of the United States has derived the hope that it was also the
desire of the Government of Japan to maintain and preserve peace
in the area of the Pacific. The reports which are now reaching the
American Government are so completely contrary to those state¬
ments and utterances that the Government of theUnited States finds
it very difficult to believe in the truth of those reports.

Should Japan enter upon a course of military aggression and con¬
quest it stands to reason that such action would render illusory the
ch erished hope of the American Government, which it understood
was shared by the Japanese Government, that peace in the Pacific
area, far from being further upset, might now indeed be strengthened

and made more secure. . ,

It is the earnest hope of the Government of the United States that
the reports of Japan’s decision to enter upon hostilities against the
Soviet Union are not based upon fact, and an assurance to that effect
from His Excellency the Prime Minister of Japan would be deeply
appreciated by the Government of the United States.

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

34 6

Message in reply sent by His Imperial Japanese Majesty’s Minister
for Foreign Affairs at the request of the Prime Minister for delivery
to the President of the United States of America, dated July 7,
Showa 16 (1941) [Translation].

At a time like this all sorts of rumours are abundantly bred not
only in Japan but in all countries.

It is hardly necessary to state that the prevention of the European
war from spreading to the regions of Greater East Asia and the
maintenance and preservation of peace in the area of the Pacific
have always been the sincere and genuine desire of the Japanese
Government, which have consistently contributed their earnest efforts
towards achieving that high purpose.

The Japanese Government wish to state, in reply to the last para¬
graph of the message, that they have not so far considered the possi¬
bility of joining the hostilities against the Soviet Union. The position
of the Japanese Government vis-d-vis the Soviet-Axis war was made
clear in the Oral Statement of July 2, 1941, of H.I.M.’s Foreign
Minister to the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo. One can do no better
than attach hereto a copy of this Oral Statement for the President’s
perusal in order to bring home the course of policy Japan has been
compelled to pursue in the present circumstances. Of course, it is
understood that the American Government will treat it as strictly
confidential.

Incidentally, the Japanese Government would like to avail them¬
selves of this opportunity for definitely ascertaining whether it is
really the intention of the President or the American Government
to intervene in the European war, as they are naturally and very
deeply concerned at the prospect, disturbed as they sincerely are,
by reports reaching them from a variety of sources.

JAPAN TAKES STOCK OF GERMANY’S ATTACK
ON RUSSIA

July 6, 1941

I feel that we now have sufficient evidence to justify an appraisal
of the position and policy of the Japanese Government as reformu¬
lated by the Imperial Conference on July 2, an appraisal which,
although necessarily somewhat speculative, would still indicate the
general trend of my views.

The serious disturbance, if not an internal crisis, which occurred
in Tokyo during the ten days of conferences and deliberations by
Japanese policy-formulating elements and groups in Japan brought
about by the German attack on Soviet Russia is becoming clear from
the evidence which reaches us. So far as we can gauge the situation,
it has come to a more or less open conflict between Matsuoka and
Baron Hiranuma. Sensational reports are going around town and
it is even said that Baron Hiranuma, in his position as Home Minister,

JAPAN TAKES STOCK OF GERMANY^ ATTACK ON RUSSIA 347

has threatened to arrest several prominent people in the extremist
camp but that he has desisted owing to warnings that he would
be assassinated if he should try to do so. (From what I know of
Hiranuma this story does not ring true.) It may at least be said
that these rumours, whether there is anything in them or not, probably
reflect an acuie cleavage of opinion among the leaders in Japan, and
we believe that a positive and dynamic policy which would create
new involvements and commitments is unlikely just now in the absence
of a unanimous or clearly dominant school of thought.

In the process of settling the last World War, Japan secured for
herself a place among the great powers which gave her considerable
self-satisfaction, and it was not fully appreciated until Japan’s in¬
vasion of Manchuria came before the League of Nations to what
extent she had become involved in purely European problems of
no vital concern to her. Following Japan’s withdrawal from the
League in 1932, it will be remembered that Japan at that time an¬
nounced her intention to liquidate her European commitments and
to confine herself to East Asia, and after the outbreak of the present
war she officially confirmed that policy and labelled it ct a free and
independent policy.” This policy was followed with some show of
determination for eight years, but it was sharply reversed when
Japan concluded the Tripartite Alliance, which again involved her
in European affairs, and an increasing realization had been develop¬
ing for some time before the German attack on Soviet Russia that
Japan, in allying herself with Germany and Italy, had assumed certain
avoidable risks.

There is a great difference between the German and Japanese
conceptions of the German bloc and the Japanese bloc, and especi¬
ally of the secondary place which Japan is expected to take in the
new scheme. Japan, in fact, has begun to take notice of Germany’s
desire for a privileged position in China regardless of the New Order
in East Asia, and she has begun to wonder whether she can afford
to rely on German promises and whether, if Germany should be
victorious in the war, all will be well for Japan. Matsuoka has
repeatedly been challenged to refute the evidence of Germany’s
deliberate deception of Japan in attacking Soviet Russia in the face of
the advice which Hitler is alleged to have given Matsuoka in Berlin,
that Japan should improve Soviet-Japanese relations by concluding
a pact with the Soviet Union. I would not go so far as to say that
there has been a complete collapse of Japanese confidence in German
good faith, but I do not think that that confidence is to-day sufficiently
robust to justify any initiatives tending to serve German interests more
closely than the interests of Japan herself.

I therefore believe that in the light of the German-Soviet war no
reformulation of Japanese policy would have been possible without
considering the three factors hereinbefore mentioned, namely, (1) the
lack of a united opinion in Japan, (2) the desire to restrict the risks
of i&vplyement in the European war so far as possible in the light of

ONE WORLD I TWO WARS

348

Japan’s accepted commitments, and (3) a decreasing confidence in
the good faith of Germany.

It is being said by foreign observers in Tokyo that the Imperial
Conference has decided, before attacking the Maritime Provinces, to
sit on the fence and watch the general trend of the German-Soviet
war, and in the meantime to push the south-west advance. In this
plan the first step is*alleged to be aimed at Indo-China, with the
purpose of acquiring bases on Camranh Bay and elsewhere, but to
proceed gradually and step by step in order to avoid an open conflict
with the United States. The view is also expressed that this alleged
decision to push the southward advance is actually aimed at Germany
so that Japan may consolidate her position to the southward before
Germany is in a position to interfere with Japanese ambitions after
attaining full victory in the war.

It is generally held that what Germany most wants Japan to do is
to take steps which will tend to divert America’s attention from Europe
and that she is not pressing Japan to intervene in Soviet Russia. If
these are actually the desires of Germany, it would seem that the
above-described plan attributed to the Imperial Conference would
fairly well coincide therewith.

On the other hand, the “ momentous decision 55 which the Imperial
Conference is alleged to have taken may well be a determination to
follow a policy of watchful waiting in the hope of a collapse in the
Soviet Union. Several points tend to support this estimate, namely,
(1) Prince Konoye’s statement to Menken of Paramount Pictures
that Japan will honour its commitments both to Germany and to
Soviet Russia, (2) Mr. Matsuoka’s statement to the Soviet Ambassador,

and (3) the Foreign Minister’s statement to - on July 4. In

connection with the last point, the impression which Matsuoka wished

to convey to -, namely, that unanimity of opinion prevails in

Japan and that the confidence among the members of the Tripartite
Pact remains unimpaired, is so palpably contrary to the truth that we
must take the Minister’s statement with reserve.

JAPAN’S MOBILIZATION EFFORTS GO INTO
HIGH GEAR

July 12, 1941

According to persistent rumours in Tokyo, certain categories of
reservists are being called up by the military authorities, but these
measures do not appear to constitute more than precautionary steps
natural in the present situation.

This was one of the early indications of the large mobilization
movement which was continued during the next several weeks, and
reports soon began to come in from Kobe, Dairen, Mukden, and
Harbin that the flow of troops seemed to be largely in the direction
of Manchuria. We learned that men from thirty-five to forty-two
years were being called on one or two days’ notice and that in one

A BRITISH FRIEND WRITES FROM THE HEART

electric-line company alone fifty motor-men were taln^n within a
week. We ourselves lost our second cook. Osaka reported that the
annual tennis tournament and other athletic contests scheduled for
this week have all been cancelled as they would require space for
many students travelling in the trains which are needed for other
reasons. Osaka also reported that considerable gloom and an atmo¬
sphere of increasing tensity were evident and that there was a general
conviction that something is about to happen which can only be
guessed at.

This movement became so intense that no foreigners were allowed
to pass through the Inland Sea or to travel on trains which would
necessitate their crossing the ferry between Shimonoseki and Fusan,
an interference with normal traffic which caused the greatest hard¬
ship to Americans who wished to get to Shanghai to sail for the
United States on a certain date. It was only at the beginning of
August, however, that this situation became critical through the
taking off of all Japanese ships sailing to the United States and the
difficulty, and in most cases the impossibility, of even getting to
Shanghai.

A BRITISH FRIEND WRITES FROM THE HEART
July 24, 1941

Part of a long letter received from a British friend who spent the
past two or three years in Tokyo is worth quoting, because it is rather
beautifully expressed and it indicates a fact that I have long known,
namely, that many Englishmen, even those who seem inarticulate,
have in their natures a marked degree of sentiment and appreciation
which their constitutional British inhibitions generally prevent their
revealing. I believe that it may be largely due to his intimate associa¬
tion with Americans during his stay in Japan that this man has so
effectively broken through those inhibitions and can express himself
so openly. I went down to the station to see him off.

I cannot let Thursday pass, and be gone for ever, without putting
on record how very deeply I appreciate your coming to see me off
at the station.

Not only do I look on it as due to your friendship, which I value
so highly, but as to the honour which I felt, that our beloved
Doyen should take the trouble to come all that way just for a few
minutes; particularly with all you had to do, before leaving that
day for Karuizawa, just as others were leaving for Chusenji.

You came despite all that, only to join with others in a last
good-bye and god-speed to me no doubt, but it was one of those
small things which keep alive the flame of love, devotion, and respect,
which some have no power even to kindle.

It was very hard leaving you, and all the others, together with
whom I have had such a wonderfully happy time. I rejoice that

350 ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

I am going back at last, to join my dear wife and those who are
left at home ; but friendships made, as I have been blessed with
are not lightly thrown aside and cannot be broken, even for a
time, without the greatest regrets and sorrow.

I trust, however, that the days are yet to come when all is over
and through whatever bunkers I may have to hack my way, with
“ blood, tears, and sweat,” that some of us at least will be spared
to meet again somewhere, to renew these past immeasurably happy
days.

This vision for me, however, will never be completed, if I do
not find myself once again as your partner, on the first tee—some¬
where. . . .

Never again will I experience two and a half years of life among
a circle of friends of all nationalities most of whom are guarding
their tongues against their neighbours.

My life in the future will be bounded by a circle of friends (the
most remarkable in the world) one meets in the compass of a war¬
ship ; friends whose hundreds of minds must bum with a single
flame, a single thought, a single aim.

To light that flame will be my work. Among those friends,
the value of devotion and respect and unswerving loyalty, which is
so essential to great achievements in every walk of life, has to be
put to the highest tests of human endurance—in horns of battle.

To you, Mr. Grew, I owe a debt of gratitude which I can never
repay.

You have added to my store, and I have had before me in Tokyo,
a shining example and ideal, of how that flame can be lit and can
be kept alive, whereby there is no ideal which cannot be attained,
or any battle which cannot but be won.

And so, with my sincerest wishes to Mrs. Grew, and with my
highest respect, and gratitude for your friendship, may I say with
all sincerity and affection, my dear Mr. Grew,

Au Revoir.

VICHY YIELDS THE INDO-CHINA BASES TO JAPAN
July 25, 1941

We now learn that the official spokesman in Vichy announced on
the 24th that a request had been presented by Japan to occupy bases
at strategic points in Indo-Ghina j he said that negotiations were
going on both at Vichy and Hanoi and that there had been no
ultimatum from Japan nor any German pressure. He added that
arrangements would be made within the scope of the Franco-
Japanese agreement of August 30, 1940, and that no inconvenience
in temporarily extending the military agreement with japan was
seen so long as there was to be no change in French sovereignty
over Indo-Ghina and so long as no territorial demands were made
by Japan.

toyoda explains why japan decided to protect indo-china 351

When a correspondent asked the Vichy spokesman whether such
a decision would not be incpnsistent with the announced policy of
France to defend her empire against all powers, he replied that the
French Government had been obliged to come to this decision as
tlie result of events in Syria. Replying to a question as to whether
the assistance of the United States in preserving the status quo in Indo-
China had been requested by France, the spokesman was evidently
primed for the question because he said at once that France had not
bothered to make any further request to the United States at this
time since no satisfaction had been received when American assistance
in Indo-China had been asked by France in 1940. In this case the
spokesman did not take refuge in his usual procedure by saying that he
must consult his superiors when some delicate point is brought up.

FOREIGN MINISTER TOYODA EXPLAINS WHY JAPAN
DECIDED TO PROTECT INDO-CHINA
July 25, 1941

The new Minister for Foreign Affairs, Admiral Toyoda, to-day
received the diplomatic chiefs of mission individually. In opening
our conversation he said that his appointment as Minister for Foreign
Affairs had come as a great surprise, and that as he was an amateur
at diplomacy he would count upon my assistance. He then said
that the Tripartite Alliance stands and that Japanese policy is based
upon that pact. He made no further reference to policy.

For my part I said that I had been working for nine years to
build up something permanendy constructive in American-Japanese
relations and that I hoped for the Minister’s collaboration in con¬
tinuing those efforts. I said that an improvement in our relations
was not only important to the United States but that Japan has
everything to gain from such an improvement. But I added that
we must remember friendship is not a one-way street.

The Minister thanked me for what I had said and assured me of
his collaboration. He said that as soon as he had finished receiving the
chiefs of mission to-day he would like to have a longer talk with me.

Our second meeting came at 9.30 the same evening when I called
on the new Minister for Foreign Affairs at his request. He said that
at noon the following day the Japanese Government would issue an
official statement of the agreement reached with the Vichy Govern¬
ment concerning Japan’s proposed movement into Indo-China, but
that in view of the concern of the United States he wished to explain
to me in advance the reasons and intentions of such movement.
Admiral Toyoda thereupon handed to me a document in Japanese
accompanied by an unofficial English translation.

After reading the document I said that I would transmit it
prompdy to my Government, but that in the meantime I could
best reply to certain points contained therein by conveying to the
Minister the statement issued to the press yesterday by the Acting

352 ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

Secretary of State. I thereupon read to the Minister such portions
of the Acting Secretary’s statement as were picked up on the radio to¬
day, and said that I would send to him to-morrow the complete text.

In further discussion I emphasized and elaborated certain perti¬
nent points in Mr. Welles 5 statement. I spoke of the utter fallacy of
the charge of “ encirclement 55 and of the concept that Japan was
acting for the “ safety and protection of Indo-China. 55 I said that
I was glad to take note of the phrase in the Japanese statement that
“Japan has no intention at all of making the southern part of Indo-
China a base of armed advancement against adjoining areas, 55 but
that my Government and I myself had met with so many bitter dis¬
appointments during the past several years in the illusory nature of
promises and assurances conveyed to me by former Japanese Ministers
that we were now unavoidably obliged to rely on facts and actions
rather than upon words. The Minister did not attempt to refute
this statement but he earnestly begged me to believe him.

As the conversation continued, I spoke in detail of the successive
steps of the Japanese southward advance, culminating for the present
in the proposed occupation of bases in southern Indo-China and the
consequent endangering of the safety of other areas in the Pacific,
including the Philippine Islands, and I elaborated the practical and
logical reasons forour concern in the safety of Singapore and the Nether¬
lands East Indies, which were definitely threatened by this advance.

The Minister did not try to refute my argument except to repeat
the peaceful intentions of the proposed Japanese move into Indo-
China and to take issue with our use of the term “ occupation 55 in
connection therewith since Japan Thad no territorial ambitions. I
replied that the term “ occupation 55 connoted no question of time.

In closing our conversation the Minister earnestly appealed to me
to use my best efforts to convey to my Government Japan’s peaceful
intentions and the great importance of avoiding, at this critical
moment, measures which would provoke the Japanese people and
render difficult the efforts to improve the relations between Japan
and the United States. He said that he would convey to Admiral
Nomura the substance of our conversation.

OUR FREEZING ORDER APPLIED TO JAPAN
AND CHINA

Following is the text of a statement, bearing the date July 26,
released to the press by the White House at 8 p.m., July 25, 1941:

In view of the unlimited national emergency declared by the
President, he has to-day issued an executive order freezing Japanese
assets in the United States in the same manner in which assets
of various European countries were frozen on June 14, 1941.
This measure in effect brings all financial and import and export
trade transactions in which Japanese interests are involved under

WHY JAPAN’S NEW FOREIGN MINISTER COULD NOT SLEEP 353

the control of the Government, and imposes criminal penalties
for violation of the order. This executive order, just as the order
of June 14, 1941, is designed among other things to prevent the
use of the financial facilities of the United States and trade between
Japan and the United States in ways harmful to national defence
and American interests, to prevent the liquidation in the United
States of assets obtained by duress or conquest and to curb sub¬
versive activities in the United States.

At the specific request of Generalissimo Ghiang Kai-shek and
for the purpose of helping the Chinese Government, the President
has at the same time extended the freezing control to Chinese assets
in the United States. The administration of the licensing system
with respect to Chinese assets will be conducted with a view to
strengthening the foreign trade and exchange position of the Chinese
Government. The inclusion of China in the executive order in
accordance with the wishes of the Chinese Government is a con¬
tinuation of this Government’s policy of assisting China.

We learn through what is regarded as an entirely reliable source
that soon after the constitution of the new cabinet in Japan
the German Ambassador called on the Foreign Minister and asked
him to convey a message to the Premier to the effect that (i) Ger¬
many’s campaign in Russia will have been successfully finished in
August, (2) Great Britain will be invaded by Germany in September,
and (3) a complete German victory will terminate the war before
winter. Under these circumstances Japan is advised to remain loyal
to the Axis pact.

The same informant says that the dropping of Matsuoka was
desired by Germany not only because he was responsible for the
neutrality treaty with Soviet Russia but because he talked too much.
It is also stated that Japan’s invasion of Soviet Russia, rather than
continuation of the southward advance, is desired by Germany.

WHY JAPAN’S NEW FOREIGN MINISTER
COULD NOT SLEEP

July 26, 1941

At the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, I called on him
again to-day and we discussed at length the situation which had
come about as a result of the establishment by Japan of bases in
southern Indo-China and the reported action of the American Govern¬
ment in freezing Japanese assets in the United States. In view of
our complete divergence of opinion upon the subject under discussion,
there could be no meeting of minds between the Minister and myself,
and our conversation consisted largely of a reiteration of the views
brought out in my conversation with him last night.

The report of the Acting Secretary’s conversation with the Japanese
Ambassador had been received immediately prior to this interview.
12

354 one world : two wars

I therefore conveyed its substance to Admiral Toyoda so that he
might know exactly what the Acting Secretary had said to Admiral
Nomura. The Minister for Foreign Affairs was particularly anxious
to ascertain the exact words in which the Acting Secretary said
he could not see that any basis now remained for continuing the
Washington conversations. The Minister asked me to interpret
the Acting Secretary’s statement. I told him we could only accept
the statement at its face value. The Minister gave obvious indications
of being profoundly concerned at the rupture of the Washington
conversations. As I have ground for believing that the Emperor had
received him just before our interview, it seems to me likely that he
was reflecting the concern of the Emperor.

Admiral Toyoda told me that he particularly regretted the Acting
Secretary’s remark to the Japanese Ambassador regarding German
pressure on the French Government, and told me that the Japanese
negotiations with the French Government, in regard to Indo-China
had been carried on without any pressure from any outside source.

As with the British Ambassador, Admiral Toyoda endeavoured to
draw a comparison between Japanese action towards Indo-China and
the measures undertaken by England in Syria, but in reply I em¬
phasized the complete dissimilarity of the two cases.

Admiral Toyoda continually reiterated the view that the present
deplorable situation between the United States and Japan was due
solely to a misunderstanding on the part of the United States of
Japan’s real purposes, to which I replied that Japanese officials and
the Japanese press had exploited this entirely unfounded allegation
ad nauseam for many years. I recapitulated a number of bitter lessons
which we had learned from experience as a result of the assurances
and promises of previous Japanese governments in regard to the true
aims of Japan. I made it clear why finally it had become impossible
for the Government and the people of the United States to give
credence to Japanese pledges and explanations of Japan’s “ true
intentions.”

The Minister inquired with every indication of concern whether
the United States. Government intended to adopt further retaliatory
measures in addition to the freezing of Japanese assets in the United
States, to which I replied that I had received no information in the
premises.

Admiral Toyoda told me that he had hardly slept at all during
recent nights. He appeared greatly discouraged at the turn of events
and especially distressed that the present situation should have .arisen
at the very time of his assumption of the post of Minister for Foreign
Affairs. I reviewed in detail my endeavours over many years, with
particular reference to my efforts with the Yonai cabinet, to place
Japanese-American relations on a sound and enduring basis and
referred in this connection to Admiral Nomura’s work in that direction
in Washington recently.

After stating that I was reluctant to end our talk in an atmosphere

A FLICKER OF HOPE FOR JAPANESE-AMERICAN PEACE 353

of defeatism, I emphatically urged him to use his best efforts to prevent
the further deterioration of relations between the United States and
Japan, such as would inevitably occur if Japan made any more
aggressive moves in the Pacific area.

Several friends in Tokyo have asked me why Admiral Toyoda
accepted the portfolio of Foreign Affairs if he was aware of the im¬
pending Japanese action in French Indo-China and foresaw the
consequences which he would be forced to face. In my personal
opinion Admiral Toyoda shared the apparent belief of most Japanese
officials that the United States would not resort to measures of re¬
taliation ; hence, the action of the United States in freezing Japanese
assets in retaliation for the Japanese move into Indo-China caught
them unaware. Whether this mistaken view of American policy
arises from the inability of Japanese officials in the United States
correctly to gauge American public opinion or whether they have
been unable in their reports to convince the Japanese Government
in this respect, I do not know. At all times in my dealings with the
Japanese Government I have endeavoured to the best of my ability
to correct this erroneous view. I am, however, entirely convinced
that the Japanese surprise and serious concern over recent develop¬
ments are genuine and also that the bitter resentment which has been
aroused here by the action of the American Government is real.

A FLICKER OF HOPE FOR JAPANESE-
AMERICAN PEACE

July 27, 1941

This Sunday morning there came an exceedingly important tele¬
gram from the Acting Secretary reporting an equally important
proposal which the President had made to Admiral Nomura with a
view to settling the whole situation in the Far East and avoiding
the rapid deterioration of Japanese-American relations as the direct
result of Japan’s aggressive policies and measures in this part of the
world. I shall not at present record the details of this proposal in
view of their ultra-confidential nature, but they offer to Japan a
reasonable way out of her own alleged difficulties and the alleged
encirclement measures of the A B C D powers which she maintains
are threatening her own security.

On reading that telegram I thanked my stars that I had remained
in Tokyo and had not gone to Karuizawa, because it seemed to me
of the utmost importance that I should immediately not only make
sure that Admiral Toyoda had clearly understood the full purport
of the proposal but that I should also exert every ounce of my own
influence to secure its acceptance. I said once before in the diary
that I had not gone home this summer because a moment might
come when such influence could be exerted, and this seemed to me
to be precisely the sort of juncture which I then had in mind. I
therefore immediately telephoned to the Foreign Minister at his

356 one world : two wars

private house and asked for an appointment although it was a Sunday
morning. I saw him at 11.30 at his official residence, and in a long
talk made on my own initiative and responsibility the strongest appeal
of which I was capable and perhaps the strongest representations
that I have ever made.

I told the Department what I had done, and said that although I
had exceeded all authority I felt after careful thought that three
considerations justified my step : (1) the prime importance that

Admiral Toyoda should completely and accurately understand the
President’s proposal, (2) the importance of the time element, which
made it impossible for me to ask for authority from Washington in
advance, and (3) my belief that the President would wish nothing
to be left undone to ensure that maximum consideration should be
given to his proposal and that the Japanese Government should fully
recognize its far-reaching and enlightened import, because upon
its rejection or acceptance might depend the future peace of the
Pacific. To my astonishment Admiral Toyoda said that he had not
received the President’s proposal, communicated to Admiral Nomura
three days ago, on the 24th, and Toyoda confirmed this after leaving
me for some five minutes obviously to telephone to the Foreign Office.
Two days later we learned from Terasaki, Director of the American
Bureau of the Foreign Office, that on the day of his conversation with
the President, Admiral Nomura had sent only a very brief telegram
to Tokyo and that after my talk with Toyoda he had immediately
instructed Nomura to submit a comprehensive report without delay.

Two days later I received a very pleasant message from Sumner
Welles stating that he regarded my action at this time as of the greatest
assistance and value, and that both the President and he himself
had approved of what I had done. I can’t say that I am over-
optimistic as to favourable results, but I told Admiral Toyoda in our
talk that he was now presented with an opportunity to take a step
of the highest statesmanship and with a way of solving the appalling
situation which faced him at the outset of his ministry ; I said in fact
that he now had an opportunity to go down in history as one of
Japan’s greatest statesmen. Whether Japan accepts or not, the
President’s step places the United States in an unassailable position
from the point of view of history, and some day history will record this
step in full. If the Japanese fail to avail themselves of it, their own
position in history will not be enviable. On the 30th I sent another
telegram to the Department making some further suggestions on the
foregoing subject.

In my recent conversations with Admiral Toyoda it seems to me
significant that the only thing which really stirred him up were the
allusions which I made to the belief existing in our country that
German pressure is responsible for Japan’s present policies, and in
each case the Minister emphatically denied that Germany now exerts
any influence in Japan whatsoever. One of my colleagues, incident¬
ally, had previously told me that Matsuoka himself had confirmed

JAPAN AND AMERICA COME WITHIN EIGHT YARDS OF WAR 357

to him the story that he had telegraphed to von Ribbentrop to ask
if there were any basis for the reports that Germany was about to
attack Soviet Russia, that he had received from von Ribbentrop a
categorical denial, and that forty-eight hours later Germany's in¬
vasion of Soviet Russia had occurred. Once again it is abundantly
clear that the Japanese are getting fed up with the Germans, who
have obviously, as usual, overplayed their hand.

JAPAN AND AMERICA GOME WITHIN
EIGHT YARDS OF WAR

July 3 l > * 94 *

In the midst of the Indo-China crisis the Japanese, with wiiat
seems to me the utmost stupidity, allowed one of their Navy aviators
to drop a bomb on the Tutuila at Chungking, risking the very de¬
velopment which I had told Matsuoka was giving me more concern
than any other issue since I had come to Japan. By the grace of
heaven the bomb missed the Tutuila by about eight yards, although
the ship was damaged and another bomb again came dangerously
near our Embassy. Fatalities were escaped only by a miracle. It
seems to me utterly inconceivable that the incident was accidental:
three American officials saw the thing from a hill immediately over¬
looking the ship ; the weather was ideal; and the bomber on ap¬
proaching the city at an altitude of about 15,000 feet, dropped out of
formation and changed its course to a line directly over the Tutuila
and the Embassy. It was the unanimous opinion of the American
officials that the bombing was a deliberate attack on the Embassy
area and the Tutuila , which missed its targets only by the fraction of
a second.

Before I could do anything about it, the Acting Vice-Minister
for Foreign Affairs, Yamamoto, called on me at the chancery at
11 o'clock and expressed the deep regret of the Japanese Government.
Later I was told that the Foreign Minister himself intended to call on
me at the Embassy at 2 o'clock ; the appointment was later changed
to 2.30, and finally a message came that the Foreign Minister was
then with the Prime Minister and that Admiral Toyoda would be
glad to have me come to see him at 2.45, which I did. I am unaware
of the reason for the Minister's change of plans. At any rate, he also
expressed regrets and assured me that the incident was purely
accidental, with which I openly disagreed with him.

Later, Admiral Nomura told S umn er Welles confidentially that in
order to avoid such incidents in the future, the Japanese would
cease from attacking Chung king from the air, and the incident was
called closed. 1 Once again the Japanese have been playing with fire.

Incidentally, the American correspondents were prevented by the
censor from sending their stories to the United States either by tele-
1 Further attack* on Chungking were nevertheless made within a few days.

358 ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

phone or telegraph, and in several conferences with a high Japanese
official during the day I reminded him that at the time of the Panay
incident it was Hirota’s immediate call on me at the chancery and
the fact that I had got this on the wires to the United States through
the American press correspondents within five minutes that had
largely served to calm American public opinion. It therefore seemed
to me of the utmost importance that the correspondents should now
be immediately allowed to get their messages through in order to
report Yamamoto’s call on me and his immediate expressions of
regret. My official friend worked hard, but a series of misunder¬
standings with the censors intervened and it was not until late in
the afternoon, probably too late to catch the early editions of the
morning papers in the eastern part of the United States, that he was
able to clear the wires. Some of the correspondents got their messages
through during a five-minute interval when the censors opened the
lines, but they immediately closed them thereafter and one agency
man had been unable to get off his message. However, the Japanese
officials had worked so efficiently that although the beam had been
turned to South America they turned back on the United States
for a few minutes around four o’clock to let the representative of
the American news agency send his report.

SOME INSIDE INFORMATION ON SOME INSIDE
JAPANESE WEAKNESSES

August 7, 1941

Some exceedingly interesting observations were recendy made in
conversation with a member of my staff by a certain Japanese whom
I know very well and whose position and unquestioned honesty
render it certain that he knows whereof he speaks. The following
points emerged :

The staff of the Japanese Embassy in Washington is painfully
weak, and although Admiral Nomura is himself a very competent
man he has no advisers of first-class ability. In Tokyo, although
many of the younger officials in the Government are now strongly
anti-American, a stabilizing influence is exerted by Prince Konoye,
in whom lies the only hope for adjusting American-Japanese
relations.

Prince Konoye knows that I would like to talk with him oftener,
just as the President does with Admiral Nomura, but it is the fear
of leakages and publicity which has prevented such inteviews. It
was indicated that any reports which our Embassy might send to
Washington would of course become known to the Japanese author¬
ities, although our informant said that he understood that we did
have^ one confidential code ” (highly significant, but I feel perfectly
safe in the use of the one confidential code referred to).

A Japanese informant in Berlin had recently telephoned that it

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL ATLANTIC MEETING SEEN FROM JAPAN 359

was nonsensical for the Japanese to think that the German offensive
in Soviet Russia was not meeting with full success. The attack, on
the contrary, was proceeding precisely according to plan and the
Japanese in Berlin wondered why Japan was delaying in attacking
Soviet Russia. The gentleman at the Tokyo end of the wire merely
said that it was his turn to say “ nonsense.”

From the point of view of the United States and Great Britain the
most dangerous cabinet that could be formed in Japan would be one
in which Matsuoka would combine the positions of Prime Minister
and Foreign Minister. Our informant confirmed our own interpreta¬
tion of the recent cabinet change and he said that neither the Germans
nor General Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, were
pleased with the change and that Oshima had sent practically no
telegrams since the new cabinet had been installed.

It was my informant’s belief that Admiral Toyoda believed that
further conversations with me might be very helpful at this time
and that an opportunity to develop closer contact with me would
be welcomed.

THE ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL ATLANTIC MEETING
SEEN FROM JAPAN

August 14, 1941

We learned to-day of the historic meeting of Roosevelt and
Churchill somewhere in the Atlantic and of the eight-point declara¬
tion concerning the war and peace aims of the United States and
Great Britain, announced in the Japan Times and Advertiser under
small one-column headlines, whereas the recent German war bulletin
was spread across three or four columns. Opponents of the adminis¬
tration will of course see in this declaration all sorts of commitments
involving the United States in European affairs, but whatever happens
in future I believe that history will regard this meeting and the
results thereof as one of the most enlightened steps ever taken since
the announcement of President Wilson’s Fourteen Points.

Human nature may not change very much over the years but at
least it learns something through hard experience, and I venture to
believe that the politicians will never again be allowed to wreck
such a far-seeing programme as Roosevelt and Churchill have now
announced. It will take a long time, perhaps a very long time,
before such a programme can be carried out in effect, but its announce¬
ment at this time seems to me to be an act of the highest statesman¬
ship, and with all the ranting that we may now expect from the
Axis in reply, it is going to take a lot of wind out of the Axis sails
and nip in the bud any peace overtures which in due course Mr.
Hitler may contemplate. I am happier to-day than I have been for
a inng timft and, as always, inordinately proud of our country and
what it is doing.

360

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

ADMIRAL TOYODA’S PEACE OFFER
August 18, 1941

The Foreign Minister asked me to call this afternoon and we had
the longest conversation that I have ever had with any Foreign
Minister anywhere. It lasted for two and a half hours and the boys
in the Code Room finished encoding my report at 5.35 a.m., while
I myself was on the job until long after midnight.

Apropos this conversation, it was a fearfully hot day, and as I
wrote down his remarks, it was drip, drip, drip, so after the first
hour Admiral Toyoda ordered cold drinks and cold wet towels to
swab off with. He made a gesture to take off his coat and looked
at me smilingly and questioningly. Of course I nodded, so we both
took off our coats, rolled up our sleeves, and again pitched in to the
work. The Minister speaks English moderately well and under¬
stands whatever I say without interpretation, but he always has
Inagaki, of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office, present to
interpret his own remarks after he gets to the “ on-the-record 55 stage.

To-day the talk was so important that I wrote down everything
he said, about a dozen pages of foolscap, and I almost had writer’s
cramp at the end. He is a sympathetic and very human type and
I think I like him more than any other Foreign Minister I have ever
dealt with. Our personal relationship is very friendly. To-day,
while we were swabbing off with the cold towels, I said : “ Admiral,
you have often stood on the bridge of a battleship and have seen
bad storms which lasted for several days, but ever since you took
over the bridge of the Foreign Oflice you have undergone one long,
continuous storm without any rest. You and I will have to pour
some oil on those angry waves.” The Minister laughed heartily
and I guess he will relate that remark in cabinet, but he missed the
opportunity to say : “ All right, but if you stop sending us the oil,
what are we going to do about it ? ”

Our conversation began at four o’clock this afternoon and in an oral
statement which took two hours and a half to be delivered, inter¬
preted from Japanese into English and transcribed by me, Admiral
Toyoda set forth a proposal of prime importance for solving the
present critical situation between Japan and the United States. He
pointed out the supreme importance of avoiding any leakage, especi¬
ally, he said, to the Germans or Italians, and he hoped that in my
report to Washington no risk would be incurred of my telegram
being read by others. I said that the telegram would be sent in a
code which I hoped and believed was unbreakable : I said that so
far as I was concerned the only persons who would be informed
of the proposal would be Mr. Dooman and my confidential secretary,
Miss Arnold, who would transcribe the conversation. The Minister
seemed to be entirely satisfied with these assurances. . .

The Minister conmenced by stating that this was to be a long and

ADMIRAL TOYODA’s PEACE OFFER n gj

strictly confidential talk on a very important matter in which he
asked for my co-operation. He said that he would speak to me
frankly as a naval officer and not as a career diplomat. I replied
that I myself had no use for Old World diplomacy and was accus¬
tomed to speaking also with the utmost frankness and straight from
the shoulder. What follows is a paraphrase of the summary of
Admiral Toyoda’s remarks :

i. The stationing of Japanese forces in Indo-China, resulting from
the protocol for the joint defence of Indo-China, was a peaceful and
protective step taken for the purpose of solving the China affair. It
was an independent step taken on Japan’s own initiative and no
German or any other pressure had been exerted.

2. In spite of the foregoing assurances conveyed to me and also
to Admiral Nomura, the United States had assumed that this was
the exercise of armed force at the instigation of Germany and had
taken an economic step (our freezing order) which had brought our
countries very near to a complete severance of economic relations
and had left a big black spot on the long history of peaceful relations
between the United States and Japan.

3. The Japanese people, said the Minister, share his view and
public opinion has become extremely excited, but the Government
has done all in its power to repress this excitement by prohibiting
posters, public gatherings, and hostile press comment.

4. The reply of the Japanese Government to the President’s
proposal of July 24 was sent immediately to Washington, and when
Secretary Hull returned to Washington on August 6, Ambassador
Nomura had handed him the reply. This reply had been drafted
after careful and complete study and with a view to meeting as far
as possible the intentions of the American Government.

5. The Japanese reply contains important proposals which would
bind both Governments ; Japanese forces in Indo-China would be
immediately withdrawn when the China affair is settled ; it contains
three points binding each party.

6. Nevertheless, the President’s proposal was an independent one
dealing exclusively with the joint-defence measure of Indo-China.
The Japanese reply was also accordingly restricted to that subject
and was to be dealt with independently of the general adjustment
of relations which had been discussed between Secretary Hull and
Admiral Nomura.

7. On August 8, Admiral Nomura had received from Secretary
Hull the American reply to the Japanese proposal reiterating the
substance of the President’s proposal of July 24, and Admiral Toyoda
regretted that the American reply seemed to attach too little import¬
ance to the profound consideration given by the Japanese Govern¬
ment to the President’s proposal.

8. In other words, the American proposal, it seems, suggested the
withdrawal of Japanese forces from Indo-China as a prerequisite,

13 *

Cj62 ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

although the Japanese Government had definitely affirmed its
intention to withdraw immediately after the China affair had been
settled because the China affair is the obstacle to peace in the Far
East.

g. If the United States really desires peace in the Far East the
Japanese Government hopes that it will give full consideration to
the Japanese Government’s declaration and will co-operate for the
setdement of the China affair, which is the obstacle to peace in the
Far East.

10. As the Ambassador is fully aware, both the present and the
last cabinet of Prince Konoye have had the sincerest wish to adjust
relations with the United States, and it is the Minister’s firm con¬
viction that there is no room for doubt that this wish has been equally
shared by President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull.

11. Admiral Toyoda fears that the breakdown of peace between
the two countries would not only be an extremely miserable matter
in itself; Japan and the United States, as the last two countries
which hold the key for maintaining world peace in the present state
of the world, would make a bad situation still worse by failing to
practise statesmanship. This would leave the blackest spot on
human history, and future historians would find themselves unable
to understand the nature of the breakdown. Finally, if we as states¬
men allow such a situation to arise it will mean that we have failed
in our responsibilities to both peoples.

12. The Minister believes that both Japan and the United States
must do their duty as saviours of the world in the present crisis.
Therefore they must consider the problems in a calm and friendly
atmosphere on an equal basis as between two great powers facing
the Pacific Ocean. The Minister further believes that the two
countries can adjust their relations in that spirit.

13. The Minister cannot but recognize the fact that in spite of
the points just mentioned the present relations between the United
States and Japan have become extremely strained as a result of mis¬
understanding between the two countries and sinister designs by
third powers, and if nothing is done to improve matters the situation
can become more critical.

14. The Minister believes that the only way to surmount this
crisis is to have responsible people of both countries meet face to
face and express their true intentions towards each other, with a
view to remedying the present situation and discovering ways and
means to aid mankind and promote the peace of the world.

15. In other words, the Minister thinks that it would be most
opportune if the leaders of both countries, animated by the above-
mentioned desires, could talk most frankly in order to settle American-
Japanese relations in the aforesaid spirit and also from a broad¬
minded point of view. He therefore expressed his conviction that it
would be highly desirable that Prince Konoye should proceed to
Honolulu and talk personally with President Roosevelt if the Presi-

admiral toyoda’s peace offer 363

dent would consent. Moreover, Toyoda had instructed Ambassador
Nomura about this matter on August 7. He intended that Admiral
Nomura should personally see President Roosevelt on his return to
Washington.

16. According to news reports the President returned to Washing¬
ton yesterday. It is the seriousness of the matter that prompts the
Minister to make this statement to me and he wishes to ask for my
co-operation.

17. The Minister firmly believes that I will give him my co-opera¬
tion when he remembers my ever-continuing, sincere effort for the
improvement of American-Japanese friendly relations during the past
nine long years.

18. Needless to say, the Premier’s going abroad would have no

precedent in Japanese history. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister,
Prince Konoye, has firmly resolved to meet the President, notwith¬
standing the fact that he is fully aware of the objections in certain
parts of this country. This determination of Prince Konoye is noth¬
ing but the expression of his strongest desire to save the civilization
of the world from ruin as well as to maintain peace in the Pacific
by every effort in his power. The Minister firmly believes

that the President will also be in harmony with this thought and
will give his consent to the proposal of the Japanese Government.

ig. It is firmly believed that in the conversations between the
Prime Minis ter and the President it will be possible to reach a just
and equitable agreement on the general question of Japanese-
American relations from the broad-minded point of view as a result
of the expressions of the highest degree of statesmanship of both
leaders, Japan not being necessarily bound by her reply to the
President’s proposal of July 24 made through Admiral Nomura on
August 6. In this connection the Minister wishes to call my attention
to die fact that it is absolutely necessary to avoid arousing misunder¬
standing or giving an impression both inside and outside this counfcy
that the Japanese Government has entered into negotiation with
the American Government as a result of American pressure. Based
upon this point of view, the Minister deems it desirable that various
measures of economic pressure against Japan be immediately
stopped or highly moderated and the Japanese Government is, of
course, ready to reciprocate at once in this respect. The Minister
wishes to draw the attention of the American Government to this

^ 20 . The foregoing is the substance of the highly serious and
absolutely secret proposal for which the Minister especially asked me
to visit him to-day. In view of its importance and delicate nature
he did not need to ask me to keep this only to myself, as it is not
difficult to imagine what would occur if it should leak out. This »
the reason why he has so far been instructing only Admiral Nomura
to discuss and to dispose of the matter in the United States, but m
order to this proposal realized he has most frankly expressed

364 ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

his opinion to me so that he may have my helpful co-operation, and,
if there should be any question concerning this proposal, he will be
very glad to talk it over with me.

In the early part of the Minister’s oral statement, before he had
come to the proposed meeting in Honolulu, I spoke of Japan’s pro¬
gressive southward advance. I pointed out that in spite of all peaceful
assurances, the American Government could only be guided bv
facts and actions taken by Japan and not by words. I noted also
that whereas in previous conversation the Minister had ascribed the
Japanese move into Indo-China as brought about by the threatened
encirclement by other powers, including the United States and Great
Britain, he now ascribed it exclusively to the settling of the China
affair. To these comments the Minister made no reply.

I furthermore repeated to him the statement which the Under
Secretary had made to the Japanese Ambassador on July 23 to the
effect that Mr. Hull could not see that any basis was now offered for
continuing the conversations which had been carried on in Washing¬
ton between the Secretary and Admiral Nomura. I also spoke of
Mr. Hull’s statement to Admiral Nomura on August 8 to the effect
that in the view of the American Government the proposal handed
by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State on August 6
failed in responsiveness to the proposal advanced by the President
on July 24.

CHINESE UNREST REPORTED IN MANCHURIA
August 20, 1941

From a reliable source we learn that serious unrest is spreading
rapidly among the Chinese throughout Manchuria. This is the
result of economic hardship, the conscription by brutal methods of
workers from all occupations, including vitally needed coal miners,
in order to erect frontier fortifications, the expectation of eventual
war with Soviet Russia, and increasing hatred of the Japanese.
Guerilla bands are increasing and are ravaging the country for food
supplies, and the effects on peace and order are already considerable.
This movement is expected to assume revolutionary proportions if
war with Russia occurs. Even the Manchukuo troops, being infected
with the same unrest, are planning to mutiny at the first opportunity
and the Japanese are aware of all this.

August 22, 1941

From Dairen comes a report that from many sources information
in recent weeks has been coming to the Consulate reporting evidence
of growing discontent on the part of local Japanese at the international
and economic policies of the Government in Tokyo. Many of these
people are so disgusted with the increasing burden of taxation and
regimentation that they are trying to evade such taxes and restrictions

OIL EMBARGO AND FINANCIAL FREEZING HAVE EFFECTS ON JAPAN 365

in a way that they would have considered unpatriotic a year ago,
and the local reservists are often showing great reluctance to be
inducted into active service. Extreme pessimism is being expressed
over the impossible military and financial tasks to which the country
is being led by the policies of the Government, and several cases of
suicide have been reported. There can be no doubt that the morale
and patriotism of the local Japanese people have appreciably declined
during the past year and that many people, including officials, arc
unsympathetic to the present policies of the Government.

THE OIL EMBARGO AND FINANCIAL FREEZING
HAVE THEIR EFFECTS ON JAPAN
August 29, 1941

Mr. Terasaki, the Director of the American Bureau, telephoned
me this afternoon shortly before three o’clock to tell me that although
the Foreign Minister had asked me to call upon him at three o’clock
this afternoon, a recent development had made the Minister fear the
publicity that might follow such a visit. He therefore requested Mr.
Terasaki to deliver the Foreign Minister’s message to me on his behalf.
Mr. Terasaki accordingly called at the Embassy and on behalf of the
Minister conveyed to me for my information the text of the communi¬
cation from the Japanese Prime Minister to the President which had
been delivered by Admiral Nomura in Washington on August 28.

Mr. Terasaki 5 s visit was substituted for my call on the Foreign
Minister because the Japanese press had learned from Washington
that a message from the Japanese Prime Minister had been delivered
to the President, and the news had reached Japan in such a form
that it was impossible for the Government to conceal from the
Japanese public the fact of such a message.

Mr. Terasaki, speaking on behalf of the Foreign Minister, dwelt
on the unfortunate effect of the publicity which had been given to
this matter in Washington. 1 Although the reports had not disclosed
the contents of the Prime Minister’s message to the President, they
did reveal to the Japanese public and to the pro-Axis and extremist
elements that Prince Konoye had taken the initiative.in what was
obviously a conciliatory move at a time when indignation was high
in Japan as a result of the progressive steps recently taken by the
American Government. These steps included the initial order
freezing Japanese assets in the United States, the announcement that
American tankers bearing oil to the Soviet Union had departed
from Californian ports, and the decision to send a military mission
headed by General Magruder to Chiang Kai-shek. Mr. Terasaki
pointed out that the publicity given to the Prime Minister’s message
is consequently of direct advantage to the extremists and pro-Axis

1 It was Admiral Nomura himself who ann ounced to the American press on
emerging from the White House that he had just delivered to the President a message
from the Prime Minister of Japan.

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

366

elements in this country. It has not only rendered further moves in
the direction of conciliation very difficult but has in addition im¬
measurably augmented the possibility of an attempt on the life of
Prince Konoye. He added that the Chief of Police this afternoon
had indicated the increased risk to the Prime Minister’s life.

Mr. Terasaki conveyed an appeal to me from Admiral Toyoda
that I ask my Government to take the following three steps. Unless
these are taken, the Foreign Minister feared that Prince Konoye
• would meet with serious obstacles in his efforts to bring about an
understanding between the United States and Japan :

(1) The meeting between the two responsible heads of the American
arid Japanese Governments should take place without delay. Delay
would afford those elements who oppose any attempt to conciliate
the United States an opportunity to organize their adherents and
to spread the idea to the Japanese public that Prince Konoye is
yielding to American pressure and, in seeking to reach an under¬
standing with the United States in the teeth of what is publicly
regarded as provocative American measures, is exposing Japan to
humiliation.

(2) The United States Government should postpone the sending
of tankers to the Soviet Union at least pending the outcome of the
proposed meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime
Minister. Mr. Terasaki told me that the Foreign Minister felt that
the dangerous temper of public opinion on the question of the tankers
could not be exaggerated. He added in this connection that accord¬
ing to information reaching Japanese authorities five American
tankers destined for Vladivostok have already passed through Tsugaru
or Soya Straits.

(3) The American Government, pending the proposed meeting
between the heads of the two Governments, should suspend the
order freezing Japanese assets in the United States.

Mr. Terasaki, again speaking for the Minister, emphasized to me
that the Japanese Government has dealt in complete frankness with
the American Government and has assured us that upon the settle¬
ment of the China Incident Japanese troops at present in French
Indo-China would be withdrawn ; that the Japanese troops in Indo-
China would make no further move in that area ; and that Japan
would observe the treaty of neutrality with the Soviet Union so
long as that country adhered equally to the letter and spirit of the
same treaty. He explained that these- were the maximum assurances
and commitments which the Japanese Government was in a position
to assume at the present time. Since the Japanese Government has
gone the limit in giving these assurances, the Foreign Minister
believes that the American Government for its part should make
a maximum effort, along the lines of the three points outlined above,
in order to assist the Prime Minister in the course which he is pur-

DINNER WITH PRINCE KONOYE

367

suing, a course which is now fraught with extreme difficulties and
danger as a result of the Washington publicity.

Mr. Terasaki told me that the Foreign Minister was appealing to
me m an endeavour to have the situation confronting the Prime
Minister fully explained to the President and the Secretary and to
request that the United States Government approach the suggested
concessions not from a legalistic -but from a psychological point
of view.

When Mr. Terasaki concluded the foregoing outline I acquainted
him first of all with the substance of the first section of the Depart¬
ment’s telegram of August 28, which had just been received, setting
forth the Secretary’s views upon the objections raised by the Japanese
Government to the shipment of oil to the Soviet Union. I took
occasion to emphasize the logical and compelling force of the position
adopted by the Secretary on this matter. In order that there might
be no misunderstanding in regard to the accuracy of the Japanese
Ambassador’s reports of his recent conversations in Washington, I
communicated orally to Mr. Terasaki the substance of the Depart¬
ment’s telegrams reporting these conversations.

In touching on the question of the reciprocal freezing regulations
now in force I emphasized once more to Mr. Terasaki the disparity
between the very liberal administration of the freezing regulations
in the United States in respect to Japanese nationals and the exacting
and harsh treatment meted out to American citizens and interests
in Japan. Mr. Terasaki in reply merely reiterated that the Foreign
Minister’s request had been that such questions be dealt with from
the point of view of their psychological effect in Japan, since at this
period of intense crisis in relations between our two countries the
psychological effect was an especially strong one. I then drew Mr.
Terasaki’s attention to the mounting anti-American attitude of the
Japanese press, to which Mr. Terasaki replied that he could tell me
in strictest confidence that certain members of the Cabinet Informa¬
tion Board, which was charged with matters relating to publicity,
are distinctly pro-Axis in their sentiments and that the Japanese
Government is encountering real difficulties in handling this question.

In discussing with Mr. Terasaki the three points, outlined above,
raised by the Foreign Minister, I left him under no illusion that the
United States Government would find it possible to agree to either
of the preposterous requests contained in points (2) or (3) above.

DINNER WITH PRINCE KONOYE
September 6, 1941

This evening the Prime Minister invited me to dine at a private
house of a friend. Only Mr. Dooman and Mr. Ushiba, the Prime
Minister’s private secretary, were also present. The conversation
lasted for three hours and we presented with entire frankness the
fundamental views of our two countries. The Prime Minister re-

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

368

quested that his statements be transmitted personally to the President
in the belief that they might amplify and clarify the approach through
diplomatic channels which he had made in Washington through
Admiral Nomura.

Prince Konoye, and consequently the Government of Japan,
conclusively and whole-heartedly agree with the four principles
enunciated by the Secretary of State as a basis for the rehabilitation
of relations between the United States and Japan. 1

Prince Konoye recognizes that the responsibility is his for the
present regrettable state of relations between our two countries but,
with appropriate modesty as to his personal capabilities, he likewise
recognizes that only he can cause the desired rehabilitation to come
about. In the event of failure on his part, no succeeding Prime
Minister at least during his own lifetime, could achieve the results
desired. Prince Konoye is therefore determined to spare no effort,
despite all elements and factors opposing him, to crown his present
endeavours with success.

The Prime Minister hopes that as a result of the commitments
which the Japanese Government is prepared to assume as communi¬
cated to me by Admiral Toyoda, a rational basis has been established
for a meeting between the President and himself. The Prime Minister,
however, is cognizant of the fact that certain points may need
clarification and more precise formulation, and he is confident
that the divergencies in view can be reconciled to our mutual satis¬
faction, particularly by reason of the favourable disposition on the
part of Japanese naval and military leaders who have not only sub¬
scribed to his proposal but who will also be represented at the suggested
meeting. The Prime Minister stated that both the Ministers of War
and of the Navy have given their full agreement to his proposals to
the United States.

The reports which the Prime Minister has received from the
Japanese Ambassador concerning the latter’s conversations with
the President and the Secretary have led the Prime Minister to
think that the administration in Washington entertains serious
doubts as to the strength of the present cabinet, and that the
administration is not certain that in the event that the cabinet
should adopt a peaceful programme, it could successfully resist the
attacks of opposing elements. Prince Konoye told me that from the
inception of the informal talks in Washington he had received the
strongest concurrence from the responsible chiefs of both the Army

1 (1) Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all
nations;

(2) Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other
countries ;

(3) Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial
opportunity;

(4) Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may

be altered by peaceful means. »

DINNER WITH PRINCE KONOYE

3 6 9

and the Navy. Only to-day he had conferred with the Minister
of War, who had promised to send a full general to accompany
the Prime Minister to the meeting with the President; the Minister
of the Navy had agreed that a full admiral should accompany the
Prime Minister. Prince Konoye added in confidence that he expected
that the representative of the Navy would probably be Admiral
Yoshida, a former Minister of the Navy. In addition the Premier
would be accompanied by the Vice-Chiefs of Staff of the Army
and the Navy and other high-ranking officers of the armed services
who are in entire accord with his aims. He admitted that there
are certain elements within the armed forces who do not approve
his policies, but he voiced the conviction that since he had the full
support of the responsible chiefs of the Army and Navy it would
be possible for him to put down and control any opposition which
might develop among those elements.

Prince Konoye repeatedly stressed the view that time is of the
essence. It might take half a year to a year to work out all the details
of the complete setdement, and since resentment is daily mounting
in Japan over the economic pressure being exerted by other countries,
he could not guarantee to put into effect any such programme
of setdement six months or a year from now. He does,, how¬
ever, guarantee that at the present time he can carry with him the
Japanese people to the goal which he has selected, and that should
difficulties be encountered in working out the details of the com¬
mitments which he may assume, these difficulties can be overcome
satisfactorily because of the determined intention of his Government
to see to it that its present efforts are fully successful.

In the course of our discussion I outlined in general terms the
bitter lessons of the past to our Government as the result of the
failure of the Japanese Government to honour the promises given
to me by former Japanese Ministers for Foreign Affairs apparently
in all sincerity, as a result of which the Government of the United
States had at long last concluded that it must place its reliance on
actions and facts and not on Japanese promises or assurances. The
Prime Minister did not attempt to refute this statement but stressed
the fact that his Government now wished to bring about a thorough¬
going reconstruction of American-Japanese relations and he assured
me that any commitments which he would undertake .would bear
no resemblance to the “irresponsible” assurances which we had
received in the past and that such commitments if given would be
observed. The Prime Minister concluded his presentation of this
point by giving me to understand that, given the will, the way can

be found. ., , .

Prince Konoye stated that should the President desire to com¬
municate any kind of suggestion to him personally and confidenti¬
ally he would be glad to arrange subsequent secret meetings with
me, but he expressed the earnest hope that in view of the present
internal situation in Japan the projected meeting with the President

370 ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

could be arranged with the least possible delay. Prince Konoye
feels confident that all problems and questions at issue can be dis¬
posed of to our mutual satisfaction during the meeting with the
President, and he ended our conversation with the statement that
he is determined to bring to a successful conclusion the proposed
reconstruction of relations with the United States regardless of cost
or personal risk.

THE EMBASSY COUNSELLOR TALKS WITH
KONOYE’S PRIVATE SECRETARY

September 18, 1941

Eugene Dooman, our Counsellor at the Embassy, to-day submitted
this report of his conversation with Tomohiko Ushiba, private
secretary to the Japanese Premier, Prince Konoye :

Mr, Ushiba called me on the telephone yesterday afternoon
at my house, asking whether he could call on me immediately.
I told Mr. Ushiba that I had gone to bed with a cold, but that
if he wished to risk the chances of an infection I would be glad
to see him for a short while. Mr. Ushiba arrived at about five
o’clock and stayed until shortly before seven.

Mr, Ushiba asked whether the Ambassador had received any
comment from Washington on his report of the meeting which
recently took place between the Ambassador and the Prime
Minister. I replied that the Secretary of State had telegraphed
in appreciative terms concerning the attitude and views of Prince
Konoye, but that a paper which Admiral Nomura had handed
in to the State Department on September 4 had so confused
matters that the Ambassador had not felt that he had sufficient
material to warrant his asking for a further meeting with the Prime
Minister.

Mr. Ushiba said that the cabinet had been completely upset
by the information which Mr. Grew gave Admiral Toyoda on
September 10 with regard to the action of Admiral Nomura. He
said that Admiral Nomura had received from Prince Konoye a
draft which was responsive to the American draft of June 21,
but that in view of the cabinet crisis in Japan, Admiral Nomura
had not handed in that document. He had instead written a
brief letter to the Secretary of State which was not in any way
helpful. Mr. Ushiba gathered 'that the Nomura paper of
September 4 was not the draft received from Tokyo, for the reason
that one of the basic ideas of the Japanese Government has been
right along to have recourse to the good offices of the President
in opening up a path between Japan and China—and apparently
Admiral Nomura’s paper of September 4 made no reference to
the good offices of the President.

I then explained to Mr. Ushiba the combination of circum-

EMBASSY COUNSELLOR TALKS WITH KONOYE J S PRIVATE SECRETARY 371

stances which had led to difficulty in Washington in understand¬
ing precisely what the position of the Japanese Government \vas }
say as of September 4. I hoped that we were succeeding in
untangling the crossed wires 5 but the loss of a week or more in
straightening matters out was due in no part to any action of ours.

Mr. Ushiba remarked with surprising candour that he did not
blame our Government in any way for wanting to know precisely
what the aims and objectives of the Japanese are before com¬
mitting itself to such a dramatic move as that of a meeting between
the heads of Government of the United States and Japan. After
all, the crux of the problem was China. He felt that the Japanese
Government had shown very clearly that it proposed to
maintain the principle of the Open Door in China, but
that it had failed thus far to indicate clearly the terms which
it would propose to China for settlement of the China con¬
flict. Months had dragged on in conversations in Washington,
and the Secretary of State had all along shown very clearly
that he did not intend to commit the American Government
in any decision until he knew in advance what the Japanese
peace terms were and was satisfied that those terms were in con¬
formity with the principles which he advocated for the regulating
of relations between nations.

Mr. Ushiba suggested that our Government should ask the
Japanese Government to disclose those terms, as he could assure
me that his Government would immediately respond to any such
request. I said that I was unable to follow him in those observa¬
tions : as Mr. Ushiba had himself suggested, we had long ex¬
pressed desire to know the character of the Japanese peace terms ;
in our draft of June 21, Section III, we had inserted a phrase
which was designed to indicate that the Japanese Government
would have communicated those terms to the American Govern¬
ment before any approach was to be made*by the President to
the Chinese Government. I had therefore assumed that failure
on our part to be apprised of the Japanese peace terms was caused
by refusal on the part of the Japanese Government to disclose
them to us.

Mr. Ushiba said that he did not know precisely how the present
situation arose, but that he could assure me that the Japanese
Government would be only too glad to communicate the terms
to the President and to have the President show them to the Chinese
and other interested Governments. After some discussion, it seemed
desirable that the initiative with regard to communication to us
of the peace terms come from the Japanese side. Mr. Ushiba
would suggest to Prince Konoye that he communicate the terms
to Mr. Grew as further evidence of the good faith of the Japanese
Government and of its eagerness to enter into formal negotiations
with the American Government. It was also agreed that
if Prince Konoye should feel that some further initiative

ja ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

should come from the American side, Mr. Grew—if he felt that
he was in a position to do so would express to Prince
Konoye desire to be apprised of the character of the Japanese
peace terms.

We then discussed the question of the attitude of the United
States and Japan respectively towards the European war. Mr.
Ushiba said that it was impossible for Japan to give to the United
States a prior undertaking that it would interpret as a defensive
act any action on the part of the United States against Germany
which might lead to war between the United States and Germany.
He thought that the formula which had been communicated by
Admiral Toyoda to Mr. Grew was about as far as the Japanese
Government could go prior to the proposed meeting. He added,
however, that an understanding had been reached among the
various influential elements in Japan which would enable Prince
Konoye to give orally and directly to the President an assurance
with regard to the attitude of Japan which, he felt sure, would
be entirely satisfactory to the President.

Another matter which troubled him very much in this con¬
nection was precisely in what terms the Japanese Government
would explain to Germany any understanding which might be
reached with the United States on this point. I remarked t at
the United States, which was committed to supporting the prin¬
ciple of the sanctity of treaties, could not well request Japan to
betray its treaty commitments. It seemed to me, however, that
there was a very definite difference between the Treaty of Alliance,
with its rights and obligations, and the formulation of policies by
the concerned allies. It followed as a matter of course that allies
pursued policies which served their common end, but there was
no obligation arising out of the Three-Power Alliance which
required Japan to follow policies which would serve exclusively
the ends of Germany. Could not, therefore, Japan inform Germany
that Japan had undertaken to pursue policies conformable to those
of the United States, although Japan was prepared to fulfil its
obligations under Article III of the treaty? Technically the
Alliance .is a defensive alliance; and it is clear from the rescript
issued by the Emperor at the time of the signing of the Alliance
that it was then considered by the Japanese Government as an
instrument for peace. Mr. Matsuoka informed certain of the
Ambassadors in Tokyo upon his return from Moscow that, in the
event of a war occurring between Germany and the United States,
Japan would consult its allies with regard to the antecedent cir¬
cumstances, and that he felt confident that the Japanese Government
would decide, in almost every conceivable instance, to enter the
war on the side of Germany.

Mr. Ushiba expressed amazement. He said that he knew that
Mr. Matsuoka had interpreted Article III of the Alliance in a
sense which was entirely contrary to Prince Konoye’s interpreta-

japan’s peace offer to china 373

tion, but that he did not know that he (Mr, Matsuoka) had dis¬
closed his interpretation to representatives of foreign governments.
Apropos, he said that Mr. Matsuoka had told the Prime Minister
that Mr. Grew had reported to Washington that the last cabinet
change was due to American pressure on Japan. I told Mr. Ushiba
that we had reported nothing of the sort. I said that I could tell
him in confidence that we had reported that the cabinet change
was due chiefly to two causes : first, the German attack on Soviet
Russia, which upset Japanese expectation, when signing the Alliance,
that peace would be maintained between Germany and Russia ;
and, second, the conflict of interpretations by the Prime Minister
and Mr. Matsuoka with regard to the scope and significance of
the Triple Alliance. Mr. Ushiba said that we had been entirely
correct.

The concluding portions of the conversation were devoted
largely to Mr. Ushiba’s stressing the importance of the American
Government’s returning a favourable reply to the Japanese proposal
as soon as possible. Mr. Ushiba reverted again and again to the
approach of the 27th of September, the first anniversary of the signing
of the Alliance.

JAPAN’S PEACE OFFER TO CHINA
September 22, 1941

I called on Foreign Minister Toyoda this afternoon at his request.
After reading from a document in Japanese which was then
translated into English, he made substantially the following oral
statement:

1. The suggestion that the President meet with Prince Konoye
was contained by implication in the message received by the President
from the Prime Minister.

2. The Japanese Government had intended that the proposed
meeting should discuss the questions at issue between the two countries
requiring agreement, and that subsequently through normal diplo¬
matic channels the details for executing the understanding reached
at the meeting should be worked out. The Government of the United
States, however, had adopted the view that the problems which had
emerged from the preliminary and informal conversations should
be agreed on in advance of the meeting.

3. The Foreign Minister had explained that in his statement
made to me on September 4 he had replied to all of the questions
raised by the Government of the United States, and that his
statement of September 4 had widened rather than reduced the field
of the negotiations which the Japanese Government is willing to
cover,

4. The Foreign Minister then gave me the basic terms of peace
which Japan is prepared to offer China, to be co mmu nicated to the

374 one worl d * two wars

Secretary of State. The Minister emphasized that these terms should
not be regarded as a new proposal but as related and supplementary
to his statement to me of September 4 when he confirmed that the
Japanese Government still desired to seek the good offices of the
President in bringing the conflict with China to an end.

5. Admiral Toyoda told me that great internal changes had
occurred during the past month as a result of the publicity that the
suggested meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime
Minister had received abroad and as a result of the published reports
and references on radio broadcasts abroad in regard to the con-
versations in progress between Japan and the United States. Thanks
to the efforts of the Japanese Government, public opinion in Japan
and the Japanese press in the main are not aware of the develop¬
ments referred to above, but the publicity abroad is known to certain
groups in Japan and has increased the activities of those elements
in Japan who are opposed to an understanding with the United
States.

6. The Government of Japan will attempt to guard against any
incidents or special occurrences in connection with the anniversary
on September 27 of Japan’s adherence to the Axis and will allow this
anniversary to be celebrated by private organizations. However,
should a considerable lapse of time occur following the anniversary
without any sign as to the attitude of the United States, the groups
referred to above who are against an understanding with the United
States and who are informed of the Japanese-American conversations
might find it possible to inflame public opinion in Japan and thus
make it very difficult for these talks to continue.

7. Admiral Toyoda pointed out that the Japanese Government is
still awaiting the American answer to the various points set forth
by him in his statement of September 4. He expressed his belief that
in that statement the Japanese Government had with complete
frankness revealed to the American Government its intentions and
desires.

b In re Pty to the Minister’s question whether any further informa¬
tion had been received from Washington, I conveyed to him the
substance of the Department’s cable of September 20, which had
been decoded immediately before my call on the Minister. Admiral
Toyoda was especially struck by the Secretary’s remark to the Japanese
Ambassador that the Government of the United States fully shared
the desire of the Japanese Government to hasten matters. The
Minister expressed the thought that although the desire of the United
States Government to confer with other governments in regard to
the suggested agreement was clearly recognized, the element of delay
which would be involved in such consultations might have a most
unfortunate effect.

With reference to the lack of concern felt by the Japanese Am¬
bassador in Washington regarding the anniversary on September 27

japan’s peace OFFER TO CHINA gy-

of Japan’s adherence to the Axis, Admiral Toyoda expressed the view
that Admiral Nomura was not in close enough"touch with the situation
in Japan to perceive the dangers. I told the Minister that I was
surprised that he had not conveyed to the Japanese Ambassador in
Washington his own concern on this point.

With reference to the terms of peace between Japan and China, I
told the Minister that I wished to avoid any comment until the Govern¬
ment of the United States had had a chance to examine these terms,
but that for purposes of clarification I would like to know the exact
meaning of the words “ existing agreements and usages 55 mentioned
in point three. The Minister in reply stated that these words must
be understood as written ,* however, he referred in this connection to
the presence in China of American marines merely by way of an
illustration of the phrase in question.

I promised the Minister that I would immediately communicate
to the Secretary his statement given above ; likewise the proposed
terms of peace between Japan and China which he had handed to
me. But I added that in view of the communications between the
Governments of Japan and the United States, I could not be opti¬
mistic that a decision on these important matters could be reached
before the 27th of September.

Text of basic Japanese terms of peace with China, handed to the

American Ambassador by the Japanese Minister for Foreign

Affairs on September 22, 1941.

1. Neighbourly friendship.

2. Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.

3. Co-operative defence between Japan and China.

Co-operation between Japan and China for the purposes of pre¬
venting Communistic and other subversive activities which may
constitute a menace to the security of both countries and of main¬
taining the public order in China.

Stationing of Japanese troops and naval forces in certain areas in
the Chinese territory for a necessary period for the purposes referred
to above and in accordance with the existing agreements and usages*

4. Withdrawal of Japanese armed forces.

The Japanese armed forces which have been dispatched to China
for carrying out the China affair will be withdrawn from China upon
the settlement of the said affair, excepting those troops which come
under point 3.

5. Economic co-operation.

(a) There shall be economic co-optation between Japan and
China, having the development and utilization of essential materials
for national defence in China as its principal objective.

(b) The preceding paragraph does not mean to restrict any
economic activities by third powers in China so long as they are
pursued on an equitable basis.

376 ONE WORLD I TWO WARS

6. Fusion of the Chiang Kai-shek regime and the Wang Ching-wei
Government.

7. No annexation.

8. No indemnities.

9. Recognition of Manchukuo.

JAPAN’S TERMS FOR A ROOSEVELT-KONOYE
CONFERENCE, RESTATED
September 25, 1941

Mr. Terasaki called at his own request this afternoon and delivered
to me in substance the following oral statement:

Admiral Toyoda had frequently and in detail advised me that the
present attitude of the Government of Japan is one of awaiting from
moment to moment a response from the Government of the United
States to the Japanese Government’s proposal for a meeting between
the American President and the Japanese Prime Minister. Because
of the press of time and due to Admiral Toyoda’s absence from the
Foreign Office, the Director of the American Bureau had upon his
own initiative called upon me for two purposes. First, he wanted to
ask whether any information regarding the above-mentioned proposal
had been received by me from my Government; second, he had a
document to transmit to me.

The document constitutes a response on the part of the Japanese
Government to the substance and the formulae of the draft state¬
ment of the American Government dated June 21 as well as an
explanation of the proposal which the Minister for Foreign Affairs
handed to me on September 4. It contains no new proposal. The
document was prepared mainly for use as a convenient reference,
presenting in one document the Japanese position, as set forth in
the Foreign Minister’s proposal of September 4 and in his several
explanatory statements. The instrument is not to be considered as
a formal document, such, for instance, as a treaty ; the text is to be
regarded as “ entirely flexible.” It is therefore open to any revision
which the Government of the United States may propose, but any
modification of the document’s substance will not be agreeable to
the Japanese Government.

THE AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN REPORTS TO THE
SECRETARY OF STATE

(Substance)

(Paraphrase of original tdct prepared by Department of State)
September 29, 1941

In regard to the preli m i n ary conversations taking place at Wash¬
ington and Tokyo, the Ambassador points out that a review of tele¬
graphic correspondence on this subject since last spring reveals the

the ambassador in japan reports to the secretary of state 377

Japanese Government’s efforts, increasing steadily and intensified
lately, to arrange a meeting between Prince Konoye and President
Roosevelt without further delay. While admitting his role to be
chiefly that of a transmitting agent in these conversations, the
Ambassador naturally wishes to aid in any constructive way, par¬
ticularly by endeavouring to appraise accurately for the President
and the Secretary of State the Japanese factors and conditions having
direct or indirect bearing on the subject, and also by trying to bring
the Japanese Government to adopt measures and policies such as
the United States Government deems to be essential for a mutual
understanding or agreement between Japan and the United States.
Since the fall of Admiral Yonai’s cabinet in July of 1940, American
diplomacy in Japan has been in eclipse temporarily through force
of circumstances. However, when the Konoye-Toyoda regime began
last July, American diplomacy obtained a very active new lease
of life. The Ambassador expresses his earnest hope, therefore, that so
propitious a period be not permitted to slip by without a new founda¬
tion having been laid with enough stability to warrant a reasonable
amount of confidence that the structure to be erected gradually and
progressively thereon can and will endure.

The Ambassador recalls his statements in the past that in Japan
the pendulum always swings between moderate and extremist policies ;
that it was not then possible under the existing circumstances for any
Japanese leader or group to reverse the programme of expansion
and expect to survive ; that the permanent digging in by Japanese
in China and the pushing of the Japanese advance to the south could
be prevented only by insuperable obstacles. The Ambassador recalls
likewise his views that the risks of taking positive measures to maintain
United States security in the future were likely to be far smaller
than the risks of not taking such measures ; that only respect for
potential power of the United States has deterred Japan from taking
more liberties with American interests ; and that Japan’s programme
of forcible expansion could be brought to a halt only by a show of
force and by a demonstration of American willingness to use this
force if necessary. The Ambassador recalls also his statement that
if Japan’s leadership could be discredited eventually by such American
action, there might take shape in Japan ultimately a regeneration
of thought which would allow Japan to resume formal relations with
the United States, leading to a readjustment of the entire problem
of te Pacific.

The Ambassador suggests that the United States has been fol-
lowihg very wisely precisely this policy which, furthered by other
developments in the world, has helped to discredit Japanese leader¬
ship, notably that of former Foreign Minister Matsuoka. The
Ambassador cites as world developments arousing a positive reaction
from the United States the conclusion by Japan of the Tripartite
Alliance and Japan’s recognition of the Wang Ching-wei regime at
Nanking, which preceded Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union

3^8 one world : two wars

Germany’s action upset the basis for the Tripartite Pact, Japan
having joined the Italo-German Axis in order to obtain security
against Russia and thereby to avoid the peril of being caught between
the Soviet Union and the United States. At the present time Japan
is attempting to correct this miscalculation by getting out of an
extremely dangerous position. The Ambassador recalls his reports
to the Department to the effect that Japanese foreign policies are
inevitably changed by the impact of events abroad and that liberal
elements in Japan might come to the top in due course as a result
of the trend of events. He considers that such a time has arrived.
He sees a good chance of Japan’s falling into line if a programme
can be followed of world reconstruction as forecast by the declaration
of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. American
policy—of forbearance, patient argumentation, efforts at persuasion,
followed for many years, plus a manifest determination of the United
States to take positive measures when called for—plus the impact
of world developments upon Japan, has rendered Japan’s political
soil hospitable to the sowing of new seeds which, the Ambassador
feels, if planted carefully and nourished, may bring about the antici¬
pated regeneration of Japanese thought and a complete readjustment
of relations between Japan and the United States.

Certain quarters have advanced the thought—and no doubt it is
prominently in the mind of the United States Government—that at
this juncture an agreement between Japan and the United States
will serve merely as a breathing spell to Japan. During such a
breathing spell, Japan, having successfully untangled itself with
American aid from the China conflict, will recoup and strengthen
its forces in order to resume at the next favourable opportunity its
expansionist programme. This thought cannot be gainsaid with
certainty. The same school of thought also holds that Japan will be
forced to relinquish its expansionist programme because of the de¬
terioration of Japanese domestic economy and because of the threat
of financial, economic, and social collapse due to a progressive in¬
tensifying of economic measures by the United States, Great Britain,
and the Netherlands against Japan. The Ambassador adds that
should this thesis be accepted as reasonably sound, the position will
confront the United States of choosing one of two methods to
approach its objective, namely, either the method of progressive
economic strangulation or the method of constructive conciliation,
not so-called appeasement.

The Ambassador sees the second method as the definite choice of
the United States Government following the beginning of the
Washington preliminary conversations and President Roosevelt’s
acceptance in principle of the Japanese Prime Minister’s proposed
meeting. Indeed, the Ambassador remarks, the United States has
never departed from its readiness to negotiate on any issues with
Japan despite the fact that Japan already had embarked at that
time on its expansion-by-force programme. He feels that, from the

THE AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN REPORTS TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE 379

view-point of far-seeing statesmanship, the wisdom of the American
choice seems to be beyond cavil. Should failure greet the con¬
structive, conciliatory method of approach now or later, there will
always be available the other method, the application of progressive
economic sanctions. In the opinion of the Ambassador, whether
the trend of American relations with Japan is for better or for worse,
the United States obviously will have to remain for a long time to
come in a state of preparedness. The thought that eventual British
victory in the world war will solve automatically many problems may,
meanwhile, afford whatever degree of encouragement is justified.

The Ambassador, while admitting that risks will inevitably be
involved no matter what course is pursued towards Japan, offers his
carefully studied belief that there would be substantial hope at the
very least of preventing the Far Eastern situation from becoming
worse and perhaps of ensuring definitely constructive results, if an
agreement along the lines of the preliminary discussions were brought
to a head by the proposed meeting of the heads of two Governments.
The Ambassador mentions his previous expressions of opinion that the
principal point at issue between the United States and Japan is
not whether the former must call a halt to the expansionist pro¬
gramme of the latter, but when. He raises the questions whether
the United States is not now given the opportunity to halt Japan’s
programme without war, or an immediate risk of war, and
further, whether through failure to use the present opportunity
the United States will not face a greatly increased risk of war. The
Ambassador states his firm belief in an affirmative answer to these
two questions.

Certain quarters hold the view that it is altogether improbable
under listing circumstances that counteraction will be deliberately
taVfn by Japan in response to any American action likely to be
talfpn in the Pacific which would bring about war with the United
States. The Ambassador states his inability to agree that war may
not supervene following actions, whether irrational or deliberate, by
elements either in Japan or in the United States tending so to i nflame
public opinion in the other country concerned as to make war
unavoidable. He recalls in this regard the cases of the Maine and
the Panay.

The Ambassador stresses the importance of understanding Japanese
psychology, fundamentally unlike that of any Western nation.
Japanese reactions to any particular set of circumstances cannot be
measured, nor can Japanese actions be predicted by any Western
measuring rod. This fact is hardly surprising in the case of a country
so recently feudalistic. The Ambassador conceives his chief duty to
be an attempt to interpret accurately Japanese psychology, and he
states that he ha§ aimed to do this in his numerous reports during
the last several months and years to the Department. Keeping this
thought constantly before him, the Ambassador ventures at the risk
of repetition to advance the considerations set forth below.

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

380

Should the United States expect or await agreement by the Japanese
Government, in the present preliminary conversations, to clear-cut
commitments which will satisfy the United States Government both
as to principle and as to concrete detail, almost certainly the con¬
versations will drag along indefinitely and unproductively until
the Konoye cabinet and its supporting elements desiring rapproche¬
ment with the United States will come to the conclusion that the
outlook for an agreement is hopeless and that the United States
Government is only playing for time. If the abnormal sensitiveness
of Japan and the abnormal effects of loss of face are considered, in
such a situation Japanese reaction may and probably will be serious.
This will result in the Konoye Government’s being discredited and
in a revulsion to anti-American feeling, and this may and probably
will lead to unbridled acts. The eventual cost of these will not be
reckoned, and their nature is likely to inflame Americans, while
reprisal and counter-reprisal measures will bring about a situation
in which it will be difficult to avoid war. The logical outcome of
this will be the downfall of the Konoye cabinet and the formation
of a military dictatorship which will lack either the disposition or
the temperament to avoid colliding head-on with the United States.
There is a question that such a situation may prove to be more serious
even than the failure to produce an entirely satisfactory agreement
through the proposed meeting between President Roosevelt and
Prince Konoye, should it take place as planned. Worded otherwise,
the question remains whether it will not prove to be a less serious
case for the negotiations undertaken in good faith to fail of complete
success than for the United States to demonstrate its unwillingness
to enter any such negotiations.

The Ambassador continues by stating that he has been emphatic¬
ally told on numerous occasions—and such declarations he considers
must be accepted at their face value—that prior to the proposed
Roosevelt-Konoye meeting and formal negotiations it is impossible
for the Japanese Government to define its future assurances and
co mm it m ents more specifically than hitherto stated. The Ambas¬
sador explains that one reason for this Japanese position, as given
him very confidentially, is that former Foreign Minister Matsuoka,
after his retirement in July, recounted in complete detail to the
German Ambassador in Japan the course of the Washington con¬
versations up to that time. Because many supporters of Matsuoka
r em a i n in the Tokyo Foreign Office, the fear has been expressed that
these men will not scruple to reveal to both the Germans and the
Japanese extremists any information which would render the present
cabinet’s position untenable.

Although certain basic principles have been accepted provisionally
by the Japanese Government, the definitions and formulae of Japan’s
future objectives and policy, as advanced so far during the pre¬
liminary conversations, and the statements' supplementary to those
definitions, are so abstract or equivocal and are open to such wide

the ambassador in japan reports to the secretary of state 381

interpretation that they rather create confusion than clarify commit¬
ments which the Japanese Government is ready to undertake. The
Ambassador states that at the same time he has been told that
Prince Konoye is in a position in direct negotiations with President
Roosevelt to offer him assurances which, because of their far-reaching
character, will not fail to satisfy the United States. The truth of
this statement cannot be determined by the Ambassador, who, how¬
ever, points out that, in regard specifically to Japan’s Axis relations,
the Japanese Government, though refusing consistently to give an
undertaking that it will overtly renounce its alliance membership,
actually has shown a readiness to reduce Japan’s alliance adherence
to a dead letter by its indication of willingness to enter formally
into negotiations with the United States. The Ambassador therefore
does not consider unlikely the possibility of Prince Konoye’s being
in a position to give President Roosevelt directly a more explicit
and satisfactory engagement than has already been vouchsafed in the
course of the preliminary conversations.

In the opinion of the Ambassador, on the basis of the above
observations which he has every reason to regard as sound, American
objectives will not be reached by insisting or continuing to insist
during the preliminary conversations that Japan provide the sort of
clear-cut, specific commitments which appear in any final, formal
convention or treaty. Unless a reasonable amount of confidence is
placed by the United States in the professed sincerity of intention
and good faith of Prince Konoye and his supporters to mould
Japan’s future policy upon the basic principles they are ready to
accept and then to adopt measures which gradually but loyally
implement those principles, with it understood that the United States
will implement its own commitments pari passu with the steps which
Japan takes, the Ambassador does not believe that a new orientation
can be successfully created in Japan to lead to a general improving
of Japanese-American relations and to the hope that ultimate war
may be avoided in the Pacific. The sole way to discredit the Japanese
military machine and Army is through wholesale military defeat, and
the Ambassador sees no present prospect of this. The only alternative
(and the only wise one in the view of the Ambassador) is an attempt
to produce a regeneration of Japanese thought and outlook through
constructive conciliation, along the lines of American efforts at
present. The Ambassador inquires whether the better part of wisdom
and of statesmanship is not to bring such effort to a head before
the force of their initial impetus is lost, leaving it impossible to over¬
come an opposition which the Ambassador thinks will mount inevit¬
ably and steadily in Japan. , ,

In submitting the foregoing discussion, the Ambassador does so
in all deference to the much broader field of view of President
Roosevelt and Secretary Hull and in full awareness that the Ambas¬
sador’s approach to the matter is limited to the view-point of the
American Embassy in Japan.

382

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

THE BACKGROUND OF THE FINAL JAPANESE-
AMERICAN CONVERSATIONS

September 30, 1941

At the end of September it seems somewhat ostrich-like to continue
to guard in the strictest secrecy the fact that so-called preliminary
conversations between the United States and Japan have been going
on since early last spring because that fact has now been published
all over the world, and the fact that Prince Konoye has proposed
to meet the President “ somewhere in the Pacific ” but actually on
American soil is generally known in military and political circles in
Japan. Such things cannot be kept secret, at least in Japan, for too
many people have been told about it. But we ourselves have guarded
these facts in the strictest secrecy ; the Department’s telegrams on
that subject have been available only to Dooman and myself, and
my own telegrams are marked for the Secretary and Under Secretary
only.

So far as I can gather, Admiral Nomura has not handled his end
of the line particularly adeptly, for on many occasions he has delayed
in carrying out his instructions, and on at least one occasion he
appears to have thrown a monkey wrench into the works by presenting
on his own initiative a new draft agreement which Washington felt
had set things back rather than moved them forward, and several
weeks were lost before it was understood that this document had not
been drawn up in Tokyo and was not known to Tokyo, and it had
to be withdrawn. Admiral Toyoda wanted to transfer the conversa¬
tions to Tokyo, owing, as he said, to difficulties in language, but
while the Department agreed that parallel talks might be held here,
they quite properly wanted the main conversations to continue in
Washington in view of the President’s direct concern in the matter.
So many of the conversations are now duplicated, in Washington
and Tokyo, and cabled back and forth, thus at least ensuring a check
on accuracy and completeness. The President and Mr. Hull, or
sometimes Welles, Hornbeck, Hamilton, or Ballantine, talk with
Admiral Nomura or his assistant, Wakasugi, in Washington, while
Dooman and I talk with Prince Konoye or Admiral Toyoda or
Terasaki in Tokyo.

The background of these conversations is quite simple when
reduced to simple facts : the Japanese found that Matsuoka (with,
of course, the support of Prince Konoye and most of the military
people) had led them to back the wrong horse in entering the Tripar¬
tite Alliance ; the Nazis* were, just as I have constantly predicted,
overplaying their hand in Japan ; and when the United States and
Great Britain clamped down with their respective economic sanctions
as a result of the Japanese move into southern Indo-China, the
Japanese Government began at last to see the handwriting on the
wall and to realize not only that they had nothing to gain from the

BACKGROUND OF THE FINAL JAPANESE*AMERICAN CONVERSATION'S 383

Tripartite Pact, whether Germany should win or lose, but that their
own economic system could not stand the strain of Anglo-Dutch-
American economic pressure.

The conversations actually began long before all this came to
pass. A group of influential Japanese persuaded most of the then
cabinet that a rapprochement with the United States was highlv
desirable, and although Matsuoka himself opposed the movement
strenuously for a long time, he was finally induced to withdraw his
active opposition, even though he was still telling me that if \vc
should go to war with Germany we would certainly have war with
Japan on the basis of his own interpretation of Article 3 of the pact.
But when Germany attacked Soviet Russia, contrary to all assurances
given to Matsuoka by Berlin, his egregious miscalculation forced
him out of the Government, and the new set-up, with Admiral
Toyoda at the helm of the Foreign Office, soon intensified the drive
for an agreement with the United States.

Prince Konoye bore the heavy responsibility for having brought
the country to its present pass, but since Matsuoka w ? as made the
scapegoat, the Premier stayed on and was evidently far from reluctant
to support and abet the new orientation of policy. Japan was rapidly
drifting towards war with the United States and Great Britain,
and we know that the Emperor had long ago told his ministers that
whatever policy they pursued, they must on no account get Japan
into war with either of those countries. I think there can be no doubt
that the Emperor was never very happy about the Tripartite Pact
and was persuaded to approve it only in the light of misrepresentations
by Matsuoka that Japan was about to be strangled economically
by the democracies and that Germany’s victory over Great Britain
w r as certain, and also in the light of the great preponderance of
public opinion, especially military opinion, at that time in favour
of the totalitarian powers, carefully developed by Government
propaganda.

Anyway, with the new set-up, both Prince Konoye and Admiral
Toyoda started all-out for a quick agreement with the United States,
professing to be willing to meet all our wishes and to bring the pre¬
liminary conversations to a head in formal negotiations to be con¬
ducted by the Prime Minister himself at a proposed meeting with
the President on American soil. So far as I am aware, the first
suggestion for such a meeting was broached by the Japanese in one
of their early drafts submitted in April, it being then proposed that
a conference between American and Japanese delegates should be
held at Honolulu, to be opened by President Roosevelt and Prince
Konoye, as soon as possible after an understanding had been reached
in the preliminary conversations. 1 The plan was, however, communi¬
cated to me as a definite proposal by the Japanese Government by
the Foreign Minister in our long two-and-a-half-hour conversation

1 This proposal was made in a purely unofficial document which was not con¬
firmed by the Japanese Government.

3 8 4 ONE world : two waks

on August 18 and, according to our records, was conveyed to th
President by Admiral Nomura on August 23. For a Prime Minist
of Japan thus to shatter all precedent and tradition in this land^f
subservience to precedent and tradition, and to wish to come hat'
hand, so to speak, to meet the President of the United States ^
American soil, is a gauge of the determination of the Governme t
to undo the vast harm already accomplished in alienating our powerfi!]
and progressively angry country.

Just now, at the end of September, the conversations have been
making little apparent progress and the desired goal is by no means
in sight even though the Japanese Government professes to believe
that it has already met our desiderata all along the line. It has not
done so, simply because the mentality of the Japanese is such that
it cannot bring itself to express the commitments, which it rlaiVn , ; t
is prepared to undertake, in concise, unambiguous language. They
present formulae in phraseology which leave the points at issue
open to the widest interpretation, befogging rather than clarifying
those issues, and then express surprise that we do not accept those
formulae hook, bait, and sinker and proceed to arrange for an
immediate meeting between the responsible heads of the two Govern¬
ments. Prince Konoye’s warship is ready waiting to take him to
Honolulu or Alaska 1 or any other place designated by the President
and his staff of the highest military, naval, and civil officers is chosen
and rarin’ to go.

Meanwhile, I have tried my level best to paint to our Government
an accurate picture of the situation in Japan. A telegram of fifteen
pages, one of the longest that I’ve ever sent, went forward on
September 29. It aimed to give a clear and, I am convinced, an
accurate presentation of the situation in Japan with regard to’the
current conversations, but I made it clear that I was looking at the
subject from the point of view of this Embassy and that my discussion
was sent with all deference to the far wider field of view of the
President and Mr. Hull. They have to reckon with American public
opinion, which seems to be steadily growing in favour of stronger
measures against Japan, and also, of course, they must consider the
world situation as a whole, of which the Far East is only one segment
although closely bound up with everything else.

I have just had occasion to re-read some of my past letters and
telegrams in which I had indicated that the time for conciliation
had then gone by and advocated a strong policy in our dealings
with Japan. I still believe in every word that 1 then wrote when I
pointed out that the present efforts of the Japanese Government to

1 After the outbreak of war a rumour was current in the United States that the
propose meeting between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye was to take
place on a Japanese battleship and that the intention of the Japanese was to kidnap
the President. This theory was, of course, devoid of foundation. Prince Konoyri
p pos was that the meeting should take place on American soil, in Honolulu
or Alaska, or any other place that the President might suggest.

japan’s hopes for peace STILL RISE 385

bring about a new orientation in policy, involving conciliation with
the United States, is due in part to the fact that our Government
had most wisely followed precisely the policy which I have
advocated. Those recommendations of mine wound up with the
statement : 44 If by such action we can bring about the eventual
discrediting of Japan’s leaders, a regeneration of thought may ulti¬
mately take shape in this country, permitting the resumption of
normal relations with us and leading to a readjustment of the whole
Pacific problem.” Matsuoka’s discrediting and downfall were due
primarily to his miscalculations in connection with Germany’s attack
on Soviet Russia, but it was the strong policy of the United States—
that of meeting every Japanese aggressive step with a step of our
own—that led indirectly to his fall. I believe that the opportunity
now presents itself to bring about a regeneration of thought in Japan,
the resumption of normal relations with the United States, and a
readjustment of the whole Pacific problem. This will not be easy
to accomplish—it will depend in large measure on just how near
the end of her rope Japan finds herself economically as a result of
our own economic steps—but it is by no means impossible if we
continue to play our cards with wisdom.

It is not appeasement that I now advocate, but 54 constructive
conciliation.” The w r ord cc constructive ” is important. It connotes
building, and no one is going to be foolish enough to try to build
any structure, if it is to be a permanent structure, on an insecure
foundation. The purpose of the exploratory conversations with Japan
has been to try to find such a foundation, and in laying such a
foundation there can be no compromise with the fundamental
principles on which American policy is based. In the second place,
it is due to our following the strong policy advocated that we have
created a situation where constructive conciliation may be possible.

In facing these difficult and highly complicated problems, let us
not forget that diplomacy is essentially our first line of national
defence, while our Navy is but the second line and our Army, let us
hope, the third line. If the first line, diplomacy, is successful, those
other lines will never have to be brought into action, even although
that first line is immeasurably strengthened by the mere presence of
those other lines, the reserves behind the front. It is the first line,
diplomacy, that must bear the responsibility for avoiding the necessity
of ever using those reserves, and it is in that light that I look on my
duties here in Japan. What the eventual outcome will be, I do not
know ; nobody knows ; but defeatism is not within my philosophy.

JAPAN’S HOPES FOR PEACE STILL RISE
October 1, 1941

A Japanese friend of high standing took me aside and said that
he had learned from his close contacts with the Black Dragon Society
that political circles in Tokyo now know of the Prime Minister’s
13

386 ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

proposal to meet the President of the United States on American
soil and that this proposal is generally approved, even among the
military, in view of the absolute necessity of arriving at a settlement
with the United States because of the economic situation. Delega¬
tions representing important political groups are said to have met
with the Prime Minister and to have given him assurance that his
endeavours to attain an agreement with the United States will be
supported by the Japanese nation as a whole. Although these
groups apparently feel that the American position has already been
met by the Japanese Government, they also declare that, since if
the conference is held it would be unthinkable for Prince Konoye
to return to Japan from a mission which had ended in failure, the
American terms would perforce have to be accepted by the Prime
Minister. Importance is attached by the above-mentioned groups to
the following facts : namely, that close police surveillance is now
being exercised over German elements in Japan ; that on the anni¬
versary of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact the Prime Minister
purposely absented himself from Tokyo ; and that the celebration
of the anniversary was observed to a minimum degree.

ONLY PRINCE KONOYE CAN SAVE THE PEACE
October 3, 1941

Another Japanese tells me that unless our current conversations
should come to a successful head soon, they would undoubtedly be
wrecked by the growing opposition of extremist and pro-Axis elements
in Japan, and that in such a case the Konoye cabinet would probably
fall and no other Japanese statesman than Prince Konoye could
succeed in coming to an understanding with the United States. I
listened politely and then told him that I was in constant touch
with the Japanese Government through the Foreign Minister, who
naturally was keeping me informed of all these considerations, and
that naturally I was constantly conveying to my Government an
accurate picture and appraisal of conditions in Japan.

MUKDEN’S WHITE RUSSIANS MOBILIZE FOR JAPAN
October 6, 1941

On October 3 all Mukden White Russians were summoned to a
mass meeting by the police, where they were told that all members
of their community, male and female, between eighteen and thirty-
five, must at once procure uniforms in a style specified; that very
shortly they would be given physical training and that they must
hold themselves ready for service of a nature to be specified later.
They were then addressed by an officer of the special service section
of the Japanese Army, who told them that within sixty days an emer¬
gency situation would exist in Manchuria and that they must expect 1

’DOOMAN SEES USHIBA AGAIN

3»7

loyally to serve the state. The American Consul at Mukden said
that he would endeavour to offer some interpretative comment on
this extraordinary action within a few days.

DOOMAN SEES USHIBA AGAIN
'October 7, 1941

To-day, our Embassy Counsellor, Eugene Dooman, met again with
Prince Konoye’s private secretary, Tomohiko Ushiba, and submitted
the following report w r hich I quote verbatim :

In reply to a request by telephone yesterday from Mr. Ushiba,

I suggested that he breakfast with me this morning at my house.
Mr. Ushiba arrived promptly at the appointed time. Owing to
the presence of the servant during the meal, that part of our
conversation which needs to be recorded was brief and was sub¬
stantially as follows :

Mr. Ushiba said that the Prime Minister’s position had been
■made difficult by the failure of the preliminary conversations
with the United States to make any progress. Prince Konoye
was at a loss to know what further he could do, the opposition
had now something concrete to use in their attacks on the cabinet,
and the future looked dark. He said that, unless we fully appreci¬
ated the circumstances in which his chief had assumed responsi¬
bility for initiating these conversations, we would not be able to
understand the full implications of the situation. The Army was
anxious to bring the conflict with China to an end but it would
never take the responsibility for initiating a liquidation of the
conflict. When Prince Konoye had taken that responsibility, the
Army gave Mm full and unqualified support, and if his high hopes
are not fulfilled he will have to “ assume responsibility,” and there
would be no one who would have the courage to take the risks
which the Prince has taken or with sufficient prestige and political
position to gain the support of the Army in any undertaking so
vital to the nation as settlement of the China conflict by process of
negotiation.

Mr. Ushiba went on to say that pessimism in Japanese official
quarters had been strengthened by failure on the part of the
American Government to lay any of its cards on the table. It
was true that the American Government had given a full presenta¬
tion of its principles, but it had not precisely specified what it
wanted the Japanese Government to undertake. Although several
months had elapsed since the conversations began, the apparently
great care being taken by the American Government not to give
the Japanese any specifications was extremely discouraging. Since
the receipt of the last American memorandum (October 2) an
increasing number of persons in Japanese Government circles were
of the opinion that Japan had fallen into a trap, the argument

388 one world : two wars

running somewhat as follows—the United States never had any
intention of coming to any agreement with Japan ; it has now got
from Japan an exposition of Japanese policies and objectives •
those policies and objectives are not in line with American policies
and objectives ; and there is therefore justification for refusing
to make an agreement with Japan and for continuing to maintain
an attitude of quasi-hostility against Japan.

I told Mr. Ushiba that there was no basis for any such conjecture.
I recalled that the memorandum of October 2 referred to the
reaction of the American public to reports that conversations
with Japan were taking place and that the statement was made
that, although the American Government was no less eager thq n
the Japanese Government to have brought about settlement of
Pacific problems, public opinion in the United States was such as
to render necessary a meeting of minds on certain fundamental
points prior to the opening of formal negotiations.

Mr. Ushiba asked whether we had received the actual text of
the memorandum. The summary (which I had allowed him to
read on October 4) shown to him by me was business-like and
objective in tone, but the actual memorandum was, he said
“ extremely disagreeable.” It was argumentative and preceptive”
it was quite uncompromising, and it contained no suggestion or
indication calculated to be helpful to the Japanese Government
towards meeting the desires of the American Government. Citing
the reference to attitudes towards the European war, he put the
rhetorical question, Why was there not provided some indication
of the kind of undertaking the Japanese Government was expected
to give ?

In conclusion, Mr. Ushiba expressed the thought that the only
thing left for the Japanese Government was to ask the American
Government to give specifications with regard to the character 0
the undertakings which Japan was desired to give, and that if a
clear-cut reply was not forthcoming to bring the conversations
to an end. 1

Meanwhile, I had called upon the Foreign Minister at his request
this morning. He began by informing me that the text of the memo¬
randum handed to the Japanese Ambassador on October 2 by the
Secretary of State had been received and was being carefully studied.
In reply to the Minister’s question whether I would any com¬
ments on the memorandum, I said that until I had had an opportunity
to study the full test, the Embassy having received a resume only,

I would prefer to make no observations.

Admiral Toyoda then told me that he was informed of my private

1 For a dear conception of the position of the Government of the United States
m die situation dealt with in the diary from the Tokyo angle, it is important to
study the memorandum of May 19, 194a, prepared in the Department of State
and published m Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan : 1931-194T,'page 325.

DOOMAN' SEES USHIBA AGAIN'

3°M

meeting with the Prime Minister on September 6 and was aware
that I had communicated to President Roosevelt through the Secre¬
tary of State, as a “ personal and private message,” the substance of
Prince Konoye’s statements to me at that meeting. The Foreign
Minister said he wanted me clearly to understand that he harboured
no objection to my contact with Prince Konoye ; rather he was
desirous that by such meetings between the Prime Minister and
myself a helpful exchange of views might be effected. Admiral
Toyoda stated that the private records of the Prime Minister with
regard to the September 6 meeting revealed that, although Prince
Konoye had “ in principle ” accepted the four points which the
Secretary of State had continuously stressed, the Prime Minister
had indicated that some adjustment would be required in the matter
of applying the four points to actual conditions. However, a state¬
ment that the Prime Minister “ fully subscribed ” to the four points
was contained in the memorandum given to the Japanese Ambassador
on October 2. Admir al Nomura had, therefore, in view of this
disparity in the records, been instructed to inform the Secretary of
State that the phrase “in principle” should replace the words
“ fully subscribed ” in attributing to the Prime Minister the state¬
ment, which had been made privately.

The Foreign Minister declared that the statements made to me
by the Prime Minister on September 6 were of a purely private and
informal nature and were intended merely to acquaint me with the
personal views of an individual who held an important position in
the of the decisions and policies of the Government of

Japan. The thought of authorizing me to communicate the sub¬
stance of his observations as a personal message to the President had
only occurred to Prince Konoye during the course of our meeting.
Accordingly there had been no expectation, said Admiral Toyoda,
that there would be incorporated into a public document, which
had to be circulated among various Japanese Government officials
who had no knowledge of my meeting with Prince Konoye, any
statement ™arlp to me by the Prime Minister under these circum¬
stances. Thus, since an attribution of views to the Prime Minister
had appeared in an official document of the United States Govern¬
ment, it had been deemed necessary, in view of the absence of previous
comparison between the Foreign Minister and myself of notes relating
to what might have been stated by Prince Konoye at the time of
his meeting with me on Septmber 6, to clarify the Japanese record
of the Prime Minister’s statement. (There is no doubt whatsoever
that the observations of the Prime Minister, which were made in
Japanese and translated by Dooman to me, were correctly mid
accurately set forth in my telegram reporting my meeting with
Prince Konoye. The Prime Minister doubtless is referring to his
remark made subsequently that “ he is convinced that divergences
of view can be satisfactorily met ” and that he “ realizes that certain
points may require elucidation and precision.”

ONE WORLD I TWO WARS

390

Admiral Toyoda stated at this point that he hoped to be able to
comment following the completion of his examination of the Secretary’s
memorandum of October 2, and in the meantime he felt that it would
be helpful if discussion of items arising from what he termed <4 tech¬
nical procedure 55 could be avoided. He had in mind such differences
of understanding as that relating to Prince Konoye’s statement
of September 6, and to certain material delivered to the Department
by the Japanese Ambassador which either had no official standing
or was incomplete as in the case of the Ambassador’s draft statement
of September 4. Admiral Toyoda believed that any efforts to clear
up details of this character arising out of questions of technical pro¬
cedure would only tend to complicate the discussions, but once some
real progress had been made he would be prepared to take up such
questions.

The Foreign Minister said that in so far as the Secretary’s memo¬
randum of October 2 was concerned, he would like to make one
brief co mm ent, namely, that it was his impression that the Govern¬
ment of the United States wished the Japanese Government to revert
at once and unqualifiedly to the status quo which prevailed four years
ago. Since that time Japan had been involved in warfare on a large
scale demanding hardships and sacrifices of the people of Japan,
who had been led to support such trials as a patriotic duty. The
Japanese Government was willing and prepared to return to the
situation prevailing four years ago but it was essential that the
Government of the United States should understand that to undo
virtually at a moment’s notice the work of the past four years is an
undertaking of tremendous scope and one entailing basic adjustments.

Admiral Toyoda then inquired whether unofficially and privately
I felt able to offer an opinion on the position of the United States
Government as outlined in the Secretary’s memorandum of October 2.
In reply I told him that it was the desire of the United States
Government to establish conditions in the Far East on a sure and
enduring foundation and that no lasting arrangements could be
made except on such a basis. I told him that my personal reaction
to the Secretary’s memorandum of October 2 was that the American
Government was endeavouring to assure itself that Japan would
genuinely and fully observe those principles without which no sure
basis for a lasting peace in the Pacific area could be achieved.

October 8, 1941

By a special dispensation from the Foreign Office I was able to-day
for the first time since the freezing order to deposit a salary cheque
in the National City Bank and to draw cash to pay some of our bills
and household accounts, including the Mampei Hotel bill in Karui-
zawa. But the staff cannot yet get money. We are, however, nearing
an agreement. The British had this whole thing settled by mutual
agreement within a few days of the freezing order, but with us there
have been a succession of delays.

FROZEN CREDFFS BRING JAPAN Cl OF.E TO BANKRUPTCY 301

Radio news from London to-night reports a story* in the London
Daily Mail that at a dinner last night I had expressed the belief that
an agreement would be reached between the United States and
Japan. In the course of an informal and off-the-record talk to the
annual meeting of the American Association, composed exclusively
of American citizens, to which I requested that*no publicity be
given, I repeated what Secretary Hull had said in press conference
on September 13 with regard to the exploratory talks, and added:
64 We would like to see a happy adjustment of relations, severely
strained during these past years, but such an adjustment depends
on the settling of many issues, and those issues in turn depend on
many factors which greatly complicate our efforts and subject our
exertions to great 'difficulties. I cannot tell you what the eventual
outcome will be ; I do not know ; nobody knows. 95

Later in the talk I said : 64 I have never believed that our two
countries would come to a break ; I do not think so now. Let us have
the faith that can move mountains and perhaps we shall be successful
in moving those veritable mountains. I think we shall in the end
succeed. 55

The talk dealt in detail with Japan’s policy and actions during
the past several years which have brought our relations to their
present pass. Reference was also made to the view of the American
Government that the foundation for any international building
must rest on certain basic principles in international dealing and that
with those principles there can be no compromise.

FROZEN CREDITS BRING JAPAN CLOSE TO
BANKRUPTCY

October 9, ,1941

According to information received by a member of my staff from
what is regarded as a very reliable source, the amount of foreign
exchange available to the Japanese Government now is approximately
20,000 reichsmarks, and under the circumstances the Japanese
Government will be unable to avoid defaulting on contracts calling for
foreign exchange on maturity. The freezing regulations which were
put into effect by the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands
East Indies have completely cut off any exchange transactions in the
currencies of those countries, and in addition have greatly reduced
transactions in the currencies of South American countries. Ac¬
cording to this informant, his own contracts involve foreign exchange
totalling approximately five million Swedish kronen, and during
recent months Japanese purchases of Swedish goods have been
primarily financed through Berlin, presumably through German
advanced credits.

The Japanese have been informed recently by the Germans that
these credits are now frozen and are to be used only to finance the
purchase of German goods. According to our informant it is possible

392 ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

that this action by the Germans was taken in anticipation of Japan’s
withdrawal from the Axis. According to another source it is believed
that since Sweden is heavily indebted to Germany for armaments,
the Germans are now demanding in return from Sweden goods
instead of Swedish kronen. Reports are current here that Japan is
now eighty million marks in debt to Germany.

In actual fact Japan is now in virtually the same embarrassing
position from the point of view of international finance as are
designated foreigners in this country.

ADMIRAL TOYODA AGAIN TRIES TO SPEED
THE ROOSEVELT-KONOYE MEETING

October io, 1941

The Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to call this afternoon.

He began by saying that although he had given careful study to
the Secretary’s memorandum of October 2 he had encountered some
difficulty in seizing the point of the memorandum. He had, how¬
ever, come to the conclusion that the three questions concerning which
the American and Japanese Governments held divergent views were as
follows : (1) the maintenance of Japanese armed forces in China,
(2) the respective attitude of the United States and Japan in regard
to the war in Europe, and (3) equal opportunity in China. The
Minister added that on October 3 he had instructed the Japanese
Ambassador in Washington to ask the Secretary whether the United
States Government would set forth in precise terms the obligations
which the United States Government wished the Japanese Govern¬
ment to undertake with reference to the three questions mentioned
above. Having heard nothing from the Japanese Ambassador, he
had again on October 6 instructed Admiral Nomura to approach
the Secretary in the above sense. On October 9 the Japanese Am¬
bassador had telegraphed the Foreign Minister that he had seen the
Secretary on that date but that the Ambassador was unable to provide
the information which had been requested by the Foreign Minister.
Admiral Toyoda added that a week of very valuable time had been
wasted in an endeavour to elicit through the Japanese Ambassador
information which, had it been received, would have measurably
accelerated the present conversations. The Foreign Minister had
to-day sent further instructions to Admiral Nomura to continue his
efforts to obtain the desired information, but at the same time, in
order to prevent further delay, he was requesting that I ask my
Government to provide the desired information in reply to the
following statement:

The Government of Japan has submitted to the Government
of the United^States, with reference to certain questions, proposals
which are apparently not satisfactory to the Government of the
United States. Will the American Government now set forth to

ADMIRAL TOYODA TRIES TO SPEED ROOSEVELT-KONOYE MEETING 393

the Japanese Government for its consideration the undertakings
to be assumed by the Japanese Government which would be satis¬
factory to the American Government . J

At this point in the conversation I took occasion to reply to the
criticism in the Japanese press concerning the absence of progress in
the present conversations, by stressing to Admiral Toyoda that the
American Government in the determination and execution of its
policy continuously considers and gives due worth to the develop¬
ment and state of American public opinion. Admiral Toyoda re¬
marked that public opinion even in Japan could not be disregarded
but that it would be a comparatively easy matter to control Japanese
public opinion provided, as a result of the suggested meeting between
Prince Konoye and the President, some agreement were arrived at.
The Minister gave me his assurances that the Japanese Government
would find it possible to make commitments of a far-reaching char¬
acter at such a meeting, but that under present conditions the full
extent of the undertakings which the Japanese Government was
willing to assume could not be set forth prior to the meeting. He
reiterated his concern lest the Government be unable to control
extremist groups in Japan if matters remain in their present un¬
determined conditions.

The Minister having at the beginning of the conversation expressed
his appreciation of the message which I had sent him yesterday
concerning the reported plan to send additional Japanese forces
into French Indo-China, I reverted to this point and strongly em¬
phasized to him that the dispatch of Japanese reinforcements to Indo-
China at this juncture while the conversations were in progress
between our two Governments would create a very delicate situation,
and in my opinion could not but seriously and adversely affect these
conversations. I told the Foreign Minister that the arrival of ad¬
ditional Japanese forces in Indo-China at this time, in the light of
recent activities of the Japanese authorities in Indo-China to which
' I had already drawn his attention, such as threats to take over the
telegraph, post, and customs, and the demands for additional air
bases, would inevitably give rise to the most serious suspicions in
regard to Japan’s aims in respect to French Indo-China. The Minister
replied that he was giving most careful study to my private and
informal message on the subject and had already conferred with the
Minister of War, and hoped to be able to give me a reply in a few
days. He added that he had also discussed with the War Minister
the activities of the Japanese authorities in Indo-China to which
I had drawn his attention, and had asked the Minister to take im¬
mediate steps to remedy the situation.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs then told me that since he had
the im prwsion that the Japanese Ambassador in Washington was
apparently very fatigued, serious consideration was being given to
the question of sending to Washington a diplomat of wide experience to

* 3 *

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

394

assist the Ambassador in carrying on .the present conversations.
Admiral Toyoda said he had in mind a high-ranking diplomatic
official with the personal rank of Ambassador, but he had not yet
approached the official in question and was therefore uncertain as to
whether he would agree to undertake to accept the mission. It
would be of great assistance to the Minister to ascertain whether the
Government of the United States, in the event that it was decided
to send the official in question to Washington, would be prepared
to make available a reservation for him on the aeroplane from Manila
to San Francisco. Admiral Toyoda said that the official in question
would not be accredited to the Government of the United States
but would be temporarily and unofficially attached to the Japanese
Embassy in Washington. I told the Foreign Minister that I would
transmit his inquiry to my Government.

In concluding the conversation, the Minister several times stressed
to me, in view of the importance of the time factor, the necessity of
expediting the progress of the conversations.

THE KONOYE CABINET FALLS
October i6, 1941

The Konoye cabinet fell at five o’clock this afternoon, the official
announcement having been given out at 8.15. We were in my study,
a dozen or more men, after a farewell dinner for Jack Curtis, when
the Brazilian Ambassador called up to tell me the news which he
had just heard. Everyone, including myself, was surprised, for
although I knew that the failure of progress in the American-Japanese
conversations would almost certainly bring about Konoye’s fall
sooner or later, I had not looked for it so soon.

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS WITH PRINCE KONOYE
October 17, 1941

Prince Konoye this morning sent me the following personal letter :

16th October, 1941

My Dear Ambassador, —It is with great regret and disappoint¬
ment that my colleagues and I have had to resign owing to the
internal political situation, which I may be able to explain to you
sometime in the future.

I feel certain, however, that the cabinet which is to succeed
mine will exert its utmost in continuing to a successful conclusion
the conversations which we have been carrying on up till to-day.
It is my earnest hope, therefore, that you and your Government
will not be too disappointed or discouraged either by the change
of cabinet or by the mere appearance or impression of the new
cabinet. I assure, you that I will do all in my power in assisting

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS WITH PRINCE KONOYE

395

the new cabinet to attain the high purpose which mine has en¬
deavoured to accomplish so hard without success.

May I take this opportunity to express my Lean-felt gratitude
for your most friendly co-operation which I have been fortunate
to enjoy, and also to convey to you my sincere wish that you will
give the same privilege to whoever succeeds me.

With kindest personal regards, I am,—Sincerely yours,

F. Konoye

I replied :

October 17, 1941

My Dear Prime Minister, —Your friendly letter of October 16
is very deeply appreciated, and I hasten to thank you heartily for
your generous expressions and for the encouragement which you
have given me in your confidence that the coming cabinet will
make every effort to continue to a successful conclusion the con¬
versations carried on between our two Governments. It gives me
keen gratification to know that you yourself will assist the new
cabinet in attaining the high purpose for which you and your
colleagues have striven, and I need hardly assure you that your
successor may count fully on my ow r n earnest co-operation in a
continuance of the mutual efforts of our respective Governments to
achieve a successful outcome.

Please permit me to express the hope that you yourself, if you
are about to lay down for a time the cares of your high office, will
now find some degree of welcome relaxation and respite after your
long, arduous, and most distinguished official service to your
country.

With expressions of my highest respect and cordial personal
regards, I am, my dear Prince Konoye,—Sincerely yours,

Joseph C. Grew

At the same time Prince Konoye’s private secretary, Ushiba, called
on Dooman and conveyed through him to me from Prince Konoye a
very interesting explanation of die circumstances which had led to
the fall of the cabinet and the successful efforts of the Prime Minister
to ensure the appointment of a successor who would continue the
conversations with the United States. The circumstances were
extraordinarily dramatic and constitute what may in future be
regarded as one of the really big moments in Japanese history. What
all this may lead to is still in the lap of the gods.

We cabled at 10 a.m. that General Umedzu, now Commander of
the Kwantung Army, was a likely candidate for Prime Minister,
but at 5 p.m. we reported the selection of General Tojo, former
Minister of War, who will hold the posts of Prime Minister, Wax
Minister, and Home Minister. Tojo was one of the original five

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

39 6

members of the Konoye cabinet last spring who supported the
opening of conversations with the United States in the face of the
opposition of Matsuoka. This is'important.

We understand that Fritz Wiedemann, former German Consul-
General in San Francisco and a confidant of Hitler, is on his way
to Japan. We later learned that Wiedemann will probably go as
Consul-General in Tientsin, where he will supervise the Orient-
gruppe of the German military espionage network, his own specialties
being sabotage and terrorism, for which he has large secret funds.
It is believed that he will direct from Tientsin the espionage-Gestapo
organization in the Far East, having under his orders Meisinger,
now in Shanghai, and Hueber, now in Bangkok. The main objective
of this Orientgruppe is believed to be India and Burma, and it is
intended to act as the advance guard of a Far Eastern pincer move¬
ment designed to threaten India together with the other pincer
represented by the German advance into western Asia. Hitler is
understood to attach great importance to India as the goal of all the
best conquerors since Alexander the Great.

A TOUCH OF WILD WEST IN THE
AMERICAN EMBASSY

October 19, 1941

I put aside this Sunday for a careful review of all material con¬
cerning the American-Japanese preliminary conversations since they
commenced last spring, making a written r6sum6 of important points.
A graph of the movements in the progress and regress of the con¬
versations would show extraordinary fluctuations. Lately the
movement has been one of regress. I want to have th£ whole story
at my finger-tips in case Togo, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs,
approaches the subject when we meet.

I feel somewhat 65 wild West 55 these days, having carried a gun for
the past month or more, especially since the attack on Prince Konoye
on September 18, when four men armed with daggers and short
swords jumped on the running-board of his car as he was leaving
his private residence and tried to get at him . The doors were
fortunately locked, however, and the assassins were quickly over¬
powered by the plain-clothes men at the residence. During
September 27, the anniversary of the conclusion of the Tripartite
Pact, I expected anything. Gam Forbes was once on the death list
of one of the so-called patriotic societies when some assassinations
were carried out in 1931 or 1932, but he happened to be away from
Tokyo on that occasion, and I know that my own name is included
on some of their present lists. The guard at the entrance to the
Embassy has been materially strengthened, on the initiative of the
police, and a guard-house erected near the entrance to the chancery,
but it would be a very simple thing for a few dagger wielders to

ANALYSIS OF THE TOJO GOVERNMENT 397

climb over some part of our very extensive wall at night and get
into the Embassy by breaking a window. I don’t like heroics but
have no intention of letting a group of those rough-necks carve me
up without a reasonable attempt at repartee.

In one of my conversations with a Japanese official he took my
hand and put it over his heart. I thought he meant to convey the
idea that his heart was in the right place, but it felt like a very hard
heart and I soon grasped the idea that the hardness wasn't his heart
at all but a very business-like gun. Many Japanese are just as much
in danger from the military extremists as are we.

ANALYSIS OF THE TOJO GOVERNMENT
October ao, 1941

Since the American press and radio are almost universally inter¬
preting the present government as a preliminary move leading to an
attack on Russia or to some other positive action which will in¬
evitably bring about hostilities between Japan and the United
States, I am setting forth certain factors, some based on fact and
others on valid assumption, which indicate that the opinion which
appears to have been accepted by the American public in regard
to the meaning of the change of government in Japan may not be
an accurate appraisal of the situation viewed in perspective.

We are informed by a confidant of Prince Konoye that the latter
decided to resign, and in so doing to ensure that the Prime Minister
who succeeded him would be an official who would attempt to pursue
the policy inaugurated by the previous government of reconstructing
relations with the United States and bringing about a settlement
of the China affair.

We believed that should our exploratory conversations break down
or the expected formal negotiations fail, Prince Konoye would be
forced to retire and his government be succeeded, by a military dic¬
tatorship and not by a civilian government. In view of the fact that
the conversations have not been broken off, the conditions to which
the above prognostication was related have not obtained. We think
that a reasonable motive for the resignation of the previous govern¬
ment was Prince Konoye’s belief that the conversations with the
United States would make more rapid progress if our Government
were dealing with a Prime Minister whose power was based on a
commanding position in and on support of the Army, which is the
controlling force in matters affecting policy, rather than with a
go-between. Despite the fact that, as anticipated, the Konoye Govern¬
ment was succeeded not by a civilian but by a mil i t ary man, indica¬
tions of a willingness on the part of the Tojo Government to proceed
with the conversations in the light of the circumstances outlined in
the preceding paragraph would imply that it is premature to stig¬
matize the Tojo Government as a military dictatorship committed.

398 ONE WORLD : tWO WAkS

to the furtherance of policies which might be expected to bring about
armed conflict with the United States.

It is important to note that General Tojo, as distinguished from
previous Japanese military Prime Ministers, is not a retired officer
but is a full general in the active service. Thus the Japanese Army
for the first time in recent years has openly assumed responsibility
for the policies and conduct of government in Japan, which it had
previously steadfasdy declined to accept. It would be logical, there¬
fore, to expect that General Tojo, in retaining his active rank in the
Army, will as a result be in a position to exercise a larger degree of
control over Army extremist groups.

I am informed by a member of my staff who was acquainted in
Moscow with Mr. Togo, the new Foreign Minister, and who has on
several occasions in recent months met Mr. Togo’s wife and daughter
here in Tokyo, that the new Foreign Minister while Ambassador to
Moscow was held in high regard by the Soviet Government as the
most acceptable representative from Japan who had been sent to
Moscow in recent years. It was reliably reported that the Soviet
Government was frankly disappointed over his recall in the autumn
of 1940 in view of Mr. Togo’s successful conduct of the conversations
for the conclusion of a political treaty which had been proceeding
in Moscow between Japan and the Soviet Union, and the Soviet
Government extended to him unusual courtesies on the occasion of
his departure from Moscow. Mr. Togo, it will also be remem¬
bered, was among those Japanese diplomats removed from active
office by Matsuoka last year for the reason, it is believed, that
he was not in favour of the extreme foreign policy pursued by
Matsuoka.

The official Japanese agency Domei has just released a statement
to the effect that the Tojo Government will inaugurate no new
policies since the Government of Prince Konoye has already laid
down the basic national policy of Japan.

NOTE ON VICE-MINISTER NISHI
October 22, 1941

The press announced to-day the appointment as Vice-Minister
for Foreign Affairs of Haruhiko Nishi, who for several years has
specialized in Soviet-Japanese relations, having been twice assigned
to Moscow. He was there with Togo, who no doubt selected him
owing to their personal relations, so we now have in the two key
positions in the Foreign Office men who have had first-hand experience
in Soviet affairs and are regarded as friendly to the Soviet Union.
Nishi, whom I know and like, is regarded as an honest and trust¬
worthy man with no great intellectual attainments or outstanding
ability. He succeeds Amau.

HOW THE EMPEROR INTERVENED

399

“ COMPROMISE, COMPROMISE, COMPROMISE ;;
October 24, 1941

A Japanese friend made some suggestions about the American-
Japanese conversations. He wants us to make a joint declaration
with Japan stating that we have no intention of “ infiltrating v
into Indo-China, and, as usual, he said that compromise would be
necessary if we were to make progress. I was pretty severe in reply¬
ing, pointing out that there was no room for compromise and explain¬
ing die absurdity of issuing such a joint declaration as he suggested.

I gave him a copy of my long letter to-of September 1, to read,

mark, learn, and inwardly digest. My friend, much as I like him,
is difficult to debate with, for he keeps coining back to his original
point no matter what one says—compromise, compromise, com¬
promise.

HOW THE EMPEROR INTERVENED
October 25, 1941

A reliable Japanese informant tells me that just prior to the fall
of the Konoye cabinet a conference of the leading members of the
Privy Council and of the Japanese armed forces had been sum¬
moned by the Emperor, who inquired if they were prepared to
pursue a policy which would guarantee that there would be no war
with the United States. The representatives of the Army and Navy
who attended this conference did not reply to the Emperor’s question,
whereupon the latter, with a reference to the progressive policy
pursued by the Emperor Meiji, his grandfather, in an unprecedented
action ordered the armed forces to obey his wishes. The Emperor's
definite stand necessitated the selection of a Prime Minister who would
be in a position effectively to control the Army, hence the appoint¬
ment of General Tojo, who, while remaining in the Army active list,
is committed to a policy of attempting to conclude successfully the
current Japanese-American conversations.

The informant emphasized to me that the recent anti-American
tone of the Japanese press and the extreme views expressed by pro-
Axis and certain other elements gave no real indication of the desire
of Japanese of all classes and in particular of the present political
leaders that in some way or other an adjustment of relations with
the United States must be brought about. He added in this connec¬
tion that Mr. Togo, the new Foreign Minister, had accepted his
appointment with the specific aim of endeavouring to pursue the
current conversations to a successful end and it had been understood
that should he fail in this he would resign his post.

The belief is current among Japanese leaders that the principal
difficulty in the way of an understanding with the United States is
the question of the removal of Japanese armed forces from China

400 ONE WORLD *. TWO WARS

and Indo-China, but these same leaders are confident that, provided
Japan is not placed in an impossible position by the insistence on
the part of the United States that all Japanese troops in these areas
be withdrawn at once, such a removal can and will be successfully
effected.

The informant, who is in contact with the highest circles, went
on to say that for the first time in ten years the situation at present
and the existing political set-up in Japan offer a possibility of a
reorientation of Japanese policy and action.

WORDSWORTH’S ENGLAND—AND CHURCHILL’S
October 27, 1941

One hundred and thirty-five years ago, when England, after the
fall of Prussia, stood alone against Europe dominated by Napoleon,
Wordsworth wrote :

Another year ! Another deadly blow !

Another mighty Empire overthrown!

And we are left , or shall be left , alone ;

The last that dare to struggle with the Foe ,

’ Tis well! From this day forward we shall know

That in ourselves our safety must be sought;

That by our own right hands it must be wrought;

That we must stand unpropped , or be laid low .

According to Punchy the same mood was expressed in 1940 in
unpoetic language by two salts, looking over the Channel to the still¬
smoking northern French ports one of whom says : “ Well, now we’re
alone.” cc Yes,” replies the other, “ the whole bloody 400,000,000
of us.”

GERMAN REACTIONS TO THE TOJO CABINET
October 29, 1941

The following items gathered by members of another country’s
mission to Tokyo are believed to be a fairly accurate account
of the reactions of the German community here to the present
situation.

The Germans are not enthusiastic about the new cabinet, which
disappointed the hopes of a definitely interventionist Government
which they had formed on the resignation of Prince Konoye. Their
feelings were cooled still further by the arrest of two Germans im¬
mediately the new cabinet had taken office.

In the event of war between the U.S. and Germany, the local
Germans from the Ambassador down are uncertain of Japan’s
reactions. They regard the Japanese as untrustworthy opportunists.

The Germans are at present working primarily for a Japanese
attack on the Soviet. Prominent members of the German business

FOREIGN MINISTER TOGO RECEIVES 401

community here were recently summoned to the German Embassy
and were told that their salaries would continue in spite of the in¬
activity of their businesses* on the understanding that they regard
themselves as agents of the German Government. Their particular
instructions were to start a whispering campaign among the Japanese
directed both against the American-Japanese discussions and against
Russia on the lines that now is Japan’s best opportunity to attack
her. This line is believed to reflect (a) the anxiety of the German
High Command to finish with Russia quickly* particularly in view
of the difficulties of providing clothing for the German Army through¬
out the winter campaign, and ( b ) Hitler’s personal wish to divert
Japan’s attention from the Netherlands East Indies, which he wants
for himself (though the latter factor, without the former, might well
be offset by Germany’s wish to encourage Japan’s southward expansion
in order to embroil her with the democracies).

At the same time wax-like preparations continue among the German
community. Apart from certain shipping activities the German
Military Attache has organized premilitary training courses at the
Deutsches Haus in Tokyo, where all Germans of military age must
attend once a week. The rumour is that the Germans intend to form
a Freikorps to fight with the Japanese Army in the event of Japan
entering the war.

Although still generally confident in victory, the local Germans
are anxious over certain aspects of the present situation, e.g . the
losses in Russia, shortage of food in Germany, the possibility of
American intervention, and especially the murders and executions
in France, which have left on them a profound impression that all is
not well in the New Europe.

A source which has been reliable in the past has given us the follow¬
ing information :

Elaborate plans for a joint Army and Navy occupation of
Thailand are complete. These plans are modelled on the German
attack on Belgium and Holland. They call for a simultaneous
occupation of all air-fields, ports, and strategic centres by air¬
borne troops and parachutists. Two hundred and fifty transport
planes are assembled in Taiwan and Hainan or are readily available
to begin this operation when ordered.

FOREIGN MINISTER TOGO RECEIVES

October 30, 1941 . , , , , .

The new Foreign Minister, Togo, received the ambassadors individu¬
ally to-day at 3 p.m., the diplomatic ministers to be received to¬
morrow. At the Minister’s official residence they separated the sheep
from the goats in different waiting-rooms, the British allies in one,
the German allies in another, and the neutrals in a third. I,
although Dean and the first to come, was shown into a tiny ante-

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

402

room, the big salon where we usually gather no doubt being reserved
for the Axis. I saw Arsene-Henry, directly after me in seniority, drive
up but he did not come into my room ; I wonder just what category
they put him in. Craigie didn’t come because he had asked to see
the Minister urgently yesterday, but I suppose we would have been
classed together.

On entering the Minister’s room I encountered the usual solid
array of press cameras and movies and we posed for several minutes,
but then they were shooed out because they are only allowed to
take the Dean, and as usual the Advertiser next morning carried a
big picture of us on its front page, which could not have been wholly
gratifying to their dear ally, General Ott.

What a difference between Admiral Toyoda and Togo, the former
cheery and very friendly and always with a little exchange of pleas¬
antries before getting down to business, the latter grim, unsmiling,
and ultra-reserved. He speaks English well enough but talks so low
that few can understand him and I not at all, so I’m glad that he
is using an interpreter. Kase sits beside me on the sofa and
speaks very distinctly and in perfect English, so nothing will be lost.
But I shall miss my really pleasant association with Admiral
Toyoda, regardless of our negative results; he was a type that
one enjoyed doing business with, however disagreeable that business
might be.

During the course of our conference, Mr. Togo remarked that the
relations between the United States and Japan, which had not been
very good when he formerly was in the Foreign Office several years
ago, had since then progressively worsened to the present situation,
which, if this deterioration were not terminated, was fraught with
the gravest dangers. Referring to the informal conversations which
had been carried on since last spring between the Japanese and the
American Governments, the Minister declared his desire that the
conversations be continued and without delay be successfully brought
to a conclusion. He requested my co-operation in accomplishing
this objective.

Mr. Togo said that in order to make! progress, the United States
should face certain realities and facts. He thereupon cited the
stationing in China of Japanese armed forces. Other nations, he
said, at present maintained troops in certain areas of China ; for
instance, the Soviet soldiery stationed in Outer "Mongolia. The
Minister made no further allusion to the preliminary conversations
but stated that he hoped to have subsequent talks with me in due
time.

After assuring the Minister of my desire to co-operate with him,
I described the wish of our Secretary of State that the conversations
should be carried on in Washington because of the President’s close
and active interest in them. However, as parallel talks in Tokyo
were often helpful in that they afforded an opportunity for rendering
more complete and more precise the reported views of the United

the ambassador in japan reports to the secretary of state 403

States Government, I had on certain occasions in the past conveved
to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the substance of the conversations
in Washington which were reported me directly from the Secretary
of State. I then gave Mr. Togo a paraphrase of the Department's
telegram ^ reporting the Under Secretary’s conversation with Mr.
Wakasugi on October 24.

I told Mr. Togo that, as it was of course impossible for the Foreign
Minister personally to read all the correspondence directed by the
American Embassy to the Foreign Office, I had followed the
practice of bringing separate letters of special importance to the
direct attention of Admiral Toyoda, with the latter’s approval. Mr.
Togo approved of my continuing the same practice with him, and
the interview ended.

As I was leaving, Mr. Kase told me that he had been designated
Chief of the First Section of the American Bureau of the Ministry
of Foreign AJFairs and that he would be happy to serve as a direct
avenue of communication between the Foreign Minister and myself
whenever I might desire. In thanking Mr. Kase I recalled our former
pleasant association and told him I was glad once again to find him
in the role of interpreter during my conversations with the Foreign
Minister.

THE AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN REPORTS TO THE
SECRETARY OF STATE

(Substance)

(Paraphrase of original text prepared by the Department of State)

Tokyo, November 3, 1941

The Ambassador reports for Secretary Hull and Under Secretary"
Welles as follows :

He cites a leading article from the Tokyo Nichi Nichi of November 1
(reported in telegram No. 1729 of that date), adding that a banner
headline declaring “Empire Approaches Its Greatest Crisis” intro¬
duced a dispatch from New York with a summary of a statement
the Japanese Embassy reportedly gave to the New York Times regard¬
ing the need of ending the United States-Japanese economic war.
Both the article and the Nichi Nichi editorial are believed to be close
reflections of Japanese sentiments at present.

The Ambassador refers to his various telegraphic reports during
several months past analysing the factors affecting policy in Japan,
and says he has nothing to add thereto nor any substantial revision
to make thereof. In his opinion, a conclusive estimate may be had
of Japan’s position through the application to the existing situation
and the immediate future of the following points :

(a) It is not possible for Japan to dissociate either Japan or the
conflict with China; from the war. in Europe, and its fluctuations.

404 ONE WORLD I. TWO WARS'

(6) In Japan political thought ranges from mediaeval to liberal
ideas and public opinion is thus a variable quantity. The impact of
events and conditions beyond Japan may determine at any given
time which school of thought shall predominate. (In the democracies,
on the other hand, owing to a homogeneous body of principles
which influence and direct foreign policy and because methods instead
of principles are more likely to cause differences of opinion, public
opinion is formed differently.) For example, in Japan the pro-Axis
elements gained power following last year’s German victories in
Western Europe; then Japanese doubt of ultimate German victory
was created by Germany’s failure to invade the British Isles, this
factor helping to reinforce the moderate elements ; and finally,
Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union upset the expectation of
continued Russo-German peace and made the Japanese realize that
those who took Japan into the Tripartite Alliance had misled
Japan.

(c) An attempt to correct the error of 1940 may be found in the
efforts to adjust Japanese relations with the United States and thereby
to lead the way to conclusion of peace with China, made by Prince
Konoye and promised by the Tojo cabinet. If this attempt fails,
and if success continues to favour German arms, a final, closer Axis
alignment may be expected.

( d ) The Embassy in Japan has never been convinced by the theory
that Japan’s collapse as a militaristic power would shortly result from

v the depletion and the eventual exhaustion of Japan’s financial and
economic resources, as propounded by many leading American
economists. Such forecasts were unconsciously based upon the
assumption that a dominant consideration would be Japan’s retention
of the capitalistic system. The outcome they predicted has not
transpired, although it is true that the greater part of Japan’s com¬
merce has been lost, Japanese industrial production has been drastic¬
ally curtailed, and Japan’s national resources have been depleted.
Instead, there has been a drastic prosecution of the process to inte¬
grate Japan’s national economy, lacking which there might well
have occurred the predicted collapse of Japan. What has happened
to date therefore does not support the view that continuation of trade
embargoes and imposition of a blockade (proposed by some) can best
avert war in the Far East.

The Ambassador mentions his telegram No. 827, September 12,
1940 (which reported the “ golden opportunity ” seen by Japanese
Army circles for expansion as a consequence of German triumphs in
Europe). He sent this telegram under circumstances and at a time
when it appeared unwise and futile for the United States to adopt
conciliatory measures. The strong policy recommended in the
telegram was subsequently adopted by the United States. This
policy, together with the impact of world political events upon
Japan, brought the Japanese Government to the point of seeking
conciliation with the United States. If these efforts fail, the Ambas-

THE AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN REPORTS TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE 405

sador foresees a probable swing of the pendulum in Japan once- more
back to the former Japanese position or even farther. This vjspuld
lead to what he has described as an all-out, do-or-die attempt,
actually risking national hara-kiri to make Japan impervious tb*
economic embargoes abroad rather than to yield to foreign pressure.
It is realized by observers who feel Japanese national temper and
psychology from day to day that, beyond peradventure, this con¬
tingency not only is possible but is probable.

If the fibre and temper of the Japanese people are kept in mind,
the view that war probably would be averted, though there might
be some risk of war, by progressively imposing drastic economic
measures is an uncertain and dangerous hypothesis upon which to
base considered United States policy and measures. War would not
be averted by such a course if it is taken, in the opinion of the Embassy.
However, each view is only opinion, and, accordingly, to postulate
the correctness of either one and to erect a definitive policy thereon
would, in the belief of the Embassy, be contrary to American national
interests. It would mean putting the cart before the horse. The
primary point to be decided apparently involves the question whether
war with Japan is justified by American national objectives, policies,
and needs in the case of failure of the first line of national defence,
namely, diplomacy, since it would be possible only on the basis of
such a decision for the Roosevelt administration to follow a course
which would be divested as much as possible of elements of uncer¬
tainty, speculation, and opinion. The Ambassador does not doubt
that such a decision, irrevocable as it might well prove to be, already
has been debated Mly and adopted, because the sands are running
fast.

The Ambassador* emphasizes that, in the above discussion of this
grave, momentous subject, he is out of touch with the intentions
and thoughts of the administration thereon, and he does not at all
mean to imply that Washington is pursuing an undeliberated policy.
Nor does he intend to advocate for a single moment any “ appease¬
ment ” of Japan by the United States or recession in the slightest
degree by the United States Government from the fundamental
principles laid down as a basis for the conduct and adjustment of
international relations, American relations with Japan included.
There should be no compromise with principles, though methods
may be flexible. The Ambassador’s purpose is only to ensure against
the United States becoming involved in war with Japan because of
any possible misconception of Japan’s capacity to rush headlong into
a suicidal struggle with the United States. While national sanity
dictates against such action, Japanese sanity cannot be measured by
American standards of logic.

The Ambassador sees no need for much anxiety respecting the
bellicose tone and substance at present of the Japanese press (which
in the past several years has attacked the United States intensely
in recurrent waves), but he points out the short-sightedness of under-

406 one world : two wars

estimating Japan’s obvious preparations to implement an alternative
programme in the event the peace programme fails. He adds that
similarly it would be short-sighted for American policy to be based
upon the belief that Japanese preparations are no more than sabre
rattling, merely intended to give moral support to the high pressure
diplomacy of Japan. Action by Japan which might render unavoid¬
able an armed conflict with the United States may come with
dangerous and dramatic suddenness.

NATIONAL HARA-KIRI NOT ONLY POSSIBLE
BUT PROBABLE

November 4, 1941

My thoughts with regard to the general situation in Japan, and
as bearing upon American-Japanese relations, were expressed in my
telegram of November 3. If war should occur, I hope that history
will not overlook that telegram and especially the statement that if
our peace efforts should fail, Japan may go all-out in a do-or-die
effort to render herself invulnerable to foreign economic pressure,
even to the extent of committing national hara-kiri, and that those
of us who are in direct touch with the atmosphere from day to day
realize that this is not only possible but probable; that Japan’s
standards of logic or reason cannot be gauged by any Western
measuring rod ; that it would be hazardous to base our national
policy on the belief, held in certain quarters, that our economic
pressure will not drive Japan to war ; that we would be lacking in
perspicacity if we were to disregard or underestimate Japan’s # pre¬
parations for war in case its alternative programme for peace should
fail or if we were to regard these preparations merely as bluff de¬
signed to reinforce Japan’s diplomacy ; and that war between Japan
and the United States may come with dangerous and dramatic suddenness .
That important telegram is on the record for all time.

KURUSU PREPARES TO LEAVE FOR WASHINGTON
November 4, 1941

Kase came at 12.10 with a message from the ^Foreign Minister
that he wanted to send Kurusu to Washington to help Admiral
Nomura with the conversations but that the American clipper was
scheduled to leave Hong Kong to-morrow morning and that unless
he could go on that plane it would be too late to wait a fortnight
for the next one because, “ for technical reasons,” he must be in
Washington by the 13th. Before the Diet meeting on the 15th, of
course. If the clipper could not be held up for two days to permit
Kurusu to fly to Hong Kong, the only alternative would be for
Kurusu to fly to Saipan and to take a destroyer over to Guam, to
catch the plane there. I knew very well that our Government would
not welcome the latter plan.

THE JAPANESE PRESS THROW'S A MONKEY WRENCH 4O7

Dooman telephoned to Max Hamilton in Washington, and the
latter must have done some pretty snappy work because within a
few hours Hamilton telephoned back that it was all arranged for
the clipper to delay its departure from Hong Kong from the 5th till
the 7th. I immediately called Togo on the telephone and he seemed
very much pleased.

Kurusu came in at 9 p.m. to see me before leaving early to-morrow
morning. He said that he was astonished when Togo broached
the mission to him only yesterday afternoon. Since then he had been
studying the papers relating to the conversations and he realized
that he had a difficult problem. He said that he was going merely
to bring a fresh point of view to the conversations and to leave no
stone unturned to reach an agreement. He gave no impression that
he was taking any specific proposal in his pocket. He wants to take
Yuki of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office as secretary if
an extra seat on the clipper can be found for him.

Kurusu, who used to be Chief of the Commercial Bureau of the
Foreign Office at the time when the long negotiations with the oil
companies were going on, was last Ambassador in Rome and then
in Berlin, and he it was who signed the Tripartite Pact, but I have
no reason to believe that he is any more friendly to the Nazis than
to us. His wife is American and his daughter, Jaye, was a great
friend of Elsie’s. We had a long and very frank talk, and he met my
remarks about our position without heat and with a reasonable and
objective presentation of Japan’s position, going back to the days
of the Shidehara diplomacy and the reasons for its failure and the
fact that it had been interpreted by the Chinese as a display of
weakness.

THE JAPANESE PRESS THROWS A MONKEY WRENCH

November 5, 1941 ^ ... . ,

The Japan Times and Advertiser came out with a nasty editorial
to-day attacking the United States and listing seven points which
the United States, on its own initiative, should adopt as a programme
to make “ restitution ” to Japan, as follows :

1. Stoppage of all military and economic aid to Chungking by all
foreign states. Cessation of propaganda by military missions which
now try to keep Chungking fighting Japan or in a state of civil

disturbance. , ,

2. Leave China completely free to deal with Japan and therefore
end hostilities and establish economic co-operation. America could

advise Chungking to make its peace with Japan.

a. Stop encirclement of Japan by military, naval, and air bases
and by erection of economic barriers. Proceed no further with military
naval movements in the Western Pacific under the pretext of
defence.

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

408

4. Acknowledge Japan’s Co-Prosperity Sphere and leadership of
the Western Pacific, letting Manchuria, China, Indo-China, Thailand,
the Netherlands Indies and other states and protectorates establish
their own political and economic relations with Japan without
interference of any kind.

5. Take the obviously necessary course recognizing Manchukuo if
it desires. A state exists, headed by the Emperor, which nobody will
change. Common political sense, let alone statesmanship, dictates
such diplomatic recognition.

6. Stop immediately and unconditionally the freezing of Japan’s
and China’s assets in America, Britain, the Netherlands Indies, and
wherever that provocative measure has been applied.

7. Restore trade treaties, abolish all restrictions on shipping and
commerce, undo everything wrongfully done in the name of peace
but with the design of war, whether economic or military.

The American correspondents were informed in advance last
night about midnight and they rushed to their offices and, I under¬
stand, cabled the whole editorial textually to the United States,
where it very likely made the front pages of the newspapers. If any¬
thing could render utterly hopeless the prospect of our coming to
an understanding with Japan, this editorial, from a newspaper
known to be the organ of the Japanese Foreign Office, would appear
to do it, and my guess is that the American people will not be
sympathetic to further efforts towards conciliation. This sort of
stuff is as stupid as it is discouraging. It certainly affords no help to
Kurusu if it hasn’t wrecked his mission in advance.

Nothing could better illustrate the childishness of the Japanese :
they want and need an understanding with the United States and
yet, even while efforts are going on to reach such an understanding,
they continue to fill their press with hostile articles which tend to
render an understanding impossible. It is done partly, of course,
for domestic consumption, to show what patriots they are, but it is
also done with the idea of intimidating the United States, especially
the isolationists and pacifists in the United States, with a view to
forcing our Government to come to terms with Japan on Japan’s
terms. Considering that the utterances of our isolationists are splashed
across the front pages of the Japanese press under big -headlines,
it is no wonder that the Japanese people believe that they represent
the majority of American public opinion. As usual Japan follows
her ally, Germany, in totally misjudging foreign psychology, par¬
ticularly Anglo-Saxon psychology.

I have about given up hope of the Washington conversations
making any progress, but if the door can be kept open and a complete
breakdown avoided, it may be that we can tide things over until
the inevitable crack in Germany and the German Army begins,
and then the problem will gradually solve itself. That is about the
best we can hope for now.

THE JAPANESE PRESS THROWS A MONKEY WRENCH 40Q

On October 31 the Japan Times and Advertiser published another
nasty editorial stating as categorical fact that in return for the Lend-
Lease aid to Chungking, the United States had demanded what
amounts to a 46 mortgage 55 on the Chinese Republic ; specifically :
(1) the exclusive rights to maintain and utilize four unnamed naval
bases in China, to be retained in the post-war period, and 'V the
adoption by China of economic measures, such as removal of trade
restrictions, non-discriminatory use of raw materials, et cetera, which
would result in the virtual economic, domination of China by the
United States. The editorial states that these demands 55 which
were presented at pistol point by the Magruder mission have been
accepted in principle by the Chungking Government as a basis for
discussion.

After pointing out that the Chungking Government is not China
and contrasting these alleged “ demands ” on the part of the United
States with the “ co-operative ” and “ reciprocal ” nature of Japan’s
programme in respect to China, the editorial concludes : 44 Now it can
be seen that the Lend-Lease aid to Chungking was not to help 4 poor
China * but to expand rich America.”

I said to the Department that while I had in general found it wise
and expedient to ignore such inaccurate and malicious attacks in the
Japanese press, I felt that the charges in this particular editorial
were too important to let go by and I asked if the Department would
approve of my issuing a statement of denial. The Department replied
that it appreciated the restraint I had shown in ignoring such false
statements and attacks on the United States but in this particular
case it authorized the issuance of a denial. Accordingly I wrote the
following letter, which was published in the Japan Times and Advertiser
on November 5 under the heading “ U.S. Embassy Denies Report ” .

To the Editor :

While it is not the usual practice of the American Embassy in
Tokyo to take public cognizance of inaccuracies appearing in the
press with regard to the policies and actions of the United States,
the Embassy is constrained, under present circumstances, to depart
from that practice in respect of certain specific charges put forward
in the editorial of the October 31 issue of the Japan Times and
Advertiser .

It was alleged therein that the United States had presented at
Chungking certain demands which, if accepted, would create
a mortgage on China, these demands, specifically, being: first,
exclusive rights to maintain and utilize four unnamed naval bases
in China to be retained in the post-war period, and, second, the
adoption by China of certain economic measures which would
result in the virtual economic domination of China by the United
States.

The American Embassy is authorized to say that these charges are
without foundation in fact and are, therefore, wholly imaginary.

410

ONE WORLD I TWO WARS

TOGO AND SHIGEMITSU LISTEN TO REASON
November 7, 1941

At the Soviet Embassy reception to-day, to celebrate their national
holiday (they are the only diplomatic mission which now holds such
receptions), I took occasion to make the strongest representations to
every Japanese to whom I talked with regard to the Times and
Advertiser editorial, mentioned # above, listing seven points as a pro¬
gramme for American “ restitution 55 to Japan, and to point out what
serious harm the editorial had done, especially at the moment of
sending Kurusu to the United States to try to bring the current
conversations to a successful conclusion. I spoke of the utter stupidity
of creating such a hostile atmosphere here and such an unfortunate
impression on the American public at a moment when constructive,
not destructive, results were desired. I made it clear that it was not
my intention to presume to interfere with the Japanese press but
only to point out factually the inevitable effects in my country when
such editorials, assumed to represent the views of the Japanese
Government since the Times and Advertiser is known to be controlled
by the Foreign Office, were reprinted in the United States.

Togo, the Foreign Minister, appeared to know nothing about the
editorial and was sure that it had not been inspired by the Foreign
Office, but he undertook to look into it and a few moments later he
called Toshi Go, editor of the paper, over to him and told him what
I had said. I also spoke to Toshi Go, who said that he alone was
responsible for the editorial and had written it himself as indicating
Japan’s maximum demands which would undoubtedly be far beyond
what the Government would ask for in the conversations. I told
him that he could have no conception of the harm that he had done.
Somebody else told me that Go had published the editorial as a
protest against the secrecy under which the conversations were
being held.

Shigemitsu, 1 with whom I talked, was thoroughly sympathetic
and said that he would do his best to stop this sort of thing, while
Matsumoto, head of Domei, promised me that there would be an *
immediate change in the tone and substance of the Japanese press,
and he was as good as his word because the tone did immediately
change for the better, I thi nk I succeeded in stirring thprri all up
considerably, so the gathering at the Soviet party was distinctly
useful.

The next time I called on Togo I repeated these representations
and he replied that while the Foreign Office had exerted no control
over the Times and Advertiser up to the present, it was jolly well going
to exert such control from now on. The editorial may or may not
have been dictated by the Foreign Office, regardless of what Toshi

1 Former Japanese Ambassador to London, who replaced Togo as Foreign Minister
in April, 1943.

WHY JAPAN PREFERS WATCHFUL WAITING TO WAR AGAINST RUSSIA 411

Go said. One inf ormant said that it had been so dictated, but if
so, I think it was probably done by some subordinate official and
without the knowledge of the Minister, who, I am convinced, knew
nothing about it.

Perhaps I may have over-emphasized the effect of the editorial on
the American public, but my guess is that it made the front pages
of the papers at home, as the radio commentators talked a good deal
about it.

While on the subject of publicity I find pertinent and very in¬
teresting the same situation obtaining when James Gallatin (whose
fascinating diary I am reading for the second time) was doing his
best to bring England and the United States to peace prior to the
Treaty of Ghent. He writes from London under date of April 21,
1814, to William H. Crawford, Secretary of War :

They [the English people] eagerly wish “ the punishment of
America.” They do not even suspect that we had any just cause
for war, and ascribe it solely to a premeditated concert with
Bonaparte at a time when we thought him triumphant and
their cause desperate. That such opinions should be almost uni¬
versally entertained here by the great body of the people is not
at all astonishing. To produce such an effect, and thereby render
the American war popular, the Ministerial powers have had
nothing more to do than to transcribe American Federal
speeches and newspapers. If Pickering, Quincy, Strong, Hanson,
&c. have not brought a majority of the American people to their
side they have at least fully succeeded here, and had no difficulty
in convincing all that part of the English community which dervies
its information from political journals that we had no cause
of complaint [in the War of 1812] and acted only as allies of
Bonaparte.

If we substitute for Pickering, Quincy, Strong, Hanson, et cetera,
the of some of our isolationists, the analogy is clear, for it is the

speeches of those gentlemen that are splashed across the front pages
of the Japanese press, and the Japanese people naturally assume that
they represent the great majority of American public sentiment.

The President said to-day that the Government of the United
States is giving consideration to the question of withdrawal of the
American marine detachments now maintained ashore in China at
Peiping, Tientsin, and Shanghai.

WHY JAPAN WOULD PREFER
WATCHFUL WAITING TO WAR AGAINST RUSSIA

November 7, 1941

With reference to a possible Japanese attack on the Soviet Far
East, although its true programme in this respect is obviously not
known, it can only be said that since the formation of the Tojo

j^Iq ONE WORLD l TWO WARS

Government there have been no indications which would justify the
belief that an attack on the Soviet Union forms one of the immediate
intentions of that Government. Such inconclusive indications as
have recently been apparent point rather towards an effort on the
part of the Tojo Government to maintain normal relations with the
Soviet Government and possibly efforts through negotiations to take
advantage of the present position of the Soviet Union in order to
secure for Japan certain desiderata especially in relation to Soviet
policy towards China. Some clue in regard to the immediate inten¬
tions of Japan in this respect may be found in the fact that both
the new Minister and Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs have
personally had experience in constructive dealings with the Soviet
Government.

It has been noted that since the formation of the new Govern¬
ment the press has been in general more circumspect and objective
towards the Soviet-German war. On October 31 the Michi Mcki
referred in its leading editorial to certain unsettled aspects of Soviet-
Japanese relations and observed that the continued Soviet attitude
of support to Chiang Kai-shek despite the existence of the Japanese-
Soviet neutrality pact was an impediment to improvement in rela¬
tions between the two countries, and in this connection urged the
new Foreign Minister to take advantage of the present opportunity
to adjust these unsettled questions. In addition the Japan Times
and Advertiser, which is generally considered to be the mouthpiece
of the Japanese Foreign Office, in commenting editorially during
the past two weeks on the German-Soviet war has in general tended
to stress the view that even if all of European Russia, inrlnding
Moscow and Leningrad, fall into the hands of the Germans there
will be no collapse of the Soviet regime since the Soviet Government
has at its disposal sufficient men, material resources, and industrial
bases to continue the war, with British and American assistant
from Siberia.

While clearly any signs that the disintegration of the Soviet regime
was immine nt would immediately transform the situation, the
indications are that Japan for the near future at least will continue
its previous attitude of watchful waiting along the Soviet Far Eastern
frontiers. The best available estimates of the number of Japanese
troops in Manchuria vary from half a million to eight hundred
thousand. This force, while ample to take advantage of any dis¬
integration in Siberia following a collapse of the Soviet system, is
not regarded by competent military observers as sufficient to carry
out a full-fledged attack on Siberia so long as the Soviet Far Eastern
forces are intact.

With reference to the foregoing, it is yet too early to estimate the
possible effect on Soviet-Japanese relations of the sinking of the
Kehi Maru allegedly by a Soviet mine, although'up to the present
there is no indication in the press of any desire to exploit this accident,
an< * Japanese reaction has so far been confined to a protest to the

« WHEN DOGS ARE FRIGHTENED, THEY BARK ” 413

Soviet Ambassador here. This disaster took place following a number
of Japanese complaints concerning the presence of Soviet floating
mines in waters adjacent to Japan.

JAPAN’S PRESS PIPES DOWN

November 8 , 194 1

In view of the unrestrained tone of the Japanese press during the
past week in its numerous articles devoted to discussion of the United
States and foreign policy, it is significant that the flow of invective
appears suddenly to have ceased, judging by this morning’s news¬
papers. Aside from one relatively mild editorial in the Miyako re¬
garding the Kurusu mission and Japanese-American conversations,
the papers confine their comment to subjects which, from our point
of view, are quite innocuous.

CHURCHILL PLEDGES WAR WITHIN THE HOUR
November n, 1941

Churchill has come out with the statement that “ if the United
States should be involved in a war with Japan, a British declara¬
tion of war would follow within the hour.” It does one’s heart good
to hear such an unqualified statement by the British Prime Minister,
leaving nothing whatever to Japan’s imagination.

“ WHEN DOGS ARE FRIGHTENED, THEY BARK ”
November 13, 1941

The editorial in this week’s Japan Times Weekly begins with the
sentence: “In many ways the political and economic programme
now under way between Japan and French Indo-China furnishes a
cross section of Japan’s idea of a co-prosperity sphere.” Knowing
what is going on in Indo-China to-day and the methods by which
Japan obtained her present stranglehold on that country, it is re¬
freshing to have so clear-cut an acknowledgment of just what Japan’s
programme is.

The naivete of the Japanese is really amazing. They love high-
sounding formulas and slogans to cover whatever they want and
intend to do, with the idea of imparting to their plans the most perfect
righteousness, lulling even themselves into the belief that their acts
are wholly righteous. Thus “ The New Order in Greater East Asia ”
and “ The East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere ” and their “ immutable ”
policies. A Japanese friend said to me the other day: “ The trouble
with you Anglo-Saxons is that you regard and deal with the Japanese
as grown-up people, whereas the Japanese are but children and
should be treated like children. An encouraging word or gesture
immediately inspires confidence. The Germans understand this
psychology of the Japanese and they have played upon it with marked

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

414

success/ 9 I might add, parenthetically, that if this is true, it is the
first time in my experience that the Germans have understood any
foreign psychology.

That same friend, in reply to my observations about the immense
harm being done by the hostile utterances of the Japanese press and
many Japanese writers and speakers, said : “ When dogs are frightened,
they bark, and the more they are frightened, the louder they bark.
Just now, the Japanese, even the military people, are frightened.
Don’t pay any attention to the Japanese press."

I had to say to my friend that when so important a paper as the
j Vichi Nicki comes out with an article charging that the United States
acts “ like a prostitute, whispering on dark corners," as that paper
did the other day, it is a little difficult for an American and for the
American people not to pay any attention to it.

TOJO ADDRESSES THE JAPANESE DIET
November 16, 1941

This morning I attended the ceremonial opening of the Diet in
the presence of the Emperor, taking Turner and Fearey of our Embassy
with me. The Axis diplomats were there in force and a few neutrals,
but Craigie did not come. The Canadian and Australian repre¬
sentatives did come after consulting me ; I knew that my absence
would be noticed and saw no reason to leave the field to the Axis
or to convey the impression that I regarded the situation with the
United States as critical, especially in the presence of the Emperor.
Although we all met in the big reception room and, as usual, I shook
hands with Ott, the German Ambassador, and Indelli, the Italian
Ambassador, we were for the first time separated in the diplomatic
box, the Turk, the Thai, and myself taking seats on the left, while
the German and Italian moved to the right, carefully directed by
Okubo, Master of Ceremonies. Okubo has an eagle eye in chaperon¬
ing the Diplomatic Corps : he sent one man packing because he wore
a short jacket instead of the required morning coat, and he also
discovered and ousted another, who is not on the diplomatic list
but came to interpret for his chief.

The next day, when the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister
made their speeches, four members of our staff were in the diplo¬
matic box and at the end of Tojo’s address, Smith-Hutton, our'
Naval Attache, leaned over to Benninghoff, one of our secretaries,
and whispered : “ Well, he didn’t declare war, anyway." The Asahi
commented :

Four staff members of the American Embassy first appeared at the
seats reserved for foreign guests in the House of Peers, where the
Premier made his first administrative speech. At the close of the
Prime Minister’s speech thundering applause resounded through¬
out the House of Peers, where normally even excellent speeches

IT*S UP TO AMERICA TO KEEP THE PEACE 4i$

fail to receive a clapping of hands. The four staff members
of the American Embassy suddenly went into a huddle and con¬
versed with each other. And then they all strongly shook their
heads, although no one knows what they meant by this conduct.
All others in the visitors 5 gallery looked at them with fixed
attention.

The speeches were chiefly for domestic consumption, but they
won’t make a good impression in our country, particularly Togo’s
three points for reaching an understanding with the United States,
as follows :

1. Third powers will refrain from obstructing a successful con¬
clusion of the China affair, which Japan has in view.

2. The countries surrounding our Empire will not only refrain
from presenting a direct military menace to our Empire, but will
nullify such measures of a hostile character as economic blockade
and restore normal economic relations with Japan.

3. Utmost efforts will be exerted to prevent the extension of the
European war and the spread of the disturbances into East Asia.

Thus Japan’s “ immutable ” policy.

IT’S UP TO AMERICA TO KEEP THE PEACE
November 18, 1941

The editorial in this morning’s Japan Times and Advertiser contains
the paragraph :

The outstanding issues between Japan and America, as Am¬
bassador Grew said, may be counted by the hundred. But what
seems most important at this juncture is that the American Govern¬
ment should realize the all-importance of imparting to Japan a
sense of security. The formidable cordon of naval and air bases
which America has developed round Japan in concert with Britain,
the Netherlands East Indies, Australia, and Chungking con¬
stitutes a direct threat against the Japanese Empire. As long as
this strategic situation persists, Japan can have little assurance
of security or safety. If America desires no war in this part of the
world, it should realize that it holds in its own hands the key to
the solution of the whole situation.

Typical of the view-point here. It is always we who threaten; it is
always we who are the potential aggressor, never Japan. Thus does
the United States wholly “ misunderstand ” Japan’s peaceful inten¬
tions in developing the New Order and the Co-Prosperity Sphere,
and thus do we render an adjustment of relations impossible by
“ encircling ” (a word so loved by the Nazis) innocent and unoffend¬
ing Nippon.

416

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

SECOND THOUGHTS ON PRINCE KONOYE
November 21, 1941

Have often thought about my letter to Prince Konoye, in reply
to his letter informing me of the fall of his cabinet, and especially
my allusion to the distinguished service which he had rendered his
country. Some people might quibble at that statement, on the
ground that he had led his country into all sorts of difficulties, in¬
cluding the Axis alliance. I grant all that, but I put it down more
to the nefarious influence of Matsuoka than to Konoye himself, who
had his own military people and the extremists to deal with.

The chief reason why I mentioned his outstanding service was
the fact that he alone tried to reverse the engine, and tried hard and
courageously, even risking his life and having a very close call as it
was. Whatever mistakes he made in directing Japan’s policy, he had
the sense and the courage to recognize those mistakes and to try to
start his country on a new orientation of friendship with the United
States. If only for that, I think he deserves some degree of good¬
will. With the invasion of Indo-China staring us in the face during
the Washington conversations, it is difficult for anyone not living in
Japan and understanding the forces and stresses loose in this mis¬
guided country to appreciate what Konoye was up against, but I
do, and hence that allusion in my letter. I would not change it if I
had the letter to write again.

KURUSU : MISSION EMBARRASSES GERMANY
November 20, 1941

Thanksgiving Day. The service at the American Union Church
was put ahead to 10.30 so that.we could attend the Esin-Tek wedding
at 12. Craigie, Officer, Politis, Madame Forthomme, among other
foreigners, attended, for they wished to show their gratitude to our
country, and I am glad that Dr. Axling gave a very fine and inspiring
address, but it was longer than expected and Craigie and we ourselves
had to leave before the service was over. I read the President’s
Proclamation; as usual.

. ^ interesting telegram from Berlin says that the Japanese Embassy
“ has been embarrassed by the sending of Kurusu to

Washington, and resents it, Ambassador Oshima insisting to the
Germans that no matter what happens in Washington, Japan fully
intends to carry on her southward advance. It is said that, in
Oshima s opinion, the United States will do nothing at present to
stop a Japanese attack on the Dutch East Indies or on the Burma
Road; and that the situation is more favourable now than it will be
later.

It is possible that these views of Oshima reflect the efforts of the
Nazis to impress Japanese circles in Berlin with the conclusive char-

THE AMERICAN TEN-POINT OFFER REACHES JAPAN 417

acter of the German victories in Russia, but it is likewise probable
that Oshima knows very well that any real alteration of Japanese
policy towards moderation would render his own position difficult
both in Berlin and in Tokyo. General Oshima is of the Shiratori
school of thought and a dyed-in-the-wool pro-Nazi.

THE AMERICAN TEN-POINT OFFER REACHES JAPAN
November 29, 194 1

Our Government has handed to the Japanese a ten-point draft
proposal for adjusting the whole situation in the Far East. It is a
broad-gauge, objective, and statesman-like document, offering to
Japan practically everything that she has ostensibly been fighting
for if she will simply stop her aggressive policy. By adopting such
a programme she would be offered free access to needed raw materials,
free trade and commerce, financial co-operation and support, with¬
drawal of the freezing orders, and an opportunity to negotiate a
new treaty of commerce with us. If she wants a political and economic
stranglehold on the countries of East Asia (euphemistically called
the New Order in East Asia and the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere)—
which most of her extremists do want—and if she pursues her south¬
ward advance by force, she will soon be at war with all of the A B C D
powers and will unquestionably be defeated and reduced to the status
of a third-rate power. But if she plays her cards wisely, she can
obtain without further fighting all of the desiderata for which she
allegedly started fighting—strategic, economic, financial, and social
security.

Japanese public opinion can always be moulded, in a comparatively
short time, and the clever move of the Government now would be to
persuade the public that the Government, in the Washington con¬
versations, had won a * great diplomatic victory by achieving, with¬
out further force of arms, the securities or “ freedoms 95 for which
she had been fighting.

For the next two or three days I went regularly to the Tokyo Club
and talked along the foregoing lines to several prominent Japanese,
and I was later told that my observations, which were carefully
labelled as purely personal and unofficial, had been brought to the
attention of Togo, Prince Konoye, Matsudaira, Marquis Kido,
et cetera. It may have helped, although most of the men to whom
I talked were very pessimistic as a result of our draft proposal, with
which most of them appeared to be familiar. My hope is that my
remarks got through to the Emperor. They were very forcibly
expressed.

In the meantime, however, the Japanese were pouring more troops
and supplies into southern Indo-China and giving every indication
of an intention to invade Thailand. Also, at this critical juncture,
the Prime Minister took the occasion of the celebration of the an¬
niversary of the Anti-Comintern Pact to make a speech in which
*4

41S ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

he said that the United States and Britain were putting the peoples
of East Asia against each other in order to grasp hegemony in the
Far East and that “ for the honour and pride of mankind, we must
purge this sort of practice from East Asia with a vengeance.”

The President interrupted his brief visit to Warm Springs, Georgia,
to hurry back to Washington, and I have little doubt that Tojo’s
bellicose speech was at least one reason for the hurry. The speech
at this critical moment, was utterly stupid ; of course, it was chiefly
for domestic consumption, but it clearly represented the belief of
most Japanese that the United States can be intimidated by a sufficient
amount of sabre rattling; and if the Government really wants to
remain at peace with us, it seems to be the height of stupidity to
continue to inflame domestic public opinion against us. Once again
I am impressed with the truth of the remark of a Japanese friend
that when dogs are frightened, they bark, and the more they are
frightened, the louder they bark ; and also that the Japanese are
really children and should be treated as children. The Prime
Minister’s speech seems to me to be utterly childish. Where is the
much-vaunted Japanese statesmanship of olden days ?

JAPAN’S PESSIMISTIC REACTION TO THE
AMERICAN PROPOSALS

December i, 1941

During the past several days I have talked with a number of
prominent Japanese, some of whom have been in direct touch with
the Foreign Minister, and most of them appeared to be already
familiar with the substance of our Government’s recent ten-point
draft proposal. While desirous of continuing the Washington con¬
versations, they all reflect a pessimistic reaction, perceiving the
difficulties of bridging over the positions of the two countries and
emphasizing what they seem to regard as the unconciliatory “ tone ”
of our proposal.

In all of my talks I have stressed my personal opinion that our
draft is a proposal of the highest statesmanship, envisaging an ob¬
jective and broad-gauge plan, because it offers to Japan in effect the
very things for which she says that she has been fighting, as well as
a peaceful and logical way of achieving without further fighting her
constantly publicized desiderata. At the same time I have expressed
m no uncertain terms my surprise that at this critical juncture the
Prime Minister should have seen fit to deliver an address which can
only be regarded as bellicose in tone and substance, and I have made
clear the deplorable and serious reaction which that speech will
surely have created in the United States and on the American
Government and people.

^ k av f^ so that the Japanese Government is now in a position

to mould pubhc opinion to the conception that the Government
has won a diplomatic victory in the conversations (if face must be

“ WASHINGTON HAS DELIVERED AN ULTIMATUM TO US 55 419

saved) by securing without further fighting the chief purposes for
which she ostensibly took up arms in the beginning.

The papers to-night report that the cabinet to-day decided to continue
the conversations in spite of the difficulties of reaching an adjustment.

I saw one of my old Japanese friends at the Tokyo Club to-night;
he looked gray and worn and he told me that the cabinet had decided
to break off the conversations. I said that in that case I feared that
everything was over and that I would soon be leaving Japan. Soon
afterwards, however, the press announced that the conversations
would be continued. But my friend seemed crushed.

TOGO IS DISAPPOINTED

December 3, 1941

Attended the funeral of the Dowager Princess Kaya, with all the
ceremonial rites customary at Imperial funerals. It was very cold,
and since we could not wear coats I had put on two sets of under¬
clothes and a sweater. Found myself next to the German Ambassador
when standing in line waiting for the hearse. I merely asked after
Frau Ott and he replied that she was in Kobe. I led the Diplo¬
matic Corps to the altar to place the sakaki branches, and then
went out just behind the Prime Minister, General Tojo. Foreign
Minister Togo said to me, while we were awaiting our cars : “I am
very much disappointed. 5 * I replied : “ Let us continue the conver¬
sations in any case. 55 Admiral Shimada, the Navy Minister, greeted
me cordially.

“ WASHINGTON HAS DELIVERED AN
ULTIMATUM TO US 55

December 5, 1941

Yesterday I received in his own handwriting a letter from a
prominent Japanese who is closely in touch with Government circles
here. This letter reads in part as follows : “ The situation is very
regrettable. You know how I feel and I may understand your feel¬
ings. Permit me to set forth frankly to you what is now in my mind.
I have had conversations with friends and after examining their
feelings I have come to the conclusion that they believe, with no
knowledge of the actual contents of the American document of
November 26, that Washington has delivered 'an ultimatum to us.
Such is the regrettable psychology of our people that in my opinion
the only way out at the present time is for the United States to accept
as a possible basis for a modus vivendi the Japanese proposals and
later on work out a final agreement in line with the American proposal.
I am emboldened to write to you by my hope that matters will end
happily. 55

In my opinion the above letter is a fair sample of public opinion
in Japan at the present time.

420

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

MORE JAPANESE SUSPICIONS THAT AMERICA
STALLS FOR TIME

December 6, 1941

According to a Japanese informant of known reliability, neither
the Prime Minister nor any member of the cabinet had seen the
text of General' Tojo’s speech of November 30 in advance, and it is
believed that it was written by some person in the Imperial Rule
Assistance Association. The address was read by proxy, as is often
done in Japan, and it is pointed out that the substance and tone of
the speech are different from all General Tojo’s previous addresses.

It is secretly reported that according to news from a fairly reliable
informant, although unconfirmed, the Nazi terrorist organization,
directed by Wiedemann, is making a desperate effort to sabotage
the Washington conversations, and that three German agents of this
organization carried out the recent bombing attacks on an American-
owned oil-storage tank and on the American Consulate at Saigon,
in order to create the impression on the Americans that the Japanese
had inspired the attack. The chief purpose of this organization is to
work against American interests in the Far East and its activities
will probably soon be intensified.

ROOSEVELT APPEALS TO HIROHITO
December 7, 1941

To-day the radio announced that the President had sent a message
to the Emperor of Japan but gave no information as to its substance
or the channel of transmission. Late in the evening, however, a
short triple-priority telegram came from Mr. Hull saying that a tele¬
gram was then being encoded containing a message from the President
which I was to communicate to the Emperor at the earliest possible
moment. I immediately asked Dooman to come to the Embassy
and telephone to Tomoda, Togo’s secretary, to make an urgent
appointment with the Minister for me around midnight; that is,
Dooman telephoned as soon as the message itself had arrived and
was being decoded. That telegram had been received at the Japanese
telegraph office at noon, as indicated thereon, but in spite of its
urgency was not delivered until 10.30 p.m. The two telegrams
had been sent from the Department, December 6 at 8 p.m. and 9 p.m.
respectively. Tomoda seemed upset at my asking for an appointment
so late and he asked Dooman if the matter was so urgent that it
couldn’t wait till to-morrow. Dooman’s impression the next day
was that Tomoda could not possibly have then known of the impending
outbreak of war.

Tomoda, however, made the appointment and Benninghoff kindly
drove me to the Minister’s official residence at 12.15 a.m., our own
chauffeurs, having long gone home. Togo saw me immediately

ROOSEVELT APPEALS JTO HIROHITO ' 421

and I requested an audience with the Emperor in order to present
the President’s message, which I then read aloud and handed a copy
to Togo* The Department had left to my discretion the appropriate
method of communication, and I felt it important to give it the
maximum weight by asking to see the Emperor myself—and to make
sure that it got to him personally. Togo at first said that he would
study the document, but when I asked if that meant some doubt as
to whether he would ask for an audience for me, he replied that he
would present the matter to the Throne. He made some further
remarks about the Washington conversations, but when I said that
I had not yet received a report of the conversation of December 5
and that it would merely complicate matters if I should undertake
to repeat his comments to the Department, he said that it was not
necessary. I left him at about 12.30 a.m.

The Secretary’s instructions and the President’s message to the
Emperor were as follows :

TRIPLE PRIORITY

818, December 6, 9 p.m.

Confidential

Please communicate at the earliest possible moment in such
manner as you deem most appropriate a message to the Emperor
from the President, reading as follows :

“ His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Japan :

“ Almost a century ago the President of the United States
addressed to the Emperor of Japan a message extending an offer
of friendship of the people of the United States to the people of
Japan. That offer was accepted and in the long period of un¬
broken peace and friendship which has followed, our respective
nations, through the virtues of their peoples and the wisdom
of their rulers, have prospered and have substantially helped
humanity.

“ Only in situations of extraordinary importance to our two
countries need I address to Your Majesty messages on matters of
state. I feel I should now so address you because of the deep and
far-reaching emergency which appears to be in formation.

“ Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which threaten
to deprive each of our nations and all humanity of the beneficial
influence of the long peace between our two countries. Those
developments contain tragic possibilities.

“ The people of the United States, believing in peace and in
the right of nations to live and let live, have eagerly watched the
conversations between our two Governments during these past
months. We have hoped for a termination of the present conflict
between Japan and China. We have hoped that a peace of the

ONE WORLD : TWO WARS

4 23

Pacific could be consummated in such a way that nationalities
of many diverse peoples could exist side by side without fear of
invasion ; that unbearable burdens of armaments could be lifted
for them all; and that all peoples would resume commerce with¬
out discrimination against or in favour of any nation.

“ I am certain that it will be clear to Your Majesty, as it is to
me, that in seeking these great objectives both Japan and the
United States should agree to eliminate any form of military
threat. This seems essential to the attainment of the high
objectives.

“ More than a year ago Your Majesty’s Government concluded
an agreement with the Vichy Government by which five or six
thousand Japanese troops were permitted to enter northern
French Indo-China for the protection of Japanese troops which
were operating against China further north. And this spring
and summer the Vichy Government permitted further Japanese
military forces to enter into southern French Indo-China for the
common defence of French Indo-China. I think I am correct
in saying that no attack has been made upon Indo-China nor that
any has been contemplated.

“ During the past few weeks it has become clear to the world
that Japanese military, naval, and air forces have been sent to
southern Indo-China in such large numbers as to create a reason¬
able doubt on the part of other nations that this continuing
concentration in Indo-China is not defensive in its character.

“Because these continuing concentrations in Indo-China have
reached such large proportions and because they extend now to
the south-east and the south-west comers of that peninsula it is
only reasonable that the people of the Philippines, of the hundreds
of islands of the East Indies, of Malaya, and of Thailand itself
are asking themselves whether these forces of Japan are preparing
or intending to make attack in one or more of these many
directions.

“I am sure that Your Majesty will understand that the fear
of all these peoples is a legitimate fear inasmuch as it involves
their peace and their national existence. I am sure that Your
Majesty will understand why the people of the United States
in such large numbers look askance at the establishment of
military, naval, and air bases manned and equipped so greatly
as to constitute armed forces capable of measures of offence.

u It is clear that a continuance of such a situation is unthinkable.

“ None of the peoples whom I have spoken of above can sit
either indefinitely or permanently on a keg of dynamite.

“ There is absolutely no thought on the part of the United
States of invading Indo-China if every Japanese soldier or sailor
were to be withdrawn therefrom.

“ I t h i n k that we can obtain the same assurance trom the
Governments of the East Indies, the Governments of Malaya,

ROOSEVELT APPEALS TO HIROHTTO

423

and the Government of Thailand. I would even undertake to
ask for the same assurance on the part of the Government of
China. Thus a withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Indo-
China would result in the assurance of peace throughout the
whole of the south Pacific area.

I address myself to Your Majesty so that Your Majesty may
as I am doing, give thought in this definite emergency to wavs
of dispelling the dark clouds. I am confident that both of us,
for the sake of the peoples not only of our own great countries
but for the sake of humanity in neighbouring territories, have
a sacred duty to restore traditional amity and prevent further
death and destruction in the world.

“ Fjranklin D. Roosevelt ”

The press here is being informed simply that the President is
sending a message to the Emperor.

Hull

6

ONE WORLD: ONE WAR

(December 8, 1941—May 31, 1942)

Japan’s attack on the United States by-passed our first line of national
defence—diplomacy—and launched a military offensive without the
usual pre limi nary declaration of hostilities. In consequence, the
staff of the American Embassy at Tokyo and all our other officials
in the Japanese sphere of influence found themselves isolated from a
series of events that shook the world and brought the United States
into a global, total war. The Philippines, Wake, and Guam; Hong
Kong, Malaya, and Singapore; the Netherlands Indies and Burma,
all fell to Japan during the winter and early spring of 1941-42. By
the end of May, when arrangements were finally made for the United
States and Japan to exchange their diplomats, the Japanese had not
only reached the limits of their expansion for the year; they had
suffered in the Coral Sea their first defeat and had experienced one
bombing of Tokyo. America was passing through its darkest months
since the Civil War, yet already the tide of battle had begun to show
signs of turning.

WAR

December 8,1941

At 7 a.m. I was awakened by a telephone call from Kase, who
asked me to come to see the Minister as soon as possible. He said
that he had been trying to telephone to me ever since 5 a.m. but
could not get through. I hurriedly dressed and got to the official
residence at about 7.30. Kase was cordial; Togo grim and formal.
He made a brief statement which is contained in my report to the
Department and then handed to me a memorandum of thirteen
pages, dated December 8, which he said had been communicated by
Admiral Nomura to the Secretary to-day, breaking off the conversa¬
tions. The final paragraph read:

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby
the American Government that, in view of the attitude of the
American Government, it cannot but consider that it is impossible
to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

Togo said that he had seen the Emperor (at 3 a.m., I understand),
and that the memorandum constituted the Emperor’s reply to the
President’s message. He then made a little speech thanking me for
my co-operation during the conversations and came downstairs to
see me off at the door. Not a word was said about Pearl Harbour.

On returning to the Embassy I shaved and breakfasted and then

4*4

WAR

425

sent off my report to the Department, but it probably did not get
through. Shortly afterwards we heard that Imperial Headquarters
had announced that Japan was in armed conflict with the United
States and Great Britain. This was contained in a Yomiuri statement
issued early this morning. At first it was difficult to believe, although
it had all the earmarks of officialdom, and later in the morning
Ohno, of the Foreign Office, called on Crocker and read to him, his
hands trembling, the official announcement that armed conflict had
commenced.

Soon afterwards the Embassy’s gates were closed and we were told
that no one could go in or out. Masuo, a clerk in the Foreign Office,
was assigned as a liaison officer and to act as a channel between us
and the Foreign Office. We were told that no cipher telegrams could
be sent and all telegrams must be submitted to the Foreign Office
for approval. Sir Robert Craigie came to see me and was stopped
by the police at the gate ; he dismounted from his car and said who
he was, but the police grabbed him by the arms; he shook them off,
however, and found an officer to let him in. We had a last talk with
mutual expressions of appreciation of our co-operation, which, he
said, had been one of the few bright spots during his years in Japan.
Mrs. Tillitse, wife of the Danish Minister, also came to see Alice
and had difficulty in getting home but finally was able to do so with
the aid of a plain-clothes detective. Our last callers early in the
morning were Politis, the Greek Minister, and Mrs. de Vigo, wife
of the Spanish Minister, who saw Alice.

A group of Japanese radio experts came and went through the
chancery and the apartment houses with a fine-tooth comb, taking
away all short-wave radio sets. They were very polite but very
thorough, but when they came to the residence they took my word for
the fact that I had only two radio sets and removed them without
searching the other rooms. They were all exceedingly courteous and
apologized for the trouble caused, especially Ohno of the Foreign
Office, who accompanied them.

The moment we knew that the news of war had been confirmed
I gave orders to burn all our codes and confidential correspondence.

Word had meanwhile been passed around that everyone should
stay on the compound for his own protection. A telegram en clair
was prepared for the Department stating that the entire Embassy
staff was safe and well, but it was held as it was discovered on check¬
ing up that Randall Jones was not accounted for. It developed that,
it being his day off, he had gone to Yokohama and had not yet
returned. After some anxious moments we were greatly relieved and
somewhat surprised to see Jones walking across the compound. It
seems that, having heard the news at Yokohama, he took the first
train back, without incident, and took a taxi in a perfectly normal
manner from Shimbashi Station to the Embassy. Upon arrival he
found the Embassy gates locked and ingress and egress both barred.
As he was standing uncertain, trying to decide what to do, he was ,

ONE WORLD t ONE WAR

426

approached by a plain-clothes policeman who pointed to the adjoin¬
ing compound where the Naval Attache lives, and suggested that he
go there and climb into the Embassy compound by the ladder
which has been kept against the wall in the Smith-Huttons’ garden
for a number of years. He took the advice and thus returned safe
and sound.

Part of the diary kept by our Counsellor, Eugene Dooman,
covering the day’s events, should be included for the record at this
point:

My house-boy calls me every morning at 7.30. This morning,
however, he called me shortly before that time to say that Mr.
Max Hill, correspondent of the Associated Press, was on the
telephone. I heard Mr. Hill say : “ I shall have to ask the police
whether I can speak to you.” I could faintly hear Mr. Hill’s
voice at the other end of the phone talking with some Japanese
and I realized that Mr. Hill’s remark was intended to convey a
message. After a considerable pause, his maid came to the phone
and said that Mr. Hill had been obliged to leave the house. I
replied that I understood perfectly.

I thereupon called Mr. Benninghoff on the telephone and
asked him to go immediately to Mr. Hill’s house to ascertain what
had happened as I very much feared he had been arrested by
the police. At about 8.30 Mr. Benninghoff came to my house
and said that he had just returned from seeing Mr. Hill. He
reported that Mr. Hill was under arrest at his house, and that
he was having breakfast before leaving for the metropolitan
police station, where he was to be put under examination. Mr.
Dynant, the junior correspondent of the Associated Press, and
Mr. Robert Bellaire, correspondent of the United Press, were
also at Mr. Hill’s house, but Mr. Benninghoff reported that they
were not permitted by the police to communicate with Mr. Hill.
The last two named correspondents were apparently not under
arrest. Mr. Bellaire had found a moment to tell Mr. Benninghoff
that the Imperial Headquarters had announced that the Japanese
fleet had already come into touch with the American and British
fleets somewhere in the south-western Pacific. Mr. Bellaire
added also that he had heard that Japanese aeroplanes had
bombed Honolulu this morning early. Mr. Benninghoff had
breakfast with me and then rushed home to bathe and get
ready for the day.

The Japanese have profited by the German methods of Blitzkriegs
a dastardly thing to do while the conversations had not yet broken
down. I do not yet know the precise timing, but it seems to me very
doubtful if Admiral Nomura had informed Mr. Hull of the break¬
down of the conversations before Hawaii was bombed and the war
started. If the Japanese had confined themselves to the Far East and
had attacked only the Philippines, there would have been pacifists

WAR

427

and isolationists at home who would have said that we have no
business in the Far East anyway, but once they attacked Hawaii
it was certain that the American people would rise up in a solid
unit of fury. Senator Wheeler was quoted on the radio as say ing
that the United States must “ lick hell out of the Japanese.” This
may be easier said than done ; it may take a very long time and we
may get some serious knocks before our full power is able to register.
But in the long run, Japan’s defeat is absolutely certain, for the
American people, once aroused, won’t let go. With the United
States, Britain, Australia, the Netherlands East Indies, and perhaps
Soviet Russia, as well as China, eventually out against her, she will
have her hands full before very long.

I am glad to have gone on record in a recent telegram to the effect
that Japan would be perfectly capable of an all-out, do-or-die attempt
to render herself impervious to foreign economic pressure even if
it meant national hara-kiri, and that we should be ready for any
step of “ dangerous and dramatic suddenness.” That is now precisely
what has happened.

Fortunately, all pf our staff, including the non-commissioned staff,
were in the compound when ingress and egress were forbidden,
except Jones, who was in Yokohama and got safely in. I had already
forbidden anyone of our staff to leave the compound even before we
were locked in. Rumours are flying around of a difficult domestic
situation; even that martial law has been declared in Tokyo, but
that I doubt. But there are probably demonstrations going on
against us, and Makinson, our First Secretary and Consul-General,
reports seeing from the windows of the chancery a group of some
two hundred Japanese, headed by a large swastika flag, coming
towards the Embassy. They apparently never got to it, however.

Max Hamilton telephoned to me from Washington to-day ; I could
hear him perfectly but he appeared to have difficulty in under¬
standing me. He said that the Department was considering to whom
we should confide our interests in Japan and asked for my views.
I mentioned the Argentine and Brazil, although I thought that the
latter might come into the war. The British have turned their
interests over to the Argentines. Later I sent a telegram mention¬
ing also Switzerland, Spain, and Portugal among the neutrals but
don’t know if the telegram got through. I said that we had informally
suggested to the Foreign Office that the Tatuta Mam should continue
her voyage to the United States to pick up the Japanese Embassy
and Consulates, and that the Japanese might place another vessd
at our disposal, but of course we made no commitment as I didn’t
know what the attitude of the administration might be. There are
a lot of Americans and diplomats on the Tatuta, so I suppose we
would not wish to interrupt her trip. But perhaps she has already
turned back to Japan, anyway. Hamilton expressed a very kind
message from all in the Department.

At 6.45 in the evening we had the entire staffs of the Embassy

ONE WORLD : ONE WAR

4128

and Consulate in for cocktails, about sixty people. Dooman made a
very nice little speech about Alice and myself which moved us very
much. Miss Coles, Dooman, Williams, Crocker, Bohlen, Turner,
Benninghoff, Cooper, and Espy have all moved in to the Embassy,
since they live outside the compound, and we have found beds for
all and they will take most of their meals with us. Those who have
apartments in the apartment houses are giving shake-downs to any¬
one who needs a bed or a mattress on the floor. We are a well-
united and co-operative group, and a congenial one, which is very
helpful at times like these. Everyone was pretty well exhausted
to-night, the first day of war with Japan, the only country, so far
as I know, that ever declared war on us.

Of course when I saw Togo in the early morning of the 8th he
must already have known of the outbreak of war, but he said nothing
about it. If any indication was given at all, it was in his gesture
when he came into the room and slapped down on the table the
Japanese reply to our recent draft proposal, as much as to say that
this was final. But his manner was, as usual, wholly imperturbable,
and on rising after our talk he made a pleasant little speech of thanks
for my co-operation. On leaving his official residence I had not the
slightest feeling that a break had occurred, except for a break in the
conversations. Togo must have sensed that I had no suspicions
whatever as to what had occurred. The conversations had broken
down once before, when the Japanese went into Indo-China, yet
they were later resumed. The surprise of the Blitzkrieg was complete
so far as we in the Embassy were concerned, except for my prog¬
nostication on November 3 that war might come “ with dangerous
and dramatic suddenness.”

It is significant that the Department’s 818, December 6, 9 p.m.,
communicating the President’s message to the Emperor, was actually
received at the central telegraph office in Tokyo at noon on the
7th but was not delivered until 10.30 that evening. The notation
in Japanese on the telegram made this clear.

PRISONERS OF JAPAN

December 9, 1941

The Superintendent-General of the Metropolitan Police, Tsukio
Tomeoka, called on me this morning with an aide and interpreter,
although Turner did the interpreting, and said that he wished to
do everything possible for our comfort and convenience. He was
very affable. The subsequent actions and attitude of the police, who
treated us in every respect^ prisoners, if not as criminal prisoners,
invading at will the chancery, the apartment houses, and even the
Embassy residence and making every difficulty in our getting food
and clothing from outside, were no doubt due to orders from
subordinate officers and to the utter stupidity of the police guard
in interpreting their instructions without the slightest effort to

PRISONERS OF JAPAN 489

understand our position, and I doubt if the Superintendent himself
had any knowledge of what was going on.

Ohta, of the European Section of the Foreign Office, also called.
He said that Kase, of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office,
was to have come to-day but unfortunately he was very busy. Ohta
said that he had just called at the British Embassy to see what could
be done to ease the position there, and that he would be glad to
receive any suggestions Dooman might make for the improvement
of the situation at this Embassy. Dooman called in Benninghoff and
together they gave Ohta a long list of matters which had to be dealt
with. Among them were included the question of supplying us with
fresh foodstuffs, the lack of co-ordination among the Japanese officials
here, and the supply of fuel oil. Ohta said that he would take all of
these matters under consideration. After Benninghoff left, Ohta
referred to the telephone conversation which Dooman had had with
Tomoda on Sunday night. Dooman asked Ohta whether the Foreign
Minis ter, in expressing reluctance to stay up very late to receive me,
was trying to avoid having to meet me in person again after the
beginning of the hostilities. Qhta burst out spontaneously and with
considerable feeling, “Not at all. The Foreign Minister knew
nothing about the attack on Hawaii until early the next morn¬
ing.” Without pressing the point too far, it seems clear that
His Imperial Majesty’s Minister for Foreign Affairs had no prior
knowledge that an act of war was to be committed by the Japanese
forces.

' For a while, the Smith-Huttons were able to live in their house
just outside the compound and to provide room and board for some
sixteen persons, entering the compound by a ladder over the wall
(the celebrated ladder used during the February 26 Incident) and
they were thus able to bring us newspapers. The police knew of the
ladder and at first raised no objections. But then one of our consuls
sent for his Chinese servant to come in over the wall, without con¬
sulting Dooman or any of the rest of us ; the servant, with an arm¬
ful of eggs, stumbled in the dark directly into the reflection pool
and raised such a row that the police came running. This brought
about an investigation: the ladder- was removed and the Smith-
Huttons with all their guests were obliged to come into the compound
permanently, sixteen extra persons to bed and feed, necessitating
beds being set up in the chancery offices, although we took in the
three Smith-Huttons at the residence as well as Dooman, Williams,
Crocker, Bohlen, Turner, Benninghoff, and Miss Coles, Alice’s
secretary. We also kept daily table for fourteen, inviting other
members of the staff and clerks in rotation.

For the record I give below the text of the communication handed
to Crocker by Ohno, Chief of the Second Section of the American
Bureau of the Foreign Office, on the morning of the 8th. We pre¬
pared a telegram reporting this • document to the Department and
handed it to the Foreign Office representative, Masuo, and were later

ONE WORLD : ONE WAR

430

told that it had been sent, but there is no assurance that it ever got
through.

No. 136—Strictly Confidential—Investigation V.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Tokyo, December 8, 1941

Excellency:

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that there has
arisen a state of war between Your Excellency’s country and Japan
beginning to-day.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency
the assurances of my highest consideration.

Shigenori Togo
Minister of Foreign Affairs

His Excellency
Joseph Clark Grew,

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United
States of America at Tokyo.

When he had finished reading, Crocker said : “ This is a very
tragic moment,” to which Ohno replied : “ It is ; and my duty is
most distasteful.”

Ohno then proceeded to read a translation of the following state¬
ment prepared by the Japanese authorities concerning the Embassy
and its functions :

The following statement was read by Mr. Ohno to Mr. Crocker
at 11 a.ra., December 8, 1941 :

1. That functions of the Embassy and the Consulates will be
suspended as of to-day.

2. That members of the Embassy and Consulates be accorded
protection and living facilities in accordance with international
usages.

3. That in order to secure protection and facilities aforementioned
it is recommended that all the members of the Embassy be con¬
gregated in the Embassy compound.

4. That communication with the outside, including telephone
and telegraph, be suspended. In case anyone desires to go out,
permission must be obtained from the Gaimusho through the
officer who will be posted in front of the Embassy, Liaison Officer
Mr. Masuo. He has come here with me.

5. As soon as a country representing your interests is nomi¬
nated,^ contact between your Embassy and representatives of
the said country will be allowed as is necessary for the purpose
of representing your interests.

6. That due attention is being paid to protecting the citizens
of the United States.

7- That all wireless transmitting sets be surrendered at once.

GRACE UNDER PRESSURE 431

8. That all short-wave wireless receiving sets, private as well
as official, the use of which will no more be acquiesced, be handed
over.

9. That en clair telegrams informing your Government of having
been notified of a state of war will be allowed through the liaison
officer.

TRIBUTE TO JAPANESE EMPLOYEES OF
THE EMBASSY

December 12, 1941

The conduct of our Japanese employees has been beyond all
praise. All of them expressed desire to stay with us until our de¬
parture, but as they are not permitted to leave the premises or to
communicate with their families and to return while under employ¬
ment of the American Government, we have been forced to dis¬
charge those whose services are not essential. We assume that all
of them will eventually have to be discharged. A substantial number
of persons will be continuously needed to prevent deterioration of
the buildings and grounds and to maintain machinery and equip¬
ment, and we expect that arrangements can be made by the mission
eventually'representing American interests to engage our Japanese.

I urgently requested of the Department that in the meantime
I be authorized to assure our Japanese employees, whose loyalty
and sense of responsibility under the most difficult conditions have
been extraordinary, that our Government will adequately com¬
pensate those discharged and will arrange to continue the employ¬
ment of the older men during the war. The chief messenger has
been with us for about forty years, and many others have been
employed for ten years or more.

GRACE UNDER PRESSURE
December 13, 1941

The staff wished to have a dance this Saturday evening in the
community rooms at the chancery, but while wishing to take every
practicable and proper step to keep up their morale, I vetoed the
idea of a dance, because I thought it unwise at this serious time to
convey to the police, who were then swarming in the compound,
the assumption that we in the Embassy were taking, the situation
flippantly. I knew that there was not the slightest harm in the dancing
itself but, unfortunately, the mere idea of dancing always conveys
an assumption of gaiety, and our thoughts are anything but gay just
now. Every other step for entertainment and for keeping up morale
I approved.

Thus the community room, arranged and ably managed by Ruth
Kelley, became known as “ The Lido,” and it afforded a pleasant
gathering place for the staff, with an open fire, big comfortable

ONE WORLD : ONE WAR

43*

easy chairs, a piano and gramophone for music, and tables for bridge
and poker, mah-jongg, and chess, as well as books and magazines.
Meanwhile at the residence, Alice had bridge nearly every afternoon
after luncheon.

Furthermore, Commander Stone, our Assistant Naval Attache,
laid out a cleverly constructed golf course in the lower compound,
for chip shots and putts, which gave us opportunity for exercise and
amusement. It was duly opened with ceremony and a tournament,
won by Bohlen. The course was christened “ The Greater East Asia
Black Sulphur Springs Championship Golf Course,” the latter
allusion being to a report that Japanese in Washington were interned
at White Sulphur Springs.

THE SWISS TAKE CHARGE
December 14, 1941

The Swiss Minister, Mr. Gorg6, was informed by his Govern¬
ment on the 9th that he was to take charge of American interests
in Japan, and he promptly wrote to the Foreign Minister, but it
was not until last night, the 13th, that he was permitted to visit
me, which he did this morning. We saw his car at the gate, but
it was not allowed by the police to enter, so he had to go to the
Foreign Office to have instructions telephoned to the police, one
indication among many of the almost total lack of co-ordination
between the Foreign Office and the police.

When finally the gates were opened and the Minister drove in,
Dooman was forbidden by the police to speak to him, but Dooman
quickly sent word to the staff, who came down to the courtyard
and loudly applauded as the Minister descended from his car. The
police were much irritated and tried to stop the ovation, which
increased rather than diminished, and nothing could be done about
it. Dooman put his finger to his lips, indicating to the Minister
’ that he could not speak, and Mr. Gorg6 was then escorted by a large
escort of police up to the residence, one in front, one at each elbow,
and one or two behind. The theory that we were prisoners and
to be treated as criminal prisoners was clearly the attitude of the
police from the very beginning, and when, after nearly three weeks,
the Minister’s representations resulted in their being ousted from
the compound and told to relax their severity, they were clearly
irritated and tried to take it out on us in various petty ways. They
had lost face.

Up to that time, namely, during the first three weeks, the police
swarmed in the compound, entered the chancery and private apart¬
ments of the staff at will, peered through the windows of the residence,
and in one case a policeman stepped into our salon to watch the
packing, although he withdrew when requested to do so. Guard
boxes were erected, and once, when I went down to the chancery
with a parcel under my arm, I saw a policeman making an entry

THE JAPANESE PETTY OFFICIAL IN ACTION 433

in his note-book. Thus was civilized international diplomatic usage
totally ignored. The police took various petty obstructive measures
which might have been extremely serious if we had not had the good
fortune to receive a large consignment of canned foodstuffs from the
United Groceries in San Francisco just before our internment. In
order to conserve the trivial amount of heating oil allowed us, we
very nearly froze.

At first Dooman was not allowed to join my conference with the
Minister, but he shortly broke through this obstruction and there¬
after was always present. The Minister came every two or three
days and we soon appreciated our good fortune in having as our
representative a forceful man with a business-like sense of organiza¬
tion and of our rights under diplomatic usage. He made notes
of every complaint and made representations to Sato or Nishi with
eventually marked success. Former Foreign Minister Sato was
placed at the head of a committee to deal with our problems,
but he was timid and unwilling to make decisions and was a great
disappointment. Nishi, the Vice-Minister, was far more co¬
operative and understanding. Never was the segregation and
divided control between the Foreign Office and the police more
acutely exemplified.

THE JAPANESE PETTY OFFICIAL IN ACTION

December 16, 1941 {from Dooman*s Diary)

A fairly uneventful day. There was, however, one incident worth
recording because it is so revealing of the Japanese indecision, un¬
certainty, and childishness. For two days now our Officer of the Day,
with a desk in the hall of the chancery, has been working out very
well indeed and has contributed at once to a general sense of orderli¬
ness and discipline, besides furnishing a most useful information
centre, messenger service, and so forth. As we can spare enough
fuel only to have the heat on for two hours out of every twenty-four,
it is essential that the front door be kept closed, and there is a large
sign in English and in Japanese to that effect. One of the duties of
the O.D. is to remind persons who thoughtlessly leave it open to go
back and close it. During the course of the day a uniformed Japanese
policeman with sword clanking at his side flung the door open and
strode across the lobby towards the office of Masuo, the liaison man
from the Japanese Foreign Office. The O.D. spoke up politely and
asked the policeman please to close the door. He stopped in his
tracks and after perceptible hesitation went back and closed it. We
thought nothing of it at the time but our minds went back to the
incident when some six hours later, about ten p.m., the Embassy
translator, Fujimoto, came to me in some agitation' and said that
the head police officer sent him to tell me that we must abolish the
institution of O.D. and have the desk removed, on the grounds that
the Embassy’s functions had been suspended by order of the Japanese

ONE WORLD : ONE WAR

434

Government and that therefore no officer could perform any duties
or exercise any authority ! It is perfectly clear that the policeman
who was asked to close the door had been taken aback by the request,
but that at the tim e he was not able to think fast enough to decide
to refuse to accede to it; so he closed the door. However, having
then gone to his office, he began to brood upon it, and the idea slowly
grew in his mind that he was being ordered around by an officer of
the Embassy and that this was not to be tolerated. His mind probably
turned also to the notice on the bulletin board in which we set forth
amon g the duties of the O.D. that of “ supervision over the policing
of the building.” To anyone familiar with the American military
idiom the word “ policing ” means merely the business of cleaning
and tidying up. But undoubtedly the Japanese felt that we were
conferring upon the O.D. the authority to supervise the Japanese
police, an intolerable insult. There is also the strong likelihood that
by 10 p.m. the policeman had acquired a reasonable alcoholic glow
and so, after some six hours of communing with himself, and, no
doubt, with his outraged colleagues, he made a great decision to do
away with the institution of O.D. But he did not act through the
proper channel, that is, through the Foreign Office liaison man
and a written communication addressed to the Ambassador. This
would have required an irrevocable decision and an assumption of
authority which he was unwilling to take. So he indulged in the
typical Japanese trick of trying to bring about the removal of the
O.D. by r unning a bluff, just to see if it would work.

However that may be, Ned Crocker told Fujimoto to say in reply
that nothing could be done until the Ambassador was consulted, and
we proposed to ignore the matter and await developments. Crocker
did, however, remove the sign on the bulletin board and had it
rewritten, changing the word “policing” to “cleaning” and
rephrasing it so that there would be nothing in it to which the
Japanese could possibly take exception.

In the end the O.D. remained.

CHRISTMAS EVE AND CHRISTMAS DAY
December 24 and 25, 1941

Christmas Eve was memorable. For dinner Gene Dooman con¬
tributed a Virginia sugar-cured ham which he had been storing
up for some special occasion, while Ned Crocker brought two bottles
of delicious Bemcastler Doktor, 1933. Jane and Hank Smith-
Hutton, Miss Coles, Wiliams, Turner, Benninghoff, Bohlen, and
Creswell were also there. With the champagne I proposed two toasts
on the part of Alice and myself: first, to our commissioned and non¬
commissioned staffs with an expression of our deep sense of their
"splendid organization, initiative, thoughtfulness, and general help¬
fulness at this difficult time which we would certainly never forget,
and, second, to the wives at home who, we hoped, would find happy

CHRISTMAS EVE AND CHRISTMAS DAY ^5

reunion with their husbands before long, God bless them. Dooman
made a touching reply.

Flowers had been coming in from several friends and a beautiful
letter and remembrance from Yolande Arsine-Henry, wife of the
French Ambassador, to Alice, and before dinner Mrs. Nishi, wife
of the Vice-Foreign Minister, sent Alice two turkeys, which was
Nishi’s way of expressing his personal friendliness, a greatly appreci¬
ated gesture. Also flowers for Alice and myself from the entire staff,
and what a staff it is !

But the real event of the day was after dinner when almost the
whole staff, some thirty or forty, came up the hill and serenaded
us in the Embassy with Christmas hymns and carols. First they sang
“ Adeste Fideles ” in the hall and then moved slowly into the loggia,
singing “ Heilige Nacht.” It was a spontaneous action, for they had
practised only once, but the singing was truly beautiful under
BenninghofFs direction. Alice and I were both greatly moved ; she
broke down, poor dear, and I had to hold myself in. They continued
to sing for some time, finally moving slowly off, again singing “ Holy
Night ” pianissimo as they went out, and again “ O Come, All Ye
Faithful 55 as they went down the hill. That was an evening we
shall always remember. Later the staff continued to sing and
play the piano in the community room at the chancery, and I am
sure that the evening afforded a healthy outlet for their pent-up
emotions and for those whose morale is being put to a hard test.

Christmas Day

A clear, crisp, sunny day, spring-like in the sun at noon. Alice’s
knee, which had gone back on her for a few days, was better and
she enjoyed our usual walk up and down on the lawn, accompanied
by our dogs, Sasha and Micky. For the first time during our
eighteen days of incarceration several copies of the Japan Times
and Advertiser were delivered, and while the reading of it was not
particularly cheery, we take the Japanese reports of military and
naval successes with several grains of salt. I still confidently count
on the eventual crack in Germany, and once the German Army
begins to disintegrate, it will be the beginning of the end, for with
Germany out of the picture and the entire naval and air forces of
the United States and Great Britain, which will steadily increase
in power, available to attack Japan, even the cocky and truculent
Japanese can hardly fail to see their ultimate doom writ large. This
is, of course, wishful thinking, but it is based on my intimate know¬
ledge of the German character. What happened in 1918 will in all
probability happen again, and Hitler’s miscalculation in attacking
Soviet Russia will prove to be his downfall. May history substantiate
this prognostication.

The very fact of our present situation and the community spirit
called forth by that situation resulted in a celebration of Chnstmas,
as of Christmas Eve, never experienced in all our years in Tokyo.

4 3 g one^world: one war

Miss Arnold and her mess group, including Mrs. Skouland, Miss
Gardiner, Mrs. Playfair, Captains Johnson and Stuart, came up to
the residence for cocktails and then we had an admirable Christmas
dinner at i, with Mrs. Nishi’s turkeys and with Ned Crocker’s plum
puddings swimming in burning brandy. Presents were exchanged
and I managed through a friendly policeman, who appears to have
gone all over town in search of them, to get two lovely potted orchids
for Alice.

At four o’clock our servants, Shimoda, Fukaya, Funayama, and
Kato, were informed that their families had been allowed to come
into the compound and there was a joyful meeting in front of the
chancery which moved us very much. They had not been allowed
to talk with their families since our internment.

Then came the Christmas tree in the community room. We had
two trees, one at the residence and this one in the chancery, Gene
Dooman having given orders to cut down the trees which grew
along the wall of the lower compound and were obstructing the
light in front of other houses, and both were well decorated with
our left-over things from other years. First Dave Thomasson, one of
our vice-consuls, and I played the piano ; then the Christmas hymns
and carols were sung by everyone, and finally Captain Gould appeared
as Santa Claus and gave presents to everybody with clever and
amusing verses read to each. He did it exceedingly well and it was
a very successful party.

Thus ended a Christmas celebration that will always remain
vividly in our memory.

EXCHANGE OF DIPLOMATS ARRANGED
December 30, 1941

The Swiss Minister to-day told us that the Japanese Government
has accepted our proposal for an exchange in Louren^o Marques
and is now translating into French its note with regard to details,
which the Minister said he would promptly cable to Washington
through Berne. So at last things seem to be moving. At Dooman’s
wise suggestion I called a meeting of the staff and told them the
news, which called forth loud applause ; it will help their morale.
The suggestion for a direct exchange between Yokohama and San
Francisco has been discarded by the Japanese Foreign Office (which
had been toying with the idea on its own initiative) because the
Japanese Army and Navy have categorically refused to consider
allowing an American ship to come into Japanese waters.

I turned over to the Minister the -large metal trunk containing
the archives of the Dicanat, which he was to deliver to Arsine-
Henry, the new Dean, after the archives had been examined by
Kiuchi at the Foreign Office to be sure that we were not slipping
other papers out to the French Ambassador. A Japanese official had

SOME JAPANESE FRIENDS REMAIN TRUE 437

to drive with Gorg6 to the Foreign Office. Thus are the police
measures for our segregation raised to the ath degree.

The Axis diplomats are not very keen about having the French
Ambassador as Dean and would prefer the Brazilian Ambassador,
who comes next in seniority, and it remains to be seen whether
Arsine-Henry will be able to get away with it.

SOME JAPANESE FRIENDS REMAIN TRUE
December 31, 1941

A Japanese friend came to see me. He said that he could not
bring himself to come sooner owing to the intensity of his feeling
of sorrow at the outbreak of war between our two countries. He
brought me very friendly messages and two letters from Japanese
friends. He said that the severity of our initial treatment by the police
during the first two weeks of our internment was due to the total
unexpectedness of the war ; no plans had been made for such an
emergency and there was therefore at the beginning a complete lack
of co-ordination among the authorities. I said that the improvement
was now noticeable but our treatment was still that of criminal
prisoners and in no way corresponded to the very considerate and
lenient treatment of the Japanese Ambassador in Washington and his
diplomatic and consular staffs.

The two letters were as follows :

Tokyo, December 17, 1941-

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Grew, —No one could have foreseen this
tragic end of our long-standing friendly relations, although so many
unfortunate events occurred in recent years. I well remember
that you always tell me that to promote the friendship of our two
countries is your life-work. I know also how hard you worked to
prevent the breaking up of the talk in Washington even till the
very last moment. It is a very sad thing that even your unfatigued
efforts could not save the peace. But you can rest assured that
we will never forget your friendship to our country and to us.
Before ending my letter I must add one thing. Whenever I told
the progress of our talk in Washington to my wife at her sick bed¬
side during the last summer, she always tried to strain her weaken¬
ing nerves not to have escaped any words from her ears. She is
happy not to have witnessed in her lifetime this tragic end of our
good relations.

Please accept my gratitude for your personal friendship and
kindness to me and to my family, and I beg to remain,

Yours most sincerely,

Tokyo, December 30, 1941

Dear Mr. Grew, —It is with a sense of great grief that I write
you this letter. In spite of our sincere and sustained endeavours

ONE WORLD : ONE WAR

438

to avert the rupture of our relations, the awful eventuality has at
last come. I do not want to say much on the causes and circum¬
stances that have led to this war ; I only wish that the present
struggle may prove but a brief episode in the long annals of our
relations, which I hope will be quickly restored.

You and Mrs. Grew have won numerous friends among my
compatriots by your able and admirable work extending over
nine long years. As you well know, it is not the habit of our people
to forget their friends easily, especially when they are so highly
esteemed as you are, and I assure you that there, are many of us
who tender their deep sympathy to you in your great difficulty.

Perhaps it is unnecessary for me to say that I consider it a great
privilege to have enjoyed your genial and generous friendship.
I look forward keenly to the happy day when we shall once again
co-operate heartily for the advancement of the relations of our
two countries.

As I have been transferred, I am leaving for my new post within
a few days’ time. I wish Mrs. Grew and your good self a happy
new year and safe voyage home.

Yours very sincerely,

The New Year’s Eve buffet supper at the chancery. At 11.59 the
lights went out and everyone sang “ Auld Lang Syne.” When the lights
ramp on, Captain Gould was in the midst of the circle dressed as
Father Time; he made a little speech and “ Auld Lang Syne ” was sung
again, everyone holding hands. But Alice and I had left at about
10.30 and we did not wait up for the New Year. We did not feel in
a mood to wait up for anything. ^

THE NEW YEAR BEGINS

January 1, 1942

A bright, clear, crisp day. Went down this morning to the chancery
to wish the members of the staff a happy New Year and to speak
to the Japanese police, Sergeant Kiyokawa and his nine officers,
who were responsible for our protection at the residence. Kiyokawa
was the officer who had been with us at the time of the February
26 Incident in 1936 and who had driven around with me for some
time thereafter. He reminded me of that time when I had given
him a silver cigarette case. Kiyokawa said that this was a war
between states and not between individuals.

The Swiss Minister came, just before going to the New Year’s
reception at Court, which, I observed, would be somewhat smaller
than usual sp far as the Diplomatic Corps was concerned. Gorge
told us that while the Japanese had accepted our proposal that the
transfer of personnel take place at Lourengo Marques, some of them
were toying with the idea of Tahiti, which would entail far shorter
Voyages. Gorg6 said he would pass the suggestion on to Washington

exchange 439

as coming from Japanese sources. The Foreign Office has written
him a note which detailed'proposals for the exchange, a copy of which
he gave us.

HOLE IN ONE

January 4, 1942

Made my first hole in one on our Embassy golf course. The
course is 422 yards long, nine holes, with small putting greens and
everything. One of the shots goes over or around one of the apart¬
ment houses and those who elect the straight over-the-roof shot
run risks, but only one window has been broken so far. The fish in
the reflection pool are having a lovely time—if they like old golf balls.

There are always from ten to fourteen at our table for every meal
and our group is fortunately a congenial one. The clerks and other
members of the staff who do not mess with us regularly come up in
rotation for a meal, and thus we keep in touch. Alice goes frequently
to the chancery to visit the commissariat or the community room,
as well as to the individual apartments.

“ WE KEEP BUSY ”

January 9, 1942

About one-half of the Foreign Office was burned in a big fire
during the night. It appears that some of the records concerning
our eventual evacuation were destroyed, and although the Swiss
Minister will furnish extra copies of his own notes, I fear that this
may delay matters beyond the delay already encountered. We are,
however, fairly comfortable, except for the intense cold of the house
due to necessary economy in fuel (the heating is never turned on
until late afternoon). The days pass quickly. I work in the morning
from breakfast until 11.30 ; then golf for an hour or so in order to
get a little exercise and fresh air ; early to bed. Plenty of time for
good reading. I have just finished Cronin’s The Keys of the Kingdom ,
an admirable book.

EXCHANGE

January 16, 1942

The Swiss Minister brought the Japanese reply to our Govern¬
ment’s proposal relating to the exchange of personnel at Lourenjo
Marques. The place of exchange has been accepted but there are
various discrepancies in the two'proposals, discussed in a memorandum
prepared by Bohlen. I called a meeting of the entire staff and told
t hem of the progress made in the negotiations, once again expressing
my admiration of their maintenance of a high morale and of their
splendid community spirit which is beyond all praise.

January 18, 1942

At Alice’s suggestion a number of us met m the music-room at
the chancery this Sunday morning and sang a number of favourite

ONE WORLD : ONE WAR

44O

hymns, Jones at the piano and Benninghoff conducting. Marion
Arnold’s lovely voice was delightful to hear.

Our free time affords an opportunity for much good reading.
Have just finished, for the second time, John Masefield’s Bird of
Dawning , one of the greatest epics of the sea ever written—a book
which nobody should pass by. Also have finished the second volume
of the life of Balfour by Mrs. Dugdale, and am now reading the
life of Elihu Root, by Professor Jessup. Root had much to do in
handling Far Eastern questions with Theodore Roosevelt, and his
comments and actions are intensely interesting at this particular time.

January 19, 1942

The Swiss Minister and Madame Gorg6, who was finally allowed
to visit Alice, came this morning, and the ladies talked for some
two hours. Meanwhile, many of our Japanese friends and others
are sending flowers and fruit, twenty-two in all, and others tried
but failed to get permission. Several of the colleagues have also
sent flowers.

January 20, 1942

The vainglorious boasting of the Japanese papers is disgusting
reading these days. I am taking home two complete sets of the
Japan Times and Advertiser from December 8, one for the Department
and one for myself.

January 22, 1942

Beat Stone one-up in our golf tournament but was quickly elimin¬
ated by Bob Fearey shortly thereafter. Benninghoff won the badminton
tournament in a thrilling final from Lamm. There are also going on
tournaments in bridge, chess, and checkers. We keep busy.

Am very proud of Bob Fearey, my private secretary, a grandson of
Bishop Lawrence of Massachusetts, who has measured up admirably.
In the absence of laundry facilities, each member of the staff has been
doing his or her own washing, and the lower part of the compound
looks like a back yard with the washed clothes and bedding hung out
to dry. But Fearey discovered an old washing machine in our garret
and he now does the washing for the entire staff twice a day, assisted
by Rustad. He is also air-raid warden for his apartment house as well
as director of athletics, and he also takes his turn as Oflicer of the Day
as well as officer in charge of policing the chancery. Incidentally he
is an electrician, radio expert, and air pilot, having ta ken more
than five hundred parachute jumps. He did all this during his
su mm er vacations at Harvard. A keen, efficient, and public-spirited
young man who should go far.

January 24, 1942 1

General Pabst, the Netherlands Minister, died to-day at St. Luke’s
from heart trouble. He was by far the senior diplomat in Japan,

funeral service for general pabst 441

having been Minister since 1923 and Military Attach^ even before
that. He* with Craigie and Romer, was one of my most intimate
colleagues. He was a typical hard-headed Dutchman but personally
agreeable and congenial, and I shall always look back on him as
one of my few most highly valued friends in Japan. I am greatly
depressed at his sudden death, but for him it is a happy release,
for he had, I believe, no close family bonds, being a bachelor, and
the developments brought about by the war must have been a
profound sorrow.

January 25, 1942

Sunday hymns again, which will now become a fixture. These
gatherings are rather inspiring. The days pass rapidly and the
intervals between Sundays seem short. We are never for a moment
bored, at least I am not, and I doubt if many of the others are,
especially those who have some scholarly work to keep them,
interested.

Dooman is busy writing a very interesting book throwing side¬
lights on Townsend Harris 9 mission to Japan, derived from Japanese
documents to which he was given access by Count Hotta, the tennis
player, who is a descendant of one of the high Japanese officials,
equivalent to the Foreign Minister, in Harris 9 time. It is intensely
interesting to see how closely the psychology of Japanese officialdom,
especially of the police, compared with that which we in the Embassy
are facing to-day.

The only members of the staff I am really sorry for are those
few who have no scholarly interests and little or no incentive
to take up a course of profitable reading. Most of them are busy
enough with the daily duties of the chancery and the compound,
including even duties of the swabbing and cleaning gang which
undertakes the job of our departed charwomen in rotation every
morning. But certain members of the staff, I fear, depend too much
upon pure sociability, and to those who are thus dependent, there
must come moments of boredom.

FUNERAL SERVICE FOR GENERAL PABST
January 29, 1942

The Swiss Minister again. He generally has a number of questions
to discuss but he comes every few days in any case, just to keep in
touch. We could not possibly have a better person looking after our
interests ; he has a keen perception of the situation and a business¬
man’s approach, forceful while exercising great care not to com¬
promise his usefulness by any improprieties or unorthodox procedure.
At the same time his assistant, Hausheer, who also comes constantly,
is equally business-like. Their attitude reminds me closely of that of
the Swiss Charge d’Affaires in Washington in 1917 and 1918 who
had charge of German interests and who used to come to see me at

443 ONE WORLD : ONE WAR

the Department, as Chief of the Western European Division, almost
daily with a long list of questions to be discussed.

To-day was the funeral service for General Pabst at St. Luke’s
chapel. The Japanese Government had arranged that one member
from each enemy diplomatic mission might attend, and for the first
time in fifty-two days I emerged from our Embassy compound, ac¬
companied by Masuo of the Foreign Office and Sergeant Kiyokawa.

I entered St. Luke’s by a side entrance, hung with mourning curtains,
and was shown immediately into the chapel without an opportunity
to speak to anyone. I wanted to slip into a rear pew, but Kishi, who
was ushering, greeted me affectionately and showed me to the aisle
seat in the second pew on the right. In the first pew on the right
Were Bagge, the Swedish Minister, representing Dutch interests, and
the Dutch Charg6 d’Affaires and Madame Reuchlin and other
members of the Dutch Legation. In our pew were other members of
the Dutch Legation and Sir Robert and Lady Craigie, and behind us
were the Belgian Ambassador and Madame Forthomme, the Peru¬
vian, Colombian, Greek, and other representatives of countries now
at war with Japan or which had broken relations with Japan.

On the left, in the first pew, were Nishi, Vice-Foreign Minister,
Hirota, Sato, and Shidehara, who came in late and who had aged
noticeably, as he was walking with a cane and was very shaky. Behind
them were the Ars&ne-Henrys, he as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps,
and behind them many others, including the Tillitses, the Gorges, the
Chilean Minister, the Argentine Charge d’Affaires, and all the other
non-enemy diplomats. Also a great many Japanese. The service was
all in Japanese save for the address given by a Dutch clergyman in
Dutch and then in English. At the end a Dutchman came to the organ
and played the Dutch national anthem.

Bagge and the Reuchlins left first; then I was immediately shown
out, as, I suppose, were all the enemies so that they would not meet
the others. I shook hands with Bagge and the Reuchlins and im¬
mediately went down to the car. Just before leaving, the Craigies
appeared and I had just a word with them, merely an exchange of
amenities and “ See you on the boat.” I would have liked to stop
for a chat, but the police had indicated that any talk, especially
between Craigie and myself, would greatly embarrass them, so I
abstained. Alice did not go to the funeral, although invited by the
Foreign Office to do so, and we heard afterwards from Japanese
friends, indirectly, that her sense of delicacy was understood and
appreciated.

SINGAPORE FALLS

February 15, 1942

Singapore, now Shonan, fell. The new name combines the thought
of the Showa era and the southward advance. This is a heavy blow,
but I look on it as only a temporary blow. The Japanese will have
to withdraw eventually from all of their ill-gotten gains j their home

japan most be OVERWHELMINGLY BEATEN 443

jdanHs are vulnerable; their fleet and limited merchant marine will
inevitably suffer from attrition, and the day will come when we shall
be in a position to blockade Japan effectively, cutting off the home¬
land from all of their gains to the south. Failing a decisive naval
batde or the entry of Russia or the collapse of Germany, it may take
a long time, but we shall never let go until the task is completed.

February 16, 194a

The Swiss Minister brought us a copy of the latest noteTrom our
Government concerning evacuation. It had been sent through
Spanish channels and, being dated February 5 in Washington, there
had been long delay. It appears that Ohta in the Foreign Office
had had it for five days before Satoh, who is in charge of the subject,
knew of its arrival. Gorg6 is very much chagrined that the negotia¬
tions were taken out of his hands, or at least that he was not informed
of the note through Berne. It appears that the Japanese asked our
Government to centralize the negotiations through Spanish channels,
but Satoh told Gorg6 that this was untrue. The usual lack of co¬
ordination in the Gaimusho, I suspect.

The lack of directness in the Japanese processes of thought apd
negotiation is well illustrated in the fact that it has taken the Swiss
Minister over two months, with hours and hours of inconclusive
conference, to arrange finally for him to sell our automobiles, wine,
and so on to other diplomatic colleagues.

To-day the Japanese are busily celebrating the fall of Singapore,
and a big procession came to demonstrate in front of our Embassy
and probably also in front of the British Embassy. Major Babcock,
Assistant Military Attach^, went out on the balcony and waved to the
demonstrators. The demonstrators waved back with their handker¬
chiefs, laughing genially, and in spite of the efforts of their leaders
to stop their friendly gestures, the whole thing broke up in laughter
and they went away still laughing.

In spite of all the war propaganda, there does not seem to exist
any fundamental hatred of the United States among the people. We
learn, too, from various sources that in spite of Japan’s initial successes
in the war, people are asking themselves whether, in view of the
unlimited resources of America, Japan can ever really win.

JAPAN MUST BE OVERWHELMINGLY BEATEN
February 17, 1942

I called a meeting of the entire staff to-day and told them of the
progress made in the negotiations for our evacuation. I also spoke
of my absolute certainty that in spite of the present dark days our
country would without question win in the end, and I read to them
the following passage from my diary :

We are returning to our country to take whatever part we may

properly be called upon or find opportunity to take towards con-

J44 0NE WORLD : ONE WAR

tributing to the certain ultimate victory of the United States in
this war of the nations, and with the firm conviction that in spite
of initial successes by the Axis powers, a terrible reckoning in
the eventual defeat of those powers is as mathematically certain
as is the law of gravity. For her own good, for the future safety
and welfare of the United States, and for the future security and
welfare of world civilization, Japan must be overwhelmingly
beaten, for only thus, under present circumstances, can her armed
forces, her military machine and system, be wholly discredited
and liquidated, and the Japanese nation be turned permanently
into paths of peace. However long this process may take, how¬
ever much it may involve American “ blood, sweat, and tears,”
there must be no relinquishing of this essential task until it is
anall y .and effectively completed. There is not room in
the Pacific area for a peaceful America and a swashbuckling
Japan.

TENTH ANNIVERSARY AS AMBASSADOR TO JAPAN
February 19s 1942

Appointed to Japan ten years ago to-day. They have been an
interesting ten years, and despite the final failure of my mission I
would not now willingly have given up that experience even in
the light of events.

The Lessons of History

History is properly based upon facts and upon such contemporary
comments as may tend to clarify those facts. Yet a study of history
is futile unless, from the lessons of history, mankind derives con¬
structive guidance in the art of statesmanship. The rapidly accelerat¬
ing progress in certain phases of civilization, notably in science,
economics, communication, and transit, has rendered national
isolation an anachronism. The nations of the world have become so
closely integrated and knitted together that, as frequently stated by
our Government in recent years, any war between any two or more
nations disturbs a delicately balanced world economy and is there¬
fore of concern to all other nations. For that reason our Government
has consistently manifested its concern in situations in various parts
of the world which threatened to, or did in fact, lead to war.

The right to intervene morally or physically in such situations
carries with it, however, a corollary in die way of an obligation : we
cannot logically on the one hand exercise the right of intervention,
morally or physically, in situations between other nations which
might lead to war on the ground that our national interests are
affected thereby, while on the other hand manifesting indifference to
the conditions creating such situations. It is a fact and not a theory
that the nations are to-day interdependent: in a world so closely
integrated as it is to-day, the policies and actions of every nation

PURE HIGHWAY ROBBERY 445

carry consequences which reach the world’s five continents and seven
seas. We cannot permit nations to seize and pre-empt by processes
of conquest areas whose resources should be available to all. Never¬
theless, so long as any nation follows policies designed exclusively
for the protection and furtherance of its own interests and is not
solicitous to assist in resolving the problems of other nations whose
well-being is equally necessary for the operation of a world economy
such as we have to-day, just so long will the progress of civilization
and the welfare of mankind be retarded, through unnecessary and
futile wars.

In the world of to-day and to-morrow, no nation can afford simply
to “ mind its own business,” for the problems of its neighbours, all its
neighbours, must inevitably become an important part of its business,
and sound statesmanship must recognize that the practical logic of
“ splendid isolationism,” or bloc isolationism, has gone for ever.
And so long as we, in our future diplomatic, political, and legislative
policies and actions, fail to perceive the lessons of history and the
lost opportunities of the past, just so long shall we as a nation
continue to overlook opportunities to employ our limidess strength,
both material and moral, towards the development of civilization
and of the welfare of our own country and people without the
dissipation of lives and wealth in useless wars.

PURE HIGHWAY ROBBERY
February 21, 1942

The Swiss Minister came again to-day and told us that the matter
of selling our cars, wine, et cetera, has now been entirely re-opened
because the Ministry of Finance insists on the Swiss Minister putting
the proceeds into an account at the Yokohama Specie Bank separate
from his account for official expenses. From that account we would
be allowed to draw cash for our current expenses while here, but as
soon as we have left, the money would be frozen and the Minister
would not be allowed to use it for official expenses,'crediting us with
our individual proceeds in Washington. That, as the Minister pointed
out to Kiuchi, is tantamount to confiscation. I shall certainly not
sell my cars or wine under such conditions and I asked the Minister
to let the whole matter ride for the present, merely reporting the
facts to Washington.

This is pure highway robbery. The Ministry of Finance, the
Home Office, and the War Office are determined to decide every
question over the head of the Foreign Office and with no consider¬
ation of international usage. The Foreign Office, they say, has been
given the opportunity to conduct the country’s foreign affairs and
has failed, and it has lost so much face that it must now be crowded
out of the picture. One Japanese diplomat’s wife told Gorg£ that her
husband was depressed and wanted to get out, because he was placed
in the position of being authorized to give the Minister certain

446 ONE WORLD : ONE WAR

assurances and then was obliged to withdraw those assurances owing
to a change of decision in some other ministry. The Finance Ministry,
for instance, has taken the position that the Ministry an^ not the
Swiss Minister has custody of the effects of the Embassy and of its
officers and will decide all matters of the disposition of such effects.
This, of course, is absurd, and Gorg6 quite properly pointed out to
Kiuchi that in such a case the members of the Embassy would have
no legal rights of protection as they could not have recourse to the
Japanese courts of law. Yet all kinds of arbitrary decisions are taken
by the other ministries without consulting the Foreign Office on
points of international law or usage.

Another point is that the police in Yokohama will not allow the
Swiss delegate to visit one of the civilian internment camps, and
they want two representatives of the civilians to meet the Swiss dele¬
gate at the police office. That, of course, is contrary to all inter¬
national usage, and it implies that something is wrong with the
camp. The civilian delegates would of course be warned by the
police not to complain lest matters be made harsher for them. No
such prohibitions arose in Germany during the last war, and we
used to visit the civilian camp at Ruhleben at least every week. In
other parts of Japan the Swiss were allowed to talk to the prisoners
quite alone and without the presence of any police official. There
seems to be no co-ordination, and each official takes such arbitrary
decisions as he sees fit.

WASHINGTON’S BIRTHDAY
February 22, 1942

Washington’s Birthday, and Sunday, At the end of the hymns
we sang ffie “ Battle Hymn of the Republic ” and then the national
anthem, and at 11.30 we had the entire staff at the Embassy, where
I proposed a toast to the President.

THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN IS CERTAIN
February 28, 1942

With Japan steadily expanding her conquests and with so little
to show on the credit side of the ledger up to the present, it is diffi¬
cult to foresee the certain eventual victory of the Allies and Japan’s
final defeat. Yet of that final defeat I have not the slightest doubt.
As I have said, that defeat seems to me as mathematically certain as
the law of gravity.

Prophecies unsupported by facts are perhaps idle day-dreams, but
I visualize the eventual outcome somewhat as follows : Germany will
eventually crack, either through economic dissolution, especially
through lack of oil, or through revolution, possibly commencing in
the occupied countries. I know the breed by l<$ng experience:

the defeat of japan is certain 447

blatant bullies while on top, craven and whining defeatists when the
tables are turned. The strain in Germany in matters of food and raw
materials must be steadily increasing. Once the Army fails to show
continued victories, whether in Russia or elsewhere, the dissolution
will rapidly progress. Morale will go to pieces and the end will then
' be in sight. The casualty lists from the Russian campaign will have
their due effect, and the time will come, perhaps very soon, when
Goebbels’ propaganda lies will no longer serve to bolster morale and
moral disintegration will be rapid. When Churchill recently said
that victory may come sooner than expected, an unusually optimistic
statement from him because he has always painted the darker side
of the picture, I dare say that he had the foregoing situation in mind
and that he may very likely possess evidence of the impending crack
in the German Army or people.

Once Germany is out of the picture, Italy will of course immedi¬
ately have to follow suit. That will leave Japan with the prospect of
farin g alone the combined sea and air forces of the United States
and Great Britain, with the probable addition of Soviet Russia. If
Soviet Russia should then come in—and it is difficult to see how she
could afford to pass up the opportunity to acquire lost territory and
to render herself permanently invulnerable against Japan—the
problem would be immensely simplified, because, with the allied sea
and air forces based on Vladivostok, Japan proper could be rapidly
blockaded, her cities bombed, her shipping destroyed, and her life¬
lines and contacts with her outlying forces completely severed. Occu¬
pation of Japan might even eventually be feasible.

But even if Soviet Russia should remain neutral and should await
the final Anglo-American victory before settling her own problems
with Japan, there could be no doubt that the combined American
and British fleets, totally freed from the Atlantic, would be able to
reoccupy at least some of the bases within striking distance of Japan,
whence their submarines and planes could intercept shipping and
still blockade the islands.

Indeed, with Germany out of the picture, the Japanese Govern¬
ment could hardly fail to perceive the inevitable outcome, and with
a view to saving her cities and avoiding the total destruction of her
merchant marine, if only by gradual attrition, her capitulation
might well take place after the downfall of the Axis. But we shall
have to guard against a premature peace.

To return to Europe, the moment the crack in Germany begins
to appear I shall expect a general rising among the people of the
occupied countries, including' the French. Turkey may well come
into the war at that time, while Rumania is more than likely to
desert the Axis and attack Hungary for the purpose of acquiring
Transylvania. Italy, too, would fade rapidly from the scene.

All this is, of course, painting the future picture in its brightest
colours, but the hypothesis does not seem to me to be too far-fetched.
And even if the end should not come so-quickly as we might hope.

448 one world : one war

nevertheless, with the downfall of the Axis, processes would im¬
mediately be set in motion which could not fail in the end to lead
to total victory for our country.

YANKEE REMINISCENCE

March io, 1942

Father’s centenary. He was born March 10, 1842. I proposed at
dinner a toast to his memory and made a little speech with a few
reminiscences. One anecdote was of my grandfather Grew who, on his
death-bed, was worried by some problem, and just before he died he
managed to get it out: coming into Boston from Hyde Park in the
morning (I think it was New Year’s Day and that he was going to
deliver his usual presents of books) he had forgotten his purse and
had borrowed five cents from the conductor on the train to pay his
horse-car fare; he wanted before he died to be sure that the debt
would be paid. It was.

MORE EMBASSY NOTES, SOCIAL AND OTHERWISE
March 24, 1942

Went to the dentist, Dr. Kotani, as a tooth broke and an inset
came out. Had a little talk with Houstoun-Boswall and the Kennedys
of the British Embassy, who were there ; we call the dentist’s the
social dub of Tokyo, as one generally meets some colleagues.

Fujimoto, one of our translators, a full American citizen without
dual nationality, was to-day actually kidnapped from the Embassy by
the police. and arrested, charged with some breach of Japanese law
about which we are ignorant. The last seen of him was when he
accompanied a policeman to the gate, no doubt having been told
that someone wanted to see him, and once outside he was quietly
taken away. His wife and young son are in the Embassy. His f amil y
wanted him to remain in Japan, but he decided that he wished to
return with, us to his home in the United States. Subsequently he
wrote his wife that he had decided to remain in Japan, but we have
htde doubt that pressure was brought to bear on him by the police.
The Swiss Minister has made strong representations but so far without
Foreign Office says that it is awaiting a report from the
Minister of Justice. This is just one more of the outrages inflicted
on us by the Japanese police.

ONE AMERICAN-BORN JAPANESE WHO CHOSE JAPAN
March 25, 1942

Dooman’s birthday. We had a cake at tea and drank his health.
I made a little speech to the effect that no man could wish for a
more effective chief of staff, and that no group could have had a
better executive officer whose constant thought was for our welfare,

ONE AMERICAN-BORN JAPANESE WHO CHOSE JAPAN 449

both as a group and individually. He told me afterwards that he was
too much moved to make more than a perfunctory reply.

Here is another entry from Dooman’s diary telling about the
American-born Japanese who chose Japan :

Yesterday evening shortly before six o’clock Benninghoff re¬
ported to me that Fujimoto, the translator, had disappeared.
Fujimoto was bom in the United States and had dual nation¬
ality until a few years ago, when he returned to the United
States and divested himself of Japanese nationality. He came
back to Japan and has since been a member of the Embassy staff.

According to Benninghoff, Fujimoto was last seen at about
10.30 in the morning. Although his wife had noticed his absence,
she was not particularly alarmed until about three o’clock in
the afternoon, when she reported to Benninghoff that she had not
been able to find her husband. Benninghoff and Turner then
made a thorough search of the buildings and grounds, but to no
effect. Benninghoff thereupon went to Kyokawa, the officer in
charge of the police detachment at the Embassy. He found
Kyokawa working on some papers, and he asked him whether
he knew where Fujimoto was. Kyokawa continued writing with¬
out looking up and asked : “ Isn’t he here ? ” Benninghoff then
described the efforts to find Fujimoto and said that it was obvious
that Fujimoto was not in the compound. Kyokawa all this time
continued to work on his papers and did not look up. If anyone
in the compound had left the compound without Kyokawa’s
knowledge, one could be certain that Kyokawa would be extremely
excited, but he showed himself wholly unconcerned over the dis¬
appearance of Fujimoto. It was apparent to Benninghoff that
Kyokawa was cognizant of the matter.

Upon receiving this report from Benninghoff I immediately
went to Kyokawa and asked him whether he knew anything at
all about the disappearance of Fujimoto. Kyokawa looked me
straight in the eye and said he knew nothing at all about it, but
that he would call up the metropolitan police station and make
inquiries. He went into the next room where the telephone is
and I heard him through the door say over the telephone that
I was making inquiries about the Fujimoto case and he asked
what position he should take. Kyokawa returned shortly there¬
after and said that he was going to the police station and would
inquire about the Fujimoto case. I asked Kyokawa to telephone
to the Swiss Minister at once and ask that the Swiss Minister come
and call upon the Ambassador. Kyokawa then turned quite ugly,
said that he was under no obligation to “ obey my instructions,”
and he walked off.

After dinner the Ambassador gave me a note asking the Swiss
Minister to call the first thing this morning, and I took the note
to the policeman on duty and asked whether he would allow the
15

450 0NF ' WORLD : ONE WAR

note to be taken at once to the Swiss Minister. The officer called up
the metropolitan police station on the telephone, and then reported
to me that the note could not be sent out until this morning.

As soon as Kyokawa arrived this morning, I asked him what
he had to say about the Fujimoto case. Kyokawa said that all
he could tell me at that moment was that Fujimoto had been
arrested- I told Kyokawa that I knew perfectly well yesterday
evening, when he denied all knowledge of the matter, that he was
fully cognizant of it and was probably instrumental in bringing
about the seizure of Fujimoto. Kyokawa admitted that, but he said
that he had been.angered by my threatening attitude. He calmed
down after a while and I was able to extract considerable in¬
formation out of him. It appears that Fujimoto’s mother has been
bitterly opposed to Fujimoto’s return to the United States, and that
some grave charge has been lodged by some member of his family
against Fujimoto in order to provide a pretext for his detention.

March 27, 1942

I gave out the prizes for the Greater East Asia Bridge Marathon.
Smith-Hutton won the first prize, Makinson the second, and Parkes
the consolation or booby prize.

Mrs. Tillitse, wife of the Danish Minister, wrote Alice that Kishi
had finally managed to arrange for us to play golf outside and that
he hoped to play with me himself. I told the staff of my attitude and
then wrote a letter to Mrs. Tillitse. I understand that the British,
rian fldiang, and Australians have played once but that Craigie
refused to go.

GOLF REFUSED, AND WHY

Embassy of the
United States of America
Tokyo, March 29, 1942

Dear Mrs. Tillitse, —Alice has told me of Mr. Kishi’s efforts to
arrange for us to play golf and the fact that his efforts appear to have
been finally successful. I sincerely appreciate what he has done, and I
shall be very grateful if you or the Minister will find occasion to tell
him so from me. Kishi has always been one of my highly valued
friends in Japan and nothing can ever change my feeling of personal
friendship and affection ior him. That feeling will endure per¬
manently no matter what has happened or what may happen in
future. His thoughtfulness and kindness in trying to arrange the golf
are typical of his consent desire to be helpful to others, a character¬
istic which no one has appreciated more than I during the ten years
that I have known him, and I hope that some day in future we may
meet in happier circumstances and continue our friendship as before.

Unfortunately, there are a number of reasons why I cannot accept

GOLF refused, and why 451

the invitation to play golf, and I think that in view of Mr. Kishi’s
efforts it is only right that he should know these reasons. The Swiss
Minister made similar efforts long ago, but I told him at the be¬
ginning that I would definitely not accept such an invitation and I
asked him to desist. As a matter of fact, the manager of one golf club
told the Minister that it would be embarrassing to the members if we
were to come there, and I certainly would not wish to place myself
in that position in any club. The embarrassment would be mutual.

But there are even more fundamental reasons why I could not
accept such an invitation. Nearly four months have gone by, during
which we were not permitted to leave our Embassy except for medical
reasons. Now, just as the date for our evacuation is approaching,
the authorities deign to permit us to go to some golf links—perhaps
once, perhaps twice—I do not know. The assumption is logical that
this is now being done for the purpose of putting a more favourable
light on the record of our internment, and knowing the way in
which the Japanese propaganda office functions, I have little doubt that
were I to accept such an invitation, full publicity would be given
to it as an indication of our considerate treatment during this entire
period. Yet our treatment has been very far from considerate, and
at the beginning it was contrary to all concepts of international usage.
We were treated not only as prisoners but as criminal prisoners, and
throughout our internment we have been subjected to repeated indig¬
nities and humiliations by the police. I will not bore you with a recita¬
tion of these things, but it will be difficult ever to forget them in future.

Quite apart from our treatment in the Embassy, the intensity of
my own feeling is undoubtedly shared by the American people to
an inexpressible degree.

With regard to the members of my staff, I have put the matter as
follows: I do not wish them to accept this invitation as a matter of
sport or entertainment, but if they feel that they need the excursion
for reasons of physical or moral health, I have no objection to their
playing among themselves. Some of my staff, especially those who,
unlike myself, have been separated from their wives and families during
this bitter experience, are really suffering from the effects of the long
confinement; they want and need to get out into the open spaces, and
I fully sympathize with that need. I do not know whether they will
accept the invitation or not, but they have my full permission to do so.

In view of Mr. Kishi’s very kind attitude and efforts, I think it is
' only fair to him that he should fully understand my own attitude,
and I believe that it would be proper to let Him read this letter.

With our warmest affectionate regards to you and the Minister,

Always cordially yours,

March 28, 1942

Swiss Minister. When he came to the Embassy gate to-day it was
partially closed and the police merely stood with folded arms, scowling
at Gorgi, and made no move to open the gate or even to ask the

45 2 ONE WORLD : ONE WAR

chauffeur to open it himself. The Minister then drove to the Foreijm
Office and told Kiuchi of the incident; Kiuchi said, “ Mats e'tst
trh grave.” He telephoned to the police headquarters, but Gor$
insisted on a Foreign Office official accompanying him. The police
maintained the same attitude even in the presence of the nffiq a i
and the chauffeur had to get out and open die gate himself. I am
glad that the official saw it. This may be due merely to the attitude
of one policeman, but it is more likely a studied insult, either because
they think that the Minister comes too often or because they are
angry at our protest in the Fujimotp case. Gorgd was, of course
very angry and netded, as it was a direct insult to him. Just one
more indignity, and we in the Embassy are powerless.

March 30, 1942

Kase came to see me with a piece of lamb and some oranges from
a high Japanese official and friend. I talked to Kase of the Fujimoto
case and other indignities inflicted on us by the police, hoping that
he would repeat my remarks to Togo.

Dr. Amano, the wife, came to the Embassy and gave us all our first
inoculations for typhoid and paratyphoid.

March 31, 1942

The Swiss Minister. The Japanese Government has proposed to
our Government that we leave for Louren$o Marques on or about
April 25, via Shanghai, Saigon, and probably Singapore, arriving
there on May 20. The ship will accommodate about 1 r 00 passengers,
and as. there will be about 500 officials, that will leave room for
approximately 600 non-officials, which Gorge suggests might be
divided roughly to include the 100 non-officials in Indo-China and
Thailand and 250 each from Japan and China. The Japanese hope
that the American evacuation ship will arrive at Lourengo Marques
at the same time.

PLANS FOR DEPARTURE STILL MISFIRE
April 1, 1942

I called a meeting of the full staff to-day and told them of the
Japanese proposal for our evacuation from Japan on or about April 25,
the Japanese evacuation ship to stop at Shanghai and Saigon to
pick up other evacuees and to arrive at Lourenqo Marques about
May 20. This communication gave great encouragement to all and
everyone’s spirits rose immediately. The proposal, alas, did not go
through.

April 5,. 1942

We held an Easter service in the chancery, with several of the Easter
' music by Jones, piano, Tiso and Mrs. Playfair, violins,

and Miss Williams, flute. I also read the lesson from St. John, We

AFTER BATAAN AND THE CORAL SEA 453

had been asked by the police if we wished to have some American
clergyman come in to hold the service, but we declined, preferring
an informal gathering. The Catholics were taken to Mass in one of
the Catholic churches.

April 8, 1942

The Swiss Minister. It now looks as if we should not get away
until the middle of May at earliest. It is amusing to remember how,
in December, Alice remarked that we had better conserve our fire¬
wood because we might be here until February and how everyone had
laughed at the joke. I lost ten dollars to Ned Crocker in a bet that
we should be away before St. Valentine’s Day, and I believe that he
cleaned up in several other monthly bets.

JIMMIE DOOLITTLE RAIDS TOKYO .

April 18, 1942

The Swiss Minister came again, and just as he was leaving before
lunch we heard a lot of planes overhead and saw five or six large
fires burning in different directions with great volumes of smoke. At
first we thought that it was only manoeuvres but soon became aware
that it was the first big raid on Japan by American bombers which
are reported to have attacked first in the Hokkaido and then, in
turn, Tokyo, Yokosuka, Nagoya, and Kobe. We saw one of them,
apparently losing altitude and flying very low, just over the tops of
the buildings to the west, and at first we feared that it had crashed
but then realized that it was intentionally following these tactics in
order to avoid the dives of pursuit planes and the anti-aircraft fire.
To the east we saw a plane with a whole line of black puffs of smoke,
indicating anti-aircraft explosions, just on its tail; it didn’t look like
a bomber and we are inclined to believe that the Japanese batteries
lost their heads and fired on their own pursuit planes.

All this was very exciting, but at the time it was hard to believe
that it was more than a realistic practice by Japanese planes. The
Japanese press claimed that nine enemy planes had crashed, but we
doubt if any were lost since, if even one had crashed bn land, the
papers would have been full of triumphant pictures of the wreck.
They appeared too large to have come from an aircraft carrier, and
they may have been flying from the Aleutian Islands to the new air
bases in China. We were all very happy and proud in the Embassy,
and the British told us later that they drank toasts all day to the
American fliers.

AFTER BATAAN AND THE CORAL SEA
May 26, 1942

Japanese propaganda is so childish that it merely becomes amus¬
ing. After the fall of Bataan the Nichi Jficki published on April 15

454 0NE world : one war

(evening edition) a photograph of the alleged entrance to the captured
base, but the big painted sign says : U.S. Navy Vase, Mariveles,
spelled with a V. The next day the Times and Advertiser published
the same picture, but obviously recognized the error because they
had scratched out the V and roughly substituted a B, the erasure
being quite obvious. Of course the Japanese painted that sign
themselves to prove to the public what they had captured.

In the Miyako and other vernacular papers on May 26 there are
published photographs of the Coral Sea Battle, one picture showing
the wake of a ship apparently leading up to a spout of spray and
smoke which is labelled in the paper as marking the sinking of an
American warship. But on another page of the paper another picture,
clearly taken from the same spot but shifted a little more to the right,
shows an American aircraft carrier going in the other direction
away from the explosion, and it is clearly her wake that shows in the
first picture !

WE PREPARE TO DEPART

May 29, 1942

Called a meeting of the staff to announce the good news of our
prospective departure on June 18. There was great enthusiasm.

May 31, 1942

Memorial Day meeting at the residence; we sang “ My Country,
’Tis of Thee,” “The Battle Hymn of the Republic,” and “The
Star-Spangled Banner,” and'I spoke. Everyone was there, 63 of us.

MEMORIAL DAY ADDRESS : “ OUR NATIVE LAND ”

For many years, according to the traditions of Memorial Day, we
have annually on May 30 decorated in the cemetery in Yokohama
the graves of the American soldiers, sailors, and civilians who are
buried in Japan, and our Naval Attachd has annually placed a
wreath on the water off Yokohama in memory of those who died at
sea. These ceremonies, carried out with simple reverence, were
symbolic of the American spirit: we do not, we cannot ever forget those
who gave their lives for our country, whether in the heat of combat
or in carrying out other duties aimed to create conditions in which
combat might never occur. The American soldiers, sailors, and
civilians who are buried in Japan were fortunately in the latter
category. Who shall say whether it is the warriors in battle or those
who work for peace before war intervenes that best serve their country ?
Many 'an American has lived and died abroad without fanfare, yet
who^ laboured loyally, unselfishly, and patriotically for \\hat he
considered to be the highest concept of his nation’s good. But when
war comes, when freedom and righteousness and law and order are

memorial day address : “ our native land ” 455

confronted with lawlessness and disorder and slavery and the predatory
instincts of primeval man, then :

Though love repine and reason chafe,

There came a voice without reply :

’Tis man’s perdition to be safe
When for the truth he ought to die!

During these months of our internment, we have regularly held
these Sunday meetings for the singing of hymns. Those of us who
have attended those meetings must have felt their spontaneity, the
reverent spirit in which they were conducted, and the inspiration
which we have derived from them. Without the formality of church
services we have, in the words of the psalm and in our own way,
“ worshipped God in the beauty of holiness,” simply but from the
heart. These Sunday gatherings, I believe, have served to brighten
the flame of our Christian faith during moments of discouragement;
they have taken us momentarily away from a war-tom world ; they
have brought us together. This year we cannot in practice‘hold the
traditional ceremonies of decorating the graves on Memorial Day,
but we have set aside this Sunday meeting of ours to remember in
mind and spirit those who gave their lives for our country, and so
that we may hold their memory perpetually warm.

I have mentioned the occasional moments of discouragement
which must have come to all of us during these past difficult months.
So far as I am concerned, such moments of discouragement have
been but temporary. I have not an iota of doubt of our ultimate
victory in this war of the nations. Call it a blind faith if you will. We
cannot sit down and prove it as we would solve a mathematical
problem. There are too many imponderable factors. Cold logic may
ascribe that faith merely to wishful thinking. But there is more to
it than that. Let us call it a fundamental instinctive convicdon, based
on many palpable factors, which to me is just as satisfying as mathe¬
matical proof, and if I can pass on to you even a tithe of that conviction
and faith to add to your own, it is yours.

Now at last we are going home. I have spoken of these past
months sis difficult ones. They have been difficult, in some respects
terribly difficult, in varying degrees and for various reasons in the
case of each of us. To those who have been separated from their
families our sympathy and understanding have been complete if
inexpressible. I myself, during these past months, have had plenty
of time to survey the ruins of a life’s work, as an architect might
regard, after earthquake and fire, the ruins of a great building which
he had conceived and had endeavoured to erect, pier by pier and
stone by stone, with a solidity that might permanently withstand the
dements. That castle, alas, has crumbled about us. It is not a happy
vision.

Some of us, no doubt, will in the future look back upon tfejs ex¬
perience since last December as a nightmare. Yet to me it will never

ONE WORLD 1 ONE WAR

456

be a nightmare, simply because it has been the most inspiring ex¬
perience in a longish public life full of vivid experiences. Here was
a group of many different elements, heterogeneous elements if you
wiS, ^jith varying interests, characters, and predilections. Human
nature is always human nature, and there were inevitable possi¬
bilities, if not probabilities, that this little group of ours would fail to
stand the strain of the daily and hourly close association of our con¬
finement over this long period. I leave it to you, each of you, to
determine whether or not it has stood that strain. My own impres¬
sion is that no similar group in the same circumstances could ever
have stood the strain so well. The community spirit, the desire to
share with the others what each could contribute, the co-operation
and mutual helpfulness, the abnegation of self in so preponderant
a number of cases, and, above all, the cheerfulness and humour that
have pervaded our group in its restricted life, restricted both in
space and activity, have given me a feeling of the deepest pride that
I shall retain as long as I live, just as I shall always retain a close
affection for you all. The spirit that has pervaded this group and
that has resulted in this splendid co-operative atmosphere is funda¬
mentally and intrinsically American. It is one of the instinctive
traits that have made our country great, the trait of community
spirit and mutual helpfulness. And as we look back in future on this
experience, I believe we shall realize that far from being a period of
stagnation, each one of us has gained something, each one of us has
developed traits of character that may have needed development,
each one of us has perhaps grown a little in stature. “ And if I drink
oblivion of a day/’ wrote Meredith, “ so shorten I the stature of my
soul.” There has been no oblivion during this period, but rather
work and care for the greatest good of the greatest number. That is
the cause of my feeling of inspiration. I venture to hope that you all
feel the same way about it, and that that same magnificent community
spirit will carry us all the way home, right up to our landing on the
soil of our beloved country.

Now we are going home to take whatever part we may find or be
called upon to take in the great effort of our country. Please share
my abundant faith, if you can, that that effort will not be in vain. We
shall need the courage of our faith, and we shall continually need,
in working with our fellow Americans at home, the same close co¬
operative spirit of which we have learned something during these
months of our association here. “ Faith, hope, and charity ” is a
pretty solid basis for the guidance of mankind, but I have always felt,
and I feel it now more than ever, that a better connotation of the
essential intention of that scriptural phrase can be expressed by the
words ** Faith, courage, and love.” Those words give us a sound
bearing for our future navigation, for both faith and hope need to be
supported by courage if they are to be something more alive and
vibrant than a mere pious platitude, and for their application in
everyday life—so that our co-operative spirit shall be equally alive

memorial day address : “ OUR native land

457

and vibrant—they need to be reinforced by what our hymn
“America the Beautiful ” refers to as our “ brotherhood . . . from
sea to shining sea.”

Throughout the greater part of my life I have followed two little
personal traditions. The first began in early youth and I carried it
into our family, and when our children began to grow up and we
returned from time to time to our country from abroad, we used to
take those four little gjrls of ours to the bow of the liner just as we
passed the Statue of Liberty in New York Harbour, and together we
recited those burning lines of Scott which Edward Everett Hale,
who in fact married us, had used so poignantly in his book The Man
Without a Country :

Breathes there the man, with soul so dead,

Who never to himself hath said:

“ This is my own, my native land; ”

Whose heart hath ne’er within him turn’d
As home his footsteps he hath turn’d
From wandering on a foreign strand?

If such there breathe, go mark him well ;

For him no minstrel raptures swell;

High though his titles , proud his fame ,

Boundless his wealth as wish can claim ,

Despite his titles , power, and pelf
The wretch concentred all in self
Living , shall forfeit fair renown ,

And, doubly dying , shall go down
To the vile dust , from whence he sprung ,

Unwept , unhonour’d, and unsung .

The other little tradition of which I speak is to repeat every Memorial
Day the Gettysburg Address, and to-day I should like to take this
moment, while with you all, to do so, for I know of nothing ever
written in the English language that can surpass it in the sheer beauty
and inspiration of its diction. No doubt you know how it was
prepared and delivered. The weary and harassed President made his
rough notes for the address on the back of an old envelope while
going down to Gettysburg in the train, and that night, while in the
hotel, he put the speech into shape. At the meeting on the battlefield
the next day, November 19, 1863, he was preceded by one of the
foremost speakers of our country, who indulged at great length
in the then customary flight of oratory. And when Lincoln, gaunt
and ungainly, arose, spoke for but two or three minutes and then
sat down, the audience was amazed and bitterly disappointed that
on such an occasion they should have been deprived of the long
bursts of grandiloquence to which they were accustomed and which
they had eagerly awaited. The anti-climax after the preceding
oration and the almost total absence of applause were pitiable. Even
Lincoln himself believed that the address had|been a woeful failure.

* 5 *

ONE WORLD : ONE WAR

458

It was only later, when the address was read and the majestic beauty
and dignity of its words had penetrated, that the world found it
was the richer for one of the greatest and most inspiring literary
masterpieces of all time. How apt are those historic words on this
Memorial Day, nearly eighty years later, must overwhelmingly
impress us all.

Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on
this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated
to the proposition that all men are created equal..

Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that
nation or any nation so conceived and so dedicated can long
endure. We are met on a great battlefield of that war. We have
come to dedicate a portion of that field as a final,resting-place
of those who here gave their lives that this nation might live. It
is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this.

But, in a larger sense, we cannot dedicate—we cannot conse¬
crate—we cannot hallow—this ground. The brave men, living
and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it, far above
our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note,
nor long remember, what we say here, but it can never forget
what they did here. It is for us the living, rather, to be dedi¬
cated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here
have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here
dedicated to the great task remaining before us—that from these
honoured dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which
they gave the last full measure of devotion—that we here highly
resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain that this
nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom and that
government of the people, by the people, for the people shall not
perish from the earth. ,

POSTSCRIPT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Radio Address delivered over the CBS network, August 30,1942

First op all, I should like to say how deeply we have been moved,
my associates and myself, who have just returned on the exchange
ship Gripsholm, by the many greetings of friends and the great volume
of messages of welcome which have come to us from all over the
country. The welcome given us has wanned our hearts, and it is
one that we can never forget, nor can we ever forget the really in¬
expressible joy of coming homo after the difficult months and moments
through which we have passed in Japan and Japanese-occupied
territories. It may be impossible to answer all those messages in¬
dividually. Please let me express now to all who hear me our most
grateful thanks for them.

Never before has my native land looked to me so beautiful. Never
before has a home-coming meant so much. I think you will realize
a little of what it meant to us when I tell you of those last seven
days at anchor off Yokohama before our evacuation vessel finally
sailed from Japanese waters. Wc were awaiting the completion of
the negotiations for our exchange, not knowing whether those negoti¬
ations would be successful and whether, if they were unsuccessful,
we might not all be returned to our imprisonment in Japan. Among
us were many Americans—missionaries, teachers, newspaper cor¬
respondents, business men—who had spent the preceding six months
in solitary confinement in small, bitterly cold prison cells, inade¬
quately clothed and inadequately fed and at times subjected to the
most cruel and barbaric tortures. I will not go into the nature of
those tortures, which were many, except to mention an incident on
the Gripsholm when three elderly Americans, one of them over seventy
years old, gave me a demonstration of the water cure which had
repeatedly been inflicted upon them. We went up to the bow of the
ship early in the morning where a friend posed as the subjectof the
torture. He was tied up with his knees drawn up to his chin, his neck
being attached to his knees and his hands securely bound behind him
so that the cords in the actual torture had penetrated deep under
the skin. He was then rolled over with his face up and water was
poured into his nose and mouth. It was a realistic performance,
but only from the oral description of those men could I visualize
what the actual torture must have been. Six large buckets of water
were used by the Japanese police, so that the subject in every case
lost consciousness and then was brought back to consciousness^ merely
to have the same thing repeated. One of those elderly missionaries
was given the water cure six separate times in order to make him
divulge information which he was supposed to have acquired as an
alleged spy.

459

460 POSTSCRIPT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Nearly all of the American missionaries, teachers, newspaper
correspondents, and business men were regarded as potential spies*
The stupidity of those Japanese police was only surpassed by their
utter cruelty. That same American told me that once while he was
lying tied on the ground a Japanese had ground his boot sole into his
face and then had brutally kicked him, smashing a rib. When he
was finally untied, he could barely stand and he said he feared that
a rib had been broken. One of the Japanese police asked where the
broken rib was and began tp feel his body. As the Japanese came
to the broken bone he said, “ Is that the place ? ” and when the man
answered “ Yes,” the policeman hauled off with his fist and hit that
broken rib as hard as he could. In another case, a well-known
American has been seriously maimed as a result of the gangrene
which was caused by the ill-treatment he received in his prison cell.

I had known him in years gone by and seldom have I had so great
a shock as when I saw him on the ship, a mere shadow of his former
self. There were many, many other cases.

I had heard indirecdy of the horrible atrocities perpetrated in
the rape of Nanking and of the fearful things done in Hong Kong
when soldiers who had been taken as* prisoners of war were bayoneted
to death. But on shipboard we had direct evidence, for the dying
. shrieks of those soldiers were heard by a woman, a fellow-passenger
of ours, who herself told me the terrible story. This was no second¬
hand evidence, but the reports of reliable.first-hand witnesses and,
in the case of the torture, the first-hand evidence of those who had
suffered the tortures themselves.

Do you wonder that during those seven days of waiting in the
harbour of Yokohama several of those people told me that if the
negotiations for our exchange failed they would commit suicide
rather than return to their imprisonment in Japan ? I know that
they would have done so.

And then came one of the greatest of all moments. I awoke at
1.00 a.m., on June 25, sensing that something was happening. I
looked out of die port-hole and saw a piece of wood slowly moving^
past in the water. Another piece of wood moved faster. We were
at last under way, slowly accelerating until the ship was finally
speeding at full steam, away from Yokohama, away from Japan,
pointing homewards. Ah, what a moment that was, even though we
had 18,000 miles" to cover and seventy days in all before we should
pass the Statue of Liberty in New York Harbour and repeat to our¬
selves, with tears pouring down many a face,

Breathes there the man with soul so dead

Who never to himself hath said ,

This is my own , my native land?

I shall have something to say to-night about the Japanese military
machine which brought on this war and against which we are
fighting to-day. But before turning to that subject, there is some-

POSTSCRIPT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 461

thing else which I cannot leave unsaid. I have lived for ten years in
Japan. X have had many friends in Japan, some of whom I admired,
respected, and loved. They are not the people who brought on this
war. As patriots they will fight for their Emperor and country, to
the last ditch if necessary, but they did not want this war and it
was not they who began it. Even during our imprisonment in Tokyo
many of those friends used to contrive to send us gifts, in spite of
the usual obstruction of the police, who wished to cut us off com¬
pletely from the outside world. They were not the usual gifts of
flowers but gifts of food, sometimes a piece of meat, which was the
most precious gift they could confer because they themselves could
seldom get meat. For ten years I have broken bread in their houses
and they in mine. They were personally loyal to me to the end.

But there is the other side to the picture, the ugly side of cruelty,
brutality, and utter bestiality, the ruthlessness and rapaciousness
of the Japanese military machine which brought on this war. That
Japanese military machine and military caste and military system
must be utterly crushed, their credit and predominance must be
utterly broken, for the future safety and welfare of the United States
and of the United Nations, and for the future safety and welfare of
civilization and humanity. Let us put it in a nutshell: there is not
sufficient room in the area of the Pacific Ocean for a peaceful America,
for any and all of the peace-loving United Nations, and a swash¬
buckling Japan.

And now, before closing, I should like to tell you something about
the Japanese military machine against which we are fighting to-day.
That machine has been trained and perfected through many years,
for it has always had in view, even before the invasion of Manchuria
in 1931, the prospect of eventually sweeping not only to the north
against Russia, but to the west and south in order to control what
the Japanese have latterly termed “ The Co-Prosperity Sphere of
Greater East Asia including the South Seas.” It need hardly be said
that the phrase “ Co-Prosperity Sphere ” denoted in fact the intention
to exert Japanese control, politically, economically—absolutely—
over all those far-flung territories.

In 1931 came their invasion of Manchuria. In 1937 came their
invasion of China south of the wall, and while their Amry eventually
floundered in China, due to the magnificent fighting spirit of Chiang
Kai-shek, his courageous armies, and his determined people, never¬
theless the warfare which then ensued proved a practical training
for the Japanese soldiers and sailors, who tirelessly developed and
perfected the tactics which they subsequently used in their landings
and conquests to the south.

The idea should not dor a moment be entertained that the failure
of the Japanese forces in China has discouraged the Japanese people.
It has instead served to steel them for still greater sacrifices and
to prepare them better for the war of deadly purpose to conquer
upon which they have finally embarked. As the realization came

462 POSTSCRIPT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

home to them of the need for greater and greater efforts, they accepted
the inevitable war-footing reorganization of the country’s life with
characteristic calmness and determination.

Probably no other factor has contributed more heavily to the
preliminary victories achieved by the Japanese in this war than the
offensive spirit which permeates all of the armed forces of the Empire.
This spirit, recognized by competent military men as the most
vital intangible factor in achieving victory, has been nourished and
perpetuated since the foundation of the modern Japanese Army.
The Japanese High Command has counted heavily upon the advan¬
tages this would give them over less aggressive enemies. They have
put great store in what they consider to be the white man’s flabbiness.
They look upon us Americans as constitutional weaklings, demand¬
ing our daily comforts and unwilling to make the sacrifices demanded
for victory in a war against a military machine which has prepared
and trained itself in Spartan simplicity and the hardness and tough¬
ness demanded by war. They attach great importance to the former
disunity in the United States over the war issue and they still count
on an appreciable interval before an aroused nation can find itself
and develop a fighting spirit of its own. By that time, they feel,
Japan will be in complete control of all East Asia. When they struck,
they made no provision for failure ; they left no road open for retreat.
They struck with all the force and power at their command. And
they will continue to fight in the same manner until they are utterly
crushed.

We shall crush that machine and caste and system in due course,
but if we Americans think that, collectively and individually, we
can continue to lead our normal lives, leaving the spirit of self-
sacrifice to our soldiers and sailors, letting the intensification of our
production programme take care of itself, we shall unquestionably
risk the danger of a stalemate in this war of ours with Japan. I say
this in the light of my ten years’ experience in Japan, my knowledge
of the power of the Japanese Army and Navy and of the hardness
and fighting spirit of the Japanese. I feel it my bounden duty to
say this to my fellow-countrymen. I know my own country even
better than I know Japan and I have not the slightest shadow of
doubt of our eventual victory. But I do not wish to see the period
of our blood, sweat, and tears indefinitely and unnecessarily prolonged .
That period will bo prolonged only if our people fail to realize the
truth of what I have just said, that we are up against a powerful
fighting machine, a people whose morale cannot and will not be
broken even by successive defeats, who will certainly not be broken
by economic hardships, a people who individually and collectively
will gladly sacrifice their lives for their Emperor and their nation,
and who can be brought to earth only by physical defeat, by being
ejected physically from the areas which they have temporarily con¬
quered or by a progressive attrition of their naval power and merchant
marine which will finally result in cutting off their homeland from

POSTSCRIPT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

all connection with and access to those outlying areas—by complete
defeat in battle.

I need say no more. I have told you the truth as I see it from long
experience and observation. I have come home with my associates
in the Far East to join our war effort with yours and I realize,
perhaps better than anyone else, that nothing less than the exertion
of our maximum capacities, individually and collectively, in a war
of offence will bring our beloved country safely through these deep
waters to the longed-for haven of a victorious peace.

We are fighting this war for the preservation of righteousness, law,
and order, but above all for the preservation of the freedoms which
have been conferred upon us by the glorious heritage of our American
citizenship, and for these same freedoms in other countries of the
United Nations, and while we are fighting against the forces of evil,
lawlessness, and disorder in the world, we are primarily fighting
to prevent the enslavement which actually threatens to be imposed
upon us if we fail. I am convinced that this is not an overstatement.
Surely ours is a cause worth sacrificing for and living for and dying
for, if necessary. ^

Though love repine and reason chafe,

There came a voice without reply:

5 Tis man's perdition to be safe
When for the truth he ought to die !

List of Prominent Japanese Officials and Foreign
Diplomatic Chiefs of Mission Accredited to Japan

Dates in parentheses indicate time of taking office

1932 (June)

Prime Minister : Admiral Viscount
Makoto Saito (May 23, 1932)
Minister for Foreign Affairs :
Makoto Saito (May 23, 1932)

Count Yasuya Uchida (July 6, 1932)
Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs :
Mr. Hachiro Arita (May 23, 1932)

CABINET MEMBERS :

War : Lieutenant-General Sadao Araki
(May 26, 1932)

Navy : Admiral Keisuke Okada
(May 26, 1932)

Finance ; Mr. Korekiyo Takahashi
(May 26, 1932)

Commerce and Industry : Baron
Kumakichi Nakajima (May 26, 1932)

Canada : Hon. Herbert Marler
(Sept. 18, 1929)

Mexico ; Dr. Miguel Alonzo-Romero
(Nov. 25, 1929)

Norway : Mr. Ludwig Caesar Aubeit
(March 22, 1930)

Portugal : Mr. Justino de Montalvao
(Sept. 17, 1930)

Cuba : Mr. Orestes Ferrara
(May 28, 1931)

China : General Tsiang Tso-ping
(Oct. 5, 1931)

Argentina : Dr. Rodolfo Freyre
(Dec. 24, 1931)

Persia : Mr. Hassan Ali Hedayat
(Feb. 25, 1932)

Spain : Mr. Santiago Mendez de Vigo
(April 25, 1932)

Czechoslovakia :

Mr. Frantisek Havlicek (May 6, 1932)

AMBASSADORS :

Belgium : Baron Albert de Bassompierre
•(Sept. 15, 1921)

U.S.S.R.: Mr. Alexander Troyanovsky
(Feb. 1, 1928)

Germany : Dr. Ernst Arthur Voretzsch
(Jan. 22, 1929)

Italy : Mr. Giovanni Cesare Majoni
(June 17, 1930)

France : Count Damien de Martel

(July 7,1930)

Brazil : Mr. Sylvino Gurgel do Amaral
(June 8, 1931)

Great Britain : Sir Francis Lindley
(July 8, 1931) a
United States of America :

Mr. Joseph C. Grew

MINISTERS :

Netherlands : General J. C, Pabst
(July 7 > 1923)

Poland : Mr. Zdzislaw Okecki
(June 13, 1928)

Switzerland : Mr. Emile Traversini
, (Oct. 26,1928)

Chile : Mr. Enrique Gallarde Nieto
(Oct. 31. 1928)

Sweden : Dr. J. E. Hultman
. (April 12, 1929) .. .

CHARGES D'AFFAIRES :

Rumania : Mr. Georges Stoicesco
(July 18, 1929)

Finland : Mr. George Winckelmann
(April 22, 1930)

Turkey : Mr. Nebil Bey
(Dec. 22, 1931)

AMERICAN EMBASSY:

Counsellor : Mr. Edwin L. Neville
Military Attache :

Lieutenant-Colonel James G. Mcllroy
Naval Attach^ :

Captain Isaac C. Johnson
Commercial Attache :

Mr. Halleck A. Butts
First Secretary :

Mr. Erie R. Dickover
Third Secretaries :

Mr. William T. Turner
Mr. S. Walter Washington
Consul-General : Mr. Arthur Garrcls

1933 (January 1)

Prime Minister : Admiral Viscount
Makoto Saito (May 23, 1932).
Minister for Foreign Ajfpairs :

Count Yasuya Uchida (July 6, 1932)

464

LIST OF PROMINENT JAPANESE OFFICIALS AND FOREIGN DIPLOMATS 465

Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs :
Hachiro Arita (May 23, 1932)

CABINET MEMBERS :

War : Lieutenant-General Sadao Araki
(May 26, 1932)

Navy : Admiral Keisuke Okada
(May 26, 1932)

Finance : Mr. Korekiyo Takahashi
(May 26, 1932)

Commerce and Industry : Baron
Kumakichi Nakajima (May 26, 1932)

AMBASSADORS :

Belgium : Baron Albert de Bassompierre
(Sept. 15, 1921)

U.S.S.R.: Mr. Alexander Troyanovsky
(Feb. 1, 1928)

Germany : Dr. Ernst Arthur Voretzsch
(Jan. 22, 1929)

Italy : Mr. Giovanni Cesare Majoni
(June 17, 1930)

France : Count Damien de Martel

(July 7> 1930)

Brazil : Mr. Sylvino Gurgel do Amaral
(June 8, 1931)

Great Britain : Sir Francis Lindley
(July 8 , 193O

United States of America :

Mr. Joseph C. Grew (June 14, 1932)

MINISTERS :

Netherlands : General J. G. Pabst
(July 7 > * 9 * 3 )

Poland : Mr. Zdzislaw Okecki
(June 13, 1928)

Switzerland : Mr. Emile Traversini
(Oct. 26, 1928)

Chile : Mr. Enrique Gallarde Nieto
(Oct. 31, 1928)

Sweden : Dr. J. E. Hultman
(April 12, 1929)

Canada : Hon. Herbert Marler
(Sept. 18, 1929)

Mexico : Dr. Miguel Alonzo-Romero

NowvAY?’MT 2 ,ldwig Caesar Aubert
(March 22, 1930)

Portugal : Mr. Justino de Montalvao
(Sept. 117, 1930)

Cuba ; Mr. Orestes Ferrara
(May 28, 1931)

China : General Tsiang Tso-pmg
(Oct 5, 1931)

Argentina : Dr. Rodolfo Freyre
(Dec. 24, 1931)

Persia : Mr. Hassan Ali Hedayat
(Feb. 25, 1932)

Spain : Mr. Santiago Mendez de Vigo
(April 25, 1932)

Czechoslovakia :

Mr. Frantisek Havlicek (May 6, 1932)
Siam : General Phya Indra Vijit
(Oct. 6, 1932)

CHARGES D’AFFAIRES :

Rumania : Mr. Georges Stoicesco
(July 18, 1929)

Finland : Mr. George Winckelmann
(April 22, 1930)

Turkey : Mr. Ncbil Bey
(Dec. 22, 1931)

AMERICAN EMBASSY:

Counsellor : Mr. Edwin L. Neville
Military Attach^ :

Lieutenant-Colonel James G. Mcllroy
Naval Attach^ :

Captain Isaac C. Johnson
Commercial Attach^ :

Mr. Halleck A. Butts
First Secretary :

Mr. Eric R. Dickover
Second Secretary :

Mr. William T. Turner
Third Secretary :

Mr. S. Walter Washington
Consul-General : Mr. Arthur Garrels

1934 (January 1)

Prime Minister : Admiral Viscount
Makoto Saito (May 23, 1932)
Minister for Foreign Affairs :

Mr. Koki Hirota (Sept. 14, 1933)
Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs :
Mr. Mamoru Shigemitsu
(May 16, 1933)

CABINET MEMBERS:

War : Lieutenant-General Sadao Araki
(May 26, 1932)

Navy : Admiral Mineo Osumi
(Jan. 9, 1933)

Finance : Mr. Korekiyo Takahashi
(May 26, 1932)

Commerce and Industry : Baron
Kumakichi Nakajima (May 26, 1932)

AMBASSADORS :

Belgium : Baron Albert de Bassompierre
(Sept. 15, 1921)

Brazil : Mr. Sylvino Gurgel do Amaral
(June 8, 1931)

Great Britain ; Sir Francis Lindley
(July 8, 1931)

United States of. America :

Mr. Joseph G. Grew (June 14, 1932)

466 LIST OF PROMINENT JAPANESE OFFICIALS AND FOREIGN DIPLOMATS

U.S.S.R. : Mr. Constantin Yurenev Third Secretaries :

(March 20, 1933) Mr. William T. Turner

Italy : Mr. Giacinto Auriti Mr. Morris N. Hughes

(July io, 1933) Mr. George D. Andrews

France : Mr. Fernand Pila Consul-General : Mr. Arthur Garrels

(Nov. 30, 1933)

Germany ; Dr. Herbert von Dirksen

(Dec. 27, 1933)

MINISTERS :

Netherlands : General J. C. Pabst

(July 7.1923) ,

Sweden : Dr. J. E. Hult m a n
(April 12, 1929)

Canada : Hon. Herbert Marler
(Sept. 18, 1929)

Mexico : Dr. Miguel Alonzo-Romero
(Nov. 25, 1929)

Norway : Mr. Ludwig Caesar Aubert
(March 22, 1930) ^

China : General Tsiang Tso-ping
(Oct. 5, 1931)

Argentina : Dr. Rodolfo Freyre
(Dec. 24, 1931)

Persia : Mr. Hassan Ali Hedayat
(Feb. 25, 1932)

Spain : Mr. Santiago Mendez de Vigo
(April 25, 1932)

Czechoslovakia :

Mr. Frantisek Havlicek (May 6, 1932)
Siam : General Phya Indra Vijit
(Oct. 6, 1932)

Manchukuo ; Mr. M. W. S. Tinge
(May 18, 1933)

Finland : Mr. Hugo Valvanne
(Oct. 5, 1933)

Poland : Mr. Michael Moscicld
(Oct. 5, 1933)

Afghanistan : Mr. Habibullah Tarzi
(Oct. 18, 1933)

1935 (January 1)

Prime Minister :

Admiral Keisuke Okada (July 4, 1934)
Minister for Foreign Affairs :

Mr. Koki Hirota (Sept, 14, 1933)
Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs :
Mr. Mamoru Shigemitsu
(May 6, 1933)

CABINET MEMBERS :

War : General Senjuro Hayashi
(Jan, 21, 1934)

Navy : Admiral Mineo Osumi
(Jan. 9, 1933)

Finance : Mr. Sadamobu Fuju
(July 5 > 1934)

Mr. Takahashi (Nov. 27, 1934)
Commerce and Industry :

Mr. Chuji Machida (July 5, 1934)

AMBASSADORS :

Belgium : Baron Albert de Bassompierre
(Sept. 15, 1921)

United States of America :

Mr. Joseph C. Grew (June 14, 1932)
U 1 S.S.R. : Mr. Constantin Yurenev
(March 20, 1933)

Italy : Mr. Giacinto Auriti
(July 10, 1933)

France : Mr. Fernand Pila
(Nov. 30, 1933)

Germany : Dr. Herbert von Dirksen
(Dec. 27, 1933)

Great Britain : Sir Robert Clive

CHARGES D’AFFAIRES:

Rumania : Mr. Georges Stoicesco
(July 18, 1929)

Turkey : Mr. Nebil Bey
(Dec. 22, 1931)

**

AMERICAN EMBASSY :

Counsellor : Mr, Edwin L. Neville
Military Attach^ :

Major William C. Crane
Naval Attach^ :

Captain Fred F. Rogers
Commercial Attach^ :

Mr. Frank S. Williams
First Secretary : Mr. Erie R. Dickover
Second Secretary :

Mr. Edward S. Crocker

(June 28, 1934) ,

Brazil : Mr. Carlos Martins Sousa
(Sept. 17, 1934)

MINISTERS :

Netherlands : General J. C, Pabst
(July 7 > 1923)

Sweden : Dr. J. E. Hultman
(April 12, 1929)

Canada : Hon. Herbert Marler
(Sept! 18, 1929)

Mexico : Dr. Miguel Alonzo-Romero
(Nov. 25, 1929)

Norway : Mr. Ludwig Caesar Aubert
(March 22, 1930)

China : General Tsiang iTso-ping
(Oct. 5, 1931)

Spain : Mr, Santiago Mendez de Vigo
(April 25, 1932)

LIS^ OF PROMINENT JAPANESE OFFICIALS AND FOREIGN DIPLOMATS 4$?

Czechoslovakia :

Mr. Frantisek Havlicek (May 6, 1932)
Manchukuo : Mr. M. W. S. Tinge
(May 18, 1933)

Finland : Mi Hugo Valvanne

(Oct, 5, 1933

Poland : Mr. Michael Moscicki
(Oct. 5, 1933)

Afghanistan : Mr. Habibullah Tarzi

(Oct. 19, 1533) . _

Colombia ; Dr. Domingo Esguerra
(April 28, 1934)

Siam : Mr, Phra Raksha
(June 18, 1934)

Portugal :

Mr. Thomaz Ribeiro de Mello
(July 21934) . . .

Persia : Mr. Mirza Bagher Azimi
(Oct. 18, 1934)

CHARGES D’AFFAIRES :
umania : Mr. Georges Stoicesco
(July x8, 1929)

Turkey : Mr. Nebil Bey
(Dec. 22, 193O

AMERICAN EMBASSY :

Counsellor : Mr. Edwin L. Neville
Military Attach^ :

Major William G. Crane
Naval Attach^ :

Captain Fred F. Rogers
Commercial Attach^ :

Mr. Frank S. Williams
First Secretary :

Mr. Erie R. Dickover
Second Secretary :

Mr. Edward S. Crocker
Third Secretaries :

Mr. William T. Turner
Mr. Morris N. Hughes
Mr. George D. Andrews
Consul-General : Mr. Arthur Garrels

1936 (January 1)

Prime Minister :

Admiral Keisuke Okada (July 4, 1934)
Minister for Foreign Affairs :

Mr. Koki Hirota (Sept. 14, 1933)
Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs :
Mr. Mamoru Shigemitsu
(May 6 , 1933)

CABINET MEMBERS :

War : General Yoshiyaki Kuwashima
(Sept. 4* 1935)

Navy : Admiral Mineo Osumi
(Jan. 9 , 1933 )

Finance : Mr. Sadanobu Fujii
_ (July 5 * *935)

Commerce and Industry :

Mr. Chuji Machida (July 5, 1934)

AMBASSADORS :

Belgium : Baron Albert de Bassompierre
(Sept. 15, 1921)

United States of America :

Mr. Joseph C. Grew (June 14, 1932)
U.S.S.R. : Mr. Constantin Yurenev
(March 20, 1933)

Italy : Mr. Giacinto Auriti
(July 10, 1933)

France : Mr. Fernand Pila
(Nov. 30, 1933)

Germany : Dr. Herbert von Dirksen
(Dec. 27, 1933)

Great Britain : Sir Robert Clive
(June 28, 1934)

China : General Tsiang Tso-ping
(June 20, 1935)

Manchukuo : Mr. Hsieh Chieh-shih
(July 4> 1935)

MINISTERS :

Netherlands : General J. C. Pabst
o (July 7 > 1923) _ _

Sweden : Dr. J. E. Hultman
(April 12, 1929)

Canada : Hon, Sir Herbert Marler
(Sept. 18, 1929}

Spain : Mr. Santiago Mendez de Vigo
(April 25, 1932)

Czechoslovakia :

Mr. Frantisek Havlicek (May 5, 1932)
Finland : Mr. Hugo Valvanne
(Oct. 5, 1933)

Poland : Mr. Michael Moscicki
(Oct. 5, 1933)

Afghanistan : Mr. Habibullah Tarzi
(Oct. 19, 1933) . „

Colombia : Dr. Domingo Esguerra
(April 28, 1934)

Siam : Mr. Phra Raksha
(June 18, 1934)

Portugal :

Dr. Thomaz Ribeiro de Mello
(July 2, 1934) A . ,

Iran : Mr. Mirza Bagher A z imi
(Oct. 18, 1934) _

Switzerland : Mr. Walter Thumheer

(Feb. 7, J> 935 ) . . . .,

Mexico : General Francisco J. Aguilar
(March 14, * 935 )

Argentina : Mr. Eduardo Raccdo
(Nov. 28, 1935)

CHARGES D’AFFAIRES;
Rumania : Mr. Georges Stoioesco
(July 18, 1929)

468 LIST OF PROMINENT JAPANESE

/

Turkey : Mr. Nebil Bey
(Dec. 32 , 1931)

AMERICAN EMBASSY:

Counsellor : Mr. Edwin L. Neville
Military Attache :

Lieutenant-Colonel William C. Crane

OFFICIALS AND FOREIGN DIPLOMATS'

Turkey : Mr. R. Husrey Gerede
(March 23, 1936)

China : Mr. Hsu Shih-ying
(April 6, 1936)

France : Mr. Albert Kammerer
(July 2, 1936)

Naval Attach^ :

Captain Fred F. Rogers
Commercial Attach^ :

Mr, Frank S. Williams
First Secretary :

Mr. Erie R. Dickover
Second Secretaries :

Mr. Edward S. Crocker
Mr. Cabot Coville
Third Secretaries :

Mr. Morris N. Hughes
Mr. George D. Andrews
Consul-General : Mr. Arthur Garrels

1937 (January 1)

Prime Minister : Mr. Koki Hirota
(March 19, 1936)

Minister for Foreign Affairs :

Mr. Koki Hirota (March 19, 1936)
Mr. Hachiro Arita (April 2, 1936)
Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs :
Mr. Kensuke Horinouchi
(April 1, 1936)

CABINET MEMBERS :

War : General Count Juichi Terauchi
(March 9, 1936)

Navy : Admiral Osami Nagano
(March 9, 1936}

Finance : Mr. Eiichi Baba
(March 9, 1936)

Commerce and Industry :

Mr. Ghikukei Nakajima
(March 9, 1936)

AMBASSADORS:

Belgium : Baron Albert de Bassompierre
(Sept. 15, 1921)

United States of America :

Mr. Joseph C. Grew (June 14, 1932)
U.S.S.R.: Mr. Constantin Yurenev
(March 20, 1933)

Italy : Mr. Giaanto Auriti

(July to, 1933) ,

Germany : Dr. Herbert von Dirksen
„ (Dec. 27,-1933)

Great Britain : Six Robert Clive
(June 28, 1934)

Manchukuo : Mr. Hsieh Chich-shih

„ (July 4.1935). -

Brazil : Mr. Pedro Leao Velloso
(Dec. 34,1935)

MINISTERS :

Netherlands : General J. C. Pabst
(July 7, 1923)

Sweden : Dr. J. E. Hultman
(April 12, 1929)

Spain : Mr. Santiago Mendez de Vigo
(April 25, 1932)

Czechoslovakia :

Mr. Frantisek Havlicek (May 5, 1932)
Finland : Mr. Hugo Valvanne
(Oct. 5, 1033)

Poland : Mr. Michael Moscidd
(Oct. 5, 1933)

Afghanistan : Mr. Habibullah Tar
(Oct. 19, 1933)

Colombia : Dr. Dommgo Esguerra
(April 28, 1934)

Siam : Mr. Phra Raksha
(June 18, 1934)

Portugal :

Dr. Thomaz Ribeiro de Mello
(July 2, 1934)

Iran : Mr. Mirza Bagher Azimi
(Oct. 18, 1934)

Switzerland : Mr. Walter Thuraheer
(Feb. 7, 1935)

Mexico : General Francisco J. Aguilar
(March 14, 1935)

Argentina : Mr. Eduardo Racedo
(Nov. 28, 1935)

Denmark :

Baron Rudolph Bertouch-Lehn
(Dec. 19, 1935)

Rumania : Mr. Georges Stolcesco

(April 14, 1936). _

Chile ; Mr. Martin Figueroa
(May 14, 1936)

Norway : Mr. Finn Koren
(May 28, 1936)

Canada : Hon. R. Randolph Bruce
(Nov. 7, 1036)

Peru : Dr. Ricardo Rivera Schreiber
(Dec. 18, 1936)

AMERICAN EMBASSY:

Counsellor : Mr. Edwin L. Neville
(absent)

Military Attach^ :

Lieutenant-Colonel William C. Crane
Naval Attach^ :

Captain Harold Bemis
Commercial Attach^ :

Mr. Frank S. Williams ,

j"™ OFFICIALS AND FOMlGH DIPLOMATS
MINISTERS:

First Secretaries .

Mr, Erie R. Dickover
Mr. Joseph F. McGurk
Second Secretaries :

Mr. Edward S. Crocker
Mr. Cabot Coville
Third Secretary :

Mr. George D. Andrews
Consul-General : Mr. Arthur Garrcls

1938 (January 1)

Prime Minister :

General Senjuro Hayashi
(Feb. 2, 1937)

Pnnce Fumimaro Konoye
(June 4, 1937)

Minister for Foreign Affairs :
General Senjuro Hayashi
(Feb. 2, 1937)

Mr. Naotake Sato (March 1, 1037)

n Ml \?' oki Hirota (J unc 4 . 1937 )
Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs :
Mr. Kensuke Horinouchi
(April 1, 1936)

CABINET MEMBERS:

War : General Kotaro Nakamura
(Feb. 2, 1937)

Navy : Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai
(Feb. 2, 1937)

Finance : Mr. Toyotaro Yuki
(Feb. 2, 1937)

Mr. Okinobu Kaya (June 3, 1937)
Commerce and Industry :

Admiral Takuo Godo (Feb. 2, 1937)
Mr. Sheinji Yoshino (June 3, 1937)

AMBASSADORS :

Belgium : Baron Albert de Bassompicrre
(Sept 15, 1921)
united States of America :

Mr. Joseph C. Grew (June 14. 1932)
Italy : Mr. Giadnto Auriti

u (July

Brazil : Mr. Pedro Leao Velloso
(Dec. 24, 1935)

Turkey : Mr. Husrey Gerede
(March 23, 1936)

France : Mr. Charles Arsine-Henry
(March 12, 1937)

Manchukuo : Mr. Yuan Chen-tse

u£s.R?’ : ^Mikhail Slavoutski
(Sept, a, 1937)

Great Britain :

Hon. Sir Robert Craigie
(Sept. 11, 1937)

Poland : Mr, Thaddie de Romer
(Nov, 2, 1037)

Germany : General Eugen Ott
(April 28, 1938)

469

Netherlands : General J. C. Pabst

„(J u) y 7,1933)

Czechoslovakia :
Mr.FrantisekHavlicek
(May 6 , i 938 )

Finiand : Mr. Hugo Valvanne
(Oct. 5, 1933)

Afghanistan : Mr. HabibuUah Taizi

Dr. Thomaz Ribeiro de Mello
(July 2, 1934)

Swotzerland : Mr. Walter Thumheer
(Feb. 7, i 935 )

General Francisco Aguilar
(March 14, 1935) 8

Argentina : Mr. Eduardo Racedo
(Nov. 28, 1935)

Denmark :

Baron Rudolph Bertouch-Lehn
(Dec. 19, 1035)

Kumania : Mr. Georges Stolcesco
(April 14, 1936)

Chile : Mr. Martin Figueroa
(May 14, 1936)

Norway : Mr. Finn Koren
(May 28, 1936)

: ^ on * Randolph Bruce
(Nov. 6, 1936)

Sweden : Mr. Widar Bagge
(March 12, 1937)

Siam : Mr. Phya Sri Sena
(Nov. 11, 1937)

AMERICAN EMBASSY :

Counsellor : Mr. Eugene H. Dooman
Military Attache :

Lieutenant-Colonel Harry I. Creswdl
Naval Attach^ :

Captain Harold Bemis
Commercial Attach^ :

Mr. Frank S. Williams
First Secretary :

Mr. Joseph C. McGurk
Second Secretaries :

Mr. Edward S. Crocker
Mr. Cabot Coville
Mr. George D. Andrews
Consul-General :

Mr. Charles Camercn

1939 (January 1)

Prime Minister :

Prince Fumimaro Konoye
(June 4, 1937)

Minister for Foreign Affairs :

Mr. Kolri Hirota (June 4, 1937^
General Ugaki (May 26, 1938)
Mr. Hachiro Arita (Oct. 29* 1938)

470 LIST OF PROMINENT JAPANESE

Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs :

Mr, Kensuke Horinouchi
(April i, 1936)

Mr, Renzo Sawada (Dec. 1, 193°)

CABINET MEMBERS :

War : General Gen Sugiyama
(December, 1937)

General Seishiro Itagaki
(May 126, 1938)

Navy : Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai
(Feb, 2 , 1937)

Finance : Mr. Seishin Ikeda
(May 26, 1938)

Commerce and Industry :

Mr. Seishin Ikeda (May 26, 1938)

AMBASSADORS :

Belgium : Baron Albert de Bassompierre
(Sept. 15, 1921)

United States of America :

Mr. Joseph C. Grew (June 14, 1932)
Italy : Mr. Giacinto Auriti
(July 10, 1933)'

Brazil : Mr. Pedro Leao Velloso
(Dec. 24, 1935)

Turkey : Mr. Husrey Gerede
(March 23, 1936)

France : Mr. Charles Arsine-Henry
(March 12, 1937)

Manchukuo : Mr. Yuan Chen-tse
(July a, 1937)

Great Britain :

Hon. Sir Robert Craigie
(Sept, iz, 1937)

Poland : Mr. Thaddie de Romer
(Nov. 2, 1037)

Germany : General Eugen Ott
(April 28, 1938)

MINISTERS:

Netherlands : General J. C. Pabst
(July 7 > 1923)

Czechoslovakia :

Mr. Frantisek Havlicek
(May 6, 1932)

Finland : Mr. Hugo Valvanne
(Oct. 5, 1933)

Afghanistan : Mr. Habibullah Tarzi
(Oct. 19, 1933)

Switzerland : Mr. Walter Thumheer
(Feb. 7, 1935)

Argentina : Mr. Eduardo Racedo
(Nov. 28, 1935)

Denmark ;

Baron Rudolph Bertouch-Lehn
(Dec. 19,1035)

Rumania : Mr. Georges Stoicesco
(April 14,1936)

OFFICIALS AND FOREIGN DIPLOMATS

Chile : Mr. Martin Figueroa
(May 14, 1936)

Norway : Mr. Finn Koren
(May 28, 1936)

Sweden : Mr. Widar Bagge
(March 12, 1937)

Siam : Mr. Phya Sri Sena
(Nov. 11, 1937)

Egypt : Mr. Abdel Wahab Bey
(Jan. 17, 1938)

Peru ; Dr. Ricardo Rivera Schreiber
(Sept. 8, 1938)

Portugal : Mr. Joaquim Pedrosa
(Sept. 8, 1938)

Spain : Mr. Santiago Mendez de Vigo
(Oct. 6, 1938)

AMERICAN EMBASSY :

Counsellor : Mr. Eugene H. Dooman
Military Attach^ :

Lieutenant-Colonel Harry L Creswell
Naval Attach^ :

Captain Harold M, Bemis
Commercial Attach^ :

Mr. Frank S. Williams
First Secretaries :

Mr. Joseph F. McGurk
Mr. Edward S. Crocker
Second Secretary : Mr. Cabot Coville
Third Secretaries :

Mr. Frank A. Schuler
Mr. Max W. Schmidt
Consul-General :

Mr. Charles Cameron

1940 (January 1)

Prime Minister :

Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma

(January 4, 1939J
General Nobuyaki Abe
(August 30, 1939)

Minister for Foreign Affairs :

Mr. Hachiro Arita (Oct. 28, 1938)
General Nobuyaki Abe
(August 30, 1939)

Admiral Kicmsaburo Nomura

(Sept* 25, 1939)

Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs :

Mr. Renzo Sawada (Dec. 1, 1938)
Mr. Masayuki Tam (Aug. 30, 1939)

CABINET MEMBERS :

War : General Shuroku Hata
(August 30, 1030)

Navy : Vice-Admiral Zengo Yoshida

(August 30, 1939)

Commerce and Industry :

Mr. Takuo Godo (August 30, 1939)

LIST OF PROMINENT JAPANESE OFFICIALS AND FOREIGN DIPLOMATS 471
AMBASSADORS : Naval Attach^ :

United States of America :

Mr. Joseph G. Grew (June 14, 1932)

Italy : Mr. Giacinto Auriti
(July 10, 1933)

France : Mr. Charles Arsene-Henry
(March 12, 1937)

Manchukuo : Mr. Yuan Chen-tse
(July 2, 1937)

Great Britain :

Hon. Sir Robert Craigie
(Sept. 11, 1937)

Poland : Mr. Thaddde de Romer
(Nov. 2, 1937)

Germany : General Eugen Ott
(April 28, 1938)

Brazil : Mr. Frederico de Castello-
Branco Clark (April 10, 1939)

Belgium : Mr. Pierre Forthomme
(Nov. 6, 1939)

U.S.S.R.: Mr. Constantin Smetanin
(Nov. 20, 1939)

Turkey : Mr. Ferid Tek (Dec. 14, 1939

MINISTERS :

Netherlands : General J. C. Pabst
(July 7, 1923)

Sweden : Mr. Widar Bagge
(March 12, 1937)

Thailand : Mr. Phya Sri Sena
(Nov. n, 1937)

Peru : Dr. Ricardo Rivera Schreiber
(Sept. 8, 1938)

Spain : Mr. Santiago Mendez de Vigo
(Oct. 6, 1938)

Colombia : Mr. Alfredo Michelsea
(Feb. 24, 1939)

Argentina : Dr. Rodolfo Moreno
(April 7, 1939)

Mexico : Mr. Primo Villa Michel
(April 7, 1939)

Denmark : Mr. Lars P. Tillitse
(April 10,1959)

Greece ; Mr. Athanase G. Politis
(April 24, 1939) /

Afghanistan : Zul Facar Khan
(June 12, 1939) ^ _

Rumania : Mr. Georges Paracmvesco

.(June 12,1939)

Finland : Dr, Charles Gustave Idman
(Nov. 6, 1939)

Chile : Mr. Armando Labra Carvajal
(Nov. 30, 1939) „

Hungary : Mr. Georges de Ghika
(Dec. 21, 1939)

AMERICAN EMBASSY:

Counsellor : Mr. Eugene H. Dooman
Military Attach^ :

Lieutenant-Colonel Harry I. Creswcll

Lieutenant-Commander Henri H.
Smith-Hutton
Commercial Attach^ :

Mr. Frank S. Williams
First Secretaries :

Mr. Edward S. Crocker
Mr, Stuart E. Grummon
Second Secretary :

Mr. William T. Turner
Third Secretaries :

Mr. Frank A. Schuler
Mr. Max W. Schmidt
Mr. James Espy
Consul-General :

Mr Charles Cameron

I 94 I (January 1)

Prime Minister :

General Nobuyuki Abe
(Aug; 30, 1939)

Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai
(Jan. 16, 1940)

Prince Fumimaro Konoye
(July 22, 1940)

Minister for Foreign Affairs :
Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura
(Sept. 25, 1939)

Mr. Hachiro Arita (Jan. 16, 1940)

Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka (July 22, 1940)
Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs :
Mr. Masayuki Tani (Aug. 30, 1939)
Mr. Chuichi Ohashi (Aug. 19, 1940)

CABINET MEMBERS :

War : Lieutenant-General Hideki Tojo
(July 22, 1940)

Navy : Admiral Koshiro Oikawa
(Sept. 5, 1940)

Finance : Mr. Isao Kawata
(July 22, 1940)

Commerce and Industry :

Mr. Ichizo Kobayashi (July 22, 1940)

AMBASSADORS :

United States of America :

Mr. Joseph C. Grew (June 14, 1932)
France : Mr. Charles Arsine-Henry
(March 12, 1937)

Great Britain : Hon. Sir Robert Craigie
(Sept, ii, 1937)

Poland : Mr. Thaddie de Romer
(Nov. 2, 1937)

Germany : General Eugen Ott
(April 28, 1938)

Brazil : Mr. Frederico 4 de Castello-
Branco Clark (April 10, 1939)
Belgium : Mr. Pierre Forthomme
(Nov. 6, 1939)

U.S.S.R.: Mr. Constantin Smetanin
(Nov, 20, 1939)

472 LIST OF PROMINENT JAPANESE

Turkey : Mr. Ferid Tek (Dec. 14, 1939)
Italy : Mr. Mario Indelli (July 20,1940)
Manchukuo : Mr. Li Shao-keng
(Dec. 24, 1940)

MINISTERS :

Netherlands : General J. G. Pabst
(July 7, 1923)

Sweden : Mr. Widar Bagge
(March 12, 1937)

Thailand : Mr. rhya Sri Sena
(Nov. 11, 1937)

Peru : Dh Ricardo Rivera Schreiber
(Sept. *8, 1938)

Spain : Mr. Santiago Mendez de Vigo
(Oct. 6, 1938)

Colombia : Mr. Alfredo Michelsen
(Feb. 24, 1939)

Argentina : Dr. Rodolfo Moreno
(April 7, 1939)

Mexico : Mr. Primo Villa Michel
(April 7, 1939)

Denmark : Mr. Lars P. Tillitse
(April 10, 1939)

Greece : Mr. Athanase G. Politis
(April 24, 1939)

Afghanistan : Zul Facar Khan
(June 12, 1939)

Finland : Dr. Charles G. Idman
(Nov. 6, 1939) .

Chile : Mr. Armando L. Carvajal
(Nov. 30, 1939)

Hungary : Mr. Georges de Ghika
(Dec. 21, 1939)

Switzerland : Mr. Camille Gorgd
(March 5, 1940)

Portugal : Dr. Luiz Esteves Fernandes
(March 29, 1940)

Australia :

The Hon. Sir John G. Latham
(Dec. 24, 1940)

AMERICAN EMBASSY:

Counsellor : Mr. Eugene H. Dooman
Military Attach^ ;

Lieutenant-Colonel Harry I. Creswell
Naval Attach^ ;
Lieutenant-Commander Henri H.
Smith-Hutton
Commercial Attach^ :

Mr. Frank S. Williams
First Secretaries :

Mr. George A. Makinson
Mr. Edward S. Crocker
Mr. Stuart E. Grummon
Second Secretary :

Mr. William T. Turner
Third Secretaries :

Mr. Max W. Schmidt
Mr. John K. Emmerson
Mr. Charles A. Cooper
Mr. James Espy

OFFICIALS AND FOREIGN DIPLOMATS

1942 (January r)

Prime Minister :

Prince Fumimaro Konoye
(July 22, 1940) 2d Cabinet
Prince Fumimaro Konoye
(July 18, 1941) 3d Cabinet
General Hideki Tojo
(October 18, 1941)

Minister for Foreign Affairs :

Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka (July 2a, 1940) ‘
Admiral Teijiro Toyoda
(July 18, 1941)

Mr. Shigenori Togo (Oct. 18, 1941)
Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs :
Mr. Chuichi Ohashi (Aug. 19, 1940)
Mr. Eiji Amau (Aug. 15, 1941)

Mr. Haruhiko Nishi (Oct. 21, 1941)

CABINET MEMBERS :

War : General Hideki Tojo
(concurrently Prime Minister)

(Oct. 18, 1941)

Navy : Admiral Shigetaro Shimada
(Oct. x8, 1941)

Finance : Mr. Okinobu Kaya
(Oct. 18, 1941)

Commerce and Industry :

Mr. Nobusuke Kishi (Oct. x8, 1941)

AMBASSADORS :

United States of America :

Mr. Joseph C. Grew (June 14, 1932)

France : Mr. Charles Arsine-Henry
(March 12, 1937)

Great Britain : Hon. Sir Robert Craigie
(Sept. 11, 1937)

Germany : General Eugen Ott
(April 28, 1938)

Brazil : Mr. Frederico de Castello-
Branco Clark (April 10, 1939)

Belgium : Mr. Pierre Forthomme
(Nov. 6, 1939)

U.S.S.R.: Mr. Constantin Smetanin
(Nov. 20, 1939)

Turkey : Mr. Ferid Tek (Dec. 14, 1939)

Italy : Mr. Mario Indelli (July 20,1940)

Manchukuo : Mr. Li Shao-keng
(Dec. 24, 1940)

Thailand : Mr. Phya Sri Sena
(Oct. 2, 1941)

China : Mr. Hsu Liang (Nov. 27, 1941)

MINISTERS :

Netherlands : General J. C. Pabst
„ (July 7> i 9 « 3 )

Sweden : Mr. Widar Bagge
(March 12* 1937)

Peru : Dr. Ricardo Rivera Schreiber
(Sept. 8, 1938)

LIST OF PROMINENT JAPANESE OPFIt

Spain : Mr. Santiago Mendez do Vim
(Oct. 6, 1938)

Colombia : Mr. Alfredo Michdseu
(Feb. 24, 1939)

Denmark : Mr. Lars P. Tillitsc
(April 10, 1939)

Greece : Mr. Athanasc G. Politis
(April 24, 1939)

Afghanistan : Zul Farar Khan
(June 12, 1939)

Finland : Dr. Charles Gustave Itlmnn
(Nov. 6, 1939)

Chile : Mr. Armando Lnbra Carvaial
(Nov. 30, 1939)

Switzerland : Mr. Camille Gory*

(March 5, 1940}

Portugal : Dr. Luiz Estcvcs Fernandes
(March 29, 1940)

Australia :

The Hon. Sir John G. Latham
(Dec. 24, 1940)

Panama : Mr. Angelo Ferrari
(March 13, 1941)

Iran : Mr. Abolghasscm Nadjrn
(March 13, 1941)

R ™28 G i94if Ge0rgCS BagUlcaC0

Jials and Fount as wx»j.o.m. vi .,

* a 41 *

IIpnoary : Mr. NinLart rfa \v ,

(June 1i, 1941)

Mexico i General JmP |. u i, a
(Sept. 10, u M t) >s -Wczcua

AMERICAN EMRASSY

Cm insulin ut : Mr. Kum,e H n
Military A - n . u:nl : *' D ''°man

Lieutenant-Colonel Many T ,

Naval AttawiP. : ’ C ' rc -We!l

Liriitenant-Cmmuawirr Henri jr
hinith-Huuon u -

Commercial Attach* :

Mr. Prank S. Wilfuim

riHHT SltfiRKTAUIltS .*

Mr* George A. Makin.iom
Mr. Edward S. Grockcr

oHCOMn SkcRETAKIEK ,*

Mr. William T. Turner
Mr. Charles K. IMilrn
Mr, H. Merrell Urmhii^hofi'

I itmi> Skckki ariw :

Mr, John K. Kmmcrsun
Mr. Charles A. CWpcr
Mr. James Espy

INDEX

Abe, General Nobukai (Japanese Prime
Minister), 274.

Adachi, General, 34.

Adams, Charles Francis, 22.

Aguilar, General Francisco J., 157.

Ahlin, Captain, 17.

Aizawa, 154, 158.

Akaboshi, Shiro, 132.

Akimoto, 27,

Aldrovandi, Signor (Italian League of
Nations Commissioner), 35.

Alexander the Great, 396.

Amano, Dr., 452.

Amaral, Sylvino Gurgel do (Brazilian
Ambassador to Japan), 26, 94, 113.
Amau, Eija (Spokesman for the Japanese
Foreign Office), 119-121, 123, 126,
137, 142, 148, 183-184, 322, 398.
Ando, Captain, 153, 158.

Andrews, George D. (Third Secretary of
the American Embassy, Tokyo), 144.
Araki, Lieutenant-General Sadao, 23,

37 , 55 > 6 9 > I0 7 > II0 »

172, 342-

Arita, Hachiro (Japanese Foreign Mun¬
ster), 29, 37, 40, 41, 46, 47, 53, 54, 95,
182, 185, 224-229, 237-239, 243, 244,
245, 258, 271, 274-276, 278, 279, 280,
285, 3i9» 342.

Arita, Madame, 41, 53, 54.

Ariyoshi (Japanese Minister to China)
121.

Arnold, Miss Marion, 436, 440.
Aysene-Henry, Charles (French Am¬
bassador to Japan), 286,305,335,402,
435 > 438 , 442 -

Arsene-Henry, Madame, 435, 442.

Asaka, Princess, 100, 162.

Ashida, 194.

Astor, Lady Nancy, 35.

Aubert, Ludwig Caesar (Norwegian
Minister to Japan), 60.

Auriti, Giacinto (Italian Ambassador to
'Japan), 94, 166.

Axling, Dr., 416.

Babb, Joseph Glenn, 17, 21, 95.

Babcock, Major, 443.

Bagge, Widar (Swedish Minister to
Japan), 442.

Bagley, Admiral David Worth, 88.

Baker, Bishop James Chamberlain,
3 * 7 -

Ballantine, Arthur, 382.

Bassompierre, Baron Albert D. (Belgian
Ambassador to Japan), 18, 60, 113,
147, 224*

Bassompierre, Madame, 224.

Batista, Fulgencio, 153.

Bellaire, Robert, 426.

Bemis, Captain Harold, 208, 241, 244.

Bemis, Mrs. Harold, 244.

BeneS, Edouard (President, Exiled
Czechoslovak Government), 222.

Benninghof, H. Merrell, 414, 420, 426,
428, 429, 434, 440, 449.

Bey, Tewfik Ruschdi, 323.

Biddle, Lieutenant, 35.

Bingham, Hiram, Jr., 18, 21, 24, 27.

Blakeslee, Dr., 35.

Bohlen, Charles E., 318, 428, 429, 434.

Brown, Don, 42.

Burton, Father Spence, 101.

Butts, Halleck A., 21, 24, 47.

Byas, Hugh, 17, 95, 258.

Cameron, Charles, 214.

Caravajal, Armando Labra, 442.

Castle, William Richards, 22, 25, 30,
33 , 38 , 140. 344 *

Chamberlain, Neville (former British
Prime Minister), 222.

Chang Hsueh-liang, Marshal, 52, 55,
* 73 -

Chiang Kai-shek, 173, 199, 231, 239,
273, 287, 289, 296-297, 299, 307,

3 * 4 > 33 *> 335 > 353 > 365* 37 6 > 4*2,
461.

Cluchibu, Prince, 24, 25, 26, 66-67, 79,
*00, 177, 305, 334.

Chichibu, Princess, 24, 25, 26, 79, 100,
334 *

Churchill, Winston, 359, 400, 413.

Clark, Frederico de Castello-Branco
(Brazilian Ambassador to Japan), 394,
437 -

Claudel, General, 35,

Clive, Sir Robert (British Ambassador
to Japan), 176.

Coolidge, President Calvin, 22.

474

INDEX

475

Cooper, Charles A., 428.

Coville, Cabot, 222, 223.

Craigie, Sir Robert, 191, 197-198, 219,
223, 233, 272, 282, 354, 402, 416, 425,
44 L 442 , 450 -
Craigie, Lady, 442.

Crane, Esther, 99, 103.

Crane, Lieut.~Col. William C., 117, 156,
188, 191, 205.

Crane, Mrs. William C., 117.

Creswcll, Lieut.-Col. Harry J., 208, 216,
256, 434 -

Crocker, Edward S., 191, 268, 425, 428,

43 °, 434 ) 436 , 453 -
Cronin, A. J., 439.

Curtis, Jack (National City Bank, Tokyo),
46 , 47 , 394 -

Dan, Baron (Japanese Finance Minister
assassinated in 1932), 51, 69.

Davis, Norman FI., 71, 197.

Debuchi, Ambassador, 41, 52-55, 65,
m, 117, 118, 245.

Debuchi, Madame, 53, 54.

Dickover, Erie R., 21, 24, 37, 117, 165,
170.

' Dickover, Mrs. Erie R., 117.

Dillingham, Walker, 334.

Dirksen, Dr. Herbert von (German
Ambassador to Japan), 103.

Dirksen, Frau, 103.

Dodd, William E. (American Ambas¬
sador to Germany), 122.

Dodds, James Leisham (Counsellor at
British Embassy in Tokyo,) 189,
190.

Dooman, Eugene H., 189, 191, 195, 197,
200, 201, 208, 222, 223, 227, 233,
242, 245, 256, 257, 267, 270, 360,
367, 370 - 373 , 382, 387-388, 395,
407, 420, 426, 428, 429, 432-433,
434 , 436 , 44 * > 448 - 449 -
Drummond, Sir Eric (former Secretary
of League of Nations), 50.

Dubose, M. (Editor of die Paris Temps),

m.

Dugdale, Mrs, Edgar, 440.

Eddy, Nelson, 155.

Eden, Anthony, 197, 199, 322.

Edge, Walter Evans, 140.

Edge, Mrs. Walter E., 140.

Emeny, Brooks, 273.

Empress (Dowager of Japan), 163,
^ 333 - 334 -

Empress of Japan, 18, 20, 22, 24,
25, 26, 103, 113, XI4, 148, 163,

Espy, James, 428.

Evans, Dr., 101.

Fain, Baron, 322.

Fairbanks, Douglas, 47-48.

Fearey, Robert, 414, 440.

Fish, Hamilton, 294,

Fleisher, B. W. (Founder of the Japan
Advertiser), 1*03.

Fleisher, Wilfrid (Editor of the Japan
Advertiser), 17, 36, 39-40, 42, 45,
46, 52» 74> 95) 103, 206.

Forbes, Cameron, 18, 25, 30, 36,
398 .

Franklin, Benjamin, 148.

Fujii, Sadamubu (Japanese Finance
Minister), 129.

Fujimoto (Translator, American Em-
bassy), 433-434, 448, 449-450, 452.
Fujimoto, Mrs., 448.

Fujita, Shin-Ichiro, 45.

Gallatin, James, 411.

Garrels, Arthur, 15, 21.

Gilbert, Prentiss B., 125.

Glassford, Rear-Admiral, 318.

Go, Toshi, 410.

Godo, Admiral Takuo, 194.

Goodsell, Dr. (American Missionary in.
Japan), 223-224.

Gorg<$, Camille, 432-433, 436-437,
438 , 440 ) 44 L 442 ) 443, 445-446,
448 ) 449 - 450 > 45 x - 452 ) 453 -
Gorg6, Mine., 440, 442.

Goto, Count, 85, 153.

Gould, Captain, 438.

Gould, John C., 78, 117.

Gowan, Dr., 101.

Grew, Anita (Mrs. Robert English), 25,
50.

Grew, Elsie (Mrs, Cecil Lyon), 16,
17, 19, 21, 23, 24 25, 35) 48, 57)
79-80, 90, 99-100, 105-106, 114, 157,
190-191, 407.

Grew, Joseph C., 14-15, 17, 18, 19,

20, 23, 24, 35, 37 ) 39 ) 4 h 49 ) 53 )
57, 60-61, 62, 78-79, 79-80, 99-
100, 102, 105-106, 117-119, 121,
125, 132-133, 143 - 144 ) *47) *52-
154, 163, 168, 185, 190-191, 202-204,
208-209, 216-217, 224, 240, 244,
245, 271-272, 276-278, 305-306,
322 ) 328, 337, 349 - 350 ) 394 r 395 )
416, 428, 430, 434 - 435 ) 437 - 438 )
448-449, 450-451.

Grew, Mrs. Joseph C., 16, I7, v i8, 19,

21, 22, 24, 25, 28, 33, 35, 36, 54,

INDEX

476

109, 113, 117-119* I21 * 1 4 S" I 44 »
154, *56, 162, 183, 185, 190* 205,
207, 216-217, 224, 243, 244, 245, 249,
272, 277, 324, 333 - 334 * 35 °> 4 2 5 >
428, 432, 434 ~ 435 * 43 6 * 437 - 43 $,
439 * 450 , 453 - w _ x

Grew, Lilia (Mrs. J. Pierrepont Moffat),

50 .

Grey, Sir Edward, 312.

Hale, Edward Everett, 457.

Hamilton, Max, 382, 407, 427.
Haraguchi, General, 285, 314-315.
Harris, Townsend, 117-118, 441.

Hart, A dmir al Thomas Charles, 318.
Hasegawa, Admiral (Japanese Vice-
Minister of the Navy), 165, 192.

Hata, General Shuroka, 259.

Hayashi, General Senjuro, 23, 24, 25,
35, 66, 107, 108, in, 115, 129 * 142,
153 -

Hearst, William Randolph, 140.

Hedayat, Hassan Ali, 35.

Hidetatsu, Egawa, 118.

Higashikuni, Prince, 334.

Hill, Max, 329, 426.

Hiranuma, Baron Kiichiro, 42, 239,
246,250,278,308,328,342,346-
347 -

Hirohito, Emperor, 14, 18, 20, 22, 23-
25, 26, 27, 38, 52, 60, 62, 69, 81, 96,
113-114, 116, 123, 130, 147, 148,

153* 15 7* 159* 160, 161, 163, 177,

182, 189, 192, 208, 245, 294, 300,

305-306, 307, 333, 334* 354* 3^3*
399, 408, 414* 4^7* 420-423, 424,

428.

Hirota, Koki, 94-95, 100, 108-109,

hi, 114, 116, 118, 120, 121, 123,

125-127, 129-130, 131, 132, 137,

141, 145, 146, 147, 149-150, 158,
160^-162, 168, 170-171, 175, 178,

183, 185, 190, 191-194, 195* 196, 197*

198-201,' 205-207, 209, 211, 215,

218, 234, 237, 279, 319, 358.

Hitler, Adolf, 103, 222, 240, 244, 281,
286, 3 2 5 > 327 > 33 i, 336 , 344 * 347 *

359 * 396 ? 401* 435 -
Holt, Dr. Ivan Lee, 141-142.

Hoover, President Herbert, 102.
Horinuchi, Kensuke, 157, 219, 221, 222,
229, 268, 270, 271, 300.

Hombeck, Stanley K., 146, 271, 382.
Houston-Boswall, W. E. (Counsellor
British Embassy in Tokyo), 448.
Howard, Roy, 294.

Hueber, Herr (German Gestapo Agent),

396.

Hughes, Charles Evans (former U.S.
Secretary of State), 22.

Hull, Cordell, 14, 30, 80, 123-124, 140,
146, 150, 166-168, 187, 200-201, 219,
256, 268, 271, 273, 276, 279, 298, 300,
3i9* 324, 332, 337* 338, 343* 345,

361, 362, 364** 367* 368, 370, 371,

374 , 375, 376, 382, 384, 388, 390,

392, 402, 403, 420-423, 424, 426.

Hurley, Patrick J., 52.

Ikeda, Fumicko, 107.

Ikeda, Seishin, 218, 239.

IndelH, Mario (Italian Ambassador to
Japan), 414.

Inouye (Japanese Finance Minister), 51,

69* 89*

Inukai, Premier, 14, 26, 69, no.

Ishii, Viscount (former Japanese Am¬
bassador to the United States), 35,

42, 84, 88, 194* 258, 322, 329-*

Itagaki, General Seishiro, 245.

Ito, Prince, 260.

Jessup, Philip Caryl, 440.

Johnson, General Hugh, 312.

Johnson, Captain Isaac C., 17, 21, 24, *
35* 44* 58, 89, 205, 436.

Jones, Randall, 425-426, 440, 452.

Jones, Robert T., Jr., 42.

Judd, Lawrence McC., 16.

Kabayama, Count, 54, 55, 100, 106,
117, 118, 155, 194-

Kaneko, Count, 60, 241-242, 285-
286.

Kase (Japanese Interpreter), 402, 403,
424* 429* 452.

Kaya, Dowager, Princess, 419.

Keller, Helen, 185.

Kelley, Ruth, 431.

. Kennedy, Joseph P., 189.

Kido, Marquis, 246, 417.

Kishi, Nobusuke, 161, 222, 259, 450,
45*-

Kitashirakawa, Dowager Princess, 162.

Kiuchi (Japanese Foreign Office Official)
445-446,45a.

Kiyokawa, Sergeant (Japanese ponce
official), 438, 44a, 449-450.

Konoye, Prince Fumimaro, i8g, 315,
ai8, aa6, aa8, 33a, 334-337, 339, 350,
374, 277. 278, 281, a8a, 383, 384, 385,
387, a88,390, 394, 398, 300, 303, 305,
306, 308, si 1, 333, 335, 338, 339, 333,
335 . 342 , 343 . 345 - 346 , 348 . 353 , 358 ,
362, 363, 365, 366, 367-370, 370 - 373 ,
376 , 376-381, 382-385, 386, 387, 389 ,

INDEX

390, 393» 394“396, 397-398, 400, 4°4>
416, 417-

Krock, Arthur, 294.

Kuroda, Count (Attendant to Emperor
Hirohito), 21, 23, 24.

Kurusu, Jaye, 407.

Kurusu, Saburo, 84, 406-407, 4 ° 8 , 4 10 ,
4 X 3-

Kurusu, Mrs., 407.

LaGuardia, Mayor Fiorello H., 143.
Landon, Governor Alf M., 208.
Lawrence, Bishop William, 440.

Lincoln, Abraham, 457 ~ 45 &

Lindbergh, Anne Morrow, 105.
Lindbergh, Charles A., 56, 105, 315.
Lindley, Sir Francis, 21, 26, 35, 36, 41,
hi, 121.

Lindley, Lady, 21, 121.

Lippmann, Walter, 308.

Lockhart, Consul, 15, 21.

Lyon, Cedi, 90, 99-100.

Lytton, Lord, 35, 45, 53, 55, 66, 68, 70,
81.

MacArthur, General Douglas, 135, 182-
i93»

McCormick, Vance, 56.

McCoy, General Frank, 35, 37, 39.
McCoy, Mrs. Frank, 35.

MacDonald, Jeanette, 155.

MacDonald, J. Ramsay, 50.

Mcllroy, Lieut.-Col. James G., 17, 21,
24 ) 35 ) 44 ) 46» 53 ) 54 ) 55 ) 68, 69.
Mcllroy, Mrs. James G., 53, 54.
McKinley, President William, 76.
MacMurray, John V. A., 20 r.

Magruder, General, 365, 409.

Majoni, Giovanni Cesare, 20; 26, 41.
Makino, Count (Lord Keeper of the
Privy Seal), 24, 25, 33, 37 ) 38) 39 > 5 2 >
54, 62, 69, hi, 116, 126, 129, 136,
142-143, 152, i54- I 55> *57) 160, 198,
259 *

Makino, Kazuko, 157-150.

Makinson, George A., 427, 450.

Marler, Herbert, 35, 41, 100.

Marler, Mrs. Herbert, 41.

Martel, Count Damien de, 20, 26, 36-
37-

Masefield, John, 440. .

Masuo (Japanese Foreign Office offidal),

4 2 5) 4*9) 43°> 433) 442*

Matheson, Walker, 301-302.

Matsudaira, Count Tsuneo (Japanese
Ambassador to Great Britain), 24,
38, 80, 131, 142, 182, 198, 277, 333,
417 -

477

Matsudaira, Madame, 24, 142, 182, 277,
333 .

Matsukata, Kojiro, 194-277.

Matsumoto (Head of the Japanese News
Agency), 410.

Matsuoka, Yosuke, 83, 197, 279-281,
283, 285, 286-288, 289, 290, 294, 295,
298-300, 302, 303 - 304 ) 306, 307) 3 1 *)
3 X 7 ) 3 X 9 ) 321 - 322 ) 323 - 324 ) 327-328,
330 - 332 ) 333 ) 335 ) 336 - 339 » 339 -
340, 342 - 345 ) 346 ) 347 ) 348 , 353, 356,
357 , 359 ) 372 , 377 ) 380, 383, 385, 396 ,
398 , 4 x 6 *

Mazaki, General, 154.

Meiji, Emperor, 399.

Meredith, George, 456.

Mikasa, Prince, 333.

Miller, Lillian, 56.

Minami, General, 246.

Mitani (Japanese Foreign Office spokes¬
man), 259.

Molotov, V. M., 331, 344.

Moore, Frederick W., 67,192.

Morin, Reiman, 206, 258.

Motosawa (Ambassador Grew’s chauf¬
feur), 106.

Mussolini, Benito, 166, 240, 244, 331.
Muto, General, 51.

Nagano, Admiral, 130.

Nagata, General, 154.

Neville, Edwin L., 17, 18, 21, 23, 24, 25,
26, 27, 29, 35, 40, 41, 43, 61, 95, 99,
109, 131, 140, x 56, 164, 168.

Neville, Mrs. Edwin L., 17, 2 x, 35, 156.
Nishi, Haruhiko, 208, 398, 433, 435, 442.
Nishi, Madame, 435.

Nishihara, General, 286.

Nishio, General, 259.

Nitob£, Dr., 38.

Nomura, Admiral Kichisaburu, 89, 117,
ii8, 259, 265-271, 303, 304, 309, 316,
3 X 7 ) 324 ) 337 ) 343 ) 345 > 352 , 354, 355,
356 ) 357 ) 358 ) 361, 3 6 3 ) 3 6 4 ) 3 6 5 ) 368,
370 , 375 ) 382, 384) 388, 390 , 393 ) 406,

424, 426.

O’Doul, Lefty, 132.

Ohashi, Chuichi, 60, 129, 295, 299-300,
302, 304 ) 324 ) 329 ) 344 - _ .

Ohno (Japanese Foreign Office official),

425, 430.

Ohta (Japanese Foreign Office official,
429, 443.

Oikawa, Admiral Keshira, 3 0 ® j}68,

369-

Okada, Admiral Keisuke, 129,143, 144,
153, 155, I59-i6o.

INDEX

478

Okubo, Marquis, 185, 414.

Osbima, Major-General, 171, 175, 359 >
416-417.

Osuini, Admiral Mineo, 154, 161.

Otani (Japanese movie magnate), 36,
27, 28-29.

Ott, General Eugen, 171, 353, 4 °*) 4 * 4 >
4i9-

Ott, Mrs. Eugen, 419.

Pabst, General J. G., 60, 61, 124-125,
135-136) J 42> 165-166, 198, 224, 440,
441-442.

Paderewski, Ignace Jan, 216-217.

Pao (Manchukuoan Envoy to Japan),
67 -

Parsons, J. Graham, Jr., 15, 16, 17, 18,
27 > 35 > 58 > 78 , 84.

Peabody, Dr. Endicott, 15.

Perry, Bishop James de Wolfe, 88, 89.
Perry, Mrs. James de W., 88.

Perry, Commodore Matthew Galbraith,
39» 117-119.

Perry, Mrs. Matthew C., 19.

Perry, Thomas Sargeant, 50.

Phillips, William, 146-147.

Pickford, Mary, 48
Pittman, Senator Key, 150-151.

Politis, Athanase G., 336, 416, 425.

Poole, Maya Lindsey, 17.

Powell, J. B., X13.

Pu-yi, Henry (Puppet Emperor of
Manchukuo), 67, 100.

Quezon, Manuel, 182-183.

Reifsnider, Bishop Charles S., xox,
140.

Reischauer, Dr, August Karl, 191. .
Reischauer, Mrs. August Karl, 191.
Reischauer, Robert, igi.

Reuchlin, M, (Dutch Charge d’Affaires
in Tokyo), 442.

Reuchlin,' Madame, 442,

Ribbentrop, Joachim von, 317, 327,
331, 357.

Rogers, Captain Fred F., 117, 140,
159, 205.

Rogers, Mrs. Fred F., 117.

Romer, Thadd^e de, 250, 441,

Romer, Mme. Thadd^e de, 249.
Roosevelt, President Franklin XX, 14,
30, 57, 61, 67, 68, 80, 88, 101-102,
140, 146, 148-149, 159, 194, 199,
222, 223, 231, 244, 245, 250, 256, 272,
276, 280-281, 304, 309-314, 315,
318, 324, 332 , 343 - 344 , 345-346,
355 , 356 , 359 , 361, 36a, 363, 364,

365, 367 , 368, 369, 370, 37J, 376-
381, 383, 384, 389, 392 - 394 , 402*
405, 411, 418, 420-423, 424, 428.

Roosevelt, President Theodore, 139, 285,
440.

Ross, Sir Frederick Leith (British.
Treasury official), 147.

Ruth, Babe, 104, 132-133.

Saionji, Prince, 33, 62, 73, 111,, n6,
126, 129, 155, 198, 307.

Saito, Arita, 244.

Saito, Viscount Makoto, 18, 20, 23,
24, 26, 27, 34, 35, 55, 62, 66, 69,
73, 81, 91, 96, in, 128, 129, 131, 136,
152, 154-159, 192, 207, 240-244,
271.

Saito, Madame, 24, 91, 154, 158, 243,
244.

Sansom, Sir George, 189, 190.

Sato, Naotake, 433, 442, 443.

Schley, Admiral, 156.

Schnee, Dr. (League of Nations Com*
missioner)', 35.

Scott, Sir Walter, 457.

Scovell, Dr., 219.

Sena Phya Sri (Thai Ambassador to
Japan), 414.

Shidehara, Baron (Japanese statesman),
42, 62, 68, 107, 114, 184, 185, 264,
407, 442.

Shigemitsu, Mamoru, 42, 95, xai,
x68, 322, 410.

Shimada, Admiral Shigetaro (Com-
mander-in-Chief of Japanese Naval
Forces in China), 318, 419.

Shiratori, T. (Spokesman for the
Japanese Foreign Office), 23-24, 25,
37 , 39 - 4 °, 43 , 43 , 49 , &>, 6i, 65,
67, 68. 69, 74, 89, 125, 137, 17i, 184,
3 °a, 417 -

Simon, Sir John, 123-124.

Simonds, Frank, 134.

Smetanin, Constantin, 289, 342, 344,
348, 413*

Smith-Hutton, Mrs. Henri H., 429,
434 *

Smith-Hutton, Lt.-Com. Henri H.,
256, 414, 429, 434, 450.

Stahmer, Herr von (Special German
Emissary to Tokyo), 288.

Stalin, Marshal Joseph, 327, 330, 344.

Steele, A. T., 290-292.

Steinhardt, Laurence, 283, 330, 332.

Stimson, Henry L., 22, 38, 40, 41,

42 , 43 > 44 > 45 > 53 ) 58> 63-72, 75, 84,
IQ2, 149.

Stirling, Admiral Yates, x6*

INDEX

Stoicesco, Georges (Rumanian Charge
d’Affaires in Tokyo), 60, 61, 93,
142.

Stoicesco, Mme. Georges, 166.

Stone, Commander, 432, 440.

Stuart, Captain, 436.

Suetsugu, Admiral (Commander of
the Japanese Fleet), 104, 130, 239.

Suma (Spokesman for the Japanese
Foreign Office), 188.

Suzuki, Admiral Bunjiro (Grand Cham¬
berlain of the Japanese Court), 107,
152, 154, 158, 194, 268, 328.

Suzuki, Madame, 158.

Takahashi, Korekiyo (Japanese Finance
Minister), 62, 69, 90, 129, 153, 154,
158, 159.

Takamatsu, Prince, 24, 182, 305.

Tani, Masayuki, 42, 275.

Taylor, Admiral, 88, 89.

Tek, Ferid, 414.

Terasaki (Japanese Director of the
American Bureau), 356, 365-367,
376, 382.

Terauchi, General Juichi, 160, 179*

Teusler, Dr. Rudolph B., 55.

Teusler, Mrs. Rudolph B., 35.

Thomasson, David (American Vice-
Consul in Tokyo), 436.

Thumheer, Walter, 224.

Thumheer, Mme. Walter, 224.

Tillitse, Lars P., 425, 442, 450.

Tillitse, Mme. Lars P., 425, 442, 450.

Ting Chien-hsui (Manchukuoan Minister
of Communications), 36.

Tinge, General (Manchukuoan Minister
to Japan), 100.

Togo, Shigenori (Japanese Foreign
Minister), 42, 396, 398, 399, 401-403,
406-407, 410-411, 412, 414, 417, 418,
419, 420-421, 424, 428, 429, 430, 432,
452 .

Togo, Madame, 398.

Tojo, General Hideki (Japanese Foreign
Minister), 294,308, 317, 368, 369, 393,
395 » 398 , 399 > 400, 404 ) 412, 4 x 4 - 4 * 5 )
417, 418, 419, 420.

Tokugawa, Marquis, 48.

Tokugawa, Prince (President of America-
Japan Society), 30, 53, 54, 56, 99,
185, 277-

Tomeoka, Tsukio (Head of the Tokyo
Police), 428.

Tomoda (Foreign Minister Togo’s secre¬
tary), 420, 429.

Toyama, Mitsuru (Head of the Black
Dragon Society), 69.

479

Toyoda, Admiral Teijiro, 328, 351-352,
353 - 357 , 359 ) 360-364, 365-367) 368,
370 ) 372 ) 373 - 376 , 382, 383 ) 386, 388-
390 , 392 - 394 ) 402, 403.

Trautman, Ambassador (German Am¬
bassador to China), 196.

Troyanovsky, Alexander, 51, 60-61, roi,

119-

Tsiang Tso-ping, General (Chinese
Minister to Japan), 41.

Tumulty, Joseph, 56.

Turner, Captain Richmond Kelly, 241-
243 ) 244

Turner, William T., 21, 24, 414, 428,
429 ) 434 ) 449 *

Uchida, Sumako, 88.

Uchida, Count Yasuya, 20, 23, 29, 37,
40,41,47,48-49, 54,63-64,88,94,95,
125, 130, 285.

Uchida, Madame, 54, 88.

Ugaki, General (Governor of Korea), 55,
217, 218, 219, 221, 222-223, 234) 235,
237 -

Ushiba, Tomohiko, 367, 370-373, 387-
388, 395-

Van Rechteren, Fay, 100.

Vaughn, Miles, 17,95.

Velloso, Pedro Leao, 224.

Vigo, Santiago Mendez de, 425.

Voretzch, Dr. Ernst Arthur, 26, 60, 61.

Wakatsuki, Rejeiro, 51, 107.

Wang Ching-wei (Head of Nanking
Puppet Government), 263, 272, 274,
307 ) 309, 335 ) 376 , 377 -

Wang Keh-rain, 263.

Washington, S. Walker, 21, 24, 35.

Watanabe, General (Japanese Inspector-
General of Military Education), 152,
x 54 > x 55 > 159 *

Weidemann, Captain Fritz, 396, 420.

Weillschott, Signor (Italian Chargd
d’Affaires in Tokyo), 61, 62.

Welch, Bishop Herbert, 91.

Welch, Mrs. Herbert, 91.

Welles, Sumner, 219, 294, 35a, 353, 355,
356 , 357 , 364,38a, 403 -

Wheeled, Senator Burton K., 427.

Whitney, Cornelius V., 294.

Wilhelm II (Emperor of Germany), 77.

Williams, Dr. David, 58.

Williams, Frank S., 428, 429, 434.

Willkie, Wendell, 276-277, 326-327.

Wilson, Hugh, 7 u

Wilson, President Woodrow, 55, 261,
359 -

480

Wilson, Mrs. Woodrow, 54, s*.
Wordsworth, William, 400.

Yamagata, Takeo, 20.

Yamamoto, Admiral, 208, 357-358.
Yamanaka, Madame (Lady~in-Waiting
to the Japanese Court), 334.
Yanagawa, General (Japanese Minister
of Justice), 259, 340.

Yarnell, Admiral Harry Ervin, 207-
209. 1

INDEX

Yonai, Admiral Mitsumasa, a <L*
271, 278, 281, 289, 35. o 77 45 ' 5 46

Yosliida, Admiral, i6o-i6 3 ^ 7 36 9

Y Too Z X i japanese statesi »an), ao
I°°, 185, 195, 200, 201, 208, 20Q on,

233, 242, 246, 259, 267, 270. 9 ’ 3 ’

Young, James R., 273.

Yuan Chen-tse (Manchukuoan Amba*
sador to Japan), 240. ® bas '

Constantin > 94 , 101, u 4 - Il6
127, 129-131, I 39 , 144-145, x 71 t